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**#101 - Denmark: Center Democrats (CD)**

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Coder: Gibson (revised 2-23-93 by RH/RG; again 12-1-95 by RH/SSH; codes and descriptions for 12.03 and 12.04 were altered by RH/RG on 3-16-96)

**Note 1:** "The party's organization reflects its leaders' belief that political power should be left with the voters and the elected parliamentarians rather than with the party activist" (Jacobs, 1989:53). Given this statement, where information was lacking in the literature, the score indicating maximum parliamentary control was given initially. Since that time, additional information has been provided by Lars Bille (2/93).

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1973-90: 2a**

"The party's candidates for the Folketing are chosen by postal ballot among the party's members in each Amt, in order to avoid giving too much power to the local branch activists." Once the candidates have been selected their order on the ballot is determined according to the number of personal votes they receive. (Jacobs, 1989:53) In Katz and Mair (1992), Bille notes that while the national level may comment on potential candidates for the constituency level's list, "a ballot is held among the members in the region" to make the final nominations. There is no further ratification process. Though there was a minor change in the national party's role (in 1977; Katz and Mair, Table IV.D.5.e), the overall code for this variable remains the same.

**12.02 Parliamentary Leadership Selection****1973-90: 1**

Pederson says that of the 5 parties to enter the Parliament in 1973 all except the Justice Party faced building an organization from scratch. This left the local campaign activists to coopt local "notables" into leadership positions for the 1973 election (Pederson, 1987:39). Bille (2/93) confirms that the leadership of the parliamentary group is selected by the parliamentary party alone, and that this was integrated into party rules after 1973.

**12.03 Conformation to Extraparliamentary Positions****1973-90: 1b**

There is no reference to requirements that the parliamentary group follow extraparliamentary positions. The party's national congress cannot pass binding resolutions on matters of policy. (Jacobs, 1989:53) In fact, it is the parliamentary group that we deemed to be totally responsible for formulating the party's positions on

public policy. (See Variable 12.06.)

#### **12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives**

**1973-90: 1b**

There are no formal discernible techniques for disciplining representatives, but Bille (2/93) indicates that in practice, it is actually the parliamentary group itself that administers discipline. In fact, it is the parliamentary group that we deemed to be totally responsible for formulating the party's positions on public policy. (See Variable 12.06.)

#### **12.05 Rotation Requirement/Tenure Limitation**

**1973-90: 99**

"The party has a rule that any elected Folketing member has the right to be a candidate in subsequent elections, even if not chosen by party members in the postal ballot. This is to allow voters and not the party organization to judge. In practice this rule has never had to be applied." (Jacobs, 1989:53) According to Bille (2/93) law requires reselection between elections.

#### **12.06 Public Policy Positions**

**1973-90: 1**

"The party's national congress is held once a year. The national congress cannot pass binding resolutions on matters of policy..." (Jacobs, 1989:53). There are however, two smaller bodies beyond the congress, the National Council and the Executive. Neither is dominated by the parliamentary group, the latter seems more important since it is smaller and meets once a month. (Thomas, 1987:284) Bille (2/93) confirms that the code of "1" is appropriate, adding that among the Danish parties, it is the Center Democrats who are most clear on this point, publicly proclaiming the parliamentary group's independence.

#### **12.07 Primary Leader of the Party**

**1973-1990: 5**

According to Bille (2/93), the ranking of the leaders has always followed this order in the Center Democrats: #1, party chairman; #2, parliamentary group leader; #3, national chairman. Hence, the code of 5 is appropriate. It is the party chair position that has been held by Jacobsen and then Jacobsen's daughter.

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**#102 - Denmark: Christian People's Party (KrF)**

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Coder: Gibson (with typos corrected by RH/SSh on 1-22-96)

A national chair existed first, then after the party gained seats in 1973, a parliamentary leader emerged, but no details as to how are given (Jacobs, 1989:57).

It is a party formed around a specific grievance, the moral decline of Danish society. Therefore, its representatives have a very clear mandate when elected. This would lead one to expect that on certain key issues, such as abortion, conformity to the party principles is required, but on other issues they would be allowed more flexibility. Jacobs supports this when he says that on economic matters they are not strongly ideological (Jacobs, 1989:58). Overall then, I think that we can expect that the extraparliamentary wing will be stronger than the parliamentary wing. Because the party has never achieved significant representation in the Folketing, one can expect that this wing does not hold a great deal of power.

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1970-90: 2b**

According to Table IV.D.5.d, "The nomination takes place in a meeting where all members in the constituency can vote... The national committee shall approve the proposed candidate before a nomination. Can add names to the list."

**12.02 Selection of the Parliamentary Leader****1970-90: 1**

A position of parliamentary chair exists, separate from the national chair. However, no indication is given of how this person is selected. Bille confirms (2/93).

**12.03 Conformation to Extraparliamentary Positions****1970-90: 2b**

According to Bille (2/93), there is no formal provision on this in the rules, but in practice, the extraparliamentary party adopts manifestos and broad political statements on specific issues. These are expected to be followed by the parliamentary party.

**12.04 Discipline****1970-90: 1a**

According to Bille (2/93), there is no formal provision in the rules on this, but in practice, it is the parliamentary group itself that administers discipline.

**12.05 Rotation Requirement****1970-90: 99**

According to Bille (2/93), reselection between elections is required by law.

**12.06 Public Policy Positions****1970-90: 3**

Bille (2/93) indicates that the appropriate code is probably 3, but it could be a 2. However, information in Katz and Mair, Table IV.D.4.d, supports the conclusion that the extraparliamentary party (both through the conference ("the highest authority on policy..."), the national committee, and the national executive) has the upper hand in policy making/implementation.

**12.07 Identity of Party Leader****1970-90: 3a**

It would seem that the national chair is more dominant in party affairs than the parliamentary chair. He is the one referred to in Jacobs' section on "Personalities," (Jacobs, 1989:58). It is unclear whether this is a function of the smallness of the parliamentary wing, or statutory decree. Bille (2/93) indicates that this changes over time, depending on personalities and on whether the chair of the national party is also an MP. From 1991 until 1993, "it is divided."

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**#103 - Denmark: Conservative People's Party (Conservative; KF)**

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Coder: Gibson (typos corrected, and code for 12.07 added, by RH/SSh on 1-22-96)

**Note 1:** Speaking generally, Jacobs (1989:43) notes that the parliamentary group "...enjoys great freedom of manoeuvre" from the annual national congress, which cannot bind it in any way. Initially, this was taken to indicate a high level of parliamentary autonomy. Hence, where information was not available, the value of the highest degree of parliamentary control tended to be applied. Since the initial coding, Lars Bille has been consulted (2/93) and has provided additional information which was used to revise the initial codes.

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1950-90: 2a**

Candidates are chosen through local ballots or at party meetings (Jacobs, 1989:44).

According to Elder et al (1988:149), "in the event of a parliamentary vacancy the next person on the party list (or the next most popular person bearing the party label) moves up to fill the place."

Members of the European Parliament (MEP's) are chosen by the national representatives assembly. Candidates are put forward by the Amts and subject to recommendation by the party leaders (Jacobs, 1989:44).

In Katz and Mair (1992), Table IV.D.5.g, Bille says that individual members "propose and elect," and candidates are actually elected at a nomination meeting where all members are allowed to attend. From at least 1971 to 1989 (when this provision was dropped), the national committee was "entitled to call for a meeting in the regional organization and members of the National Committee may attend the meeting." We are assuming that this did not mean that ratification by the national level was required.

**12.02 Parliamentary Leadership Selection****1950-90: 1**

A leader does exist; the "Folketing group has a separate chairman." "The Parliamentary group has an elected chair." He/She can also be party leader and chief spokesperson, e.g. Poul Schluter. "Leadership of the party and leadership of the parliamentary group are strictly separate" (Stammen, 1980:136 n18).

In the absence of any specific reference a score of 1 was assigned; see Note 1.

Lars Bille confirms that this is the appropriate code (2/93).

### **12.03 Conformation to Extraparliamentary Positions**

#### **1950-90: 2b**

No information provided. However, given that the Parliamentary group plays a strong role in formulating public policy and that some extraparliamentary control is exerted, a score of 2b (no requirement to follow ex.parl. party) was given.

Bille (2/93) indicates that while there is no formal provision to this effect in the rules, there is a strong and clear expectation of conformation.

### **12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives**

#### **1950-90: 1a**

"There is a strong tradition of party discipline in each of the Nordic Parliaments which is enforced more by group loyalties than by a whip system, although the Norwegian and some of the Finnish parties each have an official...whip. Party groups meet each day in Denmark during the session, and a member who disagrees with his party's line is expected to give notice at this meeting rather than spring it publicly on his colleagues" (Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988:129). This could mean that the party disciplines members for not following extra-parliamentary guidelines. However, given the strong role that the parliamentary group has, it is assumed to administer its own discipline.

Bille (2/93) confirms that this is the proper code.

### **12.05 Rotation Requirement/Tenure Limitation**

#### **1950-90: 99**

Law requires reselection between elections (Bille, 2/93).

### **12.06 Public Policy Positions**

#### **1950-90: 2**

While the parliamentary group seems to enjoy a high degree of autonomy from the national organization in the form of the congress, it does have to go through the National Council to have its policies approved.

"At national level there is an annual national congress (landsradet), in which around 1500 delegates take part. Its resolutions are not binding on the Conservative parliamentary group, which enjoys great freedom of manoeuvre" (Jacobs, 1989:44).

"The Folketing group has a separate chairman, and it is the group which does most of the preparatory work on policy matters, subject to the final ratification of the national council" (Fitzmaurice, 1981:113).

"The parliamentary group proposes directions for party policy for debate by the national council, a relatively large body which is the party's highest authority in political matters" (Delury, 1983:253). "The supreme organ is the national council...representing largely the local party districts in proportion to Conservative votes at the last election" (ibid; see also Day & Degenhardt, 1984:95 for reference to supremacy of the National Council).

Lars Bille confirms that this is the appropriate code (2/93).

### **12.07 Primary Leader of the Party**

**1950-1981:2**

**1982-1990:4**

Bille (8/94) says that by convention, but not officially, the parliamentary group chairperson is the de facto leader of the party. When the party joins government, the parliamentary chair resigns his/her position and joins the cabinet. However, the same person remains de facto the leader of the party, even though a different parliamentary chair is chosen. In cases where multiple cabinet posts are held, and the prime ministership is one of those posts, the prime minister becomes the party leader. In cases where multiple posts other than prime ministership are held, the former parliamentary group chair remains the party leader.

In 1982, Poul Schluter, who had earlier been elected chairman of the extra-parliamentary group, became prime minister. He also became the de facto leader of the party, according to convention. This is reflected in the code change in 1982. Note, however, that the change in 1982 did not mean a shift in power from the parliamentary to the extra-parliamentary wing of the party.

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**#104 - Denmark: Left Socialist Party (VS)**

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Coder: Gibson (typos corrected and code for 12.07 added by  
RH/SSh on 1-22-96)

**Note 1:** The Left Socialists were founded in 1967 so their scores will run from 1967-90.

**Note 2:** There was very little information in English about this party. However, Delury notes that they are "skeptical of the parliamentary and state institutions" and concentrate instead on pursuing their "revolutionary socialist aims in workplaces". (Delury, 1983:261; Fitzmaurice, 1981:110). This would seem to indicate that their principal policy articulation does not come from the parliamentary group and that it is very much more focused on extra-parliamentary activity and goals. This is endorsed by Jacobs who says "The party's former Folketing group was subject to strict control from party activists" (Jacobs, 1989:50). Therefore, when no information was available the score indicating the highest degree of extraparliamentary control was assigned.

Also, VS was a break-away from the Socialist People's Party which it felt had deserted its socialist principles. This party is described by Jacobs as being "particularly characterized by the tighter accountability of its parliamentary group to the national party organization than in most other Danish parties" (see #109 Parliamentary vs. Extraparliamentary Coding).

Lars Bille was consulted and provided more information in February, 1993.

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1967-90: 99 (missing)**

No information available.

**12.02 Parliamentary Leadership Selection****1967-90: 1**

Bille (2/93) indicates that it is the parliamentary group that selects the parliamentary group's leader.

**12.03 Conformation to Extraparliamentary Positions****1967-90: 3**

Given the strict degree of control exercised over the Folketing group referred to numerous times in the literature a score of 3 was given indicating that they are required to conform to extraparliamentary positions and that this is effectively enforced. Bille confirms this code (2/93).



## **12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives**

**1967-90: 3**

Although Elder et al. report that "There is a strong tradition of party discipline in each of the Nordic Parliaments which is enforced more by group loyalties than by a whip system, although the Norwegian and some of the Finnish parties each have an official...whip. Party groups meet each day in Denmark during the session, and a member who disagrees with his party's line is expected to give notice at this meeting rather than spring it publicly on his colleagues" (Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988:129). The unusually strong control exercised by the extraparliamentary group and its break off status from the Socialist People's Party in which the mass party expelled Folketing representatives indicates that a score of 3 is appropriate.

Bille suggests that this could be a toss-up between 3 and 1a, depending on what relative weights would be assigned to what is stated formally and what is done in practice. Ultimately, it is always the parliamentary group that makes the decision to carry out discipline, however (2/93).

## **12.05 Rotation Requirement/Tenure Limitation**

**1967-90: 6**

Jacobs reports that "The principle of rotation was...established" (Jacobs, 1989:63). While no reference is made to whether or not it was closely or loosely followed, the strictness of extraparliamentary vigilance in general was taken to mean that it would be adhered to.

## **12.06 Public Policy Positions**

**1967-90: 4**

Jacobs reports that the extra-parliamentary organization is structured such that there is a National Congress, with delegates from the party branches, a National Board of 21 members elected from the Congress, and an Executive Committee which is elected from the Board. No information is provided on the roles of these bodies, or how much influence the parliamentary group has upon them. However, they all are selected directly (Congress) or indirectly (the Board and the Executive) by the grass roots party organization, and given Note 1 that the Folketing group are strictly controlled by party activists a score of 5, indicating total control by the extraparliamentary organization, was given initially.

Bille argues, however, that a 4 is the more appropriate code throughout the period, because although the parliamentary group has no formal authority for taking policy positions, the extraparliamentary organization was at times unable to provide a unanimous and/or completely clear directive to the parliamentary group, thus giving it some room in which to play (2/93).

**12.07 Primary Leader of the Party****1967-90: 5**

Bille (8/94 tape) says that the extra-parliamentary leadership is officially the party leadership, so the code of 5 is appropriate. However, it should be noted that the extra-parliamentary leadership is collective (i.e., more than one person) by the National Executive.

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**#105 - Denmark: Liberal Party (Venstre; V)**

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Coder: Gibson (slight alterations made by RH/SSh on 1-22-96)

**Note 1:** Thomas (1988:299) says "Generally speaking, in setting policy priorities, the parliamentary leadership of Venstre appears to be under less constraint from the rest of the party than the Radicals' leaders, whose national assembly can often be highly critical of parliamentary policy developments if they conflict with the views of party activists."

**Note 2:** This is supported when Jacobs and Fitzmaurice report that there was no central party organization until 1929; however Jacobs and Thomas say that they have always had strong local organizations (Jacobs, 1989:47; Fitzmaurice, 1981:112; Thomas, 1988:282). Thomas says that it is more decentralized than the Radical Liberals (ibid:283).

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1950-72:3c****1973-90:2a**

County organizations nominate parliamentary candidates, according to Thomas (1988:283).

In Katz and Mair (Table IV.D.5.f), Bille says that until 1973, the decision was made solely by the regional and/or constituency organizations. Beginning in 1973, "a majority on a constituency meeting can decide to hold a ballot among the members." Although the latter is only an option, we feel justified in coding the change from 3c to 2a in 1973.

**12.02 Parliamentary Leadership Selection****1950-90:1**

The national chair is usually the party leader and the position is often combined with chairmanship of the parliamentary group. (Thomas, 1988:284) This person is directly elected by the national conference.

Bille (2/93) indicates that the parliamentary leader is selected by the parliamentary group.

It is likely that both are true: that is, the national chair is selected by the national assembly and the parliamentary leader by the parliamentary group, and they are usually the same person. This would still justify the code of 1.

**12.03 Conformation to Extraparliamentary Positions****1950-90:2b**

This coding is based on Bille's comments (2/93) that there is strong expectation, though it is not present in the rules.

## **12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives**

### **1950-90:1a**

While there were no specific references to disciplinary techniques and who administered them, Thomas (1988) provides a table showing the degree of cohesion among parliamentary representatives in the Danish Folketing by party. Venstre ranks beneath SF, SD and RV and the Conservative party, although its unity is still very high: 94.9% for 1953-5, 96.7% for 1971-9. This, Thomas says, indicates that the breaks in Venstre's discipline were more major and comprehensive than just one or two individuals (Thomas, 1988:282). Katz and Mair, Table IV.D.2.f, says that the national committee "Has the right to expel party organizations or members."

Bille in person (2/93) indicated that a 1a would be appropriate. Though further checking would be required to confirm this, it could be that expulsion is hardly ever (if ever) used, and hence the disciplinary techniques that are actually employed are carried out by the parliamentary group itself.

## **12.05 Rotation Requirement/Tenure Limitation**

### **1950-90: 99**

Law requires reselection between elections.

## **12.06 Public Policy Positions**

### **1950-90:3**

"The national meeting decides the party program..." (Delury, 1983:254). It meets once a year and consists of constituency representatives, the National Executive (50-60 members, mostly local party activists; see Jacobs:47), the Folketing and European parliamentary group, ministers and parliamentary candidates, and other extra-parliamentary actors (Delury, 1983:254). There are about 700-800 representatives in total, (Jacobs:47). "Congress is the supreme authority" (Fitzmaurice, 1981:112).

Thomas says that ideas come from the constituency level but that the national assembly is the decisive authority on party policy. They can hold "extraordinary meetings if necessary" (Thomas, 1988:283).

The Executive Committee is the next authority down in terms of policy (Delury:254). It consists of 11 members, including the party chair, vice-chair, treasurer and chair of the Folketing group (Jacobs:47). It is charged with discussing policy and negotiating with the parliamentary group on policy matters (Delury:254).

Bille (2/93) indicates that while the party organization does write the manifestos, etc., the parliamentary group has some leeway. However, the latter is limited by a clear expectation that the parliamentary group will act in accordance with the extraparliamentary organization's directives. (He suggested that a value of 2 could be appropriate, but we feel that would be going too far. We prefer his second choice, a "3".)

**12.07 Identity of Party Leader****1950-90:5**

The party chair is the party's national leader (Jacobs, 1989:47).  
(See also 12.02 above.)

Bille concurs that the extraparliamentary chair is leader (8/94).

***Corrective for 2000 printing: Though 1973 was originally assigned as the beginning date for the following codes, all are actually applicable from the 1972 founding date of the Progress Party.***

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## **#106 - Denmark: Progress Party (F)**

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Coder: Gibson (typos corrected by RH/SSh on 1-22-96; 12.03 and 12.04 were altered by RH/RG on 3-16-96)

**Note 1:** The parliamentary group is very strong in the Progress Party. An official organization did not exist at first. Glistrup, the founder of the party did not want any structures at the national or local levels. This gave the parliamentary group, de facto, all the decision making power, as individuals. Since Glistrup was jailed from 1984 to 1987, the extraparliamentary organization was built up, but as of 1987 the parliamentary group was still in a dominant position. Thus, when information is lacking the score indicating the highest degree of parliamentary autonomy was given.

### **12.01 Candidate Selection**

#### **1973-90:4**

The ultimate selection of candidates is made at the national level, by the "Main Board." They can change the nominating rules for candidates in constituencies and veto nominations (Harmel & Svasand, 1989:27; Pederson, 1987:39). Initial selection is made at the lower levels first by the party organization. Bille (2/93) concurs. Even though this is apparently the procedure that is followed, Katz and Mair (1992, Table IV.D.5.h), says that "there are no rules as regards candidate selection for national election in the central party rules." (This assumes that at the constituency level, it is the organization and not the entire membership that is acting.)

### **12.02 Selection of Parliamentary Leader**

#### **1973-90:1**

A separate parliamentary chair exists, distinct from the national party organization chair (Harmel & Svasand, 1989:28). However, until Glistrup's jail term in 1984 he was the effective party leader in all respects. Although he was never elected as the parliamentary leader he enjoyed a lifetime position on the Main Board (Harmel & Svasand, 1989:27). By the time he returned in 1987 the party had another parliamentary spokesperson. No reference is made to selection procedures but given the strength of the parliamentary group in the organization a score indicating selection by parliamentary members only was given initially. Bille (2/93) concurs.

### **12.03 Conformation to Extraparliamentary Positions**

#### **1973-90: 1b**

The parliamentary group is in control. References to discipline and the statutory position of the convention make it apparent that there are limits on the positions that they can adopt, but the parliamentary group dominates the convention, and no reference is made to extra-parliamentary discipline techniques. In fact, it is the parliamentary group that we deemed to be totally responsible for formulating the party's positions on public policy. (See Variable 12.06.)

Bille (2/93) indicates that the party is now moving toward a "2b", but that it would be premature to indicate that the new expectation has been "routinized" already.

### **12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives**

#### **1973-90: 1b**

Party discipline only applies to the most fundamental points in the party program; on other issues each MF and each party member is free to decide (Fitzmaurice (in Henig, ed.), 1979:41). No reference was made to how the discipline is effected but given the strength of the parliamentary group generally, it was assumed that it administered its own techniques. In fact, it is the parliamentary group that we deemed to be totally responsible for formulating the party's positions on public policy. (See Variable 12.06.)

Bille (2/93) confirms that this coding is correct.

In Katz and Mair (1992, Table IV.D.2.h), it is noted that the national committee "has the right to expel members." (See discussion under 12.04 for Venstre.)

### **12.05 Rotation Requirement/Tenure Limitation**

#### **1973-90: 99**

Reselection between elections is required by law.

### **12.06 Public Policy Positions**

#### **1973-90: 1**

"Although the party statutes stipulate that the national convention is 'the party's highest authority' there is actually very little said about its role." Its agenda is set by the Main Board; this body makes the policy decisions and its members include parliamentary group representatives. In fact this group controls its decisions (Harmel & Svasand, 1989:26-7). The Main Board is elected by the congress but structural links made it possible for the central committee (Main Board) to control the congress and thus its own composition (Pederson, 1987:39). They also command the purse, thus acting as an efficient check on the national organization (Pederson, 1989:40). Therefore the parliamentary group is assumed to control the policy positions adopted by the party.

*Addendum for 2000 printing:*

*The following language supporting the code of 2 for variable 12.07 was not included in the original data book produced in May of 1996, and corrects faulty information that was provided in that edition. The corrective language was developed by Harmel after consultation with Lars Bille in Copenhagen on April 30, 1999. Though the coding is not affected, the supporting information is different.*

**12.07 Identity of Party Leader**

**1972-90: 2**

*De jure*, the party chair is the head of the national organization. *De facto*, this has never been the case. First the founder, Mogens Glistrup, was undisputed primary leader of the party, and this was the case until he went to prison in 1984. For the next five years (including the period when Glistrup was jailed) Folketing group chair Helge Dohrman and Folketing (technically: “political”) spokesperson Pia Kjaersgaard effectively shared control of the party. This was the case until Dohrman died in 1989 and Kjaersgaard, still from her position as political spokesperson, took control alone. Though Glistrup was never chair of the Folketing group (and was spokesperson only in 1976 (co-) and 1984), he was leader as the party’s founder, but was operating primarily from his position within the Folketing group. Though Kjaersgaard was never Folketing group chair, she was operating as primary leader from her position as the group’s spokesperson. Hence, it seems to us that it is most reasonable to assign the code of “2” throughout the period 1972-90. (Rejustified by Bille and Harmel, 4/30/90; see also Bille, 1997, p. 386.)



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**#107 - Denmark: Social Liberals (Radical Liberals; RV)**

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Coder: Gibson (typos corrected by RH/SSh on 1-29-96; RH/RG altered 12.03 (from 1a to 1b) on 3-16-96)

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1950-69: 99 (missing)****1970-90: 2a**

Constituency associations nominate parliamentary candidates (Thomas, 1987:284; Pederson, 1987:32).

Katz and Mair (1992), Table IV.D.5.c, says that from 1962 to 1970, there were no rules governing this at all. Then, beginning in 1970, individual members (i.e., as a group) were given responsibility for proposing and electing. Under constituency organization, Katz and Mair says "The nomination takes place in a general meeting. All members have the right to vote."

**12.02 Parliamentary Leadership Selection****1950-90: 1**

"The party's parliamentary group chooses its own chairman, who is normally the political leader of the party (unless its political leader is a government minister)" (Jacobs, 1989:50).

Bille (2/93) concurs. (See also Katz and Mair (1992), Table IV.D.4.c, Note.)

**12.03 Conformation to Extra-parliamentary Positions****1950-90: 1b**

There is no requirement that the parliamentary group conform to extraparliamentary programs.

The national party organization cannot bind their decisions in any way (Jacobs, 1989:50). Though no explicit statements were found to indicate that party rules permit the parliamentary group to formulate policy, we inferred from other information that it is the parliamentary group that is totally responsible for formulating the party's positions on public policy. (See Variable 12.06.) Hence, a code of 1b is appropriate.

**12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives****1950-90: 1b**

No discernible techniques of discipline were discovered.

Given our code in 12.06, the code of 1b is appropriate here. Bille (2/93) concurs.

**12.05 Rotation Requirement/Tenure Limitation****1950-90: 99**

Law requires reselection between elections.

## **12.06 Public Policy Positions**

### **1950-90: 1**

The National Congress is the highest political and organizational authority (Day & Degenhardt, 1984:96). The National "Assembly" is the highest authority and only delegates can vote. However, it meets only once a year and between then the Executive acts as ultimate authority. This body consists of about 100 members, the proportion of Folketing representatives being about 4% (Thomas, 1987:284). However, "...the parliamentary group is given great freedom of manoeuvre by the national party organization, which cannot bind its decisions in any way" (Jacobs, 1989:50). The extraparliamentary group "rely heavily on the parliamentary group" (Thomas, 1987:283). The role in policy making of the National "conference" is "approving programs" (Fitzmaurice, 1981:114). Following the "old" pre-war party mould the party organization "played a secondary role in relation to the parliamentary party...the opinion of the parliamentary party would prevail...not the party organization..." which did not interfere with national politics (Pederson, 1987:33).

Katz and Mair (1992), Table IV.D.4.c, says that the national conference, beginning in 1974, has had responsibility to "discuss the political plan of the parliamentary group for next year."

Bille (2/93) confirms that 1 is probably the correct code for now, though the party may be moving in the direction of "2."

## **12.07 Primary Leader of the Party**

### **1950-90: 2**

Bille (2/93) indicates that by tradition (though it is probably not in the rules), the chair of the parliamentary group is the recognized leader of the party.

NOTE: There are two conflicts in the literature:

1. Regarding the status of the parliamentary leader: Pederson says that the leader in Parliament "in those days (1950s)...was generally also chairman of the national organization" (1987:33). Thomas, however, says the chair of the Assembly and Executive "is not normally a member of parliament..." (1987:284) and cites Tagholt (1971:130).

2. Regarding the voting rights of Folketing members at National Assemblies: Pederson says they "participated" (1987:33), and Thomas says that "...only constituency delegates may vote" (1987: 284).

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**#108 - Denmark: Social Democratic Party (SD)**

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Coder: Gibson (typos corrected by RH/SSh on 1-29-96)

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1950-90: 2b**

Thomas reports that in 1969 a deliberate decision was made to open the party to initiatives from constituency-level associations. This meant allowing local branches to nominate another candidate for parliamentary seat, whereas before decisions must have been made at the top (Thomas, 1977:259).

Candidates for the Folketing are chosen by ballot or meetings within electoral districts. The party now generally follows the system which gives the seats to the candidate who got the most popular votes, rather than by place on a party list (Jacobs, 1989:36; Fitzmaurice, 1981:107).

Katz and Mair (1992, Table IV.D.5.b) indicates that until 1969, the decisions were made at meetings where all members could participate, at the constituency level. After 1969, the option of a postal ballot is introduced. Throughout both periods, "all nominated candidates must be approved by the national committee." (In other words, the change that occurred in 1969 apparently would not result in a different code for this variable.)

**12.02 Parliamentary Leadership Selection****1950-90:1**

There is a position for a Folketing Chair (Jacobs, 1989:36). The Congress is listed specifically as electing the party chair, vice-chair and secretary. No mention is made of the parliamentary leader.

According to Bille (2/93) the parliamentary group alone selects the Folketing chair, officially, but by tradition and by "unwritten rule," the parliamentary group **always** selects the party leader who was chosen by the party conference (except when the party is in power). In 1987, when there was retirement from the combined leadership position, there was a split in the party that was solved by breaking up the two leadership positions. This lasted until 1991, when the original "unwritten rule" was again understood and followed.

Bille suggests using a code of 4 until 1987, then a "1", and then a "4" again after 1991 (Bille, 2/93). However, to be consistent with our coding of this variable for the Venstre party, we have chosen to give a "1" throughout the period.

**12.03 Conformation to Extraparliamentary Positions****1950-90: 2b**

No specific reference was found to regulations requiring

conformation. Bille (2/93) indicates that this is not included in the rules, but that there is a clear and strong expectation that the extraparliamentary organization's positions will be followed by the Folketing group.

#### **12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives**

##### **1950-90: 1a**

The party is noted for its tight discipline and cohesion (Thomas, 1977:259).

Elder et al (1988) report that "There is a strong tradition of party discipline in each of the Nordic Parliaments which is enforced more by group loyalties than by a whip system, although the Norwegian and some of the Finnish parties each have an official...whip. Party groups meet each day in Denmark during the session, and a member who disagrees with his party's line is expected to give notice at this meeting rather than spring it publicly on his colleagues" (Elder, Thomas and Arter, 1988:129). Katz and Mair (1992), Table IV.D.2.b.ii, says that the national executive "Can expell members and must confirm all expulsions." However, Bille (2/93) suggests that "1a" is the appropriate code, such that the parliamentary group itself administers discipline. The only way to understand these two statements together is to assume that expulsion is hardly ever (if ever) used, and all other discipline is carried out by the group itself.

[Note: the level of confidence for this code is lower than for that of other variables.]

#### **12.05 Rotation Requirement/Tenure Limitation**

##### **1950-68: 99**

##### **1969-90: 2**

We assume that until 1969 the party was covered by the same law that required reselection between elections for all other parties. In 1969 major organizational changes occurred which transferred decisions concerning renomination to the basic level of the party. These included rules that candidates be renominated annually in each constituency so that they remain in touch with their electorate (Thomas, 1977: 243; Elder et al, 1988:125). However, existing candidates are automatically renominated unless 25 members of the nomination district propose another, then a vote must take place (Thomas, 1977:243).

Also, restrictions are placed upon parliamentary members in that they cannot hold seats in the Folketing, the European Parliament, and local or county level (Delury, 1983:257; Fitzmaurice, 1981:107).

#### **12.06 Public Policy Positions**

##### **1950-90:4**

The Party Congress meets every 4 years; it approves the party's program of principles after debate in the branches (Delury, 1983:257). This role of the locally based policy making structure is confirmed by Elder et al; internal rules allow party branches to take policy initiatives (Elder et al, 1988:125). Congress is the

"supreme policy making body of the party..."; in 1973 it called for the drawing up a new program by 1977, the next meeting. A drafting committee was set up by the national executive (national party organization leaders, Amt representatives, the Folketing chair, plus other ex officio members) the following year and it was adopted at the next meeting of congress. The Congress is highly organized and can deal with detailed discussions of programs; it sets up working groups and considers amendments in depth (Fitzmaurice, 1981:106-7).

Since 1888 the Party Congress has been the supreme authority (Thomas, 1977:236), and has drawn up specific programs for the party to follow (Thomas, 1977:254-59). Party programs between 1973-1977 Congress's were put out for debate to the associations. In 1977 the Congress reinterpreted party principles to bring them up to date with the changing society (Thomas, 1977:257).

The next highest authority would seem to be the Executive Committee; it has 15 members, one of which is the chair of the Folketing group, and it meets most frequently, every 4 days (Jacobs, 1989:36). It is the main source of coordination and continuity, deciding tactics and negotiating with other parties (Thomas, 1977:259).

Bille (2/93) says that the power of the executive committee should not be overstated. Its role is one of negotiating **on behalf of** the parliamentary group, rather than of directing the group's activities.

In Katz and Mair (1992, Table IV.D.2.b.ii), however, Bille says that the national executive is "In practice, leading party body in all organizational and policy matters." So, while Bille (2/93) suggested a code of 3 for this variable, we judge that "4" may be more appropriate.

## **12.07 Identity of Party Leader**

### **1950-90: 5**

The national congress, which meets every four years, elects the national chair who is effectively the party's leader.

Bille (2/93) confirms this code.

NOTE: Individual parliamentarians are closely accountable to their local organizations.

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**#109 - Denmark: Socialist People's Party (SF)**

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Coder: Gibson (typos corrected by RH/SSh on 1-29-96)

NOTE: Coding runs from 1959-90, because SF was founded in 1959. It is also noteworthy that "SF's organization is particularly characterized by the tighter accountability of its parliamentary group to the national party organization than in most other Danish parties" (Jacobs, 1989:40).

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1959-90: 3b**

Folketing candidates are generally chosen by secret ballot of all SF members within an Amt. Three of these organizations decide on the candidates through the number of preference votes they receive. The others adopt a party list system, whereby the order of election is determined by a candidate's position on the list with the order also being decided in a secret ballot (Jacobs, 1989:40). The control that the party organization exerts over the order in which candidates are elected "has seriously limited the room for manoeuvre of the parliamentary leadership..." (ibid).

According to Katz and Mair (1992, Table IV.D.5.a), the national committee "shall approve all candidates," and this has been the case throughout the period (though in 1965 they were "...to take active part in the nominations on the local and regional levels"). From 1959 through 1969, individual members "propose and elect" at a meeting open to all members at the constituency level; in 1970, this was reduced to "electing" only. In 1970 also, "representatives from the boards of the local branches form a nomination committee." In 1976, "if a candidate list in the constituency is preferred, a ballot is held among the members in the constituency."

**12.02 Parliamentary Leadership Selection****1959-90:1**

The annual party congress elects all party leaders (Delury, 1989:259).

However, according to Bille (2/93), Delury's statement does not apply to the parliamentary group leader, who is actually selected by the parliamentary group itself.

**12.03 Conformation to Extraparliamentary Positions****1959-90: 3**

"The parliamentary group has to follow the guidelines laid down in the annual conference and has an obligation to report to the party's central committee or executive committee before voting on important political matters" (Jacobs, 1989:40). Bille (2/93) adds that this is the only party that explicitly says that major policy

moves in parliamentary have to be confirmed by the extraparliamentary organization.

(See also Katz and Mair (1992), Table IV.D.2.a.i.)

#### **12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives**

##### **1959-90: 1a**

No explicit references were found to disciplinary tactics. However, Fitzmaurice reports that "...there has been a constant tension between the Folketing group and the mass party, culminating in a purge of five MP's before the 1977 election" (Fitzmaurice, 1981:109-110). This would seem to indicate that the extraparliamentary organization exercises disciplinary power.

However, Bille (2/93) says the word "purge" in the above statement is too strong; they were not actually purged, per se. Party members determined the ordering of candidates on the list, and in effect did make it impossible for these five candidates to be re-elected.

#### **12.05 Rotation Requirement/Tenure Limitation**

##### **1959-90: 2**

Bille (2/93) indicates that party rules require reselection. I.e., in this case rules as well as the law requires reselection between elections.

#### **12.06 Public Policy Positions**

##### **1959-90: 4**

The annual party conference lays down the platform guidelines for the Folketing representatives (Jacobs, 1989:40). According to Delury (1983:258), "the party congress of delegates from local branches must approve the party program." There is also a role for the party's executive committee in formulating policy between conferences. This committee is dominated by extraparliamentary members; it can have no more than three of its nine members be Folketing representatives. It meets with the parliamentary members, who must "report" before an important vote and it (i.e., executive committee) is "very powerful within the party..." (Jacobs, 1989:40). There are also 20 party committees which prepare the party's policies in specific fields, such as taxation and agriculture (ibid). Their parliamentary/extraparliamentary status is not referred to, but given the strong control by the extraparliamentary organization and the fact that they (i.e., the party committees) are mentioned after discussion of the executive committee would seem to indicate that they report to that body. Thus, even though parliamentary members are included on the executive committee, they are deliberately given minority status. Thus, while a score of 5 might be justified, Bille (2/93) suggests that a "4" would be more accurate.

#### **12.07 Identity of Party Leader**

##### **1959-90: 5**

While there is a party chairman and a parliamentary leader, the

former, elected by the national conference, is more powerful than the latter, and is recognized as the party's national leader (Jacobs, 1989:40).

Bille (2/93) confirms the above statement, and indicates that this has been very clearcut throughout the life of this party.



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**#201 - Germany: Christian Democratic Union (CDU)**

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Coder: Gibson (typos corrected by RH/SSh on 2-9-96)

**Note:** The CDU, like the FDP, has a history of loose geographical ties. Its federal nature means that while the central parliamentary party is very dominant in the Bundestag, it does not control the Lander parties very well. There was a movement from 1969 onward when the party first went into opposition to build up the extra-parliamentary organization's power. However, there are only intermittent references to structural changes designed to equalize the power between the two wings, such as policy groups being set up under the General Secretary. No major moves to enhance accountability of the parliamentary group to the extra-parliamentary organization seem to have been made.

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1950-9: 2a**

"Constituency candidates must be elected by a secret ballot of either all members of the constituency party or of a selection committee elected from among its members by the the constituency party," i.e. all members or delegates nominate candidates. Land executives can object to, and demand reconsideration of, candidates. This rarely happens however, and constituency parties enjoy a significant degree of autonomy (Urwin, 1974: 140, see also Jacobs, 1989: 450-51).

According to Katz & Mair (Table VI.D.5.b), the national organization has "the right to veto a constituency candidate selected by a members or delegates assembly." However, according to Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94), this is true only for constituency candidates, and not candidates on land lists. Given that vetoes tend not to be exercised in either case, we opt for a "2a" rather than "2b".

**12.02 Selection of Parliamentary Leader****1950-1990:1**

No specific reference is made to the formal procedure for selecting the Fraktion party leader. Irving, however, states that Barzel was elected leader of the parliamentary party at the same time as Erhard was elected chancellor in 1966 (Irving, 1979: 125). However, Poguntke makes no reference to this in Katz and Mair (1992), Table VI.3.4.b, when listing the functions of the CDU Conference. So it is being assumed that the Fraktion elects its own leader.

In 1973 an attempt was made to distribute power more equally between parliamentary and the extra-parliamentary organization. Until that year the party chair and the Fraktion chair could be one individual. However, the new General Secretary called for their

separation, and the new party chair, Helmut Kohl, was not a member of the Bundestag. Thus, the extra-parliamentary group gained some independence from the parliament. There is no reference to any specific rule change however, and Pridham goes on to talk solely about the separation of the party chair and chancellorship: the "CDU chairmanship was treated for the first time in the party's history as separate from that of the chancellor candidacy" (Pridham, 1977:263 & 211).

### **12.03 Conformation to Extra-parliamentary Positions 1950-90:1a**

The CDU ministers and Chancellor are the controlling force over policy decisions. They form an elite, overruling even the wishes of their Fraktion party colleagues (Irving, 1979:127, Kolinsky, 1984:155, Pridham, 1977:260, Padgett & Burkett, 1986:110). However, they still belong to the parliamentary wing and so will be treated as such. Therefore, while congress is officially the source of all policy, "in practice of course, the congress, which sometimes only meets bi-annually, cannot seriously influence the policies actually pursued by the party." Its main objective is to bring together party leaders so they can see their national leaders in person. The Federal (aka National in 12.06) Executive committee "according to the party statutes, is the most important leading and directing organ in the CDU." However, it is too big to adequately perform this role, and the Praesidium "makes its decisions in the light of the climate of opinion prevailing in the parliamentary party (Irving, 1979:123-124, see also Padgett & Burkett, 1986:111-112).

Despite the fact that from 1972 onward, there was a concerted effort to expand the extra-parliamentary organization's powers in terms of policy making, "The fact remains that...local party organization has little voice..." in policy formulation (Kolinsky, 1984:156). One instance of where the parliamentary group overrode a congressional decision, endorsed by the party chair was when they lobbied for a different candidate for Chancellor in 1979 (Kolinsky:145). This was after the moves to involve more members in policy making had begun in the shape of the 'Basic Programme' and the establishment of a General Secretary in 1967 (Kolinsky:126-7). Though Irving (1979:123) says that congress decisions are "binding" on the Fraktion, Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94) argues that this is a liberal and non-literal statement, and that in fact there is no requirement of conformation. Hence we code as "1a".

### **12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives 1950-90: 1a**

While no references are made to formal measures of discipline, Barzel, Fraktion leader, 1971-3, is stated as employing "tight control" over Fraktion activities (Pridham, 1977:212). We must remember that because the CDU has allied with the CSU in parliament, this makes enforcement of strict party policy very difficult to ensure (see Padgett & Burkett, 1986:112).

## **12.05 Rotation Requirements/Tenure Limitations**

### **1950-90:1**

No reference is made to any limits on the tenure of parliamentary members.

## **12.06 Public Policy Positions**

### **1950-90:4**

For this variable, it is important to remember that the "Party Law" of 1967 in the Federal Republic required that the party congress occupy the sovereign position in internal party life (Paterson, 1977:183).

"In theory the supreme organ in the CDU is the party congress. It decides on the policy of the party, and its decisions are binding on the Fraktion and on CDU - led governments, whether in Bonn or in the Lander" (Irving, 1979:123 see also Jacobs, 1989:455). It elects the party chair, decides on basic policy guidelines, receives and votes on reports of the National Executive and parliamentary party (Katz & Mair, 1992 VI.D.4.a). The National Executive (party chair, general secretary [1967 onward], Fraktion leader and deputy, Land party chairs, heads of Land government, and federal ministers if CDU) "lead the party according to the decisions of the National Party Congress" (Katz & Mair, 1992:VI.D.2.b.i). The Praesidium (Executive committee), which is composed of the party chair, the Fraktion chair amongst other party officials, implements the National Executive's decisions, and "is in charge of all urgent affairs of that body" (ibid).

Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94) says that the CDU operates essentially as the SPD in this regard. That is, the extraparliamentary party sets the policy "skeleton," while the parliamentary party fills in details on a day-to-day basis.

## **12.07 Primary Leader of the Party**

### **1950-90: 3b**

In the immediate post-war period the party is described by Jacobs as being dominated by its chair, Konrad Adenauer; he was "...an authoritarian leader" (Jacobs, 1989:453ff.). He was also Chancellor and therefore it is not easy to determine which of the two roles made him most dominant. However, as was made clear above, after the party lost the chancellorship in 1969, the party had to build a central party organization from scratch, since leadership of the party had come from the Chancellor. Currently, the party is still very much Chancellor-oriented, with Helmut Kohl of the CDU occupying that position.

Poguntke (personal communication, 9-7-94) notes that: "When Kohl was elected party leader he was still not in the Bundestag (until 1976). He was nevertheless clearly recognized party leader. I would suggest the following rule: whenever the CDU has a chancellor, he is clearly the party leader. Otherwise, the formal position of extra-parliamentary leader is dominant." Poguntke further suggests that the code of 3b is clearly correct for this case.

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**#202 - Germany: The Free Democratic Party (FDP)**

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Coder: Gibson (typos corrected by RH/SSh on 2-9-96)

Note: Overall there is a high degree of parliamentary control over the extra-parliamentary organization at the *federal* level. At the *land* level, "Each land has its own organization, which has a measure of independence from the federal party, especially in the matter of coalition formation." This means that the federal parliamentary group does not control the land parliamentary groups (Delury, 1983:367). "[T]he national FDP is really only a loose federation of the eleven state parties, and there are clearly different traditions and priorities in different parts of the country...there are...different policy priorities in many of the state party organizations" (Broughton & Kirchner, 1984:189-190). An example of the independence of Land and Federal representatives can be seen in the Hesse FDP's decision to join with the CDU/CSU in a governing coalition in 1982. The Federal parliamentary leader, Genscher had already promised that the federal FDP would remain with the SPD until 1984 (ibid: 192). So the parliamentary wing is very strong, but only over federal extra-parliamentary actors, not the regional parliamentary representatives.

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1950-90:2a**

There are no rules set out. According to the electoral law the constituency members or delegates vote on candidates. There is no rule for national organizational involvement (Katz & Mair, 1992:VI.D.5.d).

**12.02 Parliamentary Leadership Selection****1950-90:1**

The only reference made to the post of "parliamentary leader" is by Jacobson (1989:467) when he says that the parliamentary party is now led by Mischnick, who is distinct from Lamsdorff, the party chair. No indication is given as to how the the parliamentary leader is selected. Given the overwhelming strength of the parliamentary wing, however, it will be assumed that the parliamentary group is responsible for electing its leader.

Aside from an official leader, it seems as though cabinet ministers, of which the FDP has many, play a dominant role in its parliamentary activities. "The prestige to FDP leaders accrues through the holding of government office, and incumbents stay for several years in important ministries" (Delury, 1983:368).

**12.03 Conformation to Extraparliamentary Positions****1950-90:1a**

"On the surface at least, the FDP's internal structure is similar

to that of many other parties. It has established the usual panoply of committees, congress's, and an executive, but the almost constant involvement in government has given the parliamentary party and the leadership elite in particular, an overwhelming degree of authority to take even crucial decisions, without invoking the formal consultative process implied by the party's structure" (Kirchner and Broughton, 1988:68). Basically, the major policy decisions are made and then brought to the party congress to legitimate after the fact (ibid; see also Paterson:171; Padgett & Burkett, 1986:104; Broughton & Kirchner, 1984:193). Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94) says the same code should be given for the FDP as for the SPD, and that is the "1a" which seems to apply here in any case.

#### **12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives**

##### **1950-90:1a**

Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94) says that "1a" is the appropriate code here. We had been unable to find enough supporting information to make a reasonable guess for this variable ourselves.

#### **12.05 Rotation Requirement**

##### **1950-90:1**

No limits on tenure were reported.

#### **12.06 Public Policy Positions**

##### **1950-90:4**

The party congress is the "supreme organ and determines its policy program" (Day, 1988:222). The highest authority in the FDP is the party congress of 400 delegates (Jacobs, 1989:466). It votes on the report of the National Executive, elects the National Executive, and decides on "all fundamental political and organizational matters" (Katz & Mair, 1992:IV.D.4.d). The party executive exists for day to day business and has a minority of federal parliamentary notables. It makes decisions "about all organizational and political questions along the lines of the party congress and party council decisions" (Katz & Mair, 1992:VI.D.2.d.i). Therefore, in formal terms the party looks as though it relies on the extraparliamentary wing for its policy direction and involves it heavily in setting the daily agenda.

Remember that the "Party Law" of 1967 in the Federal Republic required that the party congress occupy the sovereign position in internal party life (Paterson, 1977:183).

#### **12.07 Identity of Party Leader**

##### **1950-90:5**

The role of "party leader" is referred to often in the literature and it is equated with the party chair. (There is also a secretary general, established in 1969 to strengthen party organization, Paterson, 1977:163). The "party leader" is elected through the party congress; at the 1982 Berlin congress he was challenged by the leader of the FDP at Schleswig Holstein (Broughton & Kirchner,

1984:192)

Whether the party chair has to be a minister or member of the Bundestag is not clear. Mende, Scheel, Genscher, Bangemann, and Lambsdorff have all been party chairs and each held a ministerial position at one stage, but not necessarily before they were elected chair. The challenger to Genscher was a Land party chair and not very well known, but he managed to come within 50 votes of toppling Genscher.

Poguntke (personal communication, 9-7-94) confirms that the party chair is recognized in the rules as ultimate party chair. Hence a code of 5 is appropriate.

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**#203 - Germany: The Greens (Die Grunen)**

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Coder: Gibson (typos corrected by RH and SSh on 2-27-96)

[Note: This party is coded through 1992 for most variables, since Poguntke -- by personal communication -- provided the necessary coding support for the additional two years.]

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1980-92: 2a**

There are no rules established at either the constituency or Land level but the national organization is listed explicitly as having no role by Katz & Mair (1992: Table VI.D.5.e). This means that at the lowest possible level, it is individual members that elect constituency candidates. This default position is presumably the result of the Electoral Law constraints.

**12.02 Selection of Parliamentary Leader****1980-92: 1**

The Fraktion head is a plural body of three spokespersons which are selected by the Fraktion itself, since they were deselected by them in 1984 (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:181). Their powers are limited; their role is one of coordination and preparation for meetings of the parliamentary party. Their decisions can be opposed by at least three members of the Fraktion and this means then that the "genuine political centre of the parliamentary party is the extended parliamentary leadership which contains also the chairs of the working groups" (Poguntke, 1987:617).

**12.03 Conformation to Extra-parliamentary positions****1980-92: 3**

The "free will" of MPs is "constitutionally guaranteed" according to the Basic Law of the Federal and Land Governments and can be the basis for court challenges to parties' attempts to mandate MPs' behavior. Therefore, the "imperative mandate" passed on by the Greens' congress and federal council to the parliamentary representatives has no completely binding force (Poguntke, 1987:617). However, on the whole, the extra-parliamentary bodies are adhered to more than in other parties. There is a Federal Committee which makes sure that the Green Fraktion conform to the mandates from the congress. Also, in formulating positions, Green working groups in the Bundestag occupy an important position. They are open to anyone, even non-members, and offer a "participatory shortcut" for the grassroots (Poguntke, 1992:624).

Despite all these precautions, however, the Greens, "In practice...[have]...not prevented the parliamentary [wing] from becoming relatively autonomous from their respective party organizations" (Jacobs, 1989:471). There is not a big enough

membership base to make grassroots initiatives, such as the working groups, meaningful (ibid, 619,630). The Federal Committee meets only intermittently, which means that the Fraktion group has a considerable degree of freedom (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:180). Neither the Federal Committee, the Federal Executive, nor the Federal Council, are professionalized, so the Fraktion has greater resources than any of the federal extra-parliamentary organizations. This "large number of highly qualified collaborators provides parliamentary representatives with a considerable advantage in intra-party debates." Also, the Federal Council has no "clearly defined task", and the Federal Executive "has no genuine mandate for political leadership" (Poguntke, 1987:622). Basically, "the Green party head office never stood any chance of counter-acting the enormous organizational dominance of the federal parliamentary party, as soon as the Greens had entered the Bundestag" (Poguntke, 1992:11; see also Poguntke, 1987:620). The extra-parliamentary organization has "no apparatus to screen the activities of the Bundestag." Their dominance is further amplified by the fact that most of the most prominent personalities end up as MPs, not party officials (Poguntke, 1987:620-621). Significantly, the organizational reforms instituted thus far, have been directed at professionalizing the extra-parliamentary wing "against the domination of the party by its parliamentary group" (Poguntke, 1992:16).

We had originally coded this as "2a," but Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94) argues that would not be strong enough. This is in part because he considers it to be too cynical to say that the provision in the party rules to conform to extraparliamentary positions is largely ignored.

#### **12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives**

##### **1980-92:1a**

According to Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94): "expulsion from the parliamentary party is not in the hands of the federal council. According to Sindelfingen decisions, the federal council can issue binding decisions for the parliamentary party. However, jurisdiction about dissenting MPs was always exclusively with the parliamentary party."

#### **12.05 Rotation requirement/Tenure limitations**

##### **1980-82:1**

##### **1983-86:6**

##### **1987-90:5**

##### **1991-92:3**

Once the party had gained representation in the Fraktion in 1983 it was agreed that members would be rotated every two years and only allowed to be reelected once. However, this rule was "relaxed" in 1987 for practical purposes and a new limit was introduced. This restricted parliamentary representatives to four year terms, after which they could not seek re-election. However, by 1991 even the four year term restriction was ended, since they now "do not have to take an obligatory break" (Poguntke, 1992:10,14). It had proved



impracticable because the substitutes were not able to pick up where their predecessors left off. The replacements were supposed to be trained before assuming their duties; however they could not get the access necessary for doing so, e.g. they could not get into the plenary sessions of the Bundestag (Poguntke, 1987:627).

Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94) says that before there were parliamentary representatives, there was no rule at all. Hence the code of 1 for 1980-82. Then a rule was put in place, which lasted from 1983-86, before the rule gradually crumbled beginning in 1987. "The pragmatic way out of factional stalemate was to accept grass roots democracy and leave it to the Land parties" (Poguntke, personal communication). In 1991, the rotation rule was dropped for the Bundestag, though there was still a term limitation.

## **12.06 Public Policy Positions**

**1980-82: 5**

**1983-90: 4**

These generally bubble up from the Land level congresses which have the greatest possible autonomy. Their policy initiatives are extensively discussed and ratified by the Federal Party congress (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:179). These decisions are then binding on parliamentary representatives, who are called upon to justify their decisions at the party congress (Jacobs, 1989:471). There are special delegate conferences called to discuss particularly urgent questions, the decisions about which must be ratified by the entire party (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:179). Party units at the lower level guide the higher party organs: "parliamentarians should not be in position where they could dominate the politics of the party" (Poguntke, 1992:10). Between congresses the Federal Executive operates. This body consists of 17 members who are Land-level politicians but not parliamentary members. Their role is mainly to co-ordinate policy initiatives from the lower level rather than direct policy making (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:179; Jacobs, 1989:471), and to determine the preliminary agenda for the congress (Katz & Mair, 1992:Table VI.D.2.e.i). The Federal Executive is in turn directed by the Federal Council, which is the "highest party body between meetings." It meets at least four times a year, and its decisions are binding on the Executive. It consists of delegates from the Land organizations and the Executive (Katz & Mair, 1992: Table VI.D.2.e.i).

[Note for coding of later years: The separation of office and mandate was a strict rule followed until 1991, when the Federal Council admitted Land and Federal representatives, i.e. parliamentary representatives can now be full members of extra-parliamentary bodies.]

Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94) points out that once the party had members in the Bundestag, they did, in practice, begin to have a say in policy matters. However, since the "theory" had been that the representatives would not affect policy positions, we code this variable as a "5" for the years before the party had

participation in the Bundestag. A "4" seems appropriate thereafter, reflecting "practice" more than "theory."

### **12.07 Primary Leader of the Party**

**1980-82:5**

**1983-90:2**

Officially, the primary leaders of the party are the grassroots: the "supreme power within the party organization resides with the 'Basis'" (Poguntke, 1987: 619). However, as was mentioned above, the real power rests with those who formulate the alternatives for them, and as was also mentioned above this process has come to be dominated by the parliamentary party. "The Federal Executive, while it is their mouthpiece, ... has no genuine mandate for political leadership" (ibid:620); it is unprofessionalized, not given media exposure, and lacks resources to research policy alternatives.

[Note: With regard to coding after 1990: The balance may have shifted even more toward the parliamentary group since 1991, since the office/mandate separation was ended for the Federal Council, the body in charge of party affairs between Conferences.]

Since the party was not in the Bundestag from 1980-82, "leadership obviously rested with the extraparliamentary leadership" (Poguntke, personal communication, 9-5-94). But from 1983 until 1990, "leadership fluctuated between parliamentary party and extraparliamentary party depending on the political stature of the members of both bodies." Poguntke argues (personal communication) that, generally speaking, he "would attribute more weight to the parliamentary leadership." From 1990 through 1994, when there were only two east Germans in the Bundestag, leadership "rested clearly with the extraparliamentary leadership."

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**#204 - Germany: Social Democratic Party (SPD)**

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Coder: Gibson (types corrected by RH and SSh on 2-27-96)

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1950-90: 2a**

If a constituency assembly exists "individual members can participate in the election of the constituency candidate" (Katz and Mair, 1992:VI.D.5.a). Constituency and national committees must consult over candidates but "according to electoral law, national committees can only veto constituency candidates;" a second ballot at the constituency level settles the matter (Katz & Mair, 1992:VI.D.5.a). The candidates for the national parliament are proposed by the local party organizations, their choices being subject to control by the upper level of the party hierarchy (Jacobs, 1989:450-451). However, according to Poguntke (personal communication, 9-5-94), this refers only to the constituency lists, and not to the Land lists.

We give a code of 2a because (1) national ratification is not required for the Land lists, (2) even for the constituency lists, vetoes are in reality virtually nonexistent (Poguntke, personal communication), and (3) second constituency votes can override vetoes when they do occur.

**12.02 Parliamentary Leadership Selection****1950-1990: 1**

When the party is in power the parliamentary group appears to be led by the Chancellor. In power or not, it is also headed by the Chair of the Fraktion Executive. There is no requirement that they be different individuals, since in 1952 the Fraktion chair = Chancellor candidate = Party Chair (elected by Congress also; Chalmers, 1964:141-2). The Chancellor is nominated by the Party Council (regional party officials and state political leaders, coordinating national and local affairs; Drummond, 1982:5) and elected at the Party Congress (consisting of 300 delegates and members of the Executive, the Fraktion can attend but not vote; Chalmers, 1964:120). The chair of the Fraktion is elected by the SPD members of the Bundestag and they can be changed by members' votes (Chalmers, 1964:116, 144).

The Fraktion executive seems more concerned with discipline (Paterson, 1977:69; Padgett & Burkett, 1986:69) to Praesidium policy initiatives.

**12.03 Conformation to Extraparliamentary Positions****1950-90: 1a**

The extent to which the SPD Fraktion conforms to party policy depends on whether it forms the government or opposition. "With the

SPD in opposition, both the Praesidium and the Executive have concentrated on articulating party policy" (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:68). When the SPD is in power the Praesidium and Executive generally endorse the policies originating with the Chancellor or in government ministries and rally the party around their policies (ibid). SPD chancellors exercise strong control, invoking their electoral mandate to support their view that they should be independent of the party congress (Kolinsky, 1984:92). This governing/non-governing distinction in parliamentary party power carries over to the Land level as well (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:69).

The score of 1a was assigned since there was no reference in the literature to any provision requiring the parliamentary party to follow the congress's decisions. Also, while out of power the extra-parliamentary wing (the Executive and Praesidium) of the party does exert a lot of control over policy, when in government, the ministers assert control.

#### **12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives**

##### **1950-90:1a**

Since there is no requirement to conform to extra-parliamentary policy, the parliamentary group itself must be taken as administering disciplinary techniques.

The parliamentary group is expected to vote "en bloc" on all important issues and in general "the Bundestag Fraktion is pliant to the party leadership" (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:69). The Fraktion chairman (elected by the Fraktion; Chalmers, 1964:117) heads an exclusive "inner executive" committee which exercises strict control over the activities of individual deputies. When in power his/her cues seem to come from the SPD ministers; they "liaise" over the agenda and brief deputies about legislation (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:69).

#### **12.05 Rotation Requirement**

##### **1950-90:1**

There is no mention in the literature of any rotation requirement or term limitations.

#### **12.06 Public Policy Positions**

##### **1950-90: 4**

"The highest statutory authority for the party is its biannual national party congress" (Jacobs, 1989:450; Paterson, 1977:183). This is not surprising however, since "Party Law" of 1967 in the Federal Republic required that the party congress occupy the sovereign position in internal party life (Paterson, 1977:183). However, the "Bundestag Fraktion is organised according to parliamentary procedures and is not covered by party statutes" (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:69).

It "does not often make policy initiatives" though (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:69); it is more concerned with the specific details of policies (Chalmers, 1964:120). This interpretation is supported by Kolinsky who says that the SPD as a party, in contrast to the

CDU: "never rescinded its role as a policy creator. Party congresses attempted to sketch the guidelines for SPD chancellors and their ministers" (Kolinsky, 1984:92).

It is the Praesidium, elected by the Party Executive (which is in turn elected by Congress), that is responsible for organizing "day to day" business (Jacobs, 1989:450; Paterson, 1977:187). The Praesidium is the "supreme policy and decision-making body of the party." It "lays down general lines of policy for the Fraktion, sets the agenda for the larger Executive and when important occasions arise that require immediate action issues policy statements itself" (Chalmers, 1964:117).

The Praesidium is not a truly extra-parliamentary organization however, since it is composed of senior party officials and Bundestag ministers when the SPD is in office. (Padgett & Burkett, 1986:67). Chalmers reports that in 1960 it consisted of 4 party officials and 5 members of the Bundestag (Chalmers, 1964:117).

### **12.07 Primary Leader of the Party 1950-90:3b**

References in Jacobs show the party chair to be a powerful figure in party life (Jacobs, 1989:448ff). Schumacher, Ollenhauer, Brandt, and Schmidt were all major figures in the party's development. Paterson (1977:191), in discussing "leadership" of the party, discusses these figures and their styles and explicitly points to "Brandt's style as *party chairman*" being "an exceptionally loose one" (*italics added*).

However, there is evidence that once an individual became the Federal Chancellor he exercised more leadership. Helmut Schmidt, Paterson goes on to say, "displayed a tendency to regard the party as an appendage to his office" (Paterson, 1977:184). Paterson says that Schumacher used his authority as Party Chairman until the Bundestag was established and then "relied more on his position as parliamentary leader" (Paterson, 1977:184).

Gordon Smith (1989:68-69) says that German parties have been characterized as having a "dualistic structure of leadership" where "a party's serving chancellor or chancellor candidate is not also necessarily the party leader." Brandt, when he became chancellor in 1969, "had already led the SPD for several years, but after he resigned as chancellor in 1974 in favour of Schmidt, Brandt retained the party leadership [i.e. as party chair] in fact holding the post right up to 1987." Schmidt's autonomy actually "isolated him in the party" rather than giving him more authority.

According to Poguntke (personal communication, 9-7-94), the extraparliamentary chair is officially the leader. However, when the party holds the chancellorship, the chancellor is effectively the leader. When the party does not hold the chancellorship, the party chair is effectively leader. Hence, a code of 3b is called for.

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**#301 - United Kingdom: Conservative Party**

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Coder: Gibson (typos corrected by RH and SSh on 2-27-96)

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1950-90: 4**

The local party associations, which are affiliates of the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, select the candidates from the applications received. They appoint selection committees which draw up a short list and then submit this to the council. The council then recommends one name for approval, or two or three for selection, by a general meeting of the association. There is minimal involvement by the Central or Area office to control the choice of candidates. The candidates must either be on the party's approved list or secure acceptance by the party's standing advisory committee on candidates however (Ingle, 1987:62). The constituency organization produces a shortlist and then nominates the candidate. If the candidate nominated is not on the national organization's "approval list" then it can veto the choice of the constituency association. Individual members can attend a general meeting of the constituency association where the choice of candidate is ratified, thus, they have no significant role (Katz & Mair, 1992:XII.D.5.d).

**12.02 Parliamentary Leadership Selection****1950-90: 1**

From 1950-65 the leader was not elected but simply "emerged." After 1965 he/she was elected through a majority plus 15% system by the parliamentary party members. In 1975 annual re-election was introduced to give the backbenchers more power over their parliamentary leader. This resulted in the first de-selection of a leader, when Edward Heath was replaced by Margaret Thatcher. Of course Thatcher herself went on to be de-selected in favor of John Major (Ingle, 1987:48-49).

**12.03 Conformation to Extraparliamentary positions****1950-90: 1b**

The parliamentary group is responsible for formulating and implementing policy (based on coder Gibson's own knowledge).

**12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives****1950-90: 1b**

The parliamentary group itself formulates the party's public policy positions (based on coder Gibson's own knowledge).

### **12.05 Rotation Requirement**

#### **1950-90: 1**

No rotation requirement is referred to in the literature (based on coder Gibson's own knowledge).

### **12.06 Public Policy Positions**

#### **1950-90: 1**

"It is the function of the Conservative leader to provide a policy context within which priorities may be established..." (Ingle, 1987:52). He/she does this by establishing the scope of policy options and deciding from them when in office (Ingle, 1987:52). The leader listens to the deliberations of the Conference, the constitutional role of which is to advise and discuss policy (Ingle, 1987:58; MacKenzie, 1963:638). Since Heath's time, senior figures in the parliamentary party have made themselves more visible at the Conference (Ingle, 1987:58-59). However, both the National Union (which organizes the conference) and Central Office (the party's administrative wing) have had very little control over the parliamentary party's actions. "Effective control of the affairs of the Conservative Party remains in the hands of the Leader thrown up by parliamentary party and those he chooses as his associates" (MacKenzie, 1963:637).

"[A]ll important powers in the party are still concentrated in the hands of the leader and are delegated by her as she sees fit. The National Union has no formal role in the formation of policy... its executive does not have kind of policy role that is played by Labour's NEC. ... All the crucial committees in the party report directly to the leader, as does Central Office...the shadow Cabinet is appointed by leader not elected by the party, and the same is true of the chairman and other leading officials of the party organization" (Gamble in Drucker, ed., 1979:39).

### **12.07 Primary Leader of the Party**

#### **1950-90: 1**

The leader of the party in parliament is officially, and in fact, the primary leader of the party.

"The party leader...[since 1965] has been directly elected by the parliamentary party in the Commons" (Jacobs, 1989:383).

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**#302 - United Kingdom: Labour Party**

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Coder: Gibson (RH and SSh changed 12.03 from 2 to 2a on 2-27-96.  
RH and SSh corrected typos on 4-26-96.)

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1950-1990: 4**

The candidates are selected by the local constituency parties and ratified by the National Executive Committee (NEC) (Ingle, 1987:133).

**12.02 Selection of Parliamentary leader****1950-1980: 1****1981-1992: 3**

Traditionally the party leader has been elected by his/her parliamentary colleagues. This is done through exhaustive balloting and in theory must be performed annually, although there are very rarely challenges (Ingle, 1987:123). However, in 1980 the Conference passed a resolution which called for an electoral college to elect the leader. The exact format was decided upon in January 1981 at a special conference. This would give the parliamentary party 30% of the vote, the Constituency organizations 30% of the vote and the trade unions 40% of the vote (Ingle, 1987:127; Shaw, 1988:199).

**12.03 Conformation to extra-parliamentary positions****1950-1990: 2a**

In theory the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) must follow the dictates of the Party Conference. When the Labour Party is in power the Cabinet is the major factor in deciding the policy positions. Thus the PLP has the most power over policy positions during governing periods. The loyalties of the MP's to the Conference are generally overridden by the duty to sustain the government (Shaw, 1988:165).

"The Labour party endowed itself with a party constitution which raised" the prospect of extraparliamentary party control. "Yet the leadership group of the PLP, while paying lip-service to the theory of inner-party democracy, has repeatedly and consistently refused to accept direction from its extra-parliamentary supporters" (MacKenzie, 1963:642).

During the 1950s and 1960s there was very little tension between the Conference and the NEC and PLP because they were dominated by right-wing elites who shared a view on the direction of the party. However, during the 1970s the NEC and the Conference became more left-wing in orientation while the PLP remained more right-wing. The NEC joined the local parties' fight to make the PLP more accountable to the Conference and itself; this placed the PLP's de facto autonomy in jeopardy (Shaw, 1988:194-200). The PLP leader and



Prime Minister Harold Wilson argued for a stricter demarcation of roles, the PLP controlling policy, the NEC dealing with the bureaucratic details. This he largely upheld. Thus, the party became more likely to disregard conference and NEC rulings (Shaw, 1988:183).

In the early 1980s the right reasserted itself within the NEC and Conference, however, and so there was less divergence (Shaw, 1988:299).

#### **12.04 Discipline of the Parliamentary Representatives**

##### **1950-1990: 3**

The right to expel members from the party belongs to the NEC not the PLP. However, this rarely if ever happens. When the period of dissension between the PLP and the Conference/NEC began in the early 1970s the latter approached the problem of discipline through new selection processes at the Constituency level, rather than directly making the PLP implement the more Socialist policies of the Conference (Shaw, 1988:194). The role of the General Secretary was updated so as to make it a more effective office to promote conference rulings (Shaw, 1988:184). Also the electoral college was adopted and MP's were encouraged by extra-parliamentary organizations to vote their conscience and the conference line rather than the cabinet decisions if the Labour party was in power (Shaw, 1988:295-298).

#### **12.05 Rotation Requirement**

##### **1950-1979: 1**

##### **1980-1990: 2**

During the 1970s and culminating in 1980 at the Labour Party Conference, there was a strong movement to give the party organization greater control over candidate selection with the adoption of a mandatory reselection process at the Party Conference. This meant that sitting MP's would have to present themselves for reselection at each election and was designed to make the Parliamentary party more accountable and democratic. Thus it weakened their autonomy and strengthened that of the extra-parliamentary organization (Ingle, 1987:135; Shaw, 1988:194-200). Seyd and Whiteley (1991:6) state that it led to the belief that "Labour MPs now needed to stick much more closely to the views of their local activists if they were to survive reselection." The adoption of mandatory reselection in 1980 is the closest that the extra parliamentary organization has come to imposing limitations on sitting MPs' tenure.

#### **12.06 Public Policy Positions**

##### **1950-1990: 4**

The annual party conference is responsible for formulating the official party platform. This forms the blueprint for the representatives in parliament. However, the constitution allows for the NEC to consult with the PLP on a daily basis for formulating legislative proposals (Ingle, 1987:126,128; Shaw, 1988:165). The

party constitution gives the NEC, which the Conference elects, the duty to confer with the PLP to formulate legislative proposals. Given that the NEC since 1945 has been dominated by MP's, this in effect gives the parliamentary party a very strong role in deciding policy (Ingle, 1987:129).

## **12.07 Primary Leader of the Party**

**1950-1980:1**

**1981-1990:2**

Until 1981 the "party leader" was elected by the parliamentary party alone (Jacobs, 1989:391ff), and thus would have to be a parliamentary actor. However after that he/she was elected by a 40/30/30 split of the vote at the National Conference by trade unions, members of Parliament, and the constituency parties. It was thus feasible that an extra-parliamentary actor could be elected "leader" but this has not happened and it is a most unlikely event. Thus, a parliamentary member or an extra-parliamentary member can be the official and actual party leader.

The score of 2 was given to this change because should an extra-parliamentary figure be elected leader officially, it is highly unlikely that the leader of the parliamentary party would be overshadowed given the power vested in the British parliament.

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**#303 - United Kingdom: Liberal Party**

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Coder: Gibson (RG and RH changed the code and description for Variable 12.07 on 3-16-96. RH and SSh corrected typos on 4-26-96.)

**Note:** The Liberal Party only goes to 1988 because in that year it finally merged with the Social Democrats to form the Social Liberal Democrats.

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1950-1988: 2b**

The candidates are selected by the local associations and are then subject to "vetting" by the national party (Curtice, 1988:105). It is the individual members which select the candidates at a general meeting of the constituency party. The constituency party prepares the shortlist of candidates, which the national level validates. Beyond this, however, it also has the power to veto the candidate that is finally nominated by the membership (Katz & Mair, 1992: Table XII.D.5.c).

**12.02 Parliamentary Leader Selection****1950-75: 1****1976-88: 4**

The method of electing the "party leader" from the beginning of our period was a ballot of parliamentary members alone. After 1976 this was changed so that the leader and the "president" were elected by a ballot of every party member weighted according to constituency size. The leader can be chosen only if he/she is an MP (Steed, 1979:95).

**12.03 Conformation to Extra-parliamentary Positions****1950-1988: 1a**

The parliamentary group could and did override conference decisions and there seems little agreement on a common party policy among MP's. The literature stresses that parliamentary members' independence from the national extra-parliamentary organization was quite extensive and stemmed from the localized roots of the party. A Liberal MP owed little of his/her election to the national popularity of the party, but much to the local party efforts (Curtice, 1988:103). However, it has been noted that Liberal MPs' autonomy was ultimately short-term in nature. They could not stay out of line with the extra-parliamentary party for too long before they had to work toward a compromise solution (Curtice, 1988:105).

**12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives****1950-1988: 2**

No discernable techniques are found. Due to the loose, federal nature of the party, cohesion in parliament seems not to have been a priority. "...[N]either party leader nor mass party had any effective disciplinary sanctions" (Curtice, 1988:103). So, while the parliamentary group follows its own positions (see 12.03 - 1a) it does not do so in any strongly coherent manner. (This was taken to be evidence of a verified "2".)

### **12.05 Rotation Requirement/Tenure Limitation**

#### **1950-88: 1**

There are no restrictions placed on tenure of parliamentary members.

### **12.06 Public Policy Positions**

#### **1950-88: 2**

Basically, the rules make the annual assembly the source of authoritative decisions but allow for the parliamentary party to exercise significant policy making powers. The assemblies "cannot bind the parliamentary party" (Curtice, 1988:106). The parliamentary leader could singlehandedly veto conference decisions (Jacobs, 1989:399). Further evidence of the parliamentary group's prerogatives are indicated in a discussion of the Standing Committee, a body designed to promote cooperation between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary groups. It was charged with long term planning of Liberal policy and expressing party views between quarterly council meetings (Steed, 1979:94-5). It was also heavily stacked in favor of the parliamentary wing. Its Chair was an MP, elected by other MP's, and a majority of its members were MP's.

### **12.07 Primary Leader of the Party**

#### **1950-90:1**

According to Norton (in Bogdaner, 1983:144), the "Leader of the parliamentary party is Leader of the party as a whole." Until 1976, the "power to elect the leader remained with the parliamentary party" (145). Then that responsibility "was transferred to the party as a whole. Liberal MPs alone can nominate, and be nominated for, election" (145). (See Variable 12.02 above.) However, this change does not affect the fact that it is the parliamentary who is primary leader for the party throughout the period.

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**#304 - United Kingdom: Social Democratic Party, 1981-1988 (SDP)**

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Coder: Gibson (Variable 12.07 was changed from "2" to "1" by RH and SSh on 2-27-96. Associated text was also altered at that time. On 3-16-96, RH and RG changed 12.03 from "1b" to "1a." RH and SSh corrected typos on 4/26/96. RH and SSh changed the codes for 12.02 and 12.07 on 11 June 1996, based on new information.)

**Background:** This party was originally formed in 1981 and almost immediately formed an electoral alliance with the Liberal Party. The two parties closely cooperated in the House of Commons; however they maintained separate constitutional structures. (Behrens, 1989: 92-3). The SDP was really reborn when a majority of its members split off in 1988 and formed the Social and Liberal Democrats (SLD). "...[T]he majority of members of both former Alliance parties supported the creation of a new, merged party, and the Social and Liberal Democratic Party duly appeared in March, 1988" (Behrens, 1989:93). The original SDP remained under the leadership of David Owen from 1988 onward.

Therefore, we will be coding the SDP and the Liberal Party as independent cases between 1981-88, and the SLD as a separate case between 1988-90 since its organizational structure changed to accommodate both parties' preferences.

The SDP after 1988 will not be coded. This is because the SLD merger actually took most of the SDP members and all of the Liberal Party with it.

Most of the information Jacobs (1989) provides covers the minority SDP refounded after 1988. However he says that the "continuing SDP has retained the former SDP's constitution" (Jacobs, 1989:403). So, we will use the information on the SDP for 1988-90 to code the SDP for 1981-87.

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1981-1988: 2a**

Parliamentary candidates are chosen by all members of an area party by secret ballot. Unlike the SLD the voters do not have to attend hustings or apply for a special ballot form. There are requirements for female representation on the shortlists (Jacobs, 1989:403).

The individual members nominate the candidate in a postal ballot from a shortlist prepared by the constituency organization. This is constructed for the "approved list" sent by the national organization. It reserves the right to veto the final shortlist but no reference is made to it vetoing the actual candidate chosen by the members (Katz & Mair, 1992: Table XII.D.5.b).

**12.02 Selection of Parliamentary Leader**

**1981-1988: 4**

The constitution provides for the election of a leader of the parliament committee, and a president, by the whole membership (Ingle, 1987:179). Jon Tonge (via personal communication with Martin Bull, June 1996) says that: "the party leader of the SDP was chosen by a postal ballot of ALL PARTY MEMBERS. He then assumed the title of parliamentary leader (without a further ballot)." This justifies a code of 4. (We should note that Delury, 1983:1097, in contradiction to Ingle and Tonge, says that the "parliamentary leader is elected by the MPs, but must be confirmed by the Council if the election is contested." However, we have found no other source to support this claim, and hence have decided to base our code on the information provided by the other two sources.)

**12.03 Conformation to extraparliamentary positions****1981-1988:1a**

The parliamentary group obviously play a big role in forming party policy and no regulations were found requiring conformation to extraparliamentary positions. Therefore, a score indicating complete flexibility of the parliamentary group's behavior was deemed most appropriate. (Based on coder Gibson's personal knowledge.)

**12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary representatives****1981-1988:1a**

Little reference was found to disciplinary measures. However, whips exist and generally party unity is high in the British parliament. Kolinsky reports that leaders and whips of each party meet weekly, and the MP's have monthly meetings in joint policy groups (Kolinsky:103). Given that the parliamentary group plays a big role in policy formation according to the constitution, this would seem to indicate that parliamentary members discuss their voting intentions and monitor themselves.

**12.05 Rotation Requirements/Tenure Limits****1981-1988:1**

No reference to any limits on tenure were found.

**12.06 Public Policy Positions****1981-1988:3**

The annual conference has no decision-making powers. Much more power is vested in the party's "parliament" or Council for Social Democracy (CSD), which consists of elected representatives (not delegates) and SDP area parties. The CSD works with the national committee and its policy committee to draw up policy proposals (Jacobs, 1989:403). The National Committee is basically "a steering committee" (Day & Degenhardt, 1984:472). It consists of one-third members of parliament, selected by their peers, and two-thirds area party representatives (Delury, 1983:1097). According to the constitution, the council is responsible for policy; however, it is the policy committee which makes the policy proposals. The CSD

either accepts or rejects them (Ingle, 1987:179). The policy committee consists of MP's and non-MP's in equal proportion (Delury, 1983:1097).

This makes the role of the parliamentary group much stronger in the SDP than the SLD. In the latter the conference rather than the National Committee plays a big role in policy formulation.

### **12.07 Primary Leader of the Party 1981-1988:99 (missing)**

The first election for party leader took place in 1982 when Roy Jenkins was elected. In 1983 he resigned and David Owen took over without a contest (Jacobs, 1987:397). Both Jenkins and Owen were clearly the recognized and de facto leader of the party. However, since the extraparliamentary leader, who is elected by postal ballot, also assumes automatically the post of parliamentary party leader (see 12.02 above), it is impossible -- without further information about the rules -- to determine which position is given higher status. In any case, it would appear that the issue is largely moot, given that the same person holds both positions.

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**#305 - United Kingdom: Social and Liberal Democratic Party (SLD)**

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Coder: Gibson (typos corrected by RH and SSh on 5-8-96)

**Background:** This party was formed as a merger of the Liberals and Social Democrats in 1988. Neither party seemed to dominate in terms of carrying over its structural organization, so it was treated as a new case. Jacobs called it "a blend of two very different organizational traditions" (Jacobs, 1989:398). Basically, the Liberals were highly decentralized. The national conference occupied an important place in party life but the parliamentary members were not constrained by it. In the SDP, control was exercised in a far more centralized manner; conferences were not considered so important. However, the parliamentary group was not dominated by the extra-parliamentary organization, but operated more as a united body within the party.

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1988-90: 2a**

The candidates are on an approved list of each state party. Local party members choose the candidate through mail or direct vote at a hustings ceremony. There are minimum requirements for women on the shortlists (Jacobs, 1989).

No details are given as to whether the national level simply approves the local shortlist, or can veto the actual nomination. It was decided that a score of 2a would be given for two reasons. The first is that as an offshoot of the SDP it was assumed that its method of nomination would be the best indicator of that adopted by the SLD. Secondly, there was no evidence which pointed specifically to national level involvement, so the default method would be local level involvement only.

**12.02 Parliamentary Leadership Selection****1988-90: 99 (missing)****12.03 Conformation to extraparliamentary positions****1988-90: 99 (missing)****12.04 Discipline of parliamentary representatives****1988-90: 99 (missing)****12.05 Tenure Limitations/Rotation Requirement****1988-90: 99 (missing)****12.06 Public Policy Positions****1988-90: 99 (missing)**

General information: Policy making is the joint concern of the



federal conference and the federal policy committee (Jacobs, 1989:399). The conference meets two times a year (Day, 1988:576). The policy committee submits green (working) and white (final) papers to the conference, and the conference has the final word on their adoption or rejection as party policy. The policy committee consists of 27 members, 13 of which are federal conference representatives. The identity of the other 14 are not referred to. Since they might be MPs, it is not possible to assign a score because of incomplete information. There is a provision for a consultative ballot of all the members on issues that are felt to be of fundamental importance to party values and objectives (Jacobs, 1989:399-400).

### **12.07 Primary leader of the Party 1988-90:2**

There is a president and a party leader; both are elected through a secret ballot of the entire membership. The president chairs the Federal Executive, and runs the party headquarters. After an election loss the leader is submitted for re-election within 2 years. If 75 local parties request an election if a motion of no confidence is passed by a majority of MPs then an earlier election is called (Jacobs, 1989:399). This means that a parliamentary or an extra-parliamentary actor can constitute the official leader of the party.

The score of 2 was given for this variable because should an extra-parliamentary figure be elected leader officially, it is highly unlikely that the leader of the parliamentary party would be overshadowed given the power vested in the British parliament.

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**#401 - United States: Democratic Party**

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Coder: Gibson (RH/RG altered codes and statements for 12.04 (from "1b" to "2") and 12.07 (from "1" to "2") on 3-16-96; RH and SSh corrected typos on 5-10-96).

**Note 1:** The American parties present a problem for our coding system since the "parliamentary" actors are the congressional members, and the greatest source of control over them is the president, if he/she comes from the same party, rather than any "extra-parliamentary" actors. To accommodate this situation the variable was interpreted in a broader sense to refer to the distribution of "governing vs. non-governing party power," rather than parliamentary vs. extra-parliamentary control. Thus, the following codes are based on combining the president and Congress as the "governing" wing of the party, which for purposes of comparison should be read as the "parliamentary" wing (Janda, 1980, supports this; his Var. 2.02 Government Leadership is coded in terms of which party held the presidency).

**Note 2:** Due to separation of powers the American parties operate as independent units within the institutions of government. Thus, at the national level there is a House party and a Senate party, each of which has its own extraparliamentary organization to help organize campaigns, raise funds, and formulate policy. The party in Congress, therefore, is not the equivalent of a parliamentary party in Europe (Kolodny & Katz, 1992:874). However, within both parties there is an official extra-parliamentary body charged with drawing up a party platform to which both House and Senate members are supposed to adhere. Also, methods in the two chambers for electing parliamentary leaders are the same, as are disciplinary techniques and rules on re-election. (For reference to different party wings, see Kolodny and Katz in Katz & Mair, 1992:874.)

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1950-90:1**

Katz & Mair's coding starts in 1960, but they report that for this year in non-presidential elections, all 50 states were using some form of primary, either closed (42), open (7), or blanket (1) (Katz and Mair, 1992:Table XIII.D.5.i).

Selection processes differ according to states, and can differ within states, according to the office being contended. "[T]he legal authority for devising nomination practices resides with the states...;" therefore a wide array of methods can be used (Beck & Sorauf, 1992:234).

The majority of congressional legislators are elected now through the direct primary process, which makes the voters responsible for

nominating the candidates. This is where "the party electorate, variously defined, chooses candidates to run for public office under the party label" (Beck & Sorauf, 1992:232). This has meant that "party leaders have less control over who will receive the party nomination" than in the other methods of candidate selection (ibid:234). Also, in primary elections, the candidates are self-selected, because neither the national nor state parties can bar candidates (Kolodny and Katz, 1992:874).

## **12.02 Parliamentary Leadership Selection**

### **1950-90:1**

The House and Senate have separate party caucuses, independent from each other that elect their own leaders and caucus committee chairs (Kolodny & Katz, 1992:874).

## **12.03 Conformation to Extraparliamentary Positions**

### **1950-90:1a**

"Today most candidates for Congress do not pay much attention to the national platform" (Patterson, 1990:281). With regard to the National Committee, elected to run day to day business, it has little to no power over the congressional party's policy decisions, "Although in theory the national parties are run by their Committees, neither the Democratic National Committee (DNC) nor the RNC has great power... they ratify decisions made by smaller core of party leaders" (Patterson, 1990:286). It seems almost as if the real competition for power is between the congressional party leaders and the president, if the party holds the White House. In terms of their relations with the extra-governmental organization, the president generally has more influence over the National Committee than the congressional party members.

## **12.04 Discipline of Parliamentary Representatives**

### **1950-90:2**

"Party discipline is virtually unknown... sanctions are almost never imposed on deviants." Each member has a "presumptive right" to reappointment to his/her committee positions; this does not depend on the member's record of loyalty to the party (Kolodny & Katz, 1992:874). Janda (1980:188) agrees: "The Democratic party has virtually no means to discipline those who deviate from party policy." Because there are no effective techniques in party rules for disciplining the party's members in Congress, the code of 2 is appropriate.

## **12.05 Rotation Rule/Tenure Limitation**

### **1950-90:99**

Representatives are required by law to go through renomination for candidature in order to be re-elected.

## **12.06 Public Policy Positions**

### **1950-90:5**

The Charter of the Democratic Party of the United States, 1974,

Article Two, Section 2, says "The National Convention shall be the highest authority of the Democratic Party, subject to the provisions of this Charter." According to Section 3, "The National Convention shall...adopt a platform..." From Article Three, Section 1: "The Democratic National Committee shall have general responsibility for... formulating and disseminating statements of Party policy" between Conventions. No references were found to the statutory rights of congressional members or the president to articulate party policy. Therefore, for purposes of consistency, the score of 5 should be assigned to this variable for the Democratic Party.

**Note:** It should be noted, however, that the party convention is generally considered to be completely ineffectual, and is de facto ignored as a source of policy cues for government actors. The literature makes this clear. The nominating convention has as its secondary role the drafting of the national platform, to which neither Congress nor the president is bound. The Convention also installs the National Committee which is officially in charge of party business until the next convention (Kolodny & Katz, 1992:873). So, while the party platform is drawn up by extraparliamentary actors, adherence to it is not required. It is considered to be the manifesto of the majority that year, not a statement of a continuing party philosophy. Therefore, the congressional party often ignores it (Beck & Sorauf, 1992:292-3). In fact, the presidential nominees even have a hand in the development of the platform itself, demanding the insertion of planks in the final document that they feel strongly about. The nominees can do this because they, as compared to state or national party organizations, have more control over delegates' loyalty (Patterson, 1990:279-81).

Nevertheless, on the whole, congressional members are reported by Laver & Hunt (1993) to be the dominant force. In their scoring of both parties on the variable of influence on policy, activists occupy a lesser status than "leaders" (i.e. government ministers/president and cabinet), and "leaders" are less important than legislators (particularly for the Democrats) (Laver & Hunt, 1993:U.S. Table 3).

Janda (1980) agrees that a party policy is really non-existent for the American parties, but he still cites the convention as responsible for major policy positions since they must approve of the policy statement for it to be considered legitimate (for a code of 5 on his variable). He reports a change in code after 1956 on this variable, and although he is not interested in policy formulation from our perspective, the change reported does have implications for the degree of extraparliamentary control that is exercised. It seems to have become more stringent in 1956 when the DNC was "beefed up" with the addition of the Democratic Advisory Council (DAC). The code goes from a "5" to a "6." A "6" means that the individual party bodies could take stands on issues without requiring ratification by other party organizations. The DAC did take its own stands upon issues, although congressional members

refused to serve on it. It was terminated in 1961, when presidential policy came to dominate party policy (Janda, 1980:188, Var. 9.05).

### **12.07 Primary Leader of the Party 1950-90:2**

The debate here seems to focus on who leads the party when it doesn't hold the presidency. When it does, then the president dominates. However, when it doesn't, the chair of the National Committee assumes greater power, as do the leaders of the party in Congress. If the national chair is more important than congressional leaders when the party is "out" of the White House, then this variable should be coded as a "2" for those years when the party controls the presidency, and as a "3" when it does not. Here is what the literature so far says about the national chair: The national chair is the leader of the extra-parliamentary organization; he/she hires the national committee staff; and when the party is "out" of the presidency the national chair assumes a leadership role (Kolodny & Katz, 1992:874). However, the national chair and party staff are essentially transient; they seek to aspire to an independent consultancy role and the selection of the chair is controlled by the presidential nominee (Kolodny & Katz, 1992:873). So, "while the national chair is a party leader, he is in no sense the leader" (*ibid*:874; italics omitted).

Given that congressional members do not seem to adhere any more closely to what the extra-parliamentary group leader says when they do not hold the presidency, then it can be argued that the congressional leaders (and thus the parliamentary party), rather than extra-parliamentary actors, do in fact "lead" the party in terms of policy decisions.

The real party leader comes from within the governing branch of the party; however he/she changes according to whether or not the party holds the White House. If the party has the presidency, then that individual is the effective leader; if not, then the leading party member in Congress is identified as the party leader. Often this can lead to a situation of multiple leaders. Var.9.08 in Janda (1980:188) shows this for the Democrats, when it is reported that out of the White House they had a number of different spokespersons from the "governing" wing.

Though the presidents and/or congressional leaders are clearly the source of primary leadership for the party, *de facto*, we have found nothing to indicate that this is made "official" in party statutes. Hence a code of 2 is appropriate.

### **Addendum: Presidential Nominating procedure**

There is no specific reference (yet found) in the literature to when the majority of states switched to using the primary election system. However, Beck & Sorauf (1992), when talking about the presidential nomination, say that 1968 marked the turning point, and show that after the 1976 election a majority of the states were

using this method for presidential candidate selection. If we take 1976 as marking the introduction of the primary system as the dominant method of candidate selection, then pre-1976 we have the caucus system, followed by the nominating convention which has nominated candidates for the presidency since the 1830s. Each of these latter methods (and particularly the caucus) placed more control in the hands of the party organization.

[Note: The specific details are that in 38 of the 50 states, statewide officials were nominated through the direct primary system exclusively (Beck & Sorauf, 1992:234). In two of the fifty states there are primaries for the two major parties and conventions for the minor parties. In two states the state parties can choose a nominating convention or a primary. In one state there is a convention if no candidate wins more than 35% of the vote. In four states conventions produce a shortlist which is then used to determine who can be put on the ballot (Beck & Sorauf, *ibid*)]. Beck & Sorauf (1992:244) also go on to discuss the informal means by which parties can play some part in the selection process, such as through putting more resources at the disposal of the favored candidate.

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**#402 - United States: Republican Party**

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Coder: Gibson (On 3-16-96, RH and RG changed a number of codes and descriptions: from "1b" to "1a" on 12.03, from "1b" to "2" on 12.04, from "1" to "5" on 12.06, and from "1" to "2" on 12.07; typos corrected by RH and SSh on 5-13-96)

**Note 1:** The American parties present a problem for our coding system since the "parliamentary" actors are the congressional members, and the greatest source of control over them is the president, if he/she comes from the same party, rather than any "extra-parliamentary" actors. To accommodate this situation the variable was interpreted in a broader sense to refer to the distribution of "governing vs. non-governing party power," rather than parliamentary vs. extra-parliamentary control. Thus, the following codes are based on combining the president and Congress as the "governing" wing of the party, which for purposes of comparison should be read as the "parliamentary" wing (Janda, 1980, supports this; his Var. 2.02 Government Leadership is coded in terms of which party held the presidency).

**Note 2:** Due to separation of powers the American parties operate as independent units within the institutions of government. Thus, at the national level there is a House party and a Senate party, each of which has its own extraparliamentary organization to help organize campaigns, raise funds, and formulate policy. The party in Congress, therefore, is not the equivalent of a parliamentary party in Europe (Kolodny & Katz, 1992:874). However, within both parties there is an official extra-parliamentary body charged with drawing up a party platform to which both House and Senate members are supposed to adhere. Also, methods in the two chambers for electing parliamentary leaders are the same, as are disciplinary techniques and rules on re-election. (For reference to different party wings, see Kolodny and Katz in Katz & Mair, 1992:874.)

**12.01 Candidate Selection****1950-90:1**

Katz & Mair's coding starts in 1960, but they report that for this year in non-presidential elections, all 50 states were using some form of primary, either closed (42), open (7), or blanket (1) (Katz and Mair, 1992:Table XIII.D.5.i).

Selection processes differ according to states, and can differ within states, according to the office being contended. "[T]he legal authority for devising nomination practices resides with the states...;" therefore a wide array of methods can be used (Beck & Sorauf, 1992:234).

The majority of congressional legislators are elected now through

the direct primary process, which makes the voters responsible for nominating the candidates. This is where "the party electorate, variously defined, chooses candidates to run for public office under the party label" (Beck & Sorauf, 1992:232). This has meant that "party leaders have less control over who will receive the party nomination" than in the other methods of candidate selection (ibid:234). Also, in primary elections, the candidates are self-selected, because neither the national nor state parties can bar candidates (Kolodny and Katz, 1992:874).

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## **12.05 Rotation Rule/Tenure Limitation**

### **1950-90:99**

Representatives are required by law to go through renomination for candidature in order to be re-elected.

## **12.06 Public Policy Positions**

### **1950-90:5**



As is the case for the Democrats, the Republican party's main policy statement -- for public consumption purposes -- is the national party platform adopted every four years at the presidential nominating convention. The platform is adopted in advance of nominating the presidential candidate, though in instances when an incumbent president is the likely nominee, the president may exercise influence over the contents of the platform. As Janda (1980:192-3) notes, though, various interest groups within the party work for adoption of their own positions in the platform, and may threaten to withhold support of the nominee if their wishes are ignored. In spite of the possibility of some presidential influence in such cases, the document should still be seen as essentially an extraparliamentary party document. When an incumbent president is not the likely nominee, the latter is even more clearly the case. Janda (193) notes that a Republican committee on program and progress was formed in 1959, though its importance was not seen as substantial. Hence, even if members of Congress were involved in that committee (which is not clear), the platform -- basically an organization document -- would still have to be used as the basis for coding this variable. A "5" seems appropriate.

### **12.07 Primary Leader of the Party 1950-90:2**

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individual is the effective leader; if not, then the leading party member in Congress is identified as the party leader. Often this can lead to a situation of multiple leaders. For the Republicans, Janda (1980:193) reports that the president was not necessarily regarded as the oracle of policy positions. However, the predominant influences are actors from the party "in government." Though the presidents and/or congressional leaders are clearly the source of primary leadership for the party, de facto, we have found nothing to indicate that this is made "official" in party statutes. Hence a code of 2 is appropriate.

#### **Addendum: Presidential Nominating procedure**

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