

Coding Instructions

CENTRALIZATION of POWER

[This material is condensed from Chapter 10 of Kenneth Janda's *Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey*. New York: The Free Press, 1980.]

"CENTRALIZATION OF POWER" as a concept in the analysis of political parties relates to Anderson's dimension of "control" as a concept in organizational theory (1968, pp. 392-396). More specifically, Anderson means the *distribution* of control instead of the volume or sources of control. In this sense, it is identical with Duverger's concepts of "centralization and decentralization," which Duverger says, "define the way in which power is distributed amongst the different levels of leadership" (1963, p. 52). There is some tendency within the parties literature to confuse "centralization" with "organization," or at least to neglect drawing clear distinctions between the two. Duverger cannot be blamed for this conceptual ambiguity, for he takes pains to distinguish between centralization and articulation (one of our measure of organization). Nevertheless, discussions of party politics frequently equate "strong" party organization with centralization of power.

Perhaps the confusion is due to the *empirical* relationship between a high degree of organization and centralization of power. Duverger himself asserts this relationship, and it appears explicitly in the writings of other authors (see Sorauf 1964, pp. 160-162). Notwithstanding any empirical relationship that may obtain between organization and centralization, the concepts should be separated in comparative analysis. In this way, one can determine precisely the extent of their relationship and also analyze deviant cases: parties that are high in organization but low in centralization or vice versa. The existence of federalism, for example, might explain why some highly organized parties are also decentralized, and low levels of institutionalization should account for some parties that are centralized but loosely organized.

Viewing centralization of power as the location and distribution of effective decision-making authority within the party, we define the national party organs as our reference point for "central" location. Thus a centralized party is one which features the concentration of effective decision-making authority in the national party organs, with a premium placed on a *smaller* number of individuals participating in the decision. We seek to tap

the locus of power within a party with eight basic variables:

- 9.01 Nationalization of Structure
- 9.02 Selecting the National Leader
- 9.03 Selecting Parliamentary Candidates
- 9.04 Allocating Funds
- 9.05 Formulating Policy
- 9.06 Controlling Communications
- 9.07 Administering Discipline
- 9.08 Leadership Concentration

Basic Variable 9.01 Nationalization of Structure

Structural arrangements of parties can attach more or less emphasis to national, regional, or local organs in intraparty politics. For example, if no national party organs exist independently of meetings of regional party leaders, there cannot be a basis for centralization of power or effective national direction. Occasionally, parties feature a highly differentiated set of party organs yet leave authority relationships among these organs unspecified, which is conducive to "nationalization" of structure but "decentralization" of power. Variable 8.01, "structural articulation," measures *functional* differentiation at the national level without regard to hierarchical distribution of power. Variable 9.01 seeks instead to measure hierarchical distribution of power without regard to functional differentiation.

The least nationalized structural arrangements—and thus the most decentralized—occur when local organizations, commonly at the municipal or county level, are effectively independent of higher organs. One government condition that may facilitate this type of local independence is federalism, although federalism is expected to have its greatest impact in separating state party organs from national organs.

Operational Definition. The preceding conceptual considerations are incorporated in this scale. Parties were assigned the lowest applicable code.

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- 1 Local organizations, defined as *constituency/municipal/commune/county* level or lower, are the only discernible structural element in the party; these organizations may indeed demonstrate different forms of organization among themselves; there is no formal provision for higher party organs.
- 2 Local organizations remain the most discernible structural element in the party, but there are formal provisions for federation of local organizations that involve their representation in higher party organs at a regional or state level, although these organs are not effectively superior to the local organizations.
- 3 There are discernible regional party organs that exercise their authority over local organizations, but there are no formal national organs; nationwide coordination of party activities is handled, if it is attempted at all, through informal meetings of regional party leaders.
- 4 There are discernible national party organs that provide for formal representation of regional or state organs (or local organs in the absence of regional or state organs), but these national organs are not effectively superior to the regional ones, which in practice can and do defy the national organization.
- 5 There are discernible national party organs that are more powerful than regional and local organizations, but these national organs themselves constitute competing power centers rather than a single-peaked hierarchy; includes situations in which the parliamentary party organization challenges leadership of other organs.
- 6 This is a discernible party hierarchy that runs from a single national council or executive committee through regional party organs down to local organizations; parliamentary organization is subordinated to national organs.

- 6 There is a discernible party hierarchy that has a single national council or executive committee at the top acting directly on the local organizations without interposing regional organizations; there are only national organs.

Coding Results. Tables 10.1a and 10.1b present the results of coding parties on BV901, "nationalization of structure." We coded about 80 percent of the parties on this variable, had adequate means for AC901, and found no significant relationship between BV901 and AC901. Nevertheless, the operationalization of this variable was somewhat wanting, as most of the parties were clustered at the upper end of the scale, with the top two positions embracing about 70 percent of the parties. Perhaps a scale that is more sensitive to distinctions among parties at this end of the continuum could be constructed. On the other hand, perhaps the scale was adequate but parties simply do not display much variation within the concept.

Basic Variable 9.02 Selecting the National Leader*

At a minimum, a party's "national leader" is the person who acts as the primary spokesman of the party in the country's communications media. At maximum, the national leader may not only fulfill the symbolic function of personifying the party, but he may also be the real locus of power in the party and its effective leader, issuing orders that are regarded as "legitimate" by party members.

This variable isolates the set of procedures used to select the national leader. Selection procedures reflect processes of negotiation, compromise, conflict, and co-

*Donald Sylvan assisted in writing this section.

TABLE 10.1a

SUBFILE FIRST					
BV901 NATIONALIZATION OF STRUCTURE					
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
ONLY LOCAL ORGANS	0	1	.7	.9	
MAINLY REGIONAL ORGS	2	3	2.2	2.7	
BOTH REG + NATL ORGS	3	17	12.6	15.5	
COMPETING NATL ORGS	4	13	9.6	11.8	
HIERARCHY + REG ORGS	5	46	34.1	41.8	
DIRECT NATL CONTROL	6	30	22.2	27.3	
	BLANK	25	18.5	MISSING	
	TOTAL	139	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	4.718	STD DEV	1.190		

VARIABLE AC901
MEAN 6.445

TABLE 10.1b

SUBFILE SECOND					
BV901 NATIONALIZATION OF STRUCTURE					
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
ONLY LOCAL ORGANS	0	1	.7	.8	
MAINLY REGIONAL ORGS	2	1	.7	.8	
BOTH REG + NATL ORGS	3	21	14.3	17.5	
COMPETING NATL ORGS	4	13	8.6	10.6	
HIERARCHY + REG ORGS	5	55	37.4	45.8	
DIRECT NATL CONTROL	6	29	19.7	24.2	
	BLANK	27	18.4	MISSING	
	TOTAL	147	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	4.717	STD DEV	1.124		

VARIABLE AC901
MEAN 6.392

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operation within the party, providing an indicator of its distribution of power. The most decentralized or "democratic" method of selection would involve the direct election of the leader by party members or even party "identifiers" or supporters. The most centralized or "oligarchic" method of selection would involve the leader naming his successor. The range of alternatives between these points on the continuum might involve a variety of "open" or "closed" procedures, including out-and-out skulduggery. In this variable, we are less interested in the proprieties of the process than in the numbers and credentials of people who participate in the selection.

Operational Definition. The higher the score on this scale, the more "centralized" is the party on leadership selection.

- 0 No national party leader can be identified.
- 1 The leader is selected by vote of party identifiers or supporters.
- 2 He is selected by vote of party members, a smaller group than above.
- 3 He is selected by a national convention or congress, the delegates to which represent regional or local party organizations.
- 4 He is selected by the parliamentary delegation of the party.
- 5 He is selected by a national convention or congress, the delegates to which are appointed or primarily determined by the national party organization.
- 6 He is selected by the national executive committee or party council subject to ratification by some lower levels of the party.
- 7 He is selected by the national executive committee or party council without further review of the decision; selections include change in leaders as a re-

sult of "power struggles" within the top leadership group.

- 8 He is selected by his predecessor; selections include the situation in which the party was created by the incumbent leader and no apparent means for transferring leadership have been established.

Coding Results. Coding parties on their procedures for "selecting the national leader" proved to be relatively manageable. As revealed in Tables 10.2a and 10.2b, 80 percent or more of the parties were rated for BV902, the data quality codes averaged above 7, and there was no significant correlation between BV902 and AC902. Moreover, the operationalization captured considerable variance among parties in their manner of selecting leaders. While about half the parties featured centralization in the choice of leaders with little opportunity for rank-and-file participation (codes 7 and 8), more than one-fifth selected leaders through national conventions with the delegates representing local organizations (code 3). Note that the proportion of parties that gave the current leader the power to select his successor (code 8) increased somewhat from the beginning to the end of the 1950s. This was because the new parties that arose during the second half of our time period had not yet confronted the issue of leadership change. Perhaps these newer parties should be filtered out of any analysis involving BV902 as an indicator of centralization of power.

**Basic Variable 9.03
Selecting Parliamentary Candidates***

Our concern with the distribution of control over the selection of parliamentary candidates stems directly

*This section was drafted by Gilbert Rotkin.

TABLE 10.2a

SUBFILE FIRST				
BV902		SELECTING THE NATIONAL LEADER		
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO NATIONAL LEADER	0	5	3.7	4.4
BY PARTY MEMBERS	2	1	.7	.9
NATL CONV, REG REP	3	27	20.0	23.9
PARL DELEGATION	4	11	8.1	9.7
NATL CONV, NATL SEL	5	6	4.4	5.3
NATL COM + LOWER OK	6	7	5.2	6.2
NATL COMMITTEE ALONE	7	30	22.2	26.5
CHOSEN BY INCUMBENT	8	26	19.3	23.0
	BLANK	22	16.3	MISSING
	TOTAL	135	100.0	120.0
MEAN	5.460	STD DEV	2.295	

VARIABLE AC902
MEAN 7.027

TABLE 10.2b

SUBFILE SECOND				
BV902		SELECTING THE NATIONAL LEADER		
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO NATIONAL LEADER	0	3	2.0	2.4
BY PARTY MEMBERS	2	1	.7	.8
NATL CONV, REG REP	3	32	21.8	25.4
PARL DELEGATION	4	10	6.8	7.9
NATL CONV, NATL SEL	5	7	4.8	5.6
NATL COM + LOWER OK	6	8	5.4	6.3
NATL COMMITTEE ALONE	7	31	21.1	24.6
CHOSEN BY INCUMBENT	8	34	23.1	27.0
	BLANK	21	14.3	MISSING
	TOTAL	147	100.0	120.0
MEAN	5.635	STD DEV	2.200	

VARIABLE AC902
MEAN 7.024

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from our definition of parties as "organizations that pursue a goal of placing their avowed representatives in government positions." The salience of this variable for parties research has been cogently expressed by Schattschneider: The nominating (i.e., candidate selecting) process . . . has become the crucial process of the party. The nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make nominations is the owner of the party. It is therefore one of the best points at which to observe the distribution of power within the party," (1942, p. 64). Moreover, according to Ranney, "the candidate selecting process is . . . central to party structure and activity" (1968b, p. 142). Clearly, the selection of candidates offers an important indicator of the centralization of power within the party. For purposes of cross-national comparison, we focus on the selection of *parliamentary* or legislative candidates. Party candidates for other government positions might have been studied, but no other office or set of offices provides as much opportunity for comparability. For countries which feature a popularly elected chief executive, the preceding variable, "selecting the national leader," often includes party candidates for the top national office.

Although the method of selecting candidates might be conceived in terms of a distinction between "election" and "designation," we view this as a side issue and direct our attention instead to the structural position and functional composition of party organs which dominate the process, whether one of competitive election or non-competitive designation. We are interested in the number of participants in the decision and their location in the organizational hierarchy. Hence, the more restricted the privilege to participate in candidate selection, the more highly centralized is the party.

Operational Definition. The highest applicable value was assigned from this set:

- 1 Nominations are determined locally by vote of party supporters, for example, in a direct primary.
- 2 Nominations are determined locally by vote of party members, for example, by vote in local party meetings.
- 3 Selection is made by local party leaders whose selection must be ratified in some way by party members.
- 4 Selection is made by local leaders with little or no participation by rank-and-file members.
- 5 Selection is made locally, but the selections must be approved by the national organization; this includes cases that provide for local "recommendation" rather than selection of candidates.
- 6 Selection is made by associations affiliated with the party or regional associations, but the selection must be approved by the national organization.

- 7 Selection is done by the national organization, but the selection must be approved by local or affiliated organizations.
- 8 Selection is determined by a national party congress or caucus.
- 9 Selection is determined by a national committee or party council.

Coding Results. The proportion of parties that could be scored on "selecting parliamentary candidates" was limited by the number of countries with functioning legislatures during our time period as well as by the availability of data. Tables 10.3a and 10.3b record that almost 70 percent of the parties were successfully assessed for their methods of candidate selection. The most common procedure was local selection requiring national approval (code 5). The next most frequent method was central determination by the national committee (code 9). At the other extreme of the continuum, only two parties out of more than 90 included in this assessment employed the radical technique of allowing party supporters to select candidates directly. The method of candidate nomination through primary elections seems unique to the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States.

Basic Variable 9.04 Allocating Funds*

Regardless of the sources of party funds, a concept embraced in variable 7.01, the levels at which collection and allocation of those funds occur are important in establishing the distribution of power within the party. As Heidenheimer notes, "Crucial to the nature of the support transfer that takes place is who controls the distribution of funds, and whether they are distributed among individual candidates or parties, and if so, on the basis of what criteria" (1963, p. 804). The organizational level that controls the allocation of funds is in a powerful position to set priorities for the attainment of party goals.

It is difficult to think of "allocating" funds apart from "collecting" funds, for funds can hardly be allocated unless they are in hand. Collection can occur at different stages, however, with the collection agencies' transferring funds for subsequent allocation by different agencies. In general, we contend that power resides mainly in the agency or level of the party with responsibility for allocating funds obtained either by direct collection or transference of funds collected at another level, although a premium is put on funds collected directly rather than transferred.

Recognition must be given also to the *lack* of established organizational mechanisms with responsibilities for collecting and allocating funds. In some parties, the

*Donald Sylvan assisted in writing this section.

VARIABLES, CODES, AND SUMMARY STATISTICS

TABLE 10.3a

SUBFILE	FIRST				
BV903	SELECTING PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATES				
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
BY PARTY SUPPORTERS	1	2	1.5	2.2	
BY PARTY MEMBERS	2	1	.7	1.1	
LOCAL LEADERS + OK	3	11	8.1	12.1	
LOCAL LEADERS ALONE	4	9	6.7	9.9	
LOCALLY + NATL OK	5	32	23.7	35.2	
GROUPS WITH NATL OK	6	3	2.2	3.3	
NATL ORG + LOCAL OK	7	10	7.4	11.0	
NATL PARTY CONGRESS	8	2	1.5	2.2	
NATL PARTY COMMITTEE	9	21	15.6	23.1	
BLANK		44	32.6	MISSING	
TOTAL		135	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	5.781	STD DEV	2.205		

VARIABLE AC903
MEAN 6.385

TABLE 10.3b

SUBFILE	SECOND				
BV903	SELECTING PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATES				
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
BY PARTY SUPPORTERS	1	2	1.4	2.0	
BY PARTY MEMBERS	2	1	.7	1.0	
LOCAL LEADERS + OK	3	11	7.5	10.9	
LOCAL LEADERS ALONE	4	10	6.8	9.9	
LOCALLY + NATL OK	5	35	23.8	34.7	
GROUPS WITH NATL OK	6	4	2.7	4.0	
NATL ORG + LOCAL OK	7	9	6.1	8.9	
NATL PARTY CONGRESS	8	2	1.4	2.0	
NATL PARTY COMMITTEE	9	27	18.4	26.7	
BLANK		46	31.3	MISSING	
TOTAL		147	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	5.921	STD DEV	2.235		

VARIABLE AC903
MEAN 6.596

collection and allocation of funds may be diffused throughout the entire organization, so that virtually all levels participate in a helter-skelter fashion. This lack of structure for allocating funds is thought to provide for complete decentralization of power, even more than the situation which obtains when the collection and allocation of funds are prime responsibilities of the local organizations.

Operational Definition. This scale incorporates a number of combinations of levels of party organization in the collection and allocation of funds. The higher the level at which the funds are both collected and distributed, the greater the centralization of power in the party. The highest level applicable was recorded.

- 0 Responsibility for collecting and allocating funds is diffused throughout the party; little or no structure is imposed on this aspect of party activity.
- 1 Funds are collected and allocated primarily by local organizations—defined as constituency/county/municipal/commune level or lower.
- 2 Funds are collected primarily at the local level, but large amounts are transmitted upward for distribution by either the regional (state) or national organizations.
- 3 Funds are collected by all levels of the organization but are transferred to the regional level for allocation.
- 4 Funds are collected primarily at the regional level and allocated by regional organizations.
- 5 Funds are collected at all levels of the party, but large amounts are transferred to the national organization for allocation, or the national organ collects most but local organs collect a significant amount.

6 Funds are collected primarily by the national organization, which also exercises responsibility for allocating funds.

Coding Results. Few parties divulge information concerning the collection and allocation of funds that completely satisfies the need for coding BV904. In about half the cases, the coders felt that they had a sufficient grasp of party practice to venture coding this variable; in the other half, they refrained from hazarding any guess at all. Although the means for AC904 (given in Tables 10.4a and 10.4b) attest to a relatively low level of confidence in estimating party practice on this variable, no relationship emerged between BV904 and AC904. Concerning the half of our parties that were evaluated for allocating funds, there were widely different patterns. A few parties were tagged 0 to indicate a total lack of structure in fund raising, but none drew code 1, which signifies both local collection *and* allocation of funds. If funds were collected locally, the universal practice was to shunt them upward for allocation (code 2), and this pattern was observed in about 30 percent of the parties. Comparable percentages of the parties fixed responsibility for collecting and allocating funds at the national level (code 6), which was assumed to be most conducive to the centralization of power.

**Basic Variable 9.05
Formulating Policy***

"The attempt to create and exploit issues of public policy," writes Schattschneider (1942, p. 136), "involves leadership, discipline, and centralization." The

*This section was drafted by Gilbert Rotkin.

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TABLE 10.4a

SUBFILE FIRST				
8V984 ALLOCATING FUNDS				
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO SPECIAL STRUCTURE	0	4	3.0	5.6
LOCAL + UPWARD DIST	2	24	17.8	33.8
TRANSFER TO REG ORG	3	4	3.0	5.6
REG COLLECTION-DIST	4	4	3.0	5.6
TRANSFER TO NAT ORG	5	18	13.3	25.4
PRIMARILY NATL TASK	6	17	12.6	23.9
BLANK		64	47.4	MISSING
TOTAL		135	100.0	100.0
MEAN	3.775	STD DEV	1.876	

 VARIABLE AC924
 MEAN 5.563

TABLE 10.4b

SUBFILE SECOND				
8V984 ALLOCATING FUNDS				
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
NO SPECIAL STRUCTURE	0	5	3.4	6.6
LOCAL + UPWARD DIST	2	24	16.3	31.6
TRANSFER TO REG ORG	3	3	2.0	3.9
REG COLLECTION-DIST	4	5	3.4	6.6
TRANSFER TO NAT ORG	5	17	11.6	22.4
PRIMARILY NATL TASK	6	22	15.0	28.9
BLANK		71	48.3	MISSING
TOTAL		147	100.0	100.0
MEAN	3.860	STD DEV	1.341	

 VARIABLE AC984
 MEAN 5.816

information and expertise requisite to cogent policy formation are presumably available principally at the top levels of party hierarchy. Nevertheless, parties differ considerably on the extent to which lower organs participate in policy making. Although there is some doubt about their influence on ultimate party policy, constituency associations within the British Labour Party, for example, continually formulate and press resolutions upon the party at its annual conferences. The program of the Indian National Congress, on the other hand, is determined by a Working Committee dominated by government officials. Numerous personalistic parties constitute the extreme case for the centralization of power in making policy as the party position is expressed—or “revealed,” as it were—by the party leader.

“Policy” usually suggests the party’s position on substantive issues of government, but “policy” can also refer to the party’s handling of intraparty affairs, such as campaign strategy. Our main concern in this variable is to pinpoint the locus of power in determining the party’s position on substantive issues of government. Our concern is limited to the determination of party policy and not its implementation in government.

Operational Definition. A high score on this variable corresponds to the determination and promulgation of policy at elite levels of the organization and is indicative of centralization of power. The *lowest* applicable score was coded.

- 0 Responsibility for formulating policy is diffused throughout the party; little or no structure is imposed on this aspect of party activity.
- 1 Major policy stances are commonly determined by polling party members.
- 2 Local party organizations enact policy resolutions, argue them at the national level (usually the party conference or convention), and frequently win changes in party policy.

- 3 Major policy positions are formulated at the national level, but they are submitted to lower levels of the party (local or regional organizations) for approval.
- 4 Local party organizations often enact policy resolutions and submit them for national consideration, but open argument in behalf of the resolutions is not a common practice, and decision on the resolutions is not required.
- 5 Major policy positions are determined by a national party congress, conference, or convention composed of delegates from local or regional organizations; policy positions may be stated provisionally by individual party leaders, but approval of the position by the party congress is required before the policy statement is considered to be effectively binding as party policy.
- 6 Major policy positions are determined by the national committee, party council, or parliamentary party organizations; these positions are regarded as “party policy” without need for further approval by other party organs.
- 7 Major policy positions are determined and announced by the party leader or a small subgroup of the national committee, for example, an executive committee or “politbureau.” These positions are effectively regarded as “party policy” without need for approval by other party organs. (Note that a distinction must be drawn between the *leader’s* policy—sometimes pronounced by a leader who is also the nation’s chief executive—and the *party’s* policy. With respect to the United States, for example, the president is not empowered to formulate or create party policy, although he may implement it. The distinction is whether the announced policy is widely regarded as party policy or the personal policy of the officeholder, acting in his capacity as a governmental official and policy maker.)

Coding Results. The literature reveals enough of the political process within parties to assess the locus of

VARIABLES, CODES, AND SUMMARY STATISTICS

TABLE 10.5a

SUBFILE FIRST					
BV905 FORMULATING POLICY					
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO SPECIAL STRUCTURE	0	1	.7	.9	
LOCAL, PUT TO NATL	2	3	2.2	2.7	
NATL, LOCAL APPROVAL	3	2	1.5	1.8	
LOCAL, NO PRESSURE	4	1	.7	.9	
NATL PARTY CONGRESS	5	25	18.5	22.7	
NATIONAL COMMITTEE	6	49	36.3	44.5	
LEADER OR SUBGROUP	7	29	21.5	26.4	
	BLANK	25	18.5	MISSING	
	TOTAL	135	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	5.800	STD DEV	1.195		

VARIABLE AC905					
MEAN		6.436			

TABLE 10.5b

SUBFILE SECOND					
BV905 FORMULATING POLICY					
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
LOCAL, PUT TO NATL	2	3	2.8	2.4	
NATL, LOCAL APPROVAL	3	2	1.4	1.6	
LOCAL, NO PRESSURE	4	1	.7	.8	
NATL PARTY CONGRESS	5	25	17.8	20.2	
NATIONAL COMMITTEE	6	55	37.4	44.4	
LEADER OR SUBGROUP	7	38	25.9	30.6	
	BLANK	23	15.6	MISSING	
	TOTAL	147	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	5.944	STD DEV	1.038		

VARIABLE AC905					
MEAN		6.331			

power in "formulating policy" for 80 percent or more of our parties with relatively high confidence (see Tables 10.5a and 10.5b). In nearly half these parties, policy formulation is centralized in the national committee. In another quarter, this function is entrusted to the party leader himself or a small group of leaders. Of the remaining quarter of the parties, almost all reserve the major role of policy formulation for a national congress or convention. Very few parties occupy the more decentralized positions on the scale, suggesting that there are definite empirical limitations to decentralization in policy formulation regardless of the conceptual possibilities.

**Basic Variable 9.08
Controlling Communications***

Control of communications or information flow is often cited as a key factor, if not *the* key factor, in controlling an organization. Undoubtedly, informal conversation is one of the main forms of communication in virtually all organizations, and conversation among party members is difficult to control directly. By skillful use of more formal types of communication, however, a party can often structure the content of conversation indirectly. This leads us to consider the party's access to and control of mass communications media as the major indicator of controlling communications and thereby centralizing power within the organization.

Literature distribution (newspapers, magazines, party documents) and electronic broadcasts (radio, television) constitute the two major types of mass communication, with the latter being somewhat more "mass" than the former. Despite the increasing use of electronic broadcasts as a mass communications technique, especially in countries with low literacy rates, the newspaper main-

tains its position as the main vehicle for *party* communication. Therefore in considering the control of party communications we look first and foremost at the party press.

From the standpoint of centralization of power, our concern with controlling communications is the *level* of the party that controls the content and distribution of party newspapers (or other form of communication, if relevant). Apart from the most decentralized situation which obtains when the party has no mass communications media of any kind, we regard the control of party press by *local* organizations (defined as constituency/municipal/county/commune or lower) as a main condition for decentralization of power. Power is centralized, however, if the national press is considered to be "influential" either in the sense of being widely read across the country by party members and nonmembers alike or intensively and closely read only by party members.

Operational Definition. These criteria of (1) existence of facilities for mass communication, (2) the locus of control within the party over publication of information, and (3) the "influence" of the communication are incorporated into the following scale. The higher the score, the greater the degree of centralization.

- 0 The party controls no important communications media at any level.
- 1 Local organizations control the media without censorship from the national organization; the media are regarded as "influential."
- 2 Regional organizations control the media without censorship from the national organization; the media are regarded as "influential."
- 3 Either local or regional organizations control the media without national censorship, but the media are *not* regarded as influential.

*Donald Sylvan assisted in writing this section.

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- 4 Control of media is mixed: the national and local/regional organizations share about evenly in the control of media, regardless of whether they are influential or not influential.
- 5 National organization controls media of its own, but the media are *not* regarded as influential.
- 6 National organization does not have any direct control of media of its own, but through censorship and distribution of information it controls the content of local or regional media.
- 7 National organization controls media of its own, and the media are regarded as influential.

Coding Results. Tables 10.6a and 10.6b establish our experience in coding about three quarters of the parties for the locus of power in "controlling communications." The quality of the information in the literature is good, producing relatively high AC codes, but the significant correlation of .38 between BV906 and AC906 reflects a tendency to conclude that the party does not control a newspaper if the literature fails to mention one. Although we have elaborated an eight-point scale for BV906, ranging from 0 to 7, just three of the scale positions account for about 85 percent of the parties. In nearly half the cases, the national committee controls influential media (code 7). Around 20 percent of the parties stand at the other extreme of the scale, publishing no party newspaper at all. The significant fraction of the remainder have national organizations in control of unimportant media (code 5). From the standpoint of interval scaling, one might question whether this latter scale position ought not be rescored toward the lower end of the scale under the argument that control of "uninfluential" media contributes little to centralization of power. This possibility of rescoring needs to be considered when analyzing the data.

Basic Variable 9.07 Administering Discipline

The term "discipline" carries negative connotations in the sense that it suggests punishment rather than reward. If we take rewards to mean pleasures, satisfactions, or gratifications that an individual person enjoys, and punishment to refer to other experiences that a person does not enjoy, then the denial of rewards when they are expected can be interpreted as a form of punishment. Our concept of discipline thus includes both rewards and punishments used as inducements to motivate individuals to conform to group behavior.

Before considering some typical techniques of discipline, we must identify the class of individuals who are the targets of discipline. Obviously, any party member might be the target of party discipline, but we are interested only in the class of party members who are governmental *officials or candidates* for governmental office, with particular emphasis on parliamentary or legislative office. We want to determine how the party disciplines the behavior of these members in conformity with group behavior or party principles.

In reviewing specific techniques of discipline that are associated with inducing conforming behavior from governmental officials or candidates for governmental office, we restrict ourselves primarily to those that are purely within the *party's* capability for delivery rather than the government's. For example, rewarding conforming behavior with a government contract may involve the party directly, but this is not purely a party act. On the other hand, expulsion from the party is a disciplinary action that is purely internal to the party. One main reason for drawing this distinction is to control for the additional techniques of discipline in the form of patronage that are available to governing parties but not nongoverning parties.

TABLE 10.6a

SUBFILE FIRST					
BV906 CONTROLLING COMMUNICATIONS					
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO IMPORTANT MEDIA	0	21	15.6	21.2	
REG ORG, INFLUENTIAL	2	1	.7	1.0	
LOCAL, NOT INFLUENTL	3	4	3.0	3.8	
CONTROL MIXED BY ORG	4	10	7.4	9.6	
NATL, NOT INFLUENTL	5	14	10.4	13.5	
NATL USES CENSORSHIP	6	4	3.0	3.8	
NATL, INFLUENTIAL	7	50	37.0	46.1	
BLANK		31	23.0	MISSING	
TOTAL		135	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	4.788	STD DEV	2.715		

VARIABLE	AC906
MEAN	6.365

TABLE 10.6b

SUBFILE SECOND					
BV906 CONTROLLING COMMUNICATIONS					
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO IMPORTANT MEDIA	0	22	15.8	18.8	
REG ORG, INFLUENTIAL	2	2	1.4	1.7	
LOCAL, NOT INFLUENTL	3	4	2.7	3.4	
CONTROL MIXED BY ORG	4	10	6.8	8.5	
NATL, NOT INFLUENTL	5	21	14.3	17.9	
NATL USES CENSORSHIP	6	5	3.4	4.3	
NATL, INFLUENTIAL	7	53	36.1	45.3	
BLANK		33	20.4	MISSING	
TOTAL		147	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	4.803	STD DEV	2.637		

VARIABLE	AC906
MEAN	6.325

VARIABLES, CODES, AND SUMMARY STATISTICS

In addition to expulsion from the party (the most severe form of party discipline—excepting bodily harm), techniques of discipline can include the denial of rights normally accorded other members of equal status, such as participating in party caucuses, receipt of party communications, access to party resources, and removal from party office. Although control over nomination for party candidacy constitutes an important technique of party discipline, it is *not* included within this variable because of its previous inclusion in BV903. All *other* techniques of discipline available within a party to induce conformity on the party of governmental officials and candidates for government office are included in the concept.

Operational Definition. The higher the code, the more centralized the administration of discipline.

- 0 Either there are no discernible techniques of discipline to be administered to party members or responsibility for administering discipline is diffused throughout the party, with little or no structure imposed on this aspect of party activity.
- 1 Local organizations—defined as constituency/municipal/commune/county organs or lower—administer major disciplinary techniques.
- 2 Regional organizations administer major disciplinary techniques; an independent disciplinary tribunal or organ exists for disciplinary purposes, and it acts independently of the national organ.
- 3 The national *parliamentary party organization* administers the major disciplinary techniques.
- 4 The executive committee, party council, or party leader administers the major disciplinary techniques.

Coding Results. Approximately 75 percent of the parties were coded for "administering discipline," and they are distributed along the five-point scale in Tables

10.7a and 10.7b. Despite the relatively large proportion of parties that were coded on BV907 and the neat appearance of the data by categories in the table, the operationalization of this variable presented severe problems for coding. First, it proved difficult to focus coding on discipline of legislative members or candidates, as emphasized in the conceptual discussion, and there was little consistency among the targets of party discipline. Second, the literature seldom treats party discipline in a comprehensive manner, requiring judgments to be made from sketchy accounts of what happened to a few leaders here and some party member there. Finally, the top of the scale, code 4, should have been elaborated into additional coding categories to allow further distinctions, for fully half of our parties gravitated to this single point. Some discriminatory power no doubt remains in the scale, but it is not one of the better items in the study. There was no significant correlation between BV907 and AC907.

Basic Variable 9.08 Leadership Concentration

Duverger notes two facts that "have dominated the evolution of political parties since the beginning of the century: the increase in the authority of the leaders and the tendency toward personal forms of authority" (1963, p. 168). In the most extreme situation, "The leader is omniscient, omnipotent, infallible, and infinitely good and wise: every word that falls from his mouth is true; every wish emanating from him is party law" (1963, p. 182). Although it does not necessarily follow that power is more centralized in a party with few leaders rather than many, the fewer the number of individuals involved in party decision making, the more conducive the conditions for centralization of power.

"Leadership concentration" refers to the number of individuals who constitute the top party hierarchy and who are regarded as key decision makers within the par-

TABLE 10.7a

SUBFILE FIRST					
BV907 ADMINISTERING DISCIPLINE					
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO STRUCTURE-METHODS	0	29	21.5	28.7	
REGIONAL OR TRIBUNAL	2	8	5.9	7.9	
PARL PARTY ORGAN	3	11	8.1	10.9	
NATIONAL LEVEL TASK	4	53	39.3	52.5	
	BLANK	36	25.2	MISSING	
	TOTAL	135	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	2.586	STD DEV	1.745		

VARIABLE AC907
MEAN 6.000

TABLE 10.7b

SUBFILE SECOND					
BV907 ADMINISTERING DISCIPLINE					
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
NO STRUCTURE-METHODS	0	33	22.4	29.5	
REGIONAL OR TRIBUNAL	2	13	6.8	8.9	
PARL PARTY ORGAN	3	11	7.5	9.8	
NATIONAL LEVEL TASK	4	58	39.5	51.8	
	BLANK	35	23.8	MISSING	
	TOTAL	147	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	2.545	STD DEV	1.755		

VARIABLE AC907
MEAN 6.167

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ty. Commonly, these individuals constitute a subgroup of the party's "executive committee" (see variable 8.01), which often serves as the effective seat of power in the organization. But sometimes such committees are only organizational showcases, which merely legitimate decisions made by a dominant figure inside or even outside the committee. This variable aims at *effective* leadership concentration, whether formal or informal.

Operational Definition. The following scale incorporates a range of alternative situations in the concentration of leadership, from low to high.

- 0 Leadership is so dispersed that only local or regional leaders can be identified; no one presents a serious claim to the position of national party spokesman, much less central decision maker.
- 1 Leadership is clearly decentralized: there are more than five leaders who frequently make pronouncements in behalf of the national party, but they are not regarded as authoritatively binding spokesmen.
- 2 Leadership is decentralized: from one to five persons frequently speak in behalf of the party, but they are not regarded as authoritatively binding spokesmen by themselves for they do often disagree.
- 3 Leadership is collectively centralized into a group of more than five party leaders; the decisions of this group are regarded as authoritatively binding on the party; there may be a party leader, but he alone is not powerful enough to control party policy.

- 4 Leadership is collectively centralized into a group of three to five party leaders; the decisions of this group are regarded as binding on the party.
- 5 Leadership is shared by two individuals; their joint decisions are regarded as binding on the party.
- 6 Leadership is exercised by one individual who can personally commit the party to binding courses of action.

For this variable, the exercise of leadership is not to be limited to the electoral stage, which often generates an *illusion* of leadership concentration as party activists defer to the candidates in the conduct of campaigns. This kind of leader-follower relationship may be short-lived with the resumption of normal political life.

Coding Results. The data obtained after coding almost 90 percent of our parties on BV908 are presented in Tables 10.8a and 10.8b. What amounts to one-man rule holds in almost 40 percent of our parties, with the exact percentage somewhat higher in the later 1950s. The remaining 60 percent of the parties are well distributed along the scale, with collective leadership emanating from a group larger than five (code 3) embracing the next largest segment of parties. There was a tendency for situations of one-man rule to be well described in the literature, resulting in part for the significant correlation between BV908 and AC908 of .33.

TABLE 10.8a

SUBFILE FIRST		LEADERSHIP CONCENTRATION			
BV908					
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
DECENTRALIZED, > 5	1	5	3.7	4.2	
DECENTRALIZED, 1-5	2	15	11.1	12.5	
CENTRALIZED, > 5	3	32	23.7	26.7	
CENTRALIZED, 3-5	4	17	12.6	14.2	
JOINT LEADERSHIP	5	9	6.7	7.5	
PERSONAL CONTROL	6	42	31.1	35.0	
	BLANK	15	11.1	MISSING	
	TOTAL	135	100.0	135.7	
MEAN	4.133	STD DEV	1.619		

 VARIABLE AC908
 MEAN 6.417

TABLE 10.8b

SUBFILE SECOND		LEADERSHIP CONCENTRATION			
BV908					
CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	ADJUSTED FREQUENCY (PERCENT)	
DECENTRALIZED, > 5	1	5	3.4	3.7	
DECENTRALIZED, 1-5	2	14	9.5	10.4	
CENTRALIZED, > 5	3	35	23.8	25.9	
CENTRALIZED, 3-5	4	18	12.2	13.3	
JOINT LEADERSHIP	5	10	6.8	7.4	
PERSONAL CONTROL	6	53	36.1	39.3	
	BLANK	12	8.2	MISSING	
	TOTAL	147	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	4.281	STD DEV	1.610		

 VARIABLE AC908
 MEAN 6.519