

INTA 696

Advanced Analytic Tradecraft Fall 2021

SYLLABUS

INSTRUCTOR'S: **Name:** Dr. Reginald King
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Telephone Number(s): (703) 801-3428
Office Room Number and Office Hours: By Appointment
Assigned Class Day/Time: Tuesdays, 6:15pm – 8:55pm
Assigned Classroom Number: Classroom 2

1. Advanced Intelligence Analysis

Intelligence—accurate, up-to-date information about looming and unfolding world events—is crucial to any presidential administration and Congress conducting successful U.S. foreign policy. Largely based on their ability to gather, evaluate, and understand information about the world dictates the pace at which nations survive and thrive politically, economically, and militarily. This course is intended to introduce students to the various methods by which the United States Intelligence Community collects information, some of the analytic techniques by which it processes the information, some of the IC's key product lines for customers, and the organizational and management approaches by which all this is accomplished.

This course provides understanding of the techniques and methods for advanced intelligence analysis. Students will learn the importance of critical thinking techniques and how effectively to apply them to intelligence analysis problems. They will be taught the basic tools of the analyst and given the opportunity to apply them. Students will also study some of the successful analysts of the past and the ways they applied the techniques and understand the various approaches to advanced analysis and how to effectively determine how to select the right tools to use. They will also understand the values of automated tools and the effective application of automation to streamline and make more effective use of the analytic process.

2. OVERALL COURSE OBJECTIVES:

As a result of completing this course, the student will be able to:

1. Articulate the role of collection, intelligence analysis, and production tradecraft as the “product” of the Intelligence Community (IC), with emphasis on the roles of collectors, producers, and policymakers, who are the IC’s customers.
2. Describe and discuss the relationship between intelligence analysis and foreign policy conducted by both the US Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch.
3. Evaluate intelligence problems and determine effective strategies to collect and analyze data, arrive at an assessment, and report key judgements.
4. Comprehend the complexities of intelligence analysis and collection requirements in view of some key “intelligence failures.”
5. Understand the importance of Collection, Critical Thinking, and Advanced Intelligence Analysis, and Presentation.
6. Describe the key foreign intelligence liaison partners of the US IC and the role that they play in corroborating US intelligence.

3. REQUIRED TEXTBOOK(S) FOR PURCHASE, ARTICLES, AND MEDIA:

a. Designated Texts:

1. Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 3rd Edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2005), ISBN: 1-933116-02.
2. Richard J. Heuer, Jr. *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*. (Washington, D.C. Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999.) This work is available for download at <http://www.odci.gov/csi/books/19104/index.html>. A formatted/hardcopy version will also be available from Dr. King.
3. William E. Oden, *Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America*, 2nd Edition (Yale University Press, 2004, ISBN: 0300103042.
4. Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrebaum, *Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments*, (Praeger Security International, Santa Barbara, 2010). ISBN-13:978-0313382659.
5. Jerome Clauser and Jan Goldman, *An Introduction to Intelligence Research and Analysis*, Lanham, MD, Scarecrow, 2008, ISBN-13: 978-0810861817.
6. Robert M. Clark, *Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach*. (CQ Press, an Imprint of SAGE Publications, 2018), ISBN 978-1-5063-1681-9.

b. Required Scholarly Articles:

1. Russell Swenson, “Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices”, *Joint Military Intelligence College Paper*, 2003, pg. 95-104.
2. Heuer, “Thinking About Thinking and “Perception: Why Can’t We See What Is There to Be Seen?” Chapters 1-2, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (1999); Odom, “Why Intelligence Reform?” Chapter 1, *Fixing Intelligence* (2003), pgs. 1-7.

3. Eric V. Larson, Derek Eaton, Brian Nichiporuk, Thomas S. Szayna, "Assessing Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Intelligence Analysis, (Rand Corporation Paper, Arroyo Center, 2008), pgs. 7-28.
4. Lowenthal, "The Intelligence Process—Collection and the Collection Disciplines," *Thinking About Thinking* and "Perception: Why Can't We See What Is There to Be Seen?" Odom, "Why Intelligence Reform?"
5. Lt. Col. Karl E. Prinslow, US Army, and Lt. Col. Robert E. Waller, US Army, Ret., "Assessing Emerging Threats Through Open Sources," *Military Review*, September/October 1999.
6. Richard S. Friedman, "Review Essay: Open Source Intelligence," *Parameters*, Summer 1998, pgs. 129-165. Biases in Perception of Cause and Effect," Chapter 11, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (1999)
7. Odom, "Looking to See: Imagery Intelligence" Chapter 6, *Fixing Intelligence* (2003), pgs. 130-142.
8. Lowenthal, "The Intelligence Process—Oversight and Accountability," and "The Legacy of the Cold War," Chapters 1-011 in *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (2006), pgs. 191-219, 220-321;
9. Heuer, "Biases in Estimating Probabilities," Chapter 12, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (1999); Odom, "Spying to Know: Human Intelligence," Chapter 7, *Fixing Intelligence* (2003), pgs. 142-166.
10. Art Hulnick, "Producer-Consumer Relations: A New Way of Looking at an Old Problem," in Stephan Cimbala (Ed.), *Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society*, pgs. 129-144.
11. Johnson, "Pathologies of the Intelligence Cycle," Chapter 5 in *America's Secret Power*, pgs. 77-99.
12. Glen Hastedt, "Controlling Intelligence: The Role of the DCI," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 1 No. 4, pgs. 25-40.
13. Chaim Kaufman, "Threat Inflation and the Future of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War", *International Security*, vol. 29, no. 1, Summer 2004, pgs. 5-48.
14. Michael Herman, "Ethics and Intelligence After September 2001," in L.V. Scott and Peter Jackson (eds.), *Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Routledge, 2004).
15. Joshua Rovner, "Faulty Intelligence," *Foreign Policy*, June 22, 2011, Joshua Rovner, *Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq—Analysis*. Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 20, 2011.
16. *The 9/11 Commission Report; Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (Norton, 2004).
17. Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum, *Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments*. (Praeger Security International, Santa Barbara, 2010), pgs. 332-382, Robert Clark, *Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach*, (CQ Press; Washington, D.C., (2009), pgs. 265-289.
18. Bruce Berkowitz, "intelligence Reform: Less is More," *Hoover Digest*, April 30, 2004. Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Gregory F. Treverton, C. Bryan Gabbard, *Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis*, (Rand Corporation Technical Report Series) pgs. 33-52.
19. Mike McConnell, "Overhauling Intelligence." *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2007.

Part of the Instructor's role is to aid students by elaborating on the concepts and principles inherent to the topic. The student's role is to be prepared. The students are required to have completed the assigned material (readings or media) before face-to-face meetings. No written work can replace missed class time, since many class meetings will be organized around interactive

use of discussions. Students are expected to contribute to each class session by arriving on time, being attentive, participating in the class discussion, and being respectful to fellow classmates. In addition, to arriving on time, students are expected to stay the entire class period. Arriving late or leaving early is disruptive. If a situation arises that consistently causes students to be late or absent, please contact the Dean.

Participation is an important part of learning. Students should be encouraged to ask questions. Attempt to answer all student questions during lectures except when it is apparent that a student has not read the material. Instructors should also be available during designated office hours, via e-mail, and by appointment.

COURSE OBLIGATIONS:

Assignments during the semester will be in a variety of modalities. All written work must conform to the guidelines of the most recent edition of faculty handbook. Students should be advised to back up all work on a USB, and plan to print assignments at least the day prior to the due date. Technological problems are not valid reasons for submitting an assignment late. Assignments done via SONIS must be completed in the time frame listed and the format requested.

ASSIGNMENT BREAKDOWNS:

1. In-Class Examinations: There will be 2 examinations, a midterm, and a final. Your examination scores will account for 55 percent of your final grade (see Grading below). Each test will include the materials covered prior to it. The final examination is, therefore, not cumulative. The precise format and content of the examination will be gone over in class.
2. Analysis Papers: During the semester you are required to provide 4 Analytic/Reflective Summaries of the content of the course. Your papers will be worth 20 points toward your final grade. The final submission of each paper should not exceed five typed pages and must follow the Project Guidelines.
3. Summary of Visit to an IC Agency: The instructor will arrange for you to visit one of the Agencies in the Intelligence Community. Within three days of the visit, you will be required to submit a summary of your key takeaways from that visit. This summary is worth 10 points toward your final grade.
4. Classroom Participation: Classroom participation is an important indicator of whether the student is comprehending the material covered in the course. Your participation is worth 15 percent toward your final grade.

COURSE GRADING SCALE

<i>Grading Equivalents</i>			
A+ = 97.0-100	B+ = 87.0-89.9	C+ = 77.0-79.9	D+ = 67.0-69.9
A = 93.0-96.9	B = 83.0-86.9	C = 73.0-76.9	D = 60.0-66.9

A- = 90.0-92.9	B- = 80.0-82.9	C- = 70.0-72.9	F = 66.8 and lower
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CALCULATION OF A STUDENT’S FINAL GRADE:

Mid-term Exam	25 percent
Analysis Papers (4)	20 percent (5 percent each)
Classroom Participation	15 percent
Summary of Visit to an IC Agency	10 percent
Final Exam	30 percent
	100 percent

Factors such as excessive absences, tardiness, leaving class early, late submission of assignments, cell phone use and other disruptive behaviors will be counted against a student’s final grade.

COLLEGE/CLASSROOM POLICIES AND STUDENT SERVICES

SYLLABUS WEEKLY COURSE AND ASSIGNMENT SCHEDULE:

Be careful to check the assignment due dates the course listed below in red. The requirements for all assignments are specified below.

DATE	TOPIC	ASSIGNED MATERIAL & DUE DATES in RED	LEARNING OUTCOMES	
Session 1	<p>Defining Intelligence and Introduction to Critical Thinking and Advanced Analysis in the Context of National Security</p> <p>An orientation to the course, introduction of the instructor and students, and explanation of the readings and course assignments.</p>	<p>Lowenthal, Chapters 1-2 in <i>Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy</i>.</p> <p>Hall and Citrenbaum, <i>Intelligence Analysis</i>, Part 1.</p> <p>Clark, <i>Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach</i>, Chapters 1, 2, and 3.</p> <p>Russell Swenson, "Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices", <i>Joint Military Intelligence College Paper</i>, 2003, pg. 95-104.</p>	<p>1. Explain what is meant by "Advanced Intelligence Analysis"</p> <p>2. Explain what is meant by "Critical Thinking"</p>	
Session 2	<p>Intelligence as a Discipline</p>	<p>Lowenthal, Chapters 3-4 in <i>Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy</i>, pgs. 30-62, Heuer, "Thinking About Thinking and</p>	<p>1. Understand and describe some of the current-day great critical thinkers and the</p>	

		<p>“Perception: Why Can’t We See What Is There to Be Seen?” Chapters 1-2, <i>Psychology of Intelligence Analysis</i> (1999); Odom, “Why Intelligence Reform?” Chapter 1, <i>Fixing Intelligence</i> (2003), pgs. 1-7.</p>	<p>successes they had. 2. Explain how Advanced Analysis techniques can really make the difference in a successful or failed foreign policy.</p>	
Session 3	Tools and Methods I	<p>Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum, <i>Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments</i>, pgs. 77-91, 121-234. Robert Clark, <i>Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach</i>, Chapters 4 and 7, Eric V. Larson, Derek Eaton, Brian Nichiporuk, Thomas S. Szayna, “Assessing Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Intelligence Analysis, (Rand Corporation Paper,</p>	<p>1. Explain the Different Approaches to Critical Thinking 2. Comprehend How Critical Thinking is the Cornerstone to Effective Advanced Intelligence Analysis</p>	

		Arroyo Center, 2008), pgs. 7-28		
Session 4	Tools and Methods II	Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum, <i>Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments</i> , pgs. 167-234, Robert Clark, <i>Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach</i> , Chapter 7, Jeffrey R. Cooper, <i>Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis</i> , (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005) Due: Analysis Paper 1.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Explain Some of the Methods of Anticipatory Analysis. 2. Explain the Methods of Anticipatory Analysis 3. Explain the Methods of Tendency and Anomaly Analysis 	
Session 5	Sources and Methods Part I: Open Source Analysis (OSINT)	Lowenthal, "The Intelligence Process—Collection and the Collection Disciplines, "Thinking About Thinking" and	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Explain Some of the Sources of Unclassified Information. 2. Provide an Overview of CIA's 	

		<p>“Perception: Why Can’t We See What Is There to Be Seen?”, Odom, “Why Intelligence Reform?”, <i>Fixing Intelligence</i> (2003), pgs. 1-7, Graham Turbiville, Jr, Lt. Col. Karl E. Prinslow, US Army, and Lt. Col. Robert E. Waller, US Army, Ret., “Assessing Emerging Threats Through Open Sources,” <i>Military Review</i>, September/October 1999, Richard S. Friedman, “Review Essay: Open Source Intelligence,” <i>Parameters</i>, Summer 1998, pgs. 129-165.</p>	<p>Open Source Enterprise. 3. Highlight the Challenges That Social Media Present to the IC.</p>	
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<p>Session 6</p>	<p>Sources and Methods Part II: Overhead Collection</p>	<p>Lowenthal, “The Intelligence Process—Analysis,” Chapter 6 in <i>Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy</i> (2006), pgs. 109-144; Heuer, “Do You Really Need More Information?” and Keeping an Open Mind,” <i>Psychology of Intelligence Analysis</i> (1999), Chapters 5-6, Odom, “Making Dollars Yield Useful Intelligence,” Chapter 3, <i>Fixing Intelligence</i> (2003), pgs. 53-88., Lt. Commander H. Todd Black, U.S. Navy, “Commercial Satellites: Future Threats or Allies?” <i>Naval War College Review</i> Vol. 70 No. 1 (Winter 1999), Lowenthal, “The Intelligence Process—Counterintelligence,” Chapter 7 in <i>Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy</i></p>	<p>1. Explain Some of the Overhead Collection Methods. 2. Discuss How Some of the Information Gleaned From Satellites is Leveraged by the IC.</p>	
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		(2006), pgs. 145-156; Heuer, “Structuring Analytic Problems,” and Analysis of Competing Hypotheses,” Chapter 7 and 8, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (1999); Odom, “The World of Military Intelligence,” Chapter 4 Fixing Intelligence (2003), pgs. 89-114.	
Session 7	Sources and Methods Part III: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT)	Lowenthal, “The Intelligence Process-The Role of the Policy Maker,” Chapter 9 in Intelligence : From Secrets to Policy (2006), pgs. 174-190; Heuer, “Biases in Perception of Cause and Effect,” Chapter 11, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (1999); Odom, “Looking to See: Imagery Intelligence” Chapter 6, Fixing Intelligence (2003), pgs. 130-142. Lowenthal, “The Intelligence Process—Oversight and Accountability,” and “The Legacy of the Cold War,” Chapters 1-011 in Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (2006), pgs. 191-219, 220-321; Heuer, “Biases in Estimating Probabilities,” Chapter 12, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (1999); Odom, “Spying to	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Explain two key sources of information for the US IC— SIGINT and HUMINT. 2. Provide an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of each of these sources. 3. Discuss the counterintelligence risks associated with each source.

		Know: Human Intelligence,” Chapter 7, Fixing Intelligence (2003), pgs. 142-166. Due: Analysis Paper 2.	
Session 8	Mid-Term Examination		
Session 9	Producer-Consumer Relations: Part I— The Executive Branch	Lowenthal, “Intelligence Reform,” and “Foreign Intelligence Services,” Chapter 14-15 in <i>Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy</i> (2006), pgs. 274-289, 290-305; Heuer, “Improving Intelligence Analysis,” Chapter 14, <i>Psychology of Intelligence Analysis</i> (1999); Odom, “Conclusion: What It All Means,” Chapter 9, <i>Fixing Intelligence</i> (2003), pgs. 185-194.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Discuss the “First Customer” Concept regarding the President. 2. Highlight the Oval Customers who regularly receive intelligence products and briefings. 3. Explain the concepts of “taskings” “feedback” from customers and how they drive the intelligence production cycle.
Session 10	Producer-Consumer Relations: Part II— The Legislative Branch	Art Hulnick, “Producer-Consumer Relations: A New Way of Looking at an Old Problem,” in Stephan Cimbala (Ed.), <i>Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society</i> , pgs. 129-144; Johnson, “Pathologies of the Intelligence Cycle,” Chapter 5 in <i>America’s Secret Power</i> , pgs. 77-99; Glen Hastedt, “Controlling Intelligence: The Role of the DCI,” <i>International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence</i> , Vol. 1 No. 4, pgs. 25-40.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Highlight the Congress as a secondary set of intelligence customers. 2. Discuss the IC’s Oversight Committees, including the HPSCI, the SSCI, the SAC/Defense, and the HAC/Defense.
Session 11	The Human Factors of Advanced Intelligence Analysis Part I: The Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Case	Heuer, <i>The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis</i> , pgs. 31-110, Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbuam, <i>Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments</i> , (Praeger Security International, Santa Barbara, 2010), pgs. 383-405. Robert Clark, <i>Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach</i> , (CQ Press; Washington, DC, 2009), pgs. 290-307. Chaim Kaufman, “Threat Inflation and the Future of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War”, <i>International Security</i> , vol. 29, no. 1,	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Review the “Lessons Learned” from the Iraq WMD situation, which prompted a US invasion of Iraq. 2. Discuss how this “Intelligence Failure” prompted major changes in the IC.

		Summer 2004, pgs. 5-48. Due: Analysis Paper 3.	
Session 12	The Human Factors of Advanced Intelligence Analysis Part II: The Iraqi WMD Case	Joshua Rovner, "Faulty Intelligence," <i>Foreign Policy</i> , June 22, 2011, Joshua Rovner, <i>Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq—Analysis</i> . Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 20, 2011, <i>The 9/11 Commission Report; Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States</i> (Norton, 2004)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Review the "Lessons Learned" from the Iraq WMD situation, which prompted a US invasion of Iraq. 2. Discuss how this "Intelligence Failure" prompted major changes in the IC.
Session 13	The Importance of the Right Technology to Aid Advanced Intelligence Analysis	Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum, <i>Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments</i> . (Praeger Security International, Santa Barbara, 2010), pgs. 332-382, Robert Clark, <i>Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach</i> , (CQ Press; Washington, D.C., (2009), pgs. 265-289, Michael Herman, "Ethics and Intelligence After September 2001," in L.V. Scott and Peter Jackson (eds.), <i>Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century</i> (London: Routledge, 2004)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Highlight the latest technology being used within the IC to enhance intelligence gathering and analysis. 2. Discuss how the IC is increasingly partnering with the private sector improve its technology. 3. Highlight some of the legal challenges to the IC-private sector collaboration.
Session 14	Bringing It All Together	Bruce Berkowitz, "intelligence Reform: Less is More," <i>Hoover Digest</i> , April 30, 2004. Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Gregory F. Treverton, C. Bryan Gabbard, <i>Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis</i> , (Rand Corporation Technical Report Series) pgs. 33-52, Mike McConnell, "Overhauling Intelligence." <i>Foreign Affairs</i> , July/August 2007. Due: Analysis Paper 4.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Summarize some of the key points covered since the mid-term exam. 2. Provide any final guidance and answer any additional questions leading to the final exam.
Session 15	Final Exam		