
#201 - Germany: Christian Democratic Union (CDU)

Coder: Gibson (typos corrected by RH/SSh on 2-9-96)

Note: The CDU, like the FDP, has a history of loose geographical ties. Its federal nature means that while the central parliamentary party is very dominant in the Bundestag, it does not control the Lander parties very well. There was a movement from 1969 onward when the party first went into opposition to build up the extra-parliamentary organization's power. However, there are only intermittent references to structural changes designed to equalize the power between the two wings, such as policy groups being set up under the General Secretary. No major moves to enhance accountability of the parliamentary group to the extra-parliamentary organization seem to have been made.

12.01 Candidate Selection

1950-9: 2a

"Constituency candidates must be elected by a secret ballot of either all members of the constituency party or of a selection committee elected from among its members by the the constituency party," i.e. all members or delegates nominate candidates. Land executives can object to, and demand reconsideration of, candidates. This rarely happens however, and constituency parties enjoy a significant degree of autonomy (Urwin, 1974: 140, see also Jacobs, 1989: 450-51).

According to Katz & Mair (Table VI.D.5.b), the national organization has "the right to veto a constituency candidate selected by a members or delegates assembly." However, according to Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94), this is true only for constituency candidates, and not candidates on land lists. Given that vetoes tend not to be exercised in either case, we opt for a "2a" rather than "2b".

12.02 Selection of Parliamentary Leader

1950-1990:1

No specific reference is made to the formal procedure for selecting the Fraktion party leader. Irving, however, states that Barzel was elected leader of the parliamentary party at the same time as Erhard was elected chancellor in 1966 (Irving, 1979: 125). However, Poguntke makes no reference to this in Katz and Mair (1992), Table VI.3.4.b, when listing the functions of the CDU Conference. So it is being assumed that the Fraktion elects its own leader.

In 1973 an attempt was made to distribute power more equally

between parliamentary and the extra-parliamentary organization. Until that year the party chair and the Fraktion chair could be one individual. However, the new General Secretary called for their separation, and the new party chair, Helmut Kohl, was not a member of the Bundestag. Thus, the extra-parliamentary group gained some independence from the parliament. There is no reference to any specific rule change however, and Pridham goes on to talk solely about the separation of the party chair and chancellorship: the "CDU chairmanship was treated for the first time in the party's history as separate from that of the chancellor candidacy" (Pridham, 1977:263 & 211).

12.03 Conformation to Extra-parliamentary Positions 1950-90:1a

The CDU ministers and Chancellor are the controlling force over policy decisions. They form an elite, overruling even the wishes of their Fraktion party colleagues (Irving, 1979:127, Kolinsky, 1984:155, Pridham, 1977:260, Padgett & Burkett, 1986:110). However, they still belong to the parliamentary wing and so will be treated as such. Therefore, while congress is officially the source of all policy, "in practice of course, the congress, which sometimes only meets bi-annually, cannot seriously influence the policies actually pursued by the party." Its main objective is to bring together party leaders so they can see their national leaders in person. The Federal (aka National in 12.06) Executive committee "according to the party statutes, is the most important leading and directing organ in the CDU." However, it is too big to adequately perform this role, and the Praesidium "makes its decisions in the light of the climate of opinion prevailing in the parliamentary party (Irving, 1979:123-124, see also Padgett & Burkett, 1986:111-112).

Despite the fact that from 1972 onward, there was a concerted effort to expand the extra-parliamentary organization's powers in terms of policy making, "The fact remains that...local party organization has little voice..." in policy formulation (Kolinsky, 1984:156). One instance of where the parliamentary group overrode a congressional decision, endorsed by the party chair was when they lobbied for a different candidate for Chancellor in 1979 (Kolinsky:145). This was after the moves to involve more members in policy making had begun in the shape of the 'Basic Programme' and the establishment of a General Secretary in 1967 (Kolinsky:126-7). Though Irving (1979:123) says that congress decisions are "binding" on the Fraktion, Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94) argues that this is a liberal and non-literal statement, and that in fact there is no requirement of conformation. Hence we code as "1a".

12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives

1950-90: 1a

While no references are made to formal measures of discipline, Barzel, Fraktion leader, 1971-3, is stated as employing "tight control" over Fraktion activities (Pridham, 1977:212).

We must remember that because the CDU has allied with the CSU in parliament, this makes enforcement of strict party policy very difficult to ensure (see Padgett & Burkett, 1986:112).

12.05 Rotation Requirements/Tenure Limitations

1950-90:1

No reference is made to any limits on the tenure of parliamentary members.

12.06 Public Policy Positions

1950-90:4

For this variable, it is important to remember that the "Party Law" of 1967 in the Federal Republic required that the party congress occupy the sovereign position in internal party life (Paterson, 1977:183).

"In theory the supreme organ in the CDU is the party congress. It decides on the policy of the party, and its decisions are binding on the Fraktion and on CDU - led governments, whether in Bonn or in the Lander" (Irving, 1979:123 see also Jacobs, 1989:455). It elects the party chair, decides on basic policy guidelines, receives and votes on reports of the National Executive and parliamentary party (Katz & Mair, 1992 VI.D.4.a). The National Executive (party chair, general secretary [1967 onward], Fraktion leader and deputy, Land party chairs, heads of Land government, and federal ministers if CDU) "lead the party according to the decisions of the National Party Congress" (Katz & Mair, 1992:VI.D.2.b.i). The Praesidium (Executive committee), which is composed of the party chair, the Fraktion chair amongst other party officials, implements the National Executive's decisions, and "is in charge of all urgent affairs of that body" (ibid).

Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94) says that the CDU operates essentially as the SPD in this regard. That is, the extraparliamentary party sets the policy "skeleton," while the parliamentary party fills in details on a day-to-day basis.

12.07 Primary Leader of the Party

1950-90: 3b

In the immediate post-war period the party is described by Jacobs as being dominated by its chair, Konrad Adenauer; he was "...an authoritarian leader" (Jacobs, 1989:453ff.). He was also Chancellor and therefore it is not easy to determine which of the two roles made him most dominant. However, as was made clear above, after the party lost the chancellorship in 1969, the party had to build a central party organization from scratch, since

leadership of the party had come from the Chancellor. Currently, the party is still very much Chancellor-oriented, with Helmut Kohl of the CDU occupying that position.

Poguntke (personal communication, 9-7-94) notes that: "When Kohl was elected party leader he was still not in the Bundestag (until 1976). He was nevertheless clearly recognized party leader. I would suggest the following rule: whenever the CDU has a chancellor, he is clearly the party leader. Otherwise, the formal position of extra-parliamentary leader is dominant." Poguntke further suggests that the code of 3b is clearly correct for this case.

#202 - Germany: The Free Democratic Party (FDP)

Coder: Gibson (typos corrected by RH/SSh on 2-9-96)

Note: Overall there is a high degree of parliamentary control over the extra-parliamentary organization at the *federal* level. At the *land* level, "Each land has its own organization, which has a measure of independence from the federal party, especially in the matter of coalition formation." This means that the federal parliamentary group does not control the land parliamentary groups (Delury, 1983:367). "[T]he national FDP is really only a loose federation of the eleven state parties, and there are clearly different traditions and priorities in different parts of the country...there are...different policy priorities in many of the state party organizations" (Broughton & Kirchner, 1984:189-190). An example of the independence of Land and Federal representatives can be seen in the Hesse FDP's decision to join with the CDU/CSU in a governing coalition in 1982. The Federal parliamentary leader, Genscher had already promised that the federal FDP would remain with the SPD until 1984 (ibid: 192). So the parliamentary wing is very strong, but only over federal extra-parliamentary actors, not the regional parliamentary representatives.

12.01 Candidate Selection

1950-90:2a

There are no rules set out. According to the electoral law the constituency members or delegates vote on candidates. There is no rule for national organizational involvement (Katz & Mair, 1992:VI.D.5.d).

12.02 Parliamentary Leadership Selection

1950-90:1

The only reference made to the post of "parliamentary leader" is by Jacobson (1989:467) when he says that the parliamentary party is now led by Mischnick, who is distinct from Lamsdorff, the party chair. No indication is given as to how the the parliamentary leader is selected. Given the overwhelming strength of the parliamentary wing, however, it will be assumed that the parliamentary group is responsible for electing its leader. Aside from an official leader, it seems as though cabinet ministers, of which the FDP has many, play a dominant role in its parliamentary activities. "The prestige to FDP leaders accrues through the holding of government office, and incumbents stay for several years in important ministries" (Delury, 1983:368).

12.03 Conformation to Extraparliamentary Positions

1950-90:1a

"On the surface at least, the FDP's internal structure is similar to that of many other parties. It has established the usual panoply of committees, congress's, and an executive, but the almost constant involvement in government has given the parliamentary party and the leadership elite in particular, an overwhelming degree of authority to take even crucial decisions, without invoking the formal consultative process implied by the party's structure" (Kirchner and Broughton, 1988:68). Basically, the major policy decisions are made and then brought to the party congress to legitimate after the fact (ibid; see also Paterson:171; Padgett & Burkett, 1986:104; Broughton & Kirchner, 1984:193).

Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94) says the same code should be given for the FDP as for the SPD, and that is the "1a" which seems to apply here in any case.

12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives

1950-90:1a

Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94) says that "1a" is the appropriate code here. We had been unable to find enough supporting information to make a reasonable guess for this variable ourselves.

12.05 Rotation Requirement

1950-90:1

No limits on tenure were reported.

12.06 Public Policy Positions

1950-90:4

The party congress is the "supreme organ and determines its policy program" (Day, 1988:222). The highest authority in the FDP is the party congress of 400 delegates (Jacobs, 1989:466). It votes on the report of the National Executive, elects the National Executive, and decides on "all fundamental political and organizational matters" (Katz & Mair, 1992:IV.D.4.d). The party executive exists for day to day business and has a minority of federal parliamentary notables. It makes decisions "about all organizational and political questions along the lines of the party congress and party council decisions" (Katz & Mair, 1992:VI.D.2.d.i). Therefore, in formal terms the party looks as though it relies on the extraparliamentary wing for its policy direction and involves it heavily in setting the daily agenda. Remember that the "Party Law" of 1967 in the Federal Republic required that the party congress occupy the sovereign position in internal party life (Paterson, 1977:183).

12.07 Identity of Party Leader

1950-90:5

The role of "party leader" is referred to often in the literature and it is equated with the party chair. (There is also a secretary general, established in 1969 to strengthen party organization, Paterson, 1977:163). The "party leader" is elected through the party congress; at the 1982 Berlin congress he was challenged by the leader of the FDP at Schleswig Holstein (Broughton & Kirchner, 1984:192)

Whether the party chair has to be a minister or member of the Bundestag is not clear. Mende, Scheel, Genscher, Bangemann, and Lambsdorff have all been party chairs and each held a ministerial position at one stage, but not necessarily before they were elected chair. The challenger to Genscher was a Land party chair and not very well known, but he managed to come within 50 votes of toppling Genscher.

Poguntke (personal communication, 9-7-94) confirms that the party chair is recognized in the rules as ultimate party chair. Hence a code of 5 is appropriate.

#203 - Germany: The Greens (Die Grunen)

Coder: Gibson (typos corrected by RH and SSh on 2-27-96)

[Note: This party is coded through 1992 for most variables, since Poguntke -- by personal communication -- provided the necessary coding support for the additional two years.]

12.01 Candidate Selection

1980-92: 2a

There are no rules established at either the constituency or Land level but the national organization is listed explicitly as having no role by Katz & Mair (1992: Table VI.D.5.e). This means that at the lowest possible level, it is individual members that elect constituency candidates. This default position is presumably the result of the Electoral Law constraints.

12.02 Selection of Parliamentary Leader

1980-92: 1

The Fraktion head is a plural body of three spokespersons which are selected by the Fraktion itself, since they were deselected by them in 1984 (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:181). Their powers are limited; their role is one of coordination and preparation for meetings of the parliamentary party. Their decisions can be opposed by at least three members of the Fraktion and this means then that the "genuine political centre of the parliamentary party is the extended parliamentary leadership which contains also the chairs of the working groups" (Poguntke, 1987:617).

12.03 Conformation to Extra-parliamentary positions

1980-92: 3

The "free will" of MPs is "constitutionally guaranteed" according to the Basic Law of the Federal and Land Governments and can be the basis for court challenges to parties' attempts to mandate MPs' behavior. Therefore, the "imperative mandate" passed on by the Greens' congress and federal council to the parliamentary representatives has no completely binding force (Poguntke, 1987:617). However, on the whole, the extra-parliamentary bodies are adhered to more than in other parties. There is a Federal Committee which makes sure that the Green Fraktion conform to the mandates from the congress. Also, in formulating positions, Green working groups in the Bundestag occupy an important position. They are open to anyone, even non-members, and offer a "participatory shortcut" for the grassroots (Poguntke, 1992:624). Despite all these precautions, however, the Greens, "In practice...[have]...not prevented the parliamentary [wing] from

becoming relatively autonomous from their respective party organizations" (Jacobs, 1989:471). There is not a big enough membership base to make grassroots initiatives, such as the working groups, meaningful (ibid, 619,630). The Federal Committee meets only intermittently, which means that the Fraktion group has a considerable degree of freedom (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:180). Neither the Federal Committee, the Federal Executive, nor the Federal Council, are professionalized, so the Fraktion has greater resources than any of the federal extra-parliamentary organizations. This "large number of highly qualified collaborators provides parliamentary representatives with a considerable advantage in intra-party debates." Also, the Federal Council has no "clearly defined task", and the Federal Executive "has no genuine mandate for political leadership" (Poguntke, 1987:622). Basically, "the Green party head office never stood any chance of counter-acting the enormous organizational dominance of the federal parliamentary party, as soon as the Greens had entered the Bundestag" (Poguntke, 1992:11; see also Poguntke, 1987:620). The extra-parliamentary organization has "no apparatus to screen the activities of the Bundestag." Their dominance is further amplified by the fact that most of the most prominent personalities end up as MPs, not party officials (Poguntke, 1987:620-621).

Significantly, the organizational reforms instituted thus far, have been directed at professionalizing the extra-parliamentary wing "against the domination of the party by its parliamentary group" (Poguntke, 1992:16).

We had originally coded this as "2a," but Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94) argues that would not be strong enough. This is in part because he considers it to be too cynical to say that the provision in the party rules to conform to extraparlimentary positions is largely ignored.

12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives

1980-92:1a

According to Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94):

"expulsion from the parliamentary party is not in the hands of the federal council. According to Sindelfingen decisions, the federal council can issue binding decisions for the parliamentary party. However, jurisdiction about dissenting MPs was always exclusively with the parliamentary party."

12.05 Rotation requirement/Tenure limitations

1980-82:1

1983-86:6

1987-90:5

1991-92:3

Once the party had gained representation in the Fraktion in 1983 it was agreed that members would be rotated every two years and only allowed to be reelected once. However, this rule was

"relaxed" in 1987 for practical purposes and a new limit was introduced. This restricted parliamentary representatives to four year terms, after which they could not seek re-election. However, by 1991 even the four year term restriction was ended, since they now "do not have to take an obligatory break" (Poguntke, 1992:10,14). It had proved impracticable because the substitutes were not able to pick up where their predecessors left off. The replacements were supposed to be trained before assuming their duties; however they could not get the access necessary for doing so, e.g. they could not get into the plenary sessions of the Bundestag (Poguntke, 1987:627).

Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94) says that before there were parliamentary representatives, there was no rule at all. Hence the code of 1 for 1980-82. Then a rule was put in place, which lasted from 1983-86, before the rule gradually crumbled beginning in 1987. "The pragmatic way out of factional stalemate was to accept grass roots democracy and leave it to the Land parties" (Poguntke, personal communication). In 1991, the rotation rule was dropped for the Bundestag, though there was still a term limitation.

12.06 Public Policy Positions

1980-82: 5

1983-90: 4

These generally bubble up from the Land level congresses which have the greatest possible autonomy. Their policy initiatives are extensively discussed and ratified by the Federal Party congress (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:179). These decisions are then binding on parliamentary representatives, who are called upon to justify their decisions at the party congress (Jacobs, 1989:471). There are special delegate conferences called to discuss particularly urgent questions, the decisions about which must be ratified by the entire party (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:179). Party units at the lower level guide the higher party organs: "parliamentarians should not be in position where they could dominate the politics of the party" (Poguntke, 1992:10). Between congresses the Federal Executive operates. This body consists of 17 members who are Land-level politicians but not parliamentary members. Their role is mainly to co-ordinate policy initiatives from the lower level rather than direct policy making (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:179; Jacobs, 1989:471), and to determine the preliminary agenda for the congress (Katz & Mair, 1992:Table VI.D.2.e.i). The Federal Executive is in turn directed by the Federal Council, which is the "highest party body between meetings." It meets at least four times a year, and its decisions are binding on the Executive. It consists of delegates from the Land organizations and the Executive (Katz & Mair, 1992: Table VI.D.2.e.i).

[Note for coding of later years: The separation of office and mandate was a strict rule followed until 1991, when the Federal

Council admitted Land and Federal representatives, i.e. parliamentary representatives can now be full members of extra-parliamentary bodies.]

Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94) points out that once the party had members in the Bundestag, they did, in practice, begin to have a say in policy matters. However, since the "theory" had been that the representatives would not affect policy positions, we code this variable as a "5" for the years before the party had participation in the Bundestag. A "4" seems appropriate thereafter, reflecting "practice" more than "theory."

12.07 Primary Leader of the Party

1980-82:5

1983-90:2

Officially, the primary leaders of the party are the grassroots: the "supreme power within the party organization resides with the 'Basis'" (Poguntke, 1987: 619). However, as was mentioned above, the real power rests with those who formulate the alternatives for them, and as was also mentioned above this process has come to be dominated by the parliamentary party. "The Federal Executive, while it is their mouthpiece, ... has no genuine mandate for political leadership" (ibid:620); it is unprofessionalized, not given media exposure, and lacks resources to research policy alternatives.

[Note: With regard to coding after 1990: The balance may have shifted even more toward the parliamentary group since 1991, since the office/mandate separation was ended for the Federal Council, the body in charge of party affairs between Conferences.]

Since the party was not in the Bundestag from 1980-82, "leadership obviously rested with the extraparliamentary leadership" (Poguntke, personal communication, 9-5-94). But from 1983 until 1990, "leadership fluctuated between parliamentary party and extraparliamentary party depending on the political stature of the members of both bodies." Poguntke argues (personal communication) that, generally speaking, he "would attribute more weight to the parliamentary leadership." From 1990 through 1994, when there were only two east Germans in the Bundestag, leadership "rested clearly with the extraparliamentary leadership."

#204 - Germany: Social Democratic Party (SPD)

Coder: Gibson (types corrected by RH and SSh on 2-27-96)

12.01 Candidate Selection

1950-90: 2a

If a constituency assembly exists "individual members can participate in the election of the constituency candidate" (Katz and Mair, 1992:VI.D.5.a). Constituency and national committees must consult over candidates but "according to electoral law, national committees can only veto constituency candidates;" a second ballot at the constituency level settles the matter (Katz & Mair, 1992: VI.D.5.a). The candidates for the national parliament are proposed by the local party organizations, their choices being subject to control by the upper level of the party hierarchy (Jacobs, 1989:450-451). However, according to Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94), this refers only to the constituency lists, and not to the Land lists.

We give a code of 2a because (1) national ratification is not required for the Land lists, (2) even for the constituency lists, vetoes are in reality virtually nonexistent (Poguntke, personal communication), and (3) second constituency votes can override vetoes when they do occur.

12.02 Parliamentary Leadership Selection

1950-1990: 1

When the party is in power the parliamentary group appears to be led by the Chancellor. In power or not, it is also headed by the Chair of the Fraktion Executive. There is no requirement that they be different individuals, since in 1952 the Fraktion chair = Chancellor candidate = Party Chair (elected by Congress also; Chalmers, 1964:141-2). The Chancellor is nominated by the Party Council (regional party officials and state political leaders, coordinating national and local affairs; Drummond, 1982:5) and elected at the Party Congress (consisting of 300 delegates and members of the Executive, the Fraktion can attend but not vote; Chalmers, 1964:120). The chair of the Fraktion is elected by the SDP members of the Bundestag and they can be changed by members' votes (Chalmers, 1964:116, 144).

The Fraktion executive seems more concerned with discipline (Paterson, 1977:69; Padgett & Burkett, 1986:69) to Praesidium policy initiatives.

12.03 Conformation to Extraparliamentary Positions

1950-90: 1a

The extent to which the SPD Fraktion conforms to party policy depends on whether it forms the government or opposition. "With the SPD in opposition, both the Praesidium and the Executive have concentrated on articulating party policy" (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:68). When the SPD is in power the Praesidium and Executive generally endorse the policies originating with the Chancellor or in government ministries and rally the party around their policies (ibid). SPD chancellors exercise strong control, invoking their electoral mandate to support their view that they should be independent of the party congress (Kolinsky, 1984:92). This governing/non-governing distinction in parliamentary party power carries over to the Land level as well (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:69).

The score of 1a was assigned since there was no reference in the literature to any provision requiring the parliamentary party to follow the congress's decisions. Also, while out of power the extra-parliamentary wing (the Executive and Praesidium) of the party does exert a lot of control over policy, when in government, the ministers assert control.

12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives

1950-90:1a

Since there is no requirement to conform to extra-parliamentary policy, the parliamentary group itself must be taken as administering disciplinary techniques.

The parliamentary group is expected to vote "en bloc" on all important issues and in general "the Bundestag Fraktion is pliant to the party leadership" (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:69). The Fraktion chairman (elected by the Fraktion; Chalmers, 1964:117) heads an exclusive "inner executive" committee which exercises strict control over the activities of individual deputies. When in power his/her cues seem to come from the SPD ministers; they "liaise" over the agenda and brief deputies about legislation (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:69).

12.05 Rotation Requirement

1950-90:1

There is no mention in the literature of any rotation requirement or term limitations.

12.06 Public Policy Positions

1950-90: 4

"The highest statutory authority for the party is its biannual national party congress" (Jacobs, 1989:450; Paterson, 1977:183). This is not surprising however, since "Party Law" of 1967 in the Federal Republic required that the party congress occupy the sovereign position in internal party life (Paterson, 1977:183). However, the "Bundestag Fraktion is organised according to parliamentary procedures and is not covered by party statutes" (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:69).

It "does not often make policy initiatives" though (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:69); it is more concerned with the specific details of policies (Chalmers, 1964:120). This interpretation is supported by Kolinsky who says that the SPD as a party, in contrast to the CDU: "never rescinded its role as a policy creator. Party congresses attempted to sketch the guidelines for SPD chancellors and their ministers" (Kolinsky, 1984:92). It is the Praesidium, elected by the Party Executive (which is in turn elected by Congress), that is responsible for organizing "day to day" business (Jacobs, 1989:450; Paterson, 1977:187). The Praesidium is the "supreme policy and decision-making body of the party." It "lays down general lines of policy for the Fraktion, sets the agenda for the larger Executive and when important occasions arise that require immediate action issues policy statements itself" (Chalmers, 1964:117). The Praesidium is not a truly extra-parliamentary organization however, since it is composed of senior party officials and Bundestag ministers when the SPD is in office. (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:67). Chalmers reports that in 1960 it consisted of 4 party officials and 5 members of the Bundestag (Chalmers, 1964:117).

12.07 Primary Leader of the Party

1950-90:3b

References in Jacobs show the party chair to be a powerful figure in party life (Jacobs, 1989:448ff). Schumacher, Ollenhauer, Brandt, and Schmidt were all major figures in the party's development.

Paterson (1977:191), in discussing "leadership" of the party, discusses these figures and their styles and explicitly points to "Brandt's style as *party chairman*" being "an exceptionally loose one" (*italics added*).

However, there is evidence that once an individual became the Federal Chancellor he exercised more leadership. Helmut Schmidt, Paterson goes on to say, "displayed a tendency to regard the party as an appendage to his office" (Paterson, 1977:184). Paterson says that Schumacher used his authority as Party Chairman until the Bundestag was established and then "relied more on his position as parliamentary leader" (Paterson, 1977:184).

Gordon Smith (1989:68-69) says that German parties have been characterized as having a "dualistic structure of leadership" where "a party's serving chancellor or chancellor candidate is not also necessarily the party leader." Brandt, when he became chancellor in 1969, "had already led the SPD for several years, but after he resigned as chancellor in 1974 in favour of Schmidt, Brandt retained the party leadership [i.e. as party chair] in fact holding the post right up to 1987." Schmidt's autonomy actually "isolated him in the party" rather than giving him more authority.

According to Poguntke (personal communication, 9-7-94), the extraparliamentary chair is officially the leader. However, when the party holds the chancellorship, the chancellor is effectively the leader. When the party does not hold the chancellorship, the party chair is effectively leader. Hence, a code of 3b is called for.