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Primary Goal

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Introduction[1]

     In several places in the literature on political parties, we find reference to the fact that parties have more than one goal, and not all parties give the highest priority to the same goal. Strom (1990), for instance, not only identifies three types of competitive party behavior, each of which is tied to a different primary goal (votes, offices, policies), but he also provides a model to explain and predict which type of "behavior" will predominate for a particular party on the basis of institutional and organizational factors. Rather than seeing the behavioral modes as mutually compatible, Strom argues that

> We can fruitfully think of vote seeking, office seeking, and policy seeking as three independent and mutually conflicting forms of behavior in which political parties can engage (pp. 570-71).

(The vote-seeking model is most closely identified with the thinking of Anthony Downs, who argued that "since none of the appurtenances of office can be obtained without being elected, the main goal of every party is the winning of elections" (1957:34-5). Subsequently, critics have noted that it is indeed possible to maximize office benefits without maximizing votes, and hence the separation into the two models.)

     Deschouwer also discusses the need to consider more possibilities than electoral performance as primary motivators of party behavior.

> Electoral defeat is [thought to be] the mother of change. But that only works as long as we accept that the electoral goal is dominant (1992:9).

First among his alternatives to votes is "power" (which seems

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[1]Most of the Introduction is taken verbatim from Harmel and Janda (1994), pages 268-273.

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identical to "office benefits"):

> Electoral results are important. But they are not equally important for all parties, and for a single party they do not always have the same importance ... A party primarily oriented towards political power certainly needs voters, but is not necessarily out of power when it loses. Especially in systems where power is reached through coalition formation, electoral losses can be of little importance (p. 16).

Second is provision of a vehicle for organizing and articulating members' wishes, as exemplified in a fraction of the Flemish Greens:

> Within the Flemish Green party, the feelings are divided since the 1991 elections. This party also expected to win votes, and actually did: from 4.5% to 4.9%. They expected at least 7%. One fraction in the party is disappointed, and blames the party structures. The other fraction warns against direct reaction on electoral results. This party, they say, is not meant to win elections. It is meant to be an open and democratic participatory party (p. 17).

(The same distinction applies to the factions identified as "realos" and "fundos" in the German Greens, as fully documented elsewhere.)

   Deschouwer's "participation" goal seems related to what others have identified as a "representation" mission for parties. These concerns can be embraced by the broader concern for interparty democracy. Though not themselves applying the concepts to political parties, per se, Bruce et al. (1991) have empirically investigated the extent to which individual activists in America's presidential parties are motivated by "advocacy politics" (i.e., policy advocacy), "vote maximization," and "representation." With regard to representation, they note that

> One traditional view of parties sees them representing the public. They serve as 'mediating institutions' and 'as links between the community and the larger political world' (Price, 1984:112). Issue positions taken by the party reflect those held by its constituents. Almond and Powell write, 'The political party is the specialized interest aggregation structure of contemporary societies ... Its organization thus involves arrangements for ascertaining voter preference' (1978:205-6). If the

party ascertains and aggregates, then the partisan banner becomes a rallying point for those being represented (Bruce et al, 1991: 1090).

Combining the thinking of Strom, Deschouwer, and others, we employ a fourfold treatment of possible primary goals for political parties: (1) vote maximization, (2) office maximization, (3) policy advocacy, and (4) intraparty democracy maximization.

The Alternative Primary Goals

Coding of parties on goal priorities rests on the following conceptualization of the four key party goals:

Votes (i.e. winning of votes/elections) -- Although a distinction can be made between winning votes and winning elections, we follow the tendency in the literature to treat winning votes and winning elections (i.e., legislative seats) together. (For Strom, this is the "vote seeking" goal.)

Office (i.e., gaining of executive office) -- Though American scholars often neglect the distinction between winning elections and gaining executive office, this distinction is central to European scholars, for whom election results are only one ingredient of government formation in parliamentary systems. Office, for us, means executive office (as distinguished from legislative seats), and primarily consists of holding cabinet portfolios (but not necessarily the office of chief executive). (For Strom, this is the "office-seeking" goal.)

Policy (i.e., advocacy of interests/issues/ideology) -- When a party consistently places ideological or issue purity and/or pursuit of a particular interest above practical electoral concerns, it is apparently giving primacy to the policy goal over votes or office. Budge and Keman (1990) make a good case for considering the primacy of group interests or policy issues when explaining the behavior of parties in entering coalitions, obtaining ministries, and influencing policy. (For Strom, this is the "policy-seeking goal," which he calls the "least adequately developed model of competitive party behavior" (p. 568).

Democracy (i.e., implementing intraparty democracy) -- Indicators of the desire to maximize democracy within the party would certainly include development of mechanisms for meaningful grassroots participation, and implementation of

specific and far-reaching limits on leadership control. Examples of parties which have placed unusual emphasis on this particular goal are the German Greens (which developed "flat" organization in an effort to break Michels' "iron law of oligarchy") and perhaps the U.S.' Democratic party (especially in anticipation of the 1972 election).

Instructions to Coders

(based on 9-27-92 document)

Though we call this concept "primary goal," we are actually coding each party's relative priorities regarding <u>four</u> goals: votes, office, policy, and democracy. In other words, the four goals are to be rank ordered for each party, with the ranking based on the coder's review of secondary materials on the party, and to a lesser extent, on review of information collected for coding of related variables.

What we are actually trying to construct here, in support of the coding, is the party's "mission statement." Unfortunately, for most parties mission statements don't really exist, and it's not clear that they could be taken seriously if they did. Hence, we are trying to tap into the minds of the "party" (i.e. party leaders), since the concept of "goal" is defined (in Webster) as "an object or end that one strives to attain; aim." To the extent that we are forced to use <u>behavior</u> indicators, we are subject to both measurement error and research design error. In other words, we should not rely upon behavior indicators of propensity to change on various goal-related dimensions (which are, after all, the indicators of the <u>dependent</u> variable) as primary indicators. (To the extent they are used at all, they should be relegated to the status of supplementary heuristics.)

Though the literature may provide very clear, direct, and non-conflicting statements on some parties' goal priorities, this is not likely to be true for most parties. The following points should help in identifying less clear and/or less direct goal-related statements in the literature or evidence in other data sets. Such statements/evidence should be included (or at least noted) in the coder's textual statement of information supporting the codes for each party.

For party **democracy:**

If not organized intensively (see Janda, 1980), it is doubtful that the party is committed to this goal.

If membership organs don't meet regularly (including frequency and timing of party congresses), commitment is doubtful. (Note: It is important here to recognize that party democracy must be taken as applying to members <u>or</u> supporters, not both at once. The American parties don't meet regularly, but this indicates lack of interest in

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"members," not lack of interest in providing for democratic methods for "supporters" (e.g., primary elections).

If MPs are not required to follow dicta of a membership conference, commitment to party democracy is doubtful.

Special quotas for various interests within the party (including quotas for women, ethnic minorities, etc.) are relevant.

Opportunities for regular inputs for members, in addition to meetings (e.g. mail or phone opinion surveys), are relevant.

Mentions of concern with party democracy/membership representation in a party rule book or in party platforms are relevant.

Rotation requirements would indicate commitment to this goal.

For policy/**ideology**/issue advocacy:

For ideology only: Note Ken Janda's score on doctrinism (i.e. existence of a body of doctrine).

Note enforcement policies (i.e. rules and penalties to accomplish discipline).

If there are no membership requirements (i.e., suggesting an "anyone's welcome" attitude), this may indicate a lack of commitment to ideology/policy positions.

If we could get figures on the party's publication program, and then distinguish candidate-oriented publicity from policy oriented publications, the percentage of the budget devoted to the latter could be an indicator of the relative importance attributed to policy advocacy as a goal. [Though this would be a valid criterion, we should note that we never actually had such data to support our coding.]

For **votes** and/or **office** benefits:

Rotation requirements would seem to cast doubt on a priority for these goals.

If meetings/congresses are held only before elections, this would seem to indicate the primary interest is in winning elections.

Public statements on willingness (or lack of it) to join in various types of coalitions would be relevant to assessing importance of **office**.

Preference for committing to a strategy of "blackmail" rather than coalition potential would indicate more interest in **votes** (plus possibly policy advocacy) than in office benefits.

If party factions threatening to split are offered "anything" to keep them, including policy concessions, this would indicate primacy of **votes** over policy.

Post Hoc Analysis of Coding Adequacy

Beth Leech, as a Ph.D. student at Texas A&M University, was principal coder for this variable cluster. Her codes were carefully reviewed by Lars Bille for Denmark and Thomas Poguntke for Germany. In cases of disagreements, Harmel made all final decisions (usually in consultation with Leech).

Though we have a reasonably high level of confidence in most of the codes, it did prove especially difficult to distinguish between the goals of **vote**/seat maximization and **office** benefits maximization. Some parties alternate regularly between the two as primary and secondary goals, with the difference often depending on whether the party was in or out of executive office at the time. As a consequence, we have identified many more "primary goal" changes than we anticipated when we started the data collection; the surprisingly large number of changes is due primarily to all of the changes between **votes** and **office** goals.

For most research purposes, we ourselves will (and we will recommend the same to others) combine **votes** and **office** benefits as one category (hence, effectively eliminating the changes between them). This is because the more dramatic changes are clearly those between either **votes or office**, on the one hand, and party **democracy or policy** on the other, in addition to changes between the latter two goals.

As a practical matter, then, we did not devote a lot of time or concern to verifying <u>differences</u> between codings of **votes** and

office. Assigning one of those codes where the other would have been more appropriate will not cause a problem later, **if** the two categories are eventually combined into one. Researchers who wish to maintain the distinction as important in their research should be aware of our lower level of confidence in coding that particular distinction in our data.

Additional Notes for Users

As with all data collected for the Party Change Project: in a year when a change in code occurs, the new code is assigned to the case for that year. For example, if a party's primary goal changes from votes to office sometime during 1968, office is assigned the primary position for all of 1968 (as in "1968-1973 Office, Votes, Ideology, Democracy").

When data for a party begin in a year later than 1950, the first year coded is the first year of the party's existence.

A large amount of supporting information (normally in the form of extensive quotations from secondary sources) was compiled by Leech for each case. Though that information is not included in this document, special requests may be directed to Robert Harmel at Texas A&M University.

NSF Party Change Project (Harmel/Janda; as of 11-21-94; SPD and
    Labour corrected by Harmel/Sampson on 9/29/95; typos corrected
    11/17/98)

Summary of Party Goal Data, 1950-1992

	Primary	Second	Third	Fourth
(De) Center Democrats				
1973-92	Office	Ideology	Votes	Democ
(De) Christian People's				
1970-74	Ideology	Office	Votes	Democ
1975-92	Office	Ideology	Democ	Votes
(De) Conservative People's				
1950-64	Office	Votes	Ideology	Democ
1965-67	Votes	Office	Ideology	Democ
1968-72	Office	Votes	Ideology	Democ
1973-78	Votes	Ideology	Office	Democ
1979-92	Office	Votes	Ideology	Democ
(De) Left Socialists				
1967-92	Ideology	Democ	Votes	Office
(De) Liberals				
1950-64	Office	Votes	Ideology	Democ
1965-67	Votes	Office	Ideology	Democ
1968-72	Office	Votes	Ideology	Democ
1973-77	Votes	Office	Ideology	Democ
1978	Office	Votes	Ideology	Democ
1979-81	Votes	Office	Ideology	Democ
1982-92	Office	Votes	Ideology	Democ
(De) Progress				
1972-87	Ideology	Votes	Democ	Office
1988-92	Ideology	Votes	Office	Democ
(De) Social (Radical) Liberals				
1950-56	Ideology	Votes	Office	Democ
1957-63	Office	Ideology	Votes	Democ

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        1964-67      Votes     Ideology  Office    Democ
        1968-72      Office    Votes     Ideology  Democ
        1973-76      Ideology  Votes     Office    Democ
        1977-81      Votes     Ideology  Office    Democ
        1982-87      Ideology  Votes     Office    Democ
        1988-89      Ideology  Office    Votes     Democ
        1990-92      Votes     Ideology  Office    Democ
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(De) Social Democrats
```
        1950-92      Office    Ideology  Votes     Democ
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(De) Socialist People's
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        1959-92      Ideology  Democ     Office    Votes
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(Ge) Christian Democratic Union
```
        1950-68      Votes     Office    Ideology  Democ
        1969-81      Votes     Office    Democ     Ideology
        1982-92      Office    Votes     Democ     Ideology
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(Ge) Free Democrats
```
        1950-92      Office    Ideology  Votes     Democ
```

(Ge) Greens
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        1980-82      Democ     Ideology  Votes     Office
        1983-88      Ideology  Democ     Office    Votes
        1989-92      Ideology  Office    Democ     Votes
```

(Ge) Social Democrats
```
        1950-57      Ideology  Votes     Office    Democ
        1958-69      Votes     Office    Ideology  Democ
        1970-82      Office    Votes     Ideology  Democ
        1983-92      Votes     Ideology  Office    Democ
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(UK) Conservatives
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        1950-92      Office    Votes     Ideology  Democ
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(UK) Labour
```
        1950-51      Office    Ideology  Democ     Votes
        1952-55      Ideology  Office    Democ     Votes
        1956-63      Ideology  Office    Votes     Democ
        1964-70      Office    Ideology  Votes     Democ
        1971-73      Ideology  Office    Democ     Votes
        1974-79      Office    Ideology  Votes     Democ
        1980-92      Ideology  Democ     Office    Votes
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(UK) Liberal
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        1950-75      Votes     Ideology  Office    Democ
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      1976-87          Votes     Office    Ideology  Democ
      (then SLD)
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(UK) Social Dem's
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      1981-87          Office    Ideology  Votes     Democ
      (then SLD)
```

(UK) Soc. Lib. Dem's
```
      1987-92          Office    Votes     Ideology  Democ
```

(US) Democrats
```
      1950-71          Votes     Office    Democ     Ideology
      1972-79          Votes     Democ     Office    Ideology
      1980-92          Votes     Office    Democ     Ideology
```

(US) Republicans
```
      1950-72          Office    Votes     Ideology  Democ
      1973-92          Votes     Office    Ideology  Democ
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Country:  **Denmark**
Party:    **Center Democratic Party** (CD) - #101
Coders:   Harmel/Leech
Primary Consultant:  Bille (2/93)

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We adopt Bille's suggestion:

1973-92 Office, Ideology, Votes, Democracy

Harmel and Leech reason:

The Center Democratic party was founded for issue reasons (Jacobs 1989, 52; Day and Degenhardt 1984, 93), but almost immediately began compromising some of its ideals to participate in government (Jacobs 1989, 52; McHale 1983, 161). Although Pedersen (1987, 15) sees CD as a primarily issue-oriented party, compromises with parties in government and the CD's apparent lack of mechanisms to enforce the party line leads to the conclusion that office benefits is the primary goal.

CD's policy advocacy is directed toward specific issues, but there is no all-encompassing ideology for this party (McHale 1983, 161; Fitzmaurice 1981, 115; Pedersen 1987, 15). Although Jacobs (1989) discusses the CD emphasis on party democracy, stating that "the party's organization reflects its leaders' belief that political power should be left with the voters and the elected parliamentarians rather than with the party activists" (p 53), it is also true that the national congress cannot pass binding resolutions limiting members of parliament. Hence, the emphasis seems more on limiting power of party activists than on empowering voters, per se.

The only unresolved question about how to order this party's priorities seems to be where to put party democracy, given that the party clearly has thought more about the matter than have some other parties. Bille (2/93) advocated putting votes above democracy, and we tend to agree, but only because an office benefits-oriented party would presumably have some concern also for votes. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that this party's leadership has clearly stated that the party wants to reduce the power of activists within the organization, leaving control to voters and (especially) members of parliament instead.

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Country: **Denmark**
Party: **Christian People's Party** (KRF) - #102
Coders: Harmel/Leech
Primary Consultant: Bille (2/93)

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We adopt Bille's suggestion (as a slight revision of Leech's
original coding):

 1970-74 Ideology, Office, Votes, Democracy
 1975-92 Office, Ideology, Democracy, Votes

Harmel and Leech reason:

The KrF was founded for ideological reasons (Day and Degenhardt
1984, 93; Fitzmaurice 1981, 39; Jacobs 1989, 58; Pedersen 1987, 14;
Pedersen 1988, 259), but after failing to reach the two percent
mark in the 1971 election, there was internal dissent over whether
to hold to a pure ideological line or to compromise and support the
existing government; the compromisers won (Fitzmaurice 1981, 116).
So KrF is coded as changing its primary goal in 1975 (date
suggested by Bille, rather than 1973 as originally indicated by
Leech). (Bille says that this began in 1975 with talks about
possibly joining in coalition governments, and by 1982 there could
no longer be any question about office being first priority.)
Pedersen (1988, 259) does note, though, that the party cooperates
with the hope of furthering its ideological goals, so ideology
remains a strong secondary goal in the later period.

While KrF was out of government in 1977-78, there were a few
instances of blackmail (Fitzmaurice 1981, 66). Though membership
representation/party democracy is not mentioned in the literature,
Bille (2/93) indicates that the core founders made all decisions in
the earliest period, but members gained increasing influence in
later years (particularly due to recognition that vote-getting
depended heavily on a satisfied membership). Bille suggests
placing democracy ahead of vote maximizing in the second period
(rather than the other way around, as first suggested by Leech),
though he adds that these two are very close in the ranking.

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Country: **Denmark**
Party: **Conservative People's Party** (KF) - #103
Coders: Harmel/Leech
Primary Consultant: Bille (2/93)

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We adopt Bille's suggestion:

   50-64 Office, Votes, Ideology, Democracy
   65-67 Votes, Office, Ideology, Democracy
   68-72 Office, Votes, Ideology, Democracy
   73-78 Votes, Ideology, Office, Democracy
   79-92 Office, Votes, Ideology, Democracy

Harmel and Leech reason:

Two authors writing in the early 1980s (Fitzmaurice 1981; McHale 1983) emphasize the vote maximization goal, whereas two authors writing in the later 1980s (Pedersen 1987; Jacobs 1989) emphasize the cooperative, office-benefits side of the party's behavior. This would seem consistent with Bille's suggestions for the later two periods.

Bille himself argues that there are two games being played simultaneously, and the party's primary goal at a particular moment reflects which game has priority. When the primary objective is to do better electorally vis-a-vis the other bourgeois parties, vote maximization is the primary goal. But when there is a chance of governing by cooperating, office benefits replace vote maximization as the key goal.

Bille (2/93) notes that during the period 1950-65, the Liberals and Conservatives formed a "strong block," cooperating to offer a bougeouis alternative to the socialist government. They had government from 1950-53, and continued cooperation after that, with a continuing eye toward regaining control of government. Bille's belief that the period 1950-65 is characterized primarily by maximization of office benefits is supported by the party's forming a government with Venstre from 1950-53, the first bourgeois government since the 1920s (Pedersen 1987, 9), and Jacobs' description of close cooperation with Venstre from 1959 through the 1960s (1989, 42).

In 1966, for the first time in Danish history, there was the possibility for forming a leftist majority government. Though differences among the parties kept this from happening (see Jacobs

1989, 35), the fact that leftist parties accounted for a majority of seats was perhaps sufficient to cause the Conservatives to place emphasis on winning sufficient votes/seats to deny the socialists that degree of independence. Consistent with this, Bille suggests that the primary goal for the Conservatives from 1965 to 1968 was vote maximization rather than office benefits.

Then in 1968, with Social Democratic losses in the elections, the bourgeois parties were given a real chance of forming the government. Cooperation among the three bourgeois parties (Liberals, Social Liberals, and Conservatives) was emphasized, and Bille suggests that office benefits were the primary goal rather than votes.

The Conservatives took a beating in the 1973 election (see Pedersen 1988, 258-259), and the Progress party did very well in its first election, partially due to the Conservatives having been seen by their own supporters as governing more like a leftist than a bourgeois party (see Fitzmaurice 1981, 113; Jacobs 1989, 42). At the same time, real competition developed (especially with Venstre) over which bourgeois party would be the largest. (Jacobs 1989, 42, notes that the Conservatives became the main opposition party on the right when Venstre went into government coalition with the Social Democrats in 1978-79.) Hence, vote maximization became the primary goal, with ideology second, and office third. Fitzmaurice (1981, 111) somewhat supports the idea that office maximization had dropped back by noting that the party opposed repeated attempts to create a bourgeois government that would include the Progress party. But note that Fitzmaurice later (1981, 113) says that after 1973, the party began cooperating with the Social Democratic minority government in several package deals. The latter, though, could be interpreted more as wanting to further jointly held policy goals than as the Conservatives' wanting to share office benefits with the Social Democrats.

Again in 1979, firm cooperation is established with Venstre to offer an alternative to socialist government. Since 1987, there has even been more willingness than earlier to work deals with the Progress party.

Country: **Denmark**
Party: **Left Socialists** (VS) - #104
Coders: Leech
Primary Consultant: Bille (2/93)

We adopt Leech's coding (concurred to by Bille):

1967-92 Ideology, Democracy, Votes, Office

Leech argues:

VS was founded for ideological reasons and in reaction to S-SF
cooperation which involved compromises that the VS members
disagreed with (Jacobs 1989, 62; Fitzmaurice 1981, 22; Tarchys
1977, 148; Delury 1983, 261). Ideology seems to drive VS's actions
and decisions, as stated explicitly by Delury (1983, 261) and
implicitly by all of the other authors cited. Although VS's
opposition tactics (Pedersen 1987, 9 & 17; Fitzmaurice 1981, 61 &
63) could be seen as a way of maximizing either voters or ideology
at the expense of office benefits, when fights over ideology have
threatened vote totals, ideology has won out (Jacobs 1989, 63).

VS's emphasis on extraparliamentary activities (Jacobs 1989, 63)
and suspicion of parliament as an institution (Fitzmaurice 1981,
110) indicates that it ranks party democracy/participation ahead of
either votes or office benefits.

Vote-maximizing is ranked above office-benefits because while VS is
apparently openly hostile to the idea of cooperating with the
powers that be (Delury 1983, 261; Tarchys 1977, 148; Fitzmaurice
1981, 22; Pedersen 1987, 17; Jacobs 1989, 62), VS gives no
indication that it is hostile to getting at least enough votes to
obtain representation in parliament, as long as that doesn't mean
compromising ideology.

Jacobs (1989, 63) indicates that VS may be moving more toward
office-benefits maximizing (in the late 1980s, exploring the
possibility of cooperation with other parties of the far left), but
there seems to be no indication in the literature that the party
has changed enough to alter the order of goals as presented above.

Country: **Denmark**
Party: **Liberal Party** (Venstre; V) - #105
Coders: Harmel/Leech
Primary Consultant: Lars Bille (2/93)

We adopt Bille's suggestion:

    1950-64 **Office, Votes, Ideology, Democracy**
    1965-67 **Votes, Office, Ideology, Democracy**
    1968-72 **Office, Votes, Ideology, Democracy**
    1973-77 **Votes, Office, Ideology, Democracy**
    1978   **Office, Votes, Ideology, Democracy**
    1979-81 **Votes, Office, Ideology, Democracy**
    1982-92 **Office, Votes, Ideology, Democracy**

Harmel and Leech reason:

It can be inferred from two of the authors consulted (Fitzmaurice
1981, 123; Jacobs 1989, 44) that, from 1950 through 1973, Venstre
seems to have behaved as Danish parties "are supposed to,"
cooperating with other parties and participating in coalition
governments to provide an alternative to social democratic
governments (including a Liberal-Conservative coalition government,
which it headed, from 1950-1953; and from 68-71 a coalition
government with the Conservatives and RV). During most of this
period, there seems little doubt that getting and maintaining
office benefits were the primary goal.

Bille argues, though, that from 1965 through 1968 votes overtook
office as the primary consideration. This occurred as the Liberals
saw their clear vote/seat superiority over the Conservatives (i.e.
to be recognized as the larger of the two bourgeouis parties)
dwindle to near parity. (In 1957 the Liberals had an edge of 45-
30; by 1964 this had dropped to just a 38-36 advantage; by 1966 it
had dropped to 35-34.) In 1965, in fact, the leader of the Liberal
party announced that it was probably time to consider merging the
two parties. This was, though, met with serious resistance from
the ranks of the membership organization. The leader then decided
to retire, and a new chair was elected. One of the new leader's
first pronouncements was that what was needed in Danish politics
was a cooperation among bourgeouis parties that should also include
RV. Bille sees this as an attempt to publicly assert more
independence from the Conservatives, per se, partly as a move
toward office, but primarily to attract votes as a means of again

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being larger than the Conservatives. In other words, during this 1965-68 period votes were sought more as a means of asserting superiority over the Conservatives than as a means of holding government office.

From 1968 to 1973, which includes the 1968-71 three-party government, Bille agrees with Leech's original coding of office seeking being more important than vote maximizing.

From 1973 to 1975, Bille and Leech agree that votes were of primary importance. Bille notes that the Liberals were in office during this period, but that they used the position in government as a means of maximizing their votes. That is apparently why elections were called for, "unprovokedly," in 1974 (for January of 1975, when the party actually did much better in gaining seats).

Leech also coded the 1975-77 period as primarily vote maximizing. Bille argues that this is a very close call between votes and office benefits (for the period extending to 1978 in his case). He notes that ideology was also emphasized during this period, but primarily for maintaining the larger number of seats from the previous election.

Leech originally coded the remaining years as primarily office benefit seeking. Bille agrees that the years 78-79 were definitely office seeking, as evidenced in the willingness to join with the Social Democrats in government. However, he argues that from 1979 to 1982 it is primarily votes, followed by another "office benefits" period to at least 1993. Given lack of additional information in the literature to either support to cast doubts on Bille's position, we have decided to simply accept and code it.

Leech had originally coded ideology as secondary (rather than tertiary) for some of the periods, but had consistently done so on the basis of little information and with concern that votes could actually be higher. Lack of information to support the latter position had kept her from incorporating these hunches into the codes. Bille provides some of that support, however, and hence we now consistently place ideology third, followed by internal democracy.

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Country: **Denmark**
Party: **Progress Party** (FRP) - #106
Coders: Leech
Primary Consultant: Lars Bille (2/93)

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We adopt Leech's coding (and Bille concurs):

     1972-87   Ideology, Votes, Democracy, Office
     1988-92   Ideology, Votes, Office, Democracy

Leech supports this judgement with the following:

    The Progress Party was formed to reach ideological and policy
    goals (Jacobs 1989:54-56; Day and Degenhardt 1984:95; Pedersen
    1987:39), and the party has been seen as so radical and
    steadfast in reaching those goals that no other party would
    cooperate with them (McHale 1983:173; Fitzmaurice 1981:47).
    Fitzmaurice (1981:118,123) makes clear that ideology
    maximization is even more important than vote maximization for
    the Progress Party by explaining that in the Danish system,
    the party's failure to cooperate will be viewed negatively by
    voters. Vote maximization is coded as second, however,
    because of the party's offensive strategy in parliament (which
    also can be seen as a means of maximizing ideology)
    (Fitzmaurice 1981:61,63,66). Party democracy is coded as
    third even though Progress didn't have a traditional party
    organization because of its vision of itself as a popular
    movement and because office-benefit maximization is
    nonexistent.

    According to Jacobs (1989,56) the party has "now" expressed
    willingness to cooperate with other parties if it will further
    its policy goals, so office-benefits was moved up to third
    place beginning in the late 1980s.

Harmel adds (8-11-94):

    Though it is questionable, given Glistrup's penchant for
    deciding everything from his position-for-life, whether party
    democracy was ever a **serious** goal for the founder, it cannot
    be denied that lip-service was paid to the importance of a
    social movement orientation. In any case, the unwillingness
    to consider cooperation (and hence compromise) with other
    parties, at least in the early years, is legend.

Leech's decision to code a third- and fourth-place switch in the late '80s does tap an important change of heart on the latter issue. Leech herself was uncertain as to the exact year of this change. Jacobs refers only to the "late '80s." Since his book was published in 1989, it can be assumed that he was writing no later than 1988. Hence, it seems reasonable to guesstimate that the change itself took place in 1988 (or 1987 at the earliest). We tentatively code the change as having taken place sometime during 1988.

Country: **Denmark**
Party: **Social Liberals** (Radical Liberals; RV) - #107
Coders: Harmel/Leech
Primary Consultant: Bille (2/93)

We adopt Bille's suggestion (to replace what for Leech was just one period):

    1950-56 Ideology, Votes, Office, Democracy
    1957-63 Office, Ideology, Votes, Democracy
    1964-67 Votes, Ideology, Office, Democracy
    1968-72 Office, Votes, Ideology, Democracy
    1973-76 Ideology, Votes, Office, Democracy
    1977-81 Votes, Ideology, Office, Democracy
    1982-87 Ideology, Votes, Office, Democracy
    1988-89 Ideology, Office, Votes, Democracy
    1990-92 Votes, Ideology, Office, Democracy

[Note: The party participated in governments 1957-64, 1968-71, and 1988-90.]

[Note: Bille cautions that there is no body of "ideology" per se, but rather there have been times when "policies" were the major concern. So the term "ideology" is used here very loosely.]

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Country: **Denmark**
Party:   **Social Democrats** (SD) - #108
Coders:  Harmel/Leech
Primary Consultant:  Lars Bille (2/93)

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We adopt Bille's suggestion:[2]

 1950-1992 Office, Ideology, Votes, Democracy

Harmel and Leech reason:

Because the Social Democrats have never had more than about 40
percent of the vote, great emphasis has been put on cooperation
with other parties (Budge et al 1987, 178; McHale 1983, 176).
Supporting the placement of ideology before votes is the evidence
of the party being willing to let its top vote getter, Erhard
Jacobsen, leave the party rather than make the concessions on
policy that might have kept him (though it should be noted that it
did try to keep him, as Bille notes, but "the gap was too great")
(see Jacobs 1989, 35). However, the placement of office benefits
before ideology is supported by the party's occasional cooperation
with parties it does not agree with ideologically (Jacobs 1989, 35;
McHale 1983, 176; Einhorn and Logue 1988, 178; Fitzmaurice 1981,
45).

Beginning in 1968, after a poor electoral performance, the party
shifted further to the left (Jacobs 1989, 35). Bille (2/93) also
notes that even though the party has never been truly
"doctrinaire," more Marxist philosophy was built into the program
during the 1970s, including "collective ownership" in 1977.

Party democracy/membership representation is not mentioned in the
literature, except in the context of membership declining in
relation to votes since 1950 (Jacobs 1989, 35; Thomas 1977, 239).

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        [2]Leech originally had the Ideology and Votes reversed from the
above.

23

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Country: **Denmark**
Party: **Socialist People's Party** (SF) - #109
Coders: Harmel/Leech
Primary Consultant: Lars Bille (2/93)

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We adopt Bille's suggestion:[3]

1959-92 Ideology, Democracy, Office, Votes

Harmel and Leech reason:

Though there is no question that this party has been devoted to
government by a "workers' majority" (Bille 2/93; also SF 1990, 4;
Jacobs 1989, 39,41; Fitzmaurice 1981, 109-110; Pedersen 1987, 6-7),
the main reason for wanting the majority has been for
accomplishment of the ideology (see SF 1990, 4; Jacobs 1989, 41).
[Some of the staunchest ideologues left the party in 1967, however,
over the issue of compromising the ideology, and formed VS
(Pedersen 1987, 37; Fitzmaurice 1981, 109).] It should be noted
that while the party has cooperated with socialist governments, it
has never actually been in government itself, casting some doubt on
the notion that the party would "do anything" to get into
government.

One of the reasons the party was formed in the first place was to
make this more of a "membership directed" party than a "leader-
oriented" party, as the Communist Party was perceived to be (Bille,
2/93). The party's own documents still stress party democracy (SF
1990, 4) and SF's national organization maintains much tigher
control over the parliamentary group than is the case for other
Danish parties (Jacobs 1989, 40). It also has gender quotas for
its MPs (Jacobs 1989, 40). The party is organized locally and is
trying to do so across the country (Bille, 2/93).

_____

[3]Leech originally had: Office, Ideology, Democracy, Votes.

We adopt Leech's coding:

1950-68	**Votes, Office, Ideology, Democracy**	
1969-81	**Votes, Office, Democracy, Ideology**	
1982-92	**Office, Votes, Democracy, Ideology**	

Leech argues:

> The CDU's central object has always been to hold power
> (Padgett and Burkett 1986, 104), at times focusing more on
> direct electoral wins and, failing that, at times on
> coalitions. The CDU started out as a catch-all party seeking
> broad electoral support (Kolinsky 1984, 6, 18; Radunski 1986,
> 16; Irving 1979, 122). Until 1961 it captured majorities of
> the voters (Smith 1986, 116), but still sometimes invited
> other (weak) parties into its government to give it a greater
> majority (Irving 1979, 130). After 1961, coalitions became
> more important, but the CDU still seemed unwilling to grant
> concessions and lost two coalition partners (Smith 1986, 114-
> 20). Vote maximization thus remains ahead of office-seeking.
> Jacobs (1989, 454) notes that the CDU didn't have a formal
> ideology until 1963, but Pridham notes that the party is
> influenced by a common Christian Democratic ideology (1976,
> 149). Ideology is therefore ranked ahead of party democracy,
> to which the CDU was hostile in this period (Irving 1979, 123;
> Kolinsky 1984, 122; Pridham 1977, 94).
>
> Shut out of coalitions in 1969, the CDU responded by trying to
> bring down the government (Jacobs 1989, 455) and continued
> until 1982 being hostile to "competing parties" rather than
> friendly to potential coalition partners (Irving 1979, 136;
> Smith 1986, 152). Instead, the CDU attempted to increase vote
> totals by increasing membership and party democracy (Padgett
> and Burkett 1986, 106; Paterson 1987, 170; Irving 1979, 122).
> Thus vote-maximizing moves ahead of office-benefits, and party
> democracy increases in importance to third (several authors --
> Kolinsky 1984, 125; Pridham 1987, 163 -- note that party
> democracy is still very weak despite the improvements since
> 1969.)

The coming to power of Helmut Kohl as Chancellor in 1982 marks the change in emphasis on office-seeking (Jacobs 1989, 455; Smith 1986, 153). The CDU becomes more conciliatory toward the FDP, and office-seeking moves ahead of vote-maximizing.

Poguntke adds (in personal communication, 9-94):

I agree that from 1982 to 1989 the CDU became primarily office seeking (as opposed to the earlier phases of incumbency, when the party was primarily vote maximizing). This is for the following reasons: In the 1950s and 1960s the format of the German party system was less petrified. As a result, coalition patterns varied more and it was most important for a party to be as strong as possible on election day in order to have a strong positions afterwards. In the case of the CDU, this meant to try winning an overall majority.

After the Wende, which was facilitated through an a priori coalition arrangement between CDU and FDP, coalition majorities became more important. This resulted in repeated '2nd-vote-campaigns' which means that the Christian Democrats tacitly agreed on their own party faithful voting with the second vote for the prospective coalition partner. (The SPD had tolerated similar practices during the Social-Liberal coalition.)

Decision:

In discussion among Leech, Poguntke, and Harmel in 9-94, it was determined that it would be correct to extend the '82-89 codes through at least 1992.

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Country: **Germany**
Party: **Free Democratic Party** (FDP) - #202
Coder: Leech
Primary Consultant: Poguntke (9/94)

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We adopt Leech's coding:

_____**1950-92   Office, Ideology, Votes, Democracy**

Leech argues:

> The FDP is clearly primarily office-seeking, as at least two
> authors explicitly state (Kolinsky 1984, 116; Jacobs 1989,
> 463) and many other imply. Whether vote maximization or
> ideology maximization should come next is more problematic.
> Padgett (1986, 168) indicates that the FDP's coalition changes
> in 1969 and 1982 were attempts to survive electorally rather
> than attempts to further ideological goals. But Haussman, the
> FDP's national secretary, says the opposite (1986, 44), and
> Klingemann (1985, 243-44) seems to agree. (Smith (1986, 155-
> 56) cites both electoral and ideological reasons.) If FDP's
> strategy was to maximize votes over ideology, it didn't work.
> Klingemann (1985, 243-44) and Day and Degenhardt (1984, 175)
> both note that the coalition changes cost FDP much support.
> Still, we should note that several authors indicate that FDP
> isn't very ideological (Kolinsky 1984, 101; Padgett 1986, 160-
> 61; Burkett 1979, 103), and that FDP is always eying the 5
> percent hurdle into the Bundestag (Kolinsky 1984, 101).
>
> The mentions of party democracy in the literature are
> primarily negative -- it is not an important goal for the FDP.
> Party leaders even go so far as to shift ideology and change
> coalition without consulting members. We should note,
> however, that according to Neumann (1956, 383) party democracy
> is more important to the FDP than to other traditional German
> parties.]

Poguntke adds (personal communication, 9-94):

> From my perspective, the rank order ... should be as follows:
> office - ideology - votes - party democracy.
>
> The FDP's primary raison d'etre is office, defined in "system-
> functional" terms. This means that the party regards itself
> as the liberal corrective in a coalition. Plus it usually

brings about a change of power - although not a complete one, because it stays in government with a new senior partner. Ideology tends to be somewhat more important than vote maximization, because the party, by and large, has kept faith to some essentials of Liberalism. However, it should be noted that the FDP has two faces, a left-liberal and a economic-liberal face and it varies over time which of the two is the dominant one.

Decision:

There is complete agreement between the coder and the consultant, so the decision is to stay with Leech's original coding.

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Country:   **Germany**
Party:     **The Greens** (Die Grunen) - #203
Coder:     Leech
Primary Consultant: Poguntke (9/94)

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             [Note: Party founded Jan. 12-13, 1980]

We adopt this coding, as reasoned below:


        **1980-82    Democracy, Ideology, Votes, Office**
        **1983-88    Ideology, Democracy, Office, Votes**
        **1989-92    Ideology, Office, Democracy, Votes**


Leech had originally coded this as:

    1980-83 -- Primarily party democracy-maximizing, followed by
    ideology, with vote-seeking third and office-benefits last.
    1983-   -- Primarily ideology-maximizing, with party democracy
    second, office benefits third (or vice versa), and vote-
    maximizing last (this seems too far down for votes).


Leech had noted:

    Still unsure how to rank this.  There is much turmoil in
    the party, but Realos have had upper hand (as far as I
    can tell) throughout this time period.  Still, office
    benefits hasn't moved too far forward in that no actual
    coalitions have gone forward at national level and Green
    MPs are hostile rather than conciliatory to government
    actions.


Poguntke (private communication, 9/94) added:

    Generally speaking, there has been a factional stalemate
    throughout the 1980s, beginning in 1983.  The following phases
    can be identified:

    1.  1980-1983: Growth and consolidation of party.  Since
        governmental participaton was only a remote possibility,
        factional conflict was not as dominant as in later years.

    2.  1983-1986: The Greens' entry into the Bundestag marks the
        beginning of more clearly defined factional battle lines.
        The debate is exacerbated through the decision of the
        Hesse Greens to enter into negotiations with the SPD in
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October 1983. December 1984: Hamburg party congress elects Ditfurth, Trampert and Beckman as speakers (overweight of fundamentalists in extra-parliamentary party). However, before the January 1987 federal election, the moderate forces gained some ground inside the party (Nuremberg party conference of Sept. 1986).

3. 1987-1988: Polarization. Collapse of red-green government in Hesse (9 February 1987) leads to a swing towards fundamentalism and increased faction fighting within the party. Formation of Centrist group called 'Aufbruch', but ongoing factional fighting (e.g. conflict over rape legislation). December 1988: predominantly left-wing national executive resigns after it has been asked to do so by a substantial majority of party congress.

4. 1989: Consolidation. In January 1989, the radical AL in Berlin decides to enter into a coalition with the SPD. This signifies a final shift of the internal balance of power towards governmental orientation. It has become clear that the fundamentalist rhetoric of 'pure' opposition has run out of steam and that the Greens are prepared to enter coalitions -- regardless of the ideological predilections of the respective Land organization. The end of this development is marked by the decision of protagonists of the hard left to leave the party (Trampert and Ebermann in April 1990). Soon after, Ditfurth and other leading fundamentalists follow (May 1991).

Decision:

In discussing the situation further with Leech and Poguntke, Harmel decided (9-94) that office should be moved up to second rank beginning in 1989, but that ideology should remain first for the <u>national</u> party. This is because the focus of the data set is the national level of the party organizations, and while office might be ranked first for some land parties, it is not clear that it should be for the national level, at least as of 1992.

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Country:   **Germany**
Party:     **Social Democratic Party** (SPD) - #204
Coder:     Leech
Primary Consultant: Poguntke (9/94)

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We adopt the following coding, as reasoned below:

_____ **1950-57   Ideology, Votes, Office, Democracy**
              **1958-69   Votes, Office, Ideology, Democracy**
              **1970-82   Office, Votes, Ideology, Democracy**
              **1983-92   Votes, Ideology, Office, Democracy**
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Leech's original coding:

>   1950-57 -- Primarily vote-maximizing, followed by
>   ideology office-benefits maximizing, and party democracy.
>   1958-82 -- Primarily vote-maximizing, with office-
>   benefits maximizing second, ideology third, and party
>   democracy last.
>   1983-   -- Primarily vote maximizing, with ideology
>   second, office-benefits third and party democracy last.

Decision:

>   Changes reflected in a comparison of the above orderings were
>   made by Harmel and Leech after consulting with Poguntke (in
>   College Station, 9-94). Leech had originally coded vote-
>   maximizing #1 and ideology #2 for the 1950-57 period, citing
>   literature to support the view that
>
>>   In the early 1950s, the SPD spouted Marxist rhetoric and
>>   made little attempt to appeal to a broad range of voters
>>   (Parness 1991, 50; Kolinsky 1984, 21; Smith 1986, 101;
>>   Padgett and Burkett 1986, 53), but as Parness (1991, 51)
>>   notes, the main goal was still to get elected and lead
>>   Germany (albeit guided by ideology). Ideology is ranked
>>   a strong second, in part because of the SPD's fairly
>>   radical stance and in part because of its refusal to
>>   enter into coalitions with "bourgeois" parties (Padgett
>>   and Burkett 1986, 46). Office benefits are therefore
>>   ranked third. Mentions of party democracy during this
>>   time period are mostly limited to noting that the party
>>   became more democratic later (Kolinsky 1984, 86).
>
>   Poguntke argued that "spouting of Marxist rhetoric" was indeed

consistent with the primary goal of ideology, and that it would be too strong to say that the real primary goal was to get elected.

Leech's argument continues:

> After the SPD's poor showing in the election of 1957, things began to change (Jacobs 1989, 448; note that Paterson 1976, 226 says this process began in 1953), culminating in the Godesberg program in which SPD underwent a "massive reappraisal of its policies" in an attempt to attract voters (Padgett and Burkett 1986, 52; also see Kolinsky 1984, 23; Chalmers 1964, 213; McHale 1983, 1016). The SPD began thinking about how to appeal to other parties as well as to the voters (Smith 1986, 103; Jacobs 1989, 448), and began working toward coalitions (Padgett and Burkett 1986, 51; Jacobs 1989,448), even considering the CDU (Smith 1986, 103).
>
> Again after a poor showing in an election, this time in 1982, the SPD changed its emphasis. This time it became more radical in its views to attract voters that might otherwise vote Green (Jacobs 1989, 451; Padgett and Burkett 1986, 79). The party also refused to grant enough concessions to the FDP to keep that coalition alive (Smith 1986, 103). [Poguntke notes: The FDP would have left the coalition in any case!] That split is seen as an indication of maximizing ideology over office-seeking, although it seems clear that the SPD's commitment to ideology is nowhere near as strong as it seemed to be in the early 1950s. (Note that Padgett and Burkett 1986, 79, and Kolinsky 1984, 94, say that by 1984 the SPD had moderated its tone again, although still with the goal of appealing to the most voters possible.)

Poguntke disagreed with this coding only for the 1970-82 period, when he wondered

> ... whether it would not be more appropriate to code the SPD <u>after</u> the beginning of the Social Liberal coalition right through the end as "office seeking" for the following reasons:
> - there was clear evidence for at least tacit toleration of a "second-vote-campaign" by the Liberals, which means that the SPD was willing to accept a sub-optimal electoral result as long as the <u>coalition</u> won the overall majority.

- there was virtually no deviation from the coalition formulae on the Land level after the pre-existing coalitions had come to an end. This indicates that the SPD was also on the Land level willing to accept/invite co-operation with the FDP.

Primarily for the first of the two reasons, we agree with Poguntke's reasoning, and hence the coding of office as #1 from 1970 through 1982.

Leech's argument ends with this comment, which remains relevant:

Party democracy is ranked last in all periods, but we should note that the literature agrees that the SPD in general puts more emphasis on party democracy than the other old-time German parties. Paterson (1987, 169) says party democracy initially decreased under the Volkspartei model but has increased since the early 1970s. Padgett and Burkett say party democracy increased during periods of opposition (1950-64, 1983-). Neither indicate that the increase was substantial enough to lift party democracy out of last place.

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Country:    **United Kingdom**
Party:      **Conservative Party** -#301
Coder:      Leech

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We adopt Leech's coding:

1950-1992   Office, Votes, Ideology, Democracy

Leech argues:

The Conservative party clearly sees being in office as its primary role and goal (Burch 1980, 159-60; Ingle 1987, 54). The fact that the three general elections the party won between 1979 and 1989 were won with fairly <u>low</u> percentages of the vote (Jacobs 1989, 381) apparently has not disturbed the party; vote-seeking is thus put in second place. Lees and Kimber (1972, 6) make clear that party democracy and policy changes within the party are means to office rather than ends in themselves.

The Conservative party has traditionally not been a very ideological party (Jacobs 1989, 384-85; Ingle 1987, 65; Gilmour 1980, ix; Seyd 1980, 232). Although several authors note a more clear-cut policy image in the party with the rise to power of Margaret Thatcher (Jacobs 1989, 385; Layton-Henry 1980, 1), this change in policy is primarily interpreted as a means of increasing votes (Ingle 1987, 60-61; Patten 1980, 18; Gamble 1980, 41-42; Crewe and Sarlvik 1980, 244-273). Vote-seeking is thus ranked higher than ideology throughout the period of study.

Although the Conservative party is a mass membership party (Jacobs 1989, 4; Gamble 1979, 39) it is not coded as emphasizing party democracy. All important powers are in the hands of the leader (Gamble 1979, 39; Ingle 1987, 67), candidates are selected by party caucus (Lees and Kimber 1972, 79-80), and open debate and divisiveness is strongly discouraged (Jacobs 1989, 383; Ingle 1987, 54).]

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Country:   United Kingdom
Party:     Labour Party - #302
Coder:     Leech

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We adopt Leech's coding:

    1950-51   **Office, Ideology, Democracy, Votes**
    1952-55   **Ideology, Office, Democracy, Votes**
    1956-63   **Ideology, Office, Votes, Democracy**
    1964-70   **Office, Ideology, Votes, Democracy**
    1971-73   **Ideology, Office, Democracy, Votes**
    1974-79   **Office, Ideology, Votes, Democracy**
    1980-92   **Ideology, Democracy, Office, Votes**

Leech argues:

The conflict between Labour's left and right and the Parliamentary and extra-parliamentary parties makes coding difficult. At any given time there are factions of the party that emphasize each one of the four goals; the trick is deciding which is ascendant at a particular time.

It is clear that ideology and office benefits are Labour's two top goals (See especially Jacobs 1989, 392; Borthwick 1979, 54-57, 61). Several authors point out that Labour's ideology assumes that its ideological goals (socialism) can and should be obtained through the parliamentary process (Drucker 1979, 115). But is ideology or office-seeking paramount?

Several authors agree that the parliamentary party, which promotes office benefits over ideology and downplays intra-party democracy, gains the upper hand when there is a Labour government (Jacobs 1989, 392; Borthwick 1979, 56-57; Pelling 1968, 124). Thus I have coded ideology and office as flip-flopping depending on whether or not Labour is in government.

Vote-seeking vs. intra-party democracy also flip-flops depending on whether Labour is in office (since the Parliamentary party fights intra-party democracy as diminishing its powers, see Drucker 1979, 97-98). The exception to this is in the period 1956-63, when the shocks of the losses of 1955 and 1959 led Labour to put more emphasis on vote-seeking (Pelling 1968, 115, 120, 139).

Democracy moves up to second place after 1980, thanks to the party

reforms giving more power to party activists. Several authors have criticized these reforms as <u>undemocratic</u> because the activists aren't elected by Labour voters, while MPs are (Jacobs 1989, 391; Haseler 1980, x). But as McKenzie (1982) (rightly, I think) points out, this ignores the difference between <u>intraparty democracy</u> and the democracy of the political system as a whole. It is the former we are concerned with here. One still could quibble with whether democracy has truly become more important than office benefits, however.

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Country: **United Kingdom**
Party: **Liberal Party** – #303
Coder: Leech

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            [Note: Coded 1950-1987 (after that, see SLD)]

We adopt Leech's coding:

    1950-75   Votes, Ideology, Office, Democracy
    1976-87   Votes, Office, Ideology, Democracy

Leech argues:

Curtice (1988) says directly, and other sources seem to agree, that
the Liberal Party was primarily vote-seeking throughout the period:
"The aim of the Liberal Party ever since the electoral disasters of
the early 1950s has been to regain its major party status" (p. 119)
The party can been interpreted as having used party democracy and
policy change as means to advance the goal of vote-seeking (Lees
and Kimber 1972, 235; Curtice 1988, 116).

Until about 1976 (when Steel became leader), the party seems to
have preferred keeping its policy goals pure to joining another
party in government. Curtice (1988, 114) describes the party as
"wary" of coalitions during the years 1950-74.   The Liberals
rejected chances at ministries or cooperative governments in 1950,
1951 and 1974, (Douglas 1971, 261; Jacobs 1989, 396)

In 1977-78 Steel approved the Lib-Lab pact over some party
objections (Jacobs 1989, 396), then in 1980 encouraged the SDP
breakaway and approved the Alliance (Jacobs 1989, 396). Curtice
(1988, 115) says that by 1979 the Liberals were indicating they
would be prepared to negotiate with either major party, and says
that the major change with the Alliance is more of an emphasis on
governing in its own right. Both emphases would support the
advancement of office-seeking to the No. 2 position.   Still,
Curtice (1988, 119) says that vote-seeking is still the primary
goal, with the party using cooperation with other parties as a
means to that end: "Both these strategies share the aim of
providing a nationwide electoral credibility for the party."

Although the Liberal Party underwent an upsurge in party democracy
after 1974 (Byrd 1987, 221) and although Liberal ideology stresses
participation (Byrd 1987, 223), party democracy remains in last
place throughout the period. The party constitution (Lees and

Kimber 1972, 235, 240) makes clear that the goal of community associations and the participation they engender is to increase votes ("The primary aim of the Association shall be to contest and win Parliamentary Elections" p. 235), while policy advocacy is reserved for the elites on the council (Lees and Kimber 1972, 22). Byrd (1987, p. 223) also says paying lip service to party democracy was easy until the party began to gain power in the 1980s, and cites an example in which Steel overrode the assembly on a defence issue.

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Country:    **United Kingdom**
Party:      **Social Democratic Party** (SDP) - #304
Coder:      Leech

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[Note: Established 1981. Coded 1981-87, afterward see SLD.]

1981-87   Office, Ideology, Votes, Democracy

Leech argues:

The SDP broke away from the Labour Party for ideological reasons
(Jacobs 1989, 396), but almost immediately joined in an alliance
with the Liberals in an attempt to become a contender for
government (Zentner 1982, 115). Zentner (1982, 174), Behrens
(1989, 89), and Ingle (1987, 179-82) all agree that although the
two parties were close ideologically, significant policy
compromises were made to create the Alliance. Therefore office
seeking is coded first, and ideology second.

Vote-seeking is not mentioned explicitly in the literature, but is
placed ahead of party democracy because of SDP's top-down structure
and mode of operation, which seems to minimize participation
(Jacobs 1989, 399; Behrens 1989, 91; Ingle 1987, 174-75, 179).]

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Country:   United Kingdom
Party:     Social Liberal Democrats (SLD) - #305
Coder:     Leech
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                    [Note: Founded 1987]

We adopt Leech's coding:

   1987-92   Office, Votes, Ideology, Democracy

Leech argues:

I could find only two sources in our library dealing with third
parties in Britain after 1987, and most of what <u>they</u> had to say
dealt with the two parties that created the SLD (SDP and Liberals).
I have coded this party based in large part on the coding for the
SDP and Liberals. Putting office seeking first is strongly
supported by the literature (Jacobs 1989, 397; Behrens 1989, 95),
and party democracy makes sense in last place since it is last for
both of the constitutive parties.

Vote seeking and ideology (second- and third-place goals) are more
iffy. I put vote-seeking second since it was second for the
Liberal Party and it seemed unlikely that that goal had been
rejected entirely. That pushes ideology to third place.]

Country: **United States**
Party: **Democratic Party** - #401
Coder: Leech

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We adopt Leech's coding:

>   **1950-71   Votes, Office, Democracy, Ideology**
>   **1972-79   Votes, Democracy, Office, Ideology**
>   **1980-92   Votes, Office, Democracy, Ideology**

Leech argues:

There is little doubt that the two major American parties' primary
role is, as Keefe (1972, 20) puts it, "generating candidates and
electing them to office." The only difficulty in coding is
deciding whether the executive office or votes in general are
primary at a given time, and deciding whether occasional bursts of
party democracy and ideology are ever strong enough to displace
votes or office-seeking.

The literature is little help in deciding between office-seeking
and vote-seeking between 1950-1971, seldom making a distinction
between the two goals. I place vote-seeking first in large part
based on the party's willingness to subordinate office-seeking in
the 1970s. (Note that a conflicting interpretation would say that
office-seeking should be first because "[t]he saying that American
political parties exist only every four years when they select
presidential candidates is particularly true for the Democratic
Party" (Delury 1983, 1129)).

The party's internal reforms in the 1970s were spurred by a desire
to placate factions within the party to avoid losing votes. "We
believe that popular control of the Democratic Party is necessary
for its survival," the McGovern-Fraser reform commission stated
(Crotty and Jacobson 1980, 157). Vote-seeking is thus ranked
first, with party democracy second. Although the reforms never
approached a Die Grunen-style party democracy, mainly involving
power-sharing among party activists, party democracy is still
ranked above office-seeking during this period. This is because
the reforms are seen as having elected a president (Carter) who
could not use the office effectively and as helping cost the
Democrats the presidency in 1980 (Crotty and Jacobson 1980, 231;
Herrnson 1990, 48).

With the loss of the presidency and 34 House seats in the 1980

election, the tide turned on reform (Herrnson 1990, 48). In early 1982 the party's national committees changed the rules to make sure that party office holders and officials would be heavily represented at the conventions (Delury 1983, 1129). The last mid-term convention was held in 1982 (Sabato 1988, 43). Party democracy is thus coded as dropping back to third place.

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Country:   United States
Party:     Republican Party - #402
Coder:     Leech

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We adopt Leech's coding:

    1950-72   Office, Votes, Ideology, Democracy
    1973-92   Votes, Office, Ideology, Democracy

Leech argues:

As with the Democrats, there is little doubt that the primary roles of the Republican party are, as Keefe (1972, 20) puts it, "generating candidates and electing them to office." The only difficulty in coding is deciding whether the executive office or votes in general are primary at a given time, and deciding whether bursts of ideology are ever strong enough to displace either votes or office-seeking.

My choosing office-seeking first until 1972 and then vote-seeking afterward as the primary goal is thus a bit of a coin toss, but it does reflect the greater emphasis the Republican party began to put on funding and providing support for congressional candidates (rather than focusing all energy on the presidency) in the 1970s (Ware 1987, 122; Delury 1983, 1132; Crotty and Jacobson 1980, 163).

Although Ware (1987, 122) says that both parties, and especially the Republican Party, have been becoming more ideological since as far back as the 1950s, and Ware (1987, 137) says that ideology has become more important in the 1980s, there is no support in the literature for the idea that ideology has surpassed vote- or office-seeking as a goal. As Crotty and Jacobson (1980, 172) put it: "And the demands of effective policy making and winning elections may pull members in opposite directions. When they do, party loyalty suffers."

Although the Republican Party, like the Democratic Party, underwent reforms in the 1970, the reforms focused on improving organization and campaign structure, not party democracy (Crotty and Jacobson 1980, 1963). Party democracy is thus coded last throughout the period.