

GEORGE H.W. BUSH SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE

Core Liabilities and Accelerants of Terrorism

A Case Study of Germany, Denmark, and France

David Arceneaux
Casey Braswell
Brett Heil
Adam Kirby
Keith Landry
Amy Murphy
Tom Nypaver
Elizabeth Solch
Keith Wilkinson

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	2
Research Question	2
Definitions	2
Intellectual Framework	2
Why Germany, France, and Denmark?	2
Why Now?	3
Research Methods	3
Modeling	3
Key Findings	3
CORE LIABILITIES	4
GERMANY	5
Core Liabilities	5
Accelerants	7
Key Interactions	8
Conclusions	10
DENMARK	11
Core Liabilities	11
Accelerants	15
Key Interactions	16
Conclusions	17
FRANCE	19
Core Liabilities	19
Accelerants	23
Key Interactions	26
Conclusions	28
CONCLUSIONS	29
Key Findings	29
Commonalities and Differences	29
Looking Forward	29
APPENDIX A: EVALUATING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT	31
APPENDIX B: THREAT LEVEL CRITERIA	32
APPENDIX C: TABULAR GRAPHICS	36
ENDNOTES	40

INTRODUCTION

Understanding a country's complex security environment and its vulnerability to terrorism is difficult. Terrorism in today's world is fluid, personalized, and dynamic. To mitigate the threats of terrorism, a country must understand the nature of threats facing its security environment by identifying the core liabilities and accelerants that most directly impact its security environment in a negative way.

RESEARCH QUESTION

What major core liabilities and accelerants incite and/or facilitate terrorism in Germany, Denmark, and France? More specifically, what interactions of core liabilities and accelerants produce the greatest impact on the respective countries' security environments?

DEFINITIONS

Core Liabilities

Central, long-standing conditions often affecting a country's security apparatus, posture or environment in a negative way.

Accelerants

Factors that are transitory developments that have emerged, whose magnifying impact on a country's security apparatus, posture, or environment accelerates the damaging effects of the core liabilities.

INTELLECTUAL FRAMEWORK

Why Denmark, France, and Germany?

Researching the core liabilities and accelerants of terrorism in these countries is important for three key reasons. First, all three countries are close allies of the United States. The United States frequently shares intelligence with Denmark, France, and Germany and these countries often reciprocate the effort. Although this document is not a transmission of classified intelligence, it affords the aforementioned countries an outlook that may be beneficial in developing counterterrorism doctrine.

Second, these countries belong to the visa waiver program,¹ which creates the potential for radicalized individuals to travel from Germany, Denmark, or France to the United States without a visa and—in the worst case scenario—to execute a terrorist attack on US soil.

Third, these interactions provide a framework for potential mitigation by the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC). This framework may suggest dampening core liabilities, preventing accelerants from occurring, insulating core liabilities from the impact of accelerants, or other potential forms of engagement that provide the NCTC an opportunity to ameliorate the negative impact on a country's security environment.

Why Now?

Studying these three countries now is important for two reasons. One reason is that the global economic recession necessitates efficient allocation of resources. The governments of these respective countries are surely attempting to maximize results from minimum expenditure; this study helps determine which resources may achieve this aim. Secondly, it is imperative that counterterrorism measures assume a preventive capacity. This study specifically assists in this regard by directing attention to particular contingencies that may increase the likelihood of terrorism in short and intermediate term.

Research Methods

Resources: Information for this study comes exclusively from open source material. The referenced sources include academic articles and books, news articles, organizational statistics and databases, and government documents.

Modeling

This study's framework uses a three-step model. First, the study analyzes how each country identifies and qualifies the core liabilities that are most relevant to its security environment. Second, each country identifies key accelerants that may influence the security environment by exacerbating its core liabilities. Third, major interactions of core liabilities and accelerants are detailed to determine a possible negative impact on each country's security environment.²

KEY FINDINGS

- *Germany* - Germany's security environment currently faces several challenges which may escalate in the future, especially with the threats of homegrown and foreign-induced Islamic terrorism.
- *Denmark* - Denmark's security environment is relatively stable, characterized by effective defense policy and few incentives for terrorism.
- *France* - France's security environment is largely defined by a cycle of escalation that began with failure to integrate French Muslims. The cultural clash between native French and the Muslim community stymies Muslim integration and sparks agitation. This angst has formed a spiral of escalation whereby a small attack may lead to a larger crisis due to the reactions of the French government. This environment is not necessarily new to France, but might be especially toxic today given the confluence of accelerants currently acting upon the country.

CORE LIABILITIES

Five major core liabilities are identified in broad categories that are prevalent in Germany, Denmark, and France. Each core liability is qualified by a particular set of characteristics that determines its importance for each country's security environment.³ These core liabilities are operationally different in each country, but they are nevertheless strategically similar.

Muslim Integration

Muslim integration includes a number of social, cultural, and economic factors: inclusion, separation, opportunity, transparency, citizenship, radicalization, and grievances. Failure to successfully integrate the Muslim population in accordance with these factors potentially creates a more acute core liability for the countries in discussion.

Western Identification

Western identification is the degree to which a country self-identifies as part of the western world or how third parties view it as part of the western world. The criteria determining this include foreign policy, practice, and culture. Countries with a western identity potentially become premier targets for terrorists wishing to attack the western world as a singular entity.

Security Apparatus

A country's security apparatus includes legal permissions, interagency cooperation, arrests, convictions and sentencing, and freedom of movement. The manner in which a country enforces these factors largely determines the effectiveness of its counterterrorism efforts.

Border Security

Border security comprises infrastructure, enforcement, permeability, and tracking. Failure to successfully employ and execute these measures potentially creates a negative impact on a country's security environment by enabling the free movement of potential terrorists.

Tactics, Training, and Procedures

Superior tactics, training, and procedures (TTPs) in a terrorist organization increase the organization's capabilities. Elements of TTPs include the organization's size, activity, location, uniformity, training availability, equipment, and funding. Access to these factors bears negative implications on a country's security environment.

GERMANY

Germany's currently tenuous security environment may deteriorate in the future, especially with the threats of homegrown and foreign-induced Islamic terrorism. Nearly all of the country's core liabilities and accelerants deal with challenges related to Germany's significant Muslim population or its relationship with the Islamic world as a whole. Germany's three main core liabilities include an inability to integrate Muslims into German society, a security apparatus which does not share information well, and Germany's close relationships with Western countries which many perceive to be enemies of Islam. Accelerants likely to exacerbate these challenges are the economic downturn, worker immigration, military drawdown in the Middle East, and anti-Muslim violence.

CORE LIABILITIES

Germany currently faces challenges of integrating Muslims into the wider Germany society, close political and military relations with the West, and a highly fragmented state.

Muslim Integration

After the war, Germany looked abroad to find cheap labor to help rebuild the country. Part of the solution included a series of labor recruitment agreements with countries such as Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia.⁴ Partly as a legacy of this policy, Germany estimates more than 4 million Muslims, 63% of which are from Turkey, with smaller numbers from the Middle East and Asia live in the country.⁵ For many years, the German government has recognized that integration of this demographic affects the country's national security. It has federal initiatives—such as the Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance Against Extremism and Violence program—which aim to facilitate integration.⁶ However, to this date Germany has had only limited success;⁷ in 2011 Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that the country's efforts to create a 'multicultural' society had "utterly failed."⁸

Today, Muslims in Germany generally have worse economic prospects and lower levels of educational attainment than other demographics. Many believe that foreigners in Germany are victimized and marginalized.⁹ Furthermore, an estimated half of Germany's Muslim population has little to no contact with traditional Germans in everyday life.¹⁰ These traits may play a large role in the likelihood of a subject's radicalization¹¹ and are especially prominent in Germany's second- and third-generation Muslims.¹² Those of Middle Eastern descent perpetrate the majority of attacks, both attempted and actually carried out, but there have also been convictions of would-be Islamic terrorists of both ethnic German and Turkish descent, despite the opinion that these groups would be less susceptible to violent extremist ideology. Past government actions also contribute to this brewing perfect storm, such as the preventative raids of Salafist

organizations by German police in late 2010, which were authorized “just in case,” even though there was no evidence that the groups had committed any crime.¹⁴

Western Identification

Germany has had extremely close ties to the West, in particular the US and Israel, since the end of WWII. Besides the countries providing mutual political and diplomatic support, there are also strong military ties which make Germany vulnerable. US military bases have been located within German borders since the reconstruction of Germany and maintain a strong presence today. The risk that this presence poses is borne out by the historical record:¹⁵ the most recent successful terrorist attack on German soil was perpetrated against US soldiers stationed there.¹⁶ The German-Israeli bilateral relationship is slightly different. Germany is Israel’s second largest trading partner¹⁷ and they maintain extensive military ties in both arms trading and intelligence sharing.¹⁸ The US and Israel play an integral role in the perceived global “war on Islam” and are consistently listed as prominent targets by Islamists,¹⁹ which endangers Germany by association. Furthermore, Germany’s foreign policy actions have also made it a potential target in its own right: the country deployed troops to Afghanistan²⁰ and helped the US-led effort in Iraq by providing training to the new Iraqi police force.²¹

Security Apparatus

In Germany, the main concern about the security apparatus is that it does not share information well. In part because of a society-wide fear of an executive authority with unlimited power to collect and monitor the population,²² the German government is heavily federalized, and states maintain a high degree of autonomy even in national defense. Each of the sixteen states has its own police force and intelligence agency in addition to the three national intelligence institutions.²³ While information travels quickly within each state agency, it does not travel well between agencies.

Information and sources such as undercover agents are jealously guarded,²⁴ which severely restricts the ability of the government to contain threats that cross state borders. A prime example of the potential consequences of this rigidity is the story of the National Socialist Underground, a xenophobic group within Germany that managed to evade capture by German authorities for a decade. This group was responsible for ten murders (the majority of which were ethnic Turk Muslims), fourteen bank robberies, and two bombings.²⁵ By constantly staying on the move from one German state to another, the group was able to take advantage of the mistrust between various parts of the German security apparatus.

Border Security

The biggest issue for the German security apparatus in its attempts to secure the German border is the country's membership in the Schengen Area,²⁶ which effectively extends the country's de facto border beyond the area delegated on a map. With the largest total foreign-born population in Europe and the largest percentage of foreign-born residents from non-European Union countries,²⁷ policing its borders well remains a significant concern for Germany.

Tactics, Training, and Procedures

Terrorists or terrorist organizations can procure dangerous materiel within Germany many ways. First, wide availability of household items with dual-use capability (such as fertilizer) could be used to create bombs. Second, Germany provides a plethora of targets with its incredibly efficient and prolific transportation infrastructure.²⁹ In the past few years, the German authorities have prevented several attacks on the country's infrastructure, including attempted attacks on airports and train stations.³⁰ Finally, as a lasting legacy of World War I and II, the German countryside still holds a vast number of unexploded ordinance from past wars. Approximately 2,000 tons are discovered each year.³¹

ACCELERANTS

Four main accelerants could negatively impact Germany's security environment in the future: the economic downturn in Europe, a large influx of foreign migrant workers, the drawdown in the Middle East, and anti-Muslim violence.

Economic Downturn

While the German economy remains relatively strong and growing,³² this is not true for many other European Union countries. Many—especially Greece and Italy³³—are likely to face steep austerity measures as they attempt to get their federal debt under control.³⁴ As a member of the European Union's Schengen area, Germany relies heavily upon other member states to effectively manage border security and immigration issues. Any austerity measure which reduces an EU member state's ability to perform these functions poses a serious risk to Germany security as well.

Even within the strong German economy, there are sectors of the population which are relatively worse off because of the economic downturn. The country's manufacturing industries—especially those which ship a large portion of their products overseas—continue to experience growth (and benefiting from the devaluation of the euro),³⁵ but the service sector within Germany suffers. It tends to have low wages, inefficient procedures, and strong regulation.³⁶ Unfortunately, this inequality tends to dovetail with other worrisome trends: Germany's Muslim population is likely to be forced into low-paying service jobs and to be disproportionately

affected by the downturn.³⁷ In sum, Germany's Muslims will be the ones who suffer, if anyone does, as a result of the economic downturn in Europe.

Immigration

As Germany's neighbors face economic recessions and austerity measures, Germany is becoming more attractive to people who are looking abroad for work. As a result, Germany is experiencing an increase in immigration and also in migrant workers—to the tune of an estimated 800,000 over the next two years.³⁸ This expected influx is on top of the country's average annual net inflow of immigration; Germany ranks third in the world as a destination for immigrants.³⁹ Migrant workers tend to come from Poland, the Russian Federation, and Turkey, the latter of which is a group known to have trouble integrating into German society.⁴⁰ The trends are likely to increase as Germany's economy continues to do well relative to other European and Western economies.⁴¹

Anti-Muslim Violence

Racial violence has not been eliminated in Germany; the country only recently ended a decade-long, multi-state serial killing spree by a group calling itself the National Socialist Underground.⁴² During its reign, the self-titled Brown Army Faction targeted Muslims almost exclusively, though they also killed an immigrant from Greece. Anti-foreign sentiment is widespread in Germany,⁴³ which has “no go zones” for people who look foreign in large cities such as Hamburg and Berlin.⁴⁴ The potential for right-wing extremists to erupt into violence again remains high. Should racial violence against Muslims reignite, it could spark an upswing in radicalization and Islamist extremism as a form of retaliation as well as make Germany a target for foreign terrorists.

Drawdown in the Middle East

As the United States prepares to let Afghanistan take the lead in managing its own security right following withdrawal from Iraq, there will likely be fewer Western targets in the Middle East. Accordingly, Islamist fighters who believe it is their calling and duty to fight against the West may begin to search for a new front. In Germany, this could be particularly troublesome. The large US military presence there would become attractive targets to Islamists fighters with experience in creating IEDs in the Iraq or Afghanistan campaigns. The country's unexploded ordinance offers a plethora of bomb materiel in Germany's borders.

KEY INTERACTIONS

Interaction I:

Core Liability: Muslim Integration

Accelerants: Economic Downturn, Immigration, and Anti-Muslim Violence

Germany's inability to integrate its Muslim population into the wider German society has left the country with a disgruntled group of potential threats. With accelerants such as the economic downturn, an increase in immigration to Germany, and the possibility of anti-Muslim violence breaking out, Germany's integration issues will create legitimate grievances to add fuel to the fire of radicalization and may spark an increase in the intent of terrorists.

Germany's Muslim population is more likely to be economically deprived (through such factors as less educational attainment, lower wage jobs with less prestige, and higher rates of unemployment). This statistical likelihood provides a component of moral outrage for some young Muslims who feel that it isn't fair—especially in a democratic, Western country—for a particular demographic to be systematically discriminated against. The anticipated influx of ever greater numbers of people, both Muslim and non-Muslim, into Germany in the next few years will only exacerbate this tension. Further, an outbreak of violence against foreign Muslims, such as the National Socialist Underground, could amplify the perception that there is a Western-led “war against Islam,” a view to which even some of Germany's ethnic Turk Muslims ascribe. Should that violence target the friends or family of a potential radical, another element of radicalization would be added to the mix: resonance with personal experience.

Interaction II:

Core Liability: Western Identification

Accelerants: Anti-Muslim Violence and Drawdown in the Middle East

Germany's relationships with the United States and Israel, as well as its actions in the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, provide potential radicals with reasons to attack Germany. When this core liability is coupled with accelerants such as an outbreak of anti-Muslim violence and the drawdown in the Middle East, the caustic mix could provide terrorists with methods of increasing both their capability and intent to attack Germany.

Germany, under this scenario, would likely see more radicalization as potential terrorists experience the effects of anti-Muslim violence either personally (if their friends or family were attacked) or through their networks within the highly segregated Muslim community. Foreign terrorist organizations would also be more likely to target Germany as the Western military presence in the Middle East dwindles, leaving the US military installations in Germany more vulnerable than before. Further, the drawdown could free up foreign fighters who visit or move to Germany to continue their lifelong commitment to jihad. This means Islamist networks within Germany would receive personnel with the know-how and experience to carry out successful attacks.

Interaction III:

Core Liability: Security Apparatus

Accelerants: Immigration and Drawdown in the Middle East

Germany's lack of information sharing among its various intelligence and security agencies presents potential opportunities for terrorists. Additionally, an increase in expected immigration and the drawdown in the Middle East are likely to exacerbate the problems faced by Germany's security apparatus and thus cause a further increase in terrorist capabilities.

The first accelerant (an influx of immigrants) may exacerbate the capabilities of terrorists to attack within Germany. This increase would give the German security apparatus a larger pool of potential threats to monitor which potentially increases both the freedom of movement and personnel components of capability. The drawdown in the Middle East could mean that Germany will receive not only larger numbers of Muslims with the potential to be radicalized but also larger numbers of committed jihadists looking to continue the war against the West. This would then increase the know-how and training factors of the capability equations as well.

CONCLUSIONS

Germany's security environment is at risk, especially from threats of homegrown and foreign-induced Islamic terrorism. The country's main core liabilities— integrating Muslims into the wider Germany society, close political and military relations with the West, and a highly fragmented state—have created a condition which enables fostering intent and mustering capabilities within the country easier for those that wish to do harm. Interactions of accelerants with these core liabilities, including the economic downturn in Europe, a large expected influx of foreign migrant workers, the drawdown in the Middle East, and anti-Muslim violence make the country's security environment volatile.

The interaction of accelerants on the core liability of poor Muslim integration will likely increase the intent of Muslims within Germany to attack the country as the demographic sees its economic and social prospects continually deteriorate. The core liability of Western identification reacting with its accelerants will likely cause an increase of intent and capabilities as Germany takes part in the war on Islam abroad and targets within German borders become more prominent on the world stage. The failures within Germany's security apparatus could react with several accelerants to increase the capability of motivated terrorists to attack because of greater numbers of terrorist personnel, more knowledge and experience, and an increased ability to operate freely. These interactions create the potential for homegrown and/or foreign-induced terrorists.

DENMARK

Denmark's security environment is relatively stable and is characterized by effective security policy. Five out of six major terrorist plots within Denmark have been disrupted by Danish security since 2005. While Denmark has fewer core liabilities and accelerants than peers, two prominent core liabilities and four accelerants remain cause for concern. These factors are likely to increase the intent of terrorists to conduct attacks in the near to medium-term. The relevant core liabilities are Muslim integration and Western identification. The prominent accelerants are external engagements, provocative media, credible propaganda, and the potential for prison radicalization. An analysis of these factors and their impact on Denmark's security environment will validate appropriate courses of action toward ensuring effective counterterrorism policy.

CORE LIABILITIES

Of the five potential core liabilities reviewed below, two primary core liabilities are likely to have the greatest impact on Denmark's security environment: Muslim Integration and Western identity.

Muslim Integration

Minority and immigrant integration is a concern in many countries. However, Denmark stands out in this regard. While the actual number of non-Western immigrants is approximately 6.7% of Denmark's population of 5.4 million⁴⁵, the disproportionate attention garnered by political debate has riled social tensions. The Pew Forum noted that Denmark was among the top ten countries where social hostilities related to religion were on the rise from 2006 to 2009.⁴⁶ Sian Jones observed that the political climate in Denmark became increasingly hostile to immigrants after 2001.⁴⁷ A Danish government report put the number of immigrants and their descendants at 542,738 in 2010.⁴⁸ The Pew Forum estimated that there were 226,000 Muslims in Denmark that same year.⁴⁹ Several studies suggest that approximately 6% of Danish Muslims are radicalized or support terrorism.⁵⁰ These numbers indicate that there are approximately 13,500 radicalized Muslims living in Denmark, the total pool from which internal acts may originate. Grievances surrounding integration are further exacerbated by two salient components which increase tension among radical and non-radical Muslims alike: the Muhammad cartoon crisis and Denmark's immigration laws.

Muhammad Cartoons

The Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten first published twelve controversial cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in 2005. Following this printing, Danish Muslim activists travelled throughout the Middle East spreading news of the event to foreign governments. The activists inserted additional insulting depictions which were not drawn or published in Denmark.⁵¹ Initially the cartoons acted as an accelerant for terrorist intent but have since transformed into a core-liability for Denmark, becoming a semi-permanent aspect of Danish political landscape. So long as the cartoons are remembered prominently in the Muslim community inside and outside Denmark, the country will be subjected to a threat of increased terrorist activity.

The cartoons began as a debate on freedom of speech in the Danish press, but in February 2008 three men were arrested for plotting to kill cartoonist Kurt Westergaard. Subsequently, fifteen newspapers republished the cartoons in protest against the plot. Shortly thereafter, Muslim

leaders around the world condemned the newspaper, the cartoonist, and in some cases, the Danish government for attacking Islam. Al Qaeda used the issue to galvanize support for terrorist activities against Danish interests, culminating in an attack on the Danish embassy in Islamabad in 2008.⁵² Several attempted attacks against the newspaper and its cartoonist have been thwarted by thorough police work and one by premature detonation of a suicide vest, but each attack revives awareness of the cartoon issue and could serve as an impetus for other plots.

Immigration Laws

Denmark's unicameral legislative body makes it difficult for any one party to have a majority. For over ten years the leading party has relied on support from the right-wing Danish People's Party (DPP) to form a coalition government. The DPP helped push through increasingly tight immigration laws and brought Islamism, non-Western immigration, and border security to prominence in Danish political discourse. In October 2011, a liberal coalition consisting of the Social Democrat, Radical Liberal, and Socialist parties gained the majority. The new coalition has put measures in place to relax, but not remove, the immigration restrictions in by June 2012.⁵³ Another Danish initiative offers immigrants grants of DKK 123,000 (approximately \$20,000) to return to their countries of origin.⁵⁴ In 2011, applications for asylum in Denmark dropped 23% from 2010, compared to a 19% increase throughout Europe.⁵⁵ Denmark's immigration restrictions seem to have been intended to reduce the pool of potential threats and appear to have been successful in doing so.

The Danish system appears to have several shock absorbers in place which act as a balance against these social stressors. Measures include pervasive surveillance, police laws, and active measures for better integration of immigrants and natural-born citizens.⁵⁶ However, the groundwork for these tensions has been laid and can be exploited through several different avenues, inciting extremists on either side of the spectrum to take action.

Border Security

Denmark is part of the 1985 Schengen Agreement on open borders within the EU. In May 2011, Denmark briefly strengthened border security by instituting customs checkpoints at the land border with Germany and the bridge to Sweden. However, the measure was quickly reversed in April 2011 with the election of a new Danish prime minister.⁵⁷ This reversal appears to be indicative of the back and forth nature of the Danish political process. In March 2012, the Danish news media noted that Danish police believe illegal immigration is on the rise.⁵⁸ An increase in illegal immigration seems a natural response to Denmark's relatively strict immigration and naturalization policies, suggesting that threat groups may attempt to exploit what they perceive as windows of opportunity when Danish border security swings to a less restrictive posture. Denmark remains proactive in addressing the issue. The February 2012 EU Conference on Innovation in Border Management was one forum for furthering the dialogue on Smart Border programs which may include such tracking measures such as the Registered Travelers Program (RTP) and the Entry/Exit System (EES).⁵⁹ Despite the Danish Government's apparent intent to make illegal immigration and border security a focal point of the Danish term in the EU presidency, Denmark opted out of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty; Therefore, Denmark can negotiate and advocate for increased Schengen enforcement measures but it is not permitted to fully participate in many EU joint police activities. The Danish government has indicated that it may modify the opt-out so that it may selectively participate in EU police endeavors.⁶⁰ These issues

with Danish border security indicate that it is a weakness which terror groups may attempt to exploit. However, the issue does not register as a prominent core liability in the long-term due to the government's intent to remedy these shortcomings. The negative effect of border weaknesses is offset by successful practices within Denmark's security apparatus.

Western Identification

Denmark's connection with the Western world serves as a core liability to Danish security. This is an unavoidable product of Denmark's involvement in various organizations associated with Western leadership such as the European Union (EU), International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations (UN), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).⁶¹ The legacy of Denmark's external engagements has led to the enduring identification of Denmark as a piece of the larger Western unit that terrorist organizations view as their adversary.

Certain terrorist organizations view the Western world as a monolith and their purpose is to assault the West. Osama bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are notable examples of individuals holding this view, both signing a document that issues "the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military...in any country in which it is possible to do it."⁶² Denmark's historical ties with the United States and record of involvement in Western organizations certainly qualifies it as a potential target for various terrorist organizations whose aim is to target a particular set of ideas as much as an individual country.

Western connections serve as a core liability most easily exploited by the likes of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations that view Western society as a single entity and select their targets through social and cultural criteria. Denmark's extensive association with the United States and the Western world is a core liability that will endure for many years.

Security Apparatus

The successful track record of Danish security indicates that this area is more of a core asset than a core liability for the country. A 2007 Committee of Experts on Terrorism Report (CODEXTER) notes that Denmark adopted additional anti-terrorism packages and legislative amendments in 2002 and 2006. The CODEXTER report further details the specific permissions of Danish security with regard to financing, recruiting, training, aiding and abetting, surveillance, communication interception, searches. All of these hinge on the definition of terrorism in Section 114 of the Danish Criminal Code, which permits a life sentence for violations of that law. The CODEXTER report also notes Danish initiatives to establish cooperation with imams and the Muslim community, as well as Denmark's participation in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Against Money Laundering.⁶³ A 2008 report sponsored by the European Commission categorizes Denmark's counter terrorism policy as a "maximalist approach," meaning that it equally balances efforts on prevention, protection, pursuit, and response.⁶⁴ The U.S. Department of State's 2011 Crime and Safety report notes that Denmark has responded to increased gang problems with "a comprehensive surveillance and coordination effort among the police, social authorities, and the tax office." The report also observes that Denmark is increasing its use of closed circuit TV (CCTV) monitoring in high risk areas.⁶⁵ While these measures may have been initiated with other concerns in mind, the increased capabilities and permissions have clear implications for use in counterterrorism efforts. In total, Denmark appears to have a robust security apparatus with regards to counterterrorism. The combination of legal permissions,

proactive policing, and community engagement makes the security apparatus a core asset in Denmark's case.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Size and Activity

Disrupted plots within Denmark indicate that attack cells are generally small in size, ranging from individual attackers in two cases to nine suspects arrested in the largest group. These attackers intended to carry out bombings or small arms raids. The notable exception was the attempted murder of cartoonist Kurt Westergaard in 2010. In this case Mohammed Geele, a Somali refugee residing in Denmark, attempted to murder Westergaard with an axe in the cartoonist's home in Aarhus, Denmark.

Location and Composition

The composition of threat groups has been diverse. The cells disrupted in three early plots in 2005, 2006, and 2007 consisted almost entirely of persons residing in Denmark. They were predominantly Danish citizens or legal residents from a wide array of ethnicities including Afghan, Bosnian, Kurdish, Palestinian, Somali, Syrian, and Turkish.⁶⁶ From 2009 to 2012, four plots were uncovered which consisted of completely external threats. These included citizens of Belgian, Canadian, Iraqi, Norwegian, Swedish, Chechen, Kurdish, Pakistani, Turkish, and Uighur ethnicity. The shift from attacks planned within Denmark to those planned outside may be explained by the international attention generated from the reprinting of the Muhammad cartoons in 2008. Initial reports regarding the arrest of four terror suspects on weapons charges on April 27, 2012, indicates that the accused are citizens of Denmark, Jordan, Palestine, and Turkey.⁶⁷

Weapons and Equipment

Disrupted terrorist plots have demonstrated that threat groups are able to acquire small arms, automatic weapons, and small amounts of explosives in Denmark. Reports suggest that triacetone tri-peroxide (TATP) explosives were used in at least two of the cases within Denmark. Non-nitrous explosives of this type are relatively easy to make and may be difficult to detect with some bomb scanning equipment. Due to this ease of production and difficulty of detection, it remains likely that future threats will seek to use this type of explosive in Denmark. It is unknown whether these weapons have been acquired within Denmark or smuggled into the country. However, a recent Danish police raid in Copenhagen seized a cache which included twenty pistols, ten rifles, three automatic weapons, grenades, TNT, fuses, detonators, gunpowder, and ammunition.⁶⁸ It is likely that munitions of similar type and quantity will remain available to some extent through illicit markets within Denmark.

Financing

Non-classified information on terrorist financing in Denmark is limited. PET estimated that DKK 20 million (approximately \$3.5 million) is collected in Denmark and transferred to terrorist organizations abroad.⁶⁹ Given that support for terrorist funding exists in Denmark and that historic attempted attacks have been small in scale, it is likely that threat groups within Denmark will continue to be able to acquire sufficient funds to support small scale attacks.

In summary, the historic trend of plots and attacks outlined above suggests that tactics, training, and procedures are not a key vulnerability of the Danish security environment. Previous attacks

have been small in scale and extremely focused and discriminate. This further suggests that the Danish security apparatus is robust and capable of effective counterterrorism measures.

ACCELERANTS

Four potential accelerants could cause increased threat to Denmark's security environment - external engagements, provocative media, credible propaganda, and prison radicalization.

External Engagements

Denmark's military is actively involved abroad and has been a major contributor to multinational military campaigns. Specifically, Denmark is a contributing member of NATO and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)—institutions that have notably been involved in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya in recent years.⁷⁰

This international involvement is a potential accelerant of terrorism. Prior to the recent NATO effort to remove Muammar Gaddafi, Ayman al-Zawahiri stated, “[I]f...NATO forces enter Libya ...the Muslim countries should rise up and fight both the mercenaries of Gaddafi and the rest of NATO.”⁷¹ This statement provides two key understandings. First, external engagements provide potential adversaries with a purpose around which support can be gathered. Second, these engagements directly exacerbate Denmark's core liability of Western connections. Involvement in campaigns such as the overthrow of Gaddafi strengthens the affiliation of Denmark with the West and provides a motivation for terrorists to attack Danish targets. Similarly, Einhorn and Logue note that Denmark's support to Operation Iraqi Freedom contrasts with the critical responses of Sweden, Finland, and Norway.⁷² This suggests that Islamists residing in Scandinavia may be more likely to target Denmark than its neighbors.

Al-Qaeda (AQ) and Islamist terrorist organizations are not the only groups that may be driven to terrorism by Denmark's external engagements. Denmark's involvement in countering the Somali pirate threat serves as an example of this. By targeting Somalis in particular, Denmark may generate cause for retaliation in two forms.⁷³ One of these forms would be for Somali citizens to execute an attack against Danish targets. A second, and potentially more threatening form, would be the mobilization of estranged Somalis residing within Denmark. External engagements could also exacerbate the “social stressors” core liability by aggravating an already disenchanted population.

Provocative Media

The original media event which provoked Islamist anger in Denmark was the printing of the Muhammad cartoons in 2005 and their reprinting in 2008. As previously described, this accelerant event has become a core liability for Denmark. The possibility remains that similar events in the future could act as accelerants in the same manner.

Credible Propaganda

Radical Islamist groups have highlighted the accelerants of external engagements and provocative media to create credible propaganda – an accelerant in its own right. A 2009 Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) report identified nine examples of Al Qaeda videos that refer to the reprinting of the Muhammad Cartoons. PET notes that the AQ videos are highly ideological in nature and appear to seek to set the agenda for other groups to emulate.⁷⁴ Al-

Shabaab, the Somali AQ affiliate, was more direct in a 2008 internet video in which he vowed revenge against Denmark.⁷⁵ Fatwas against Denmark and Danish troops in Iraq have legitimized the more generalized anti-Danish sentiment.⁷⁶ Internet propaganda acts as an accelerant to terrorist acts in Denmark by directing homegrown, solo, and autonomous terrorists toward targets deemed viable by organizations seen as higher authorities. Tomas Precht observed that such propaganda can be used to radicalize potential recruits and give final pre-attack, moral support to suicide bombers.⁷⁷

Shifts to more militant propaganda by Islamic groups within Denmark are another concern. Gruen calls the shift in rhetoric by Hizb al-Tahrir a “significant departure from HT’s standard rhetoric, which has not previously included overt calls for violence.”⁷⁸ This could serve as a potential accelerant to actions by supporters of HT-Scandinavia (formerly HT Denmark), but could also present an opportunity for Denmark to reign in the group. Gruen alludes to this possibility, “HT has survived attempts to ban its branches in the United Kingdom and in Denmark because it cannot be proven that the group is engaged in any criminal or violent activity.”⁷⁹

Terrorist propaganda is clearly intended to incite and accelerate plots and attacks. The general threat level is likely to increase in Denmark as propaganda increases. Conversely, the threat level will decline if there is an absence of new propaganda. An extended absence of pre-cursor events, such as the Muhammad Cartoons, would degrade the appeal of new propaganda. Andersen observed that it is the politicization of these types of events rather than the events themselves which lead to attacks.⁸⁰ Propaganda output could also be diminished through the degradation of terrorist media cells or by government efforts to block Islamist websites and chat rooms.

Prison Radicalization

Many countries have recognized the potential danger that prisoners become radicalized while serving prison sentences. A report by the Danish Institute of International Studies (DIIS) investigated this issue and noted that the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) already teaches prison staff how to identify radicalization. The main recommendation of DIIS was a need for more and better qualified Imams to minister to Muslim prisoners and follow up with them after release.⁸¹ While this situation has received some attention from the Danish government, it should be monitored as a potential accelerant. Given the short nature of Danish prison sentences, only 15% of which were over one year in 2003,⁸² the possibility exists for Islamists to begin the radicalization process in prison and quickly return to society at-large to support attacks.

KEY INTERACTIONS

Interaction I:

Core Liability: Muslim Integration

Accelerants: External Engagements, Credible Propaganda, and Provocative Media

The most troublesome interaction for Denmark’s security environment is the interaction of external engagements, credible propaganda, and provocative media on the core liability of Muslim integration. The lasting legacy of the Muhammad cartoons can easily be exploited through credible propaganda by an individual seeking to propagate violence by inflaming perceived insensitivities towards the Muslim community. External engagements put Denmark in

a position that may provoke this reaction and create dissent within affected diasporas. Provocative media—specifically, a reprint of the Muhammad cartoons or another offensive publication by a Danish source—also provides exploitable material that may anger these diasporas. In general, these factors are a negative impact on Denmark’s security environment because they lead to increased moral outrage, the perception of a war on Islam, resonate with personal experience, and facilitate mobilized networks.

Interaction II:

Core Liability: Western Identification

Accelerants: External Engagements, Credible Propaganda

The second interaction of note for the Danish security environment is the impact of external engagements and credible propaganda on the core liability of Western identification. External engagements solidify the perception of Denmark as a Western state, making it a target for potential terrorists seeking to attack the West. Credible propaganda may also exacerbate this identification. For instance, terrorist leaders may seek to leverage this identity to provoke attacks against Denmark. The tools that would afford this leverage are most likely to be moral outrage and a perceived war on Islam.

CONCLUSIONS

Denmark has fewer significant core liabilities and potential accelerants than its neighbors in the EU because of three main aspects of the Danish security environment. First, Denmark has taken an assimilationist approach rather than a multiculturalist view of integrating immigrants into Danish society. On the one hand, this approach can be taken as a provocation by minority groups that do not wish to assimilate. Conversely, it can be seen as encouragement to other cultures to integrate successfully into Danish society. While prohibited from voting in national elections, immigrants do have suffrage on local issues.⁸³ Additionally, several Muslims serve in the Danish parliament, though Muslims are under-represented in proportion to their percentage of the overall population.⁸⁴ Second, Denmark has used legislation to restrict immigration and make it more difficult to obtain citizenship. These measures regulate the pool of potential dissidents or unknown threats within Denmark. Thus, it potentially slows any radicalization process instigated by the social stressor of Muslim integration. Third, the country’s law enforcement agencies have taken proactive measures to address radicalization through both preventative and enforcement measures. Preventative measures include community policing programs, awareness of prison radicalization, and community engagement.⁸⁵ Increased enforcement initiatives consist of tightened border security and enhanced surveillance authorizations and operations.⁸⁶

Prior to the publication of the Muhammad Cartoons in 2005, Denmark was largely off the radar as a target for terrorist attacks. Since then, there have been various internal and external attempts to conduct attacks as reprisal for the perceived slight. These attacks are highly symbolic, which suggests the potential of future small scale attacks specifically directed at persons and locations associated with the Danish media, rather than more complex attacks which aim for more critical economic or political targets within Denmark. While it remains a core liability, the impact of the cartoon issue is likely to diminish over time if no new incident or propaganda regarding Denmark re-ignites the issue. Denmark’s Western connections are highly likely to remain intact, though this issue alone may not be sufficient to distinguish Denmark as a target for attack.

Although social stressors are present in Denmark, they are better controlled and less threatening relative to other EU countries. The accelerant most likely to incite a plot to attack Denmark in the near to medium term is external engagements. Danish military support in Libya and policing of the seas vis-à-vis Somalia are of particular interest in this regard. This could make Denmark a target of AQ elements operating in North Africa, Somali Al Shabaab, or Somali pirate groups.

FRANCE

The French security environment is hampered by several core liabilities and accelerants, which increase the likelihood of terrorist activity on French soil. The primary core liabilities in France involve Muslim integration and radicalization, the French security apparatus, porous borders and immigration, and tactics, training, and procedures (TTPs). A number of accelerants could exacerbate these liabilities and increase the likelihood of a terrorist event in France. These include the economic recession, the halal meat controversy, anti-immigrant rhetoric in the presidential elections, financing from Qatar, prison radicalization, and the imminent release of convicted terrorists from the 1980s and 1990s.

As the recent terror attacks in France show, terrorism is not a passing trend. It remains a viable tactic for individuals, groups, and nations to use against any number of targets. In many ways, the recent case of Mohammed Merah is the perfect example for how terrorism in France might be manifested through the core liabilities and accelerants currently acting upon French society. Merah was morally outraged by societal cleavages and the sense that there was a “war on Islam” being perpetrated by the France and the West. These feelings resonated with personal experiences through the discrimination he felt as a Muslim in French society and during his time as a foreign fighter in Afghanistan. Merah was also mobilized and radicalized during his time in a French prison. These events merely gave Merah the intent to act violently. Merah developed the capability to attack through criminal networks common in the French *banlieues* and through exploiting France’s porous borders and criminal elements.

Merah was able to take advantage of France’s societal and security weaknesses, which culminated in the death of seven French citizens. However, the weaknesses Merah exploited represent only a fraction of the French security environment. Currently a vast array of core liabilities and accelerants negatively affect the French security environment. These issues could produce more terrorists and allow them to successfully carry out attacks.

CORE LIABILITIES

Muslim Integration

The most substantial, and perhaps most intractable, core liability of France’s security environment is the socio-economic status of its large Muslim minority. Socially, France has failed to integrate many Muslims into the fabric of society. In a recent poll, *Le Monde* found that 68% of French citizens believed that Muslims were not well integrated into society.⁸⁷ Furthermore, 42% of the French population believed that the Muslim community represented a “threat to their national identity.”⁸⁸ Many French Muslims feel as though their lack of integration is a result of hostility and racism from the host country. In a 2006 poll, the Pew Research Center found that 39% of Muslims in France felt that Europeans were hostile to Muslims and 37% stated that they personally had a bad experience with discrimination.⁸⁹ As one high profile Muslim blogger recently stated, “No matter what we do, no matter how hard we try, we are seen as a fifth column, the enemy within, a threat, a menace.”⁹⁰ However, racism represents only one Muslim grievance against French society. A second major grievance stems from the economic status of French Muslims. Economically, Muslims are much worse off than their non-Muslim countrymen. Muslims suffer from an unemployment rate that is 2-3 times higher than non-

Muslims.⁹¹ Additionally, Muslims have a much harder time finding long-term and full-time employment.⁹² Unemployment remains the number one concern amongst French Muslims along with other categories including integration, foreign policy, and even the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁹³

The lack of inclusion and opportunity within French society has led to a high degree of Muslim separation. Dense Muslim enclaves known as *banlieues*, which have created 751 areas of limited governmental control within France.⁹⁴ The *banlieues* create an environment where radicalization, fed by Muslim grievances against French society, can grow and prosper. Additionally, because of the isolation from French society (including security elements) *banlieues* act as a semi-safe haven for terrorists engaged in everything from planning to financing. As Mohammed Merah showed, lone terrorists can easily finance attacks through primitive criminal enterprises that thrive in the *banlieues*, and it is difficult to keep tabs on the radical elements that these enclaves produce.

Overall, poor Muslim integration acts as core liability within French society by creating an environment whereby Muslims, both physically and emotionally, become outsiders in their own country. Coupled with a lack of economic opportunity and a slew of other popular grievances against French society, many Muslims are left morally outraged and with the sense that there is a societal war against Muslims. Though this alone may not create the impetus for terrorist attacks, these criteria represent what are often the first steps toward radicalization. The potential for resonance with personal experience and the development of mobilized networks, which could emerge as a result of certain accelerants, would create the full spectrum of criteria that can lead to the decision to engage in terrorist activity.

Western Identification

France's status as a developed Western nation has explicit and implicit links to terrorism. Explicitly, France's alliance to the US and participation in the war in Afghanistan might incite terrorism. The head of the DCRI (France's domestic intelligence agency) believes France is the second highest priority target for jihadist terrorism behind the United States.⁹⁵ The Muslim populace in France may feel that France is an element of the "war on Islam," and foreign fighters may target France for its participation.

Implicitly, Western nations have participated in globalization, which may increase both the intents and capabilities of terrorist groups. France's aggressive anti-globalization protestors have shown the intent to commit violence in the past. Though the overall violence has been relatively minor in comparison to other radical elements, French anti-globalization and radical left wing forces will remain and could be catalyzed by events such as the economic downturn or the halal meat controversy, which they perceive as caused, at least partially, by globalization.⁹⁶

Relatively free travel, trade, and information flows grant would-be terrorists extensive capabilities. French connections to global transit (air lines, railways, sea lanes, etc.) allows for penetration of French society from undesirable elements that could originate from anywhere in the world. The free trade and the global marketplace grants potential terrorists (whether they be right wing, left wing, or Islamist) access to money, weapons, and numerous dual-use items. Additionally, the globalized, 24-hour news cycle means international issues become local. A

French Muslim need only turn on the television to see what he/she may consider morally outraging images of French troops in Afghanistan or the plight of Palestinians in Israel.

Security Apparatus

The French government boasts perhaps the top counterterrorism security framework in Europe. However, two key elements limit the power and influence of the French security apparatus: limited police presence in the *banlieues* and restrictions on police when monitoring potential, but not active, threats like Merah. Transport in and out of these communities is sometimes limited by roadblocks during Friday prayers, which are given over public loudspeakers.⁹⁷ These communities could provide sanctuary for terrorists for a range of activities. They might provide an established community from which to recruit and mosques to radicalize those recruits. They could also form a fundraising base for future activities. These communities could further provide opportunities to store equipment or house personnel. At the very least, the criminal elements in these communities offer the connections needed to acquire weapons⁹⁸.

Mohammed Merah highlighted a failure in French domestic law to track and monitor travelers returning from areas associated with terrorist training.⁹⁹ Merah was interviewed by the DCRI in 2010, but he was allowed to operate with a great deal of freedom. At the time of this writing, it appears that he was able to obtain this freedom-of-action by avoiding contact with known terrorist groups in France. Without this contact, French security officials did not have the legal standing to detain Merah.¹⁰⁰ It seems likely that potential and current terrorist threats have followed the story of Merah and now have an example of how to exploit this liability.

Despite these setbacks, France's security apparatus still remains one of the most aggressive and efficient outfits in Europe. It is perhaps France's strengths, rather than its weaknesses, that represent its primary liabilities moving forward. In recent decades, the French government has shown a penchant for tactically and legally overreacting to Muslim "threats" within the country. Tactically, the predisposition to respond harshly against Muslim threats creates the potential to trigger events. In 1995, French forces shot and killed Khalid Kelkal, who had perpetrated a series of bombing attacks across France. Kelkal's death, much like Merah's, was a national sensation and his killing sparked riots in Muslim communities across Paris and Lyon.¹⁰¹ In 2005, similar riots were precipitated by two Muslim youth protestors who ran into an electric fence and were killed while attempting to flee from French security officers.¹⁰²

Legally, the French government has also historically acted aggressively against any perceived Muslim threat, which has been defined as everything from the "Islamization" of society to full blown terrorist activity. The French legal response to these threats has ranged from banning Muslim face veils, to allowing of warrantless wiretaps, to the jailing of suspects regardless of whether sufficient evidence exists to charge them.¹⁰³ Though these measures undoubtedly increase the ability of security officials to prosecute terrorism, they also act as a liability because of the impression they leave among French Muslims.

Overall, the government's predisposition to act swiftly and aggressively in response to any perceived Muslim threat creates a core liability within French society – a liability that might be playing itself out today in response to the Mohammed Merah attacks, which will be discussed shortly.

Border Security

France's border is a core liability due to the freedom of movement it provides to potential terrorists and weapons. Specifically, France's border control is captive to the Schengen Area, and France's options for effectively curtailing immigration are presently limited. The impotency of French regulatory authority was highlighted in 2011 when North African political unrest caused immigration to reach a record level.¹⁰⁴ Sarkozy presently advocates France's withdrawal from the Schengen Area. If he is re-elected and he turns his rhetoric into action, France's border security might partially mend.

This core liability affects the security environment in three key ways: transnational groups can enter, domestic groups can acquire weapons, and residents can return from training and radicalization overseas. As Islamist fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan (some of whom call France home) consider their opportunities for continued jihad, internal perceptions of a "war on Islam" may cause them to consider moving their jihad to France. France's porous borders make France an attractive and accessible target. Furthermore, the full spectrum of terrorist threats in France can use a combination of criminal contacts and porous borders to acquire weaponry that would normally be restricted under French law. Merah's acquisition of weapons via his criminal contacts is a clear case-in-point of this vulnerability.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, Merah's training overseas aligns with al-Qaeda's new operational plan to train westerners overseas and have them return home to carry out attacks.¹⁰⁶ Though new border initiatives might be enacted as a result of the Merah attacks, as of this writing, France's border policies do not significantly impede this form of travel.

Tactics, Training, and Procedures

The aggrieved populaces in the *banlieues*, France's infrastructure, and criminal elements grant would-be terrorists significant capabilities. Four and half million Muslims live in the disenfranchised *banlieues*,¹⁰⁷ and radicalization of even an extremely small portion of this populace poses a serious threat. The animosity generated in some of these communities has also created 751 "no-go zones" for local French authorities, which may provide a degree of freedom of action for terrorists.^{108 109}

As a first world nation, French residents have access to an array of resources that could be used for terrorism. The ease-of-access for telecommunication equipment and transportation adds to the latent capabilities of terrorists in France. From opportunities for radicalization over the Internet to the ability to escape from an attack on a moped, France's infrastructure makes terrorism efficient. Furthermore, the civilian populace has access to military grade ordinance because of history and criminal contacts. France housed campaigns in both world wars, and approximately 50,000-75,000 tons of munitions are found each year. At this rate, the last ton of munitions would be found in roughly 500 years.¹¹⁰ France also utilizes significant nuclear power, and the security on their nuclear power plants is dubious. Greenpeace highlighted this lack of security by penetrating a facility in 2011.¹¹¹ Finally, France's criminal network allowed Merah to acquire military grade weaponry and financing.¹¹²

ACCELERANTS

Halal Controversy

The halal controversy represents a national food dispute that began after a television documentary reported that French abattoirs around Paris were engaging solely in slaughter methods governed by Muslim law known as halal. Under French law an animal must be stunned before it is killed to minimize the animal's pain and suffering. However, under halal practices the animal's throat is slit while it is still alive.¹¹³ The realization that French abattoirs were engaging solely in halal slaughter rituals, mainly due to the large Muslim market for such meat, created a firestorm throughout French society. It has even become a central issue in the ongoing presidential elections. Not surprisingly, this backlash against halal meat offended Muslim communities, exacerbating already significant societal cleavages. Mohammad Abdenebi, a Muslim geography teacher in France, told a French newspaper that the halal controversy shows the extent to which French Muslims are seen as "the enemy from within."¹¹⁴ French Muslim blogger Fateh Kamouche went even further, stating, "Every day we [Muslims] are being attacked, and we have had enough."¹¹⁵

The emergent halal controversy has the potential to lend credence to a belief among French Muslims that they are outsiders within their own country and that the French government is engaged in a "war against Islam" – beliefs which create a security environment in which the *intent* to commit acts of terrorism might be on the rise.

Economic Downturn

France, like most of Europe, finds itself in the middle of an economic downturn that could have a negative impact on the country's security environment. The National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) has estimated that France will post zero growth in the first quarter of 2012 and 0.2% growth in the second quarter.¹¹⁶ The report further estimated that France's unemployment rate would top 10% in 2012 for the first time since 2000.¹¹⁷ The weak growth projections for 2012, combined with France's high public debt, means that France will likely have to cut public spending and raise taxes. These economic realities will undoubtedly hit France's Muslims population the hardest. France's Muslim population already faces lower wages and higher unemployment than the average Frenchman. This creates a sense of moral outrage and frustration against French society that will only be exasperated by more unemployment and less social benefits.

Prison Radicalization and Subsequent Release

According to the U.S. Department of State's 2009 and 2010 *Country Reports on Terrorism*, "French officials are increasingly concerned about Islamist radicalization in the French prison system,"¹¹⁸ a concern that seems to be well justified. In September 2008, a French intelligence report was published that claimed 147 Muslim inmates were actively proselytizing and at least 211 were suspected of turning into radical Islamists.¹¹⁹ The director of France's domestic intelligence agency put it plainly in an interview with *Le Monde*: "It is there, in prison, that a minority of radical Islamist terrorists hook up with petty criminals who find their way back to religion under its most radical form."¹²⁰ Furthermore, reports suggest that the violent, salafi brand of Islam is particularly on the rise. "An RG official told *Le Figaro* in 2008 that they were observing "a steady increase in salafism with two particularities: a strong rejection

of Western values and the legitimacy of violence to achieve their goals.”¹²¹ In response, the French government initiated a number of programs to limit prison radicalization, including the employment of state-selected, moderate imams throughout the prison system, but their effectiveness remains unclear.¹²²

In the short term, this threat is particularly troublesome because a number of those imprisoned for acts of terrorism in the mid-1990s have been (or will soon be) released from prison.¹²³ In the long term, the threat stems from the profile of most Muslim prisoners, who are overwhelmingly young, poor, unemployed and cut off from all familial support. These youths could increasingly become easy prey for radical recruitment and force France to face a violent version of Islam that finds continued, long-term resonance in a population alienated from mainstream values.

Qatar Financing

French authorities may lose opportunities to interdict terrorists during operational planning phases because of seemingly benign economic aide to the *banlieues*. The government of Qatar has offered €50 million to micro-finance economic development in the *banlieues*.¹²⁴ The terrorist groups from the *banlieues* stand to gain directly by using front organizations to acquire portions of the fund. However, even legitimate payments can indirectly benefit terrorist organizations by increasing the discretionary income and time of potential supporters. This income can be operationalized to increase a range of capacities, especially travel for training and weapons acquisition. For instance, a person who has to work every day to provide for a family is probably not inclined to travel since it would mean an unacceptable loss of income for the family. Likewise, a person who is unemployed—and subsequently has time—might have difficulty raising the funds to travel. Funding from Qatar can solve the operational issues of both individuals. More importantly, neither individual would need to resort to crime for funding, which may remove a significant opportunity for catching terrorists.

Presidential Election

In the first round of the presidential elections, 17.9 % of the French populace voted for the far-right candidate Le Pen¹²⁵, who ran on a nationalist and anti-immigrant platform. Sarkozy will need to continually court this significant voting bloc to win the election. Sarkozy’s rhetoric and policy actions, therefore, will likely remain nationalistic and anti-foreign.¹²⁶ Sarkozy may also feel compelled to use more aggressive policies concerning the Muslim populace in light of the far right elements he needs to capture.

Drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan

With the close of the war in Iraq and an imminent drawdown in Afghanistan, terrorists that fought in both of these countries may seek to continue fighting for their religious beliefs in other countries. Specifically, French natives who have fought the jihad are prime candidates for a return to France. These natives, while relatively small in numbers, are perhaps more substantial than is known. It has been suggested that as many as 200 French citizens have trained in Afghan camps before moving to war zones.¹²⁷ In 2004, the Buttes-Chaumont cell sent several young French Arabs from Paris’s nineteenth arrondissement to fight American soldiers in Iraq.¹²⁸ That year the bodies of five other French jihadists were found dead after a fire fight in Fallujah.¹²⁹ Additionally, the U.S. has held at least seven French citizens at its detention base in Guantanamo Bay. As of 2006, ten Frenchman who had joined the Iraqi resistance were still unaccounted

for.¹³⁰ As these war zones demilitarize the combination of porous borders and perceptions of a “war on Islam” in France could draw the attention of these French natives, especially in the aftermath of the French response to Merah’s attacks. These individuals/groups may possess the knowledge and skills to actualize the resources found in France and train the local populace. These fighters might possess the expertise to weaponize WWI munitions or build large scale bombs or IEDs. If they were able to exploit the lack of police influence and criminal networks underpinning life in the *banlieues*, would-be terrorists could train and weaponize at home without having to travel abroad.

Mohammed Merah

The recent attacks (perpetrated by Mohammed Merah), and subsequent government response, represents the most pressing potential accelerant for terrorist activity in France. Merah’s attacks may instruct would-be terrorists as well as cause a cycle of escalation between right-wing political forces and the Muslim community. Merah’s attacks lowered the knowledge barrier-to-entry for terrorism by demonstrating how to exploit the core liabilities in France. The publication of his story and methodology gave would-be terrorist has a basic framework for how to begin their journey to jihad. A potential terrorist without this knowledge could fall prey to the French security apparatus or lacked the capability to commit an attack. Additionally, a major vulnerability in Merah’s attack was the need to rely on crime to acquire money. With funding from Qatar, students of Merah’s attacks would have a low chance of detection. Combined with the potential for domestic training, French authorities would have an extremely difficult task without greater intrusion into civil liberties.

The Merah incident also has the potential to cause a cycle of escalation based on the coupling of strong-handed tactics by the French government and moral outrage within the French Muslim community. As of this writing, the Muslim community had recently initiated protests against the government and has historically responded violently to aggressive government tactics. Twice in the last two decades French security forces have had a hand in the high-profile death of a French Muslim, and both instances led to massive unrest within France’s Muslim community.¹³¹

While the Muslim community protests of the Merah killing, the French government has reacted to the incident by ratcheting up security measures. These measures that may build upon already perceived disenfranchisement in the Muslim community. Under pressure from right-wing elements, Sarkozy put restrictions on foreign Imams and called for prison sentences for those who even visit “radical” Islamic websites.^{132 133} Furthermore, there might be greater authority given to policing elements to use brutal tactics, and the potential for another round of cultural conformity laws meant to break Muslim cultural identity and force assimilation. These measures will undoubtedly be seen as inflammatory to the Muslim community and further the notion that France is engaged in a “war against Islam.”

Though the reactionary measures taken by the French security apparatus likely go too far for French Muslims, they potentially do not go far enough for right wing elements in France. Right wing groups have shown mounting agitation with individuals of foreign birth and the practices of non-Christian religions. The Merah attacks will further paint the Muslim community as dangerous and could create the impetus for right wing terrorist attacks against “non-French” entities similar to those seen in the 1980s.¹³⁴ Like Islamists groups, a right-wing group would

have access to extensive resources for communication, sanctuary¹³⁵, transportation, and a porous border to import weapons. Unlike Islamists groups, they may have greater ease-of-access to training and financing. Thus, in relation to the threat of Muslim terrorism, the threat of right-wing terrorism creates a paradox for French policymakers. If weak measures are taken against the Muslim populace, they risk losing political support and gaining right-wing terrorism. If strong measures are taken, there is increased risk of Muslim terrorism, which also increases the risk of right-wing terrorism and a cycle of escalation. Either way, the Merah incident has driven a wedge into a society that already has destabilizing cleavages.

KEY INTERACTIONS

Interaction I:

Core Liability: Muslim Integration

Accelerants: Economic Downturn, Halal Controversy, Prison Radicalization, Presidential Elections, Merah Attacks, and Government Response

Perhaps the most worrisome interactions affecting France in the near future are the mixture of new accelerants with the core liability of Muslim integration. As previously noted, France has an integration problem that often leaves French-Muslims feeling like a fifth column within their own country. This societal cleavage, when paired with certain accelerants, has historically produced terrorist attacks. French support for the secular Algerian government in the 1990s led to numerous terrorist bombings in France (i.e. Khalid Kelkal). Similarly, the economic downturn of the mid-2000s, coupled with aggressive security responses by the French government, led to riots within the *banlieues*.

Today, the confluence of accelerants acting upon the core liability of integration may be greater than France has seen in decades. First, there are a number of cultural cleavages between Muslims and non-Muslims that are being exacerbated by current events. The halal controversy, the presidential elections, and the government's response to the Merah attacks have all increasingly polarized French society to the point where the rhetoric in France often portrays an "us versus them" mentality. Radical elements in France could increasingly recruit based upon the concept that France is engaged in a war against Islam; and the more that notion resonates with personal experience, the greater the risk of producing terrorists.

Second, there is reason to believe that France's prison radicalization problem is increasingly pervasive. A recent report has asserted that Mohammed Merah was radicalized in prison, which would make sense given the data on the amount of proselytizing occurring in French prisons.¹³⁶ Additionally, there are concerns that a large number of terrorists who were arrested during the terror sweeps of the 1990s will be getting out of jail soon. The release of these experienced terrorists would undoubtedly have negative implications on the security environment.

Third, on top of all the cultural and radicalization issues currently exacerbating liabilities associated with integration, France faces a severe economic downturn that has led to some of its highest unemployment rates in a decade.¹³⁷ This downturn is likely to adversely affect the already disadvantaged Muslim population, and lead to an increase in moral outrage emanating from Muslim enclaves.

Interaction II:

Core Liability: Security Apparatus

Accelerants: Merah Attacks, Presidential Election, and Government Reaction

The attacks by Mohammed Merah may create a spiral of escalation between the French government and residents of the Muslim *banlieues*. Sarkozy could not appear weak when reacting to the Merah attacks because he needs to court the far right. Furthermore, he likely needed to re-assert his security credentials. The result was televised arrests of individuals either linked to Merah or suspected of terrorism. In the wake of the attack, Sarkozy further banned several extremist Imams from entering the country.¹³⁸ His administration also moved to ban access to extremist websites and travel to terrorist training camps.¹³⁹

From the perspective of Muslims, these actions could simply reinforce the narrative that the French do not welcome Muslims. They likely did not see the arrests as counterterrorism efforts because of their historic perceptions of the French security apparatus. In their eyes, terrorists were not arrested; young Muslims were arrested for being Muslim. Even if some could excuse the arrests as good police work, many may not excuse bans on either their religion or freedom. The present reaction by the Muslim community has been to challenge Sarkozy politically.¹⁴⁰ If their animosity to Sarkozy's regime extends into violence, then the Sarkozy regime would likely feel compelled to further aggressive action. The cycle would start anew.

Interaction III:

Core Liabilities: TTPs and Border Security

Accelerants: Merah Attacks, Qatar Finance, and Drawdown in Iraq/Afghanistan

France could conceivably provide a terrorist or terrorist organization with training, weaponry, sanctuary, personnel, and financing. France can provide training to would-be terrorists by either granting them access to foreign training camps or developing the training mechanisms domestically. Merah's foreign training may provide the inspiration and example that a radicalized individual might desire to use. Funding from Qatar and France's porous border could allow the radical to reach a training camp. However, French residents who fought in Iraq and Afghanistan could also move through the border to assist domestic training as well.

Dual-use items, nuclear material, historic ordinance, and even smuggled-in small arms already exist in France. Trained fighters can actualize the potential of these weapons. They could store these weapons among disgruntled residents of the *banlieues*, affording them some degree of sanctuary. Returning fighters bring more than training and weapons expertise. They also bring stories. Sharing experiences in *jihad* may radicalize additional members in the communities, increasing personnel. Radicalized prisoners may also decide to move towards terrorism. Radicalized prisoners could provide a unique expertise to would-be terrorists even if the prisoners do not decide to conduct terrorism themselves. Merah used crime for both financing and weapons procurement. A radicalized prisoner could pass along the necessary contacts for a similar operation.

From the French government's perspective, the DCRI would need to expend resources tracking returning fighters, radicalized residents, residents that provide shelter, potentially radicalized prisoners, and the criminal contacts of the radicalized prisoners—to say nothing of false leads. This strain on the DCRI may result in aggressive arrests or missed attacks. Either outcome may well be acceptable to terrorists because aggressive arrests may drive others to terrorism.

CONCLUSION

France has a long history of dealing with terrorism, from both state and non-state actors. Preventing the capability of terrorists has historically been an area in which French counterterrorism efforts have excelled, and France is widely considered to have the best counterterrorism security apparatus in Europe. The threat of terrorism, nevertheless, may go a step beyond historic trends because of unique interactions in the modern era. Endemic issues with Muslim integration are not new to France. France has seen increased agitation of Muslim community before. The issues of today, however, combine longstanding angst with recent agitation, a massive disenfranchised populace, readily available capabilities, and a spiral of escalation.

Some of the 4.5 million *banlieues* residents may radicalize as their perceptions of ethnic and religious discrimination resonate with personal experience. Skilled criminals may leave prison radicalized and confer tradecraft for smuggling, finance, or weapons use. Recent accelerants could also strain French security officials. Financing from Qatar may remove a chance at interdiction. France's porous borders may let fighters from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars in and allow radicalized French residents out to train. High technology and other resources are also available in France. Consequently, the French security apparatus may be bested by some attackers, especially if domestic jihadists are able to exploit the expertise of global networks. Should an attack get past the DCRI, Sarkozy may politically feel compelled to act aggressively against radical elements of Islam, and reaction from disgruntled Muslims may continue a spiral of escalation.

Overall, the Mohammed Merah attacks represent the perfect case study on the evolving French security environment. Merah exploited a number of core liabilities and accelerants acting upon French society. While recent arrests may suggest that the DCRI is addressing the detention rules that prevented Merah's apprehension, there are still tremendous drivers for terrorism in France. And though the French recognize this threat and devote considerable resources to it, the prospect of mitigation remains both arduous and paramount.¹⁴¹

CONCLUSIONS

KEY FINDINGS

- *Germany* - Germany's security environment currently faces several challenges which may escalate in the future. These vulnerabilities increase the threat of homegrown and foreign-induced Islamic terrorism.
- *Denmark* - Denmark's security environment is a relatively stable one characterized by effective defense policy and few incentives for terrorism.
- *France* - France's security environment is largely defined by a cycle of escalation that begins with a failure to integrate French Muslims. The cultural clash between native French and the Muslim community stymies Muslim integration and sparks agitation. This angst has formed a spiral of escalation whereby a small attack may lead to a larger crisis due to the reactions of the French government. This environment is not necessarily new to France, but might be especially toxic today given the confluence of accelerants currently acting upon the country.

COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES

The security environments of the countries in question are similar in that they largely center on the same core liability—Muslim integration. Although this liability is operationally different in each country, the central concern of integrating and assimilating Muslims into Germany, Denmark, and France remains a primary concern. Additionally, all three countries are part of the visa waiver program and present the possibility of radicalized individuals travelling from these countries to the United States unchecked.

Despite these similarities, each country presents a unique challenge for NCTC mitigation of threats. A notable difference among the three countries is the manner in which they address terrorism: Germany is characterized by an extremely federalized and disparate enforcement system; Denmark pursues proactive and preventive CT measures; and France responds with overwhelming force to potential terrorist threats. Because of this uniqueness, effective threat mitigation requires that each country be given particular attention that accounts for the particularities of Germany, Denmark, and France.

LOOKING FORWARD

From this study, three key aspects are points for further consideration. First, border security must be given adequate resources and attention to prevent the free flow of terrorists between countries and—in the case of Germany—within country. Second, the countries must remain mindful of the impact of government response to terrorist threats. Overzealous reactions are historically an initiator of dissent and can readily exacerbate the situation. Lastly and most importantly, Muslim integration must be given a great amount of attention by any institution interested in mitigating

the terrorist threat in Germany, Denmark, and France. Muslim integration is the most acute core liability in each country and will undoubtedly shape each country's security environment in the next several years.

APPENDIX A: EVALUATING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Gauging the implications of certain core liabilities and accelerants on a country's security environment involves two primary considerations. What impact do liabilities and accelerants have on the *intent* to commit acts of terror? And what impact do liabilities and accelerants have on the *capability* to commit acts of terror?

In the case of Islamic terrorism (which represents the primary terrorist threat to Denmark, Germany and France) intent is tied directly to radicalization. Understanding how and why terrorists are radicalizing offers the best starting point for understanding (a) which countries are most liable to produce individuals or groups with the intent to commit acts of terror and (b) what aspects of society (i.e. core liabilities and accelerants) are leading to greater radicalization. This paper works off the framework for homegrown radicalization developed by renowned terrorist expert, and former CIA analyst, Marc Sageman. Sageman posits four key components that often lead to Islamic radicalization. These components do not have to occur in a linear fashion, nor do they have to happen all at once. Instead, Sageman's four prongs simply represent a list of criteria that when met often produce a jihadist mentality.

Moral outrage: "In many of their writings and speeches, terrorists refer to the strong motivational effects of hearing about or watching the suffering of fellow Muslims."¹⁴² Moral outrage can be created in a variety of ways, especially given the contemporary prominence of media and social networking. A Muslim in Denmark could become outraged by the site of Danish troops on Afghani soil. A French Muslim could become outraged by a news reports detailing the unemployment rates of his fellow Muslim citizens. The importance here is that an association is made between the victimization of Muslims and a certain government or society.

War Against Islam: "For many young Muslims, the sense of moral outrage is the start of a process. But by itself, it is not sufficient. This outrage has to fit into a moral universe."¹⁴³ This moral universe is usually couched in religious terms. Thus, some Muslims begin to perceive certain governments and/or societies as engaged in a "war against Islam." This belief creates an "us versus them" mentality and can be easily exacerbated by even minor events such as a societal outcry against religious meat (as seen in France) or the creation of an "insensitive" cartoon (as seen in Denmark).

Resonance with Personal Experience: Many people are exposed to jihadist interpretations, but most do not internalize them. This mentality is more likely to be adopted when moral outrage or the idea that there is a war against Islam resonates with everyday experiences.¹⁴⁴ It is one thing to see fellow Muslims suffering; it is another thing entirely when that suffering is personalized. Whether it is the belief that you were denied a job because you are a Muslim or having a sibling arrested by authorities in a counterterrorism sweep, personal experiences internalize the "us versus them" mentality and give an individual a personal stake in fighting the "other."

Mobilized by Networks: If we stopped this analysis after the first three criteria, we would be left with a lot of angry individuals, but no real terrorists.¹⁴⁵ To take the final step toward jihad, external guidance is needed. “Only other people who share [an individual’s] outrage, beliefs, and experiences...can help him/her cross the line from venting their anger to becoming a terrorist.”¹⁴⁶ This guidance can come from a group of friends, an Imam at a local mosque, or even a prison cell mate. Regardless, the importance of external individuals that can guide and encourage a jihadist mentality cannot be understated.

These four criteria thus represent the basis for considering the extent to which core liabilities and accelerants in Denmark, France, and Germany create and catalyze the radicalization processes and thus potentially increase the *intent* to carry out attacks.

Another important consideration must be made to gain a truly comprehensive understanding of the countries’ security environments. What security environment implications do core liabilities and accelerants produce that nurture a terrorist’s *capability* to plan or carry out attacks within a society? This is more straightforward than the radicalization and intent framework previously discussed and involves two considerations. What resources are available to would-be terrorists and how permissive are the environments within which they would like to attack? A terrorist’s ability to carry out an attack relies on four key resources: financing, weaponry, training/know-how, and personnel. Acquisition of these resources can be derived through exploitation of core liabilities, such as porous borders, and made easier by certain accelerants, such as an influx of capital from governments in the Middle East (see “Qatar Finance”). Meanwhile, the permissive environment of an individual country determines how easily a terrorist could carry out an attack once he/she has the resources to do so. For instance, the lack of information sharing by security authorities in Germany could make it more likely that a terrorist plot would slip through the cracks, while a higher threshold for legal action in Denmark might make it difficult for Danish authorities to arrest a suspected radical.

In sum, this paper sought to diagnose the complex security environments of Denmark, Germany, and France by examining certain core liabilities and accelerants inherent to each country and determining the impacts those considerations have on the intent and capability of would be terrorists to commit acts of violence. Methodologically, this was achieved by first identifying the various liabilities and accelerants currently (or potentially) acting on an individual country, and then applying the intent and capability framework detailed above in order to determine overall security environment implications.

APPENDIX B: THREAT LEVEL CRITERIA

The criteria which define each category of core liabilities are described below. For the purposes of this study, the criteria within each category have been evaluated in the aggregate to arrive at a comparative rank order for each core liability. Further research in this subject could evaluate these criteria from an additive or quantitative approach to render an absolute threat level for each country in isolation; however, this was not within the scope or intent of this project.

1. **Muslim Integration** – Some degree of grievance and frustration is present in each of the three countries, variance is differentiated by:
 - 1.1. Inclusion – Degree to which the Muslim population is incorporated into public discourse and extent of their influence in that discourse. This can be seen through community outreach programs, voting rights of Muslims, representation in elected positions, and degree of participation by the Muslim community in these discussions.
 - 1.2. Separation – Ethnic density of enclaves.
 - 1.3. Opportunity – Level at which the Muslim population is incorporated in local commerce. (i.e. unemployment rate).
 - 1.4. Transparency – Degree to which the “non-radical” Muslim community is able to operate openly. (e.g. The presence of “garage mosques” could indicate a low degree of transparency.)
 - 1.5. Citizenship – Ease of becoming a citizen of a particular country.
 - 1.6. Radicalization – What percentage of the Muslim population is thought to be radicalized?
 - 1.7. Grievances – What key issues are present in the country which are not common to all other countries?
2. **Border Security** – All countries are members of the Schengen area, an open borders initiative. However, variance is differentiated by
 - 2.1. Infrastructure – Does the country have checkpoints for identification and searches. Is tracking equipment available at the checkpoints (cameras, biometrics). This becomes important in crisis situations in which the government may want to lock down due to imminent threats. It represents a government’s ability to do so if it so desires.
 - 2.2. Enforcement – Does the country abide by the Schengen agreement? Is it more or less restrictive? (e.g. Denmark re-instated customs searches in 2011.)
 - 2.3. Permeability – Degree to which non-residents can enter a country undetected. (e.g. Outside of official border crossings or by sea.)
 - 2.4. Tracking – Degree to which a country is able to track the movement of persons of interest once they have entered. [There is admittedly some cross-over here with “security apparatus.”]
3. **Western Identification** – All of these countries are part of Western society, variance can be seen in how they differ in these areas:
 - 3.1. Foreign Policy – Does a country’s rhetoric set it apart by opposing key EU, UN, or NATO initiatives? (What it says.)
 - 3.2. Practice – Does a country participate in Western initiatives and institutions (NATO deployments, honoring sanctions)? (What it does.)

3.3. Culture – Degree to which a country defines itself in terms of nationality versus membership in the western community.

4. Security Apparatus

4.1. Legal Permissions – This is an estimate of the freedom with which law enforcement is authorized to operate while conducting surveillance (Human or Technical), warrants and searches. How does the country value privacy and individual liberties versus the desire to protect the population at large.

4.2. Interagency Cooperation – Degree to which agencies within a country effectively collaborate.

4.3. Arrests – Track record of disrupting terrorist plots. [Note that this should not be used as the sole basis of determining the threat level, since the absence of arrests could be simply a result of an absence of plots.]

4.4. Convictions & Sentencing – Rate at which the judicial branch convicts terrorists and length of sentence.

4.5. Access (Freedom of Movement)– Degree of freedom with which government officials and LE can move throughout Muslim communities. (Permissive, Semi-Permissive, Non-Permissive/No-Go)

5. **Tactics, Training and Procedures (TTP's) – Capabilities:** This category is an estimate of future trends in capabilities based on historic attacks. [Note: Our country groups should indicate if their judgment of future capabilities differs from the historic trend, how, and why.]

5.1. Size – Number of enemy available (or likely to participate in attacks). This is intended to be an indicator of the potential scale of future attacks. i.e. Solo or lone wolf attacks are likely to have low effects. Cells of 2-10 can be expected to achieve moderate effects. Networks of more than 10 may have high or catastrophic effects (e.g. 19 in 9/11 attacks)

5.2. Activity – Historic tactics used or planned for use in the country

5.2.1. Tactics

5.2.1.1. Murder/Assassination

5.2.1.2. Kidnapping(?)

5.2.1.3. Raid

5.2.1.4. Bombing

5.3. Location –

5.3.1. Are threats positioned internally or externally?

5.3.2. Are they urban or rural?

5.3.3. Do they have effective “sanctuary” from which to conduct attacks? (This is the tactical aspect of “no-go” zones focusing more specifically on the radical actors. While it is the converse of “access/FOM” above, the consideration should go toward how it affects the population at large.)

5.4. Uniformity –

5.4.1. To what degree do threats originate from a specific ethnic or national group?

5.4.2. How many different threat groups are present?

5.4.3. Are threats integrated in larger terrorist networks?

5.4.3.1. Officially affiliated

5.4.3.2. Unofficially / Ideologically affiliated

- 5.4.3.3. Unaffiliated
- 5.5. Training – Are threats trained or untrained? If so, how?
 - 5.5.1. Internet (Distance learning)
 - 5.5.2. Foreign “formal” training camps
 - 5.5.3. Fighters experienced in foreign conflicts
- 5.6. Equipment – Availability of equipment needed to conduct attacks. Is it present or must it be smuggled in from outside source?
 - 5.6.1. Firearms
 - 5.6.2. Explosives
 - 5.6.3. Chem
 - 5.6.4. Nuclear
 - 5.6.5. Bio(?)
 - 5.6.6. Unexploded Ordinance (UXO) –

APPENDIX C: TABULAR GRAPHICS

GERMANY		
Core Liabilities	Accelerants	Implications on the Security Environment/Change in Intents & Capabilities
Muslim Integration	Economic Downturn	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased sense of moral outrage amongst Muslims over economic conditions as compared with the rest of German society
	Worker Immigration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Would likely saturate the labor market, increasing problems of integration, separation, and opportunity that could subsequently increase moral outrage amongst Muslim communities
	Anti-Muslim Violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Would provide resonance with personal experience to go along with moral outrage and “war against Islam” components of certain Muslim communities
Border Security	Economic Downturn	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Budget cuts in Schengen member states could decrease Germany’s overall border security, allowing in people and materials that could negatively affect Germany’s security
	Worker Immigration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase in the number of migrant workers arriving in Germany, which could increase the amount of radical (or potentially radical) elements within the country
Security Apparatus	Worker Immigration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase in the number of Muslims with the potential for radicalization, further taxing a security apparatus which struggles to share information
Western Identification	Anti-Muslim Violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Would reinforce polarization of society, and the idea that there is a war between Westerners and Muslims, through resonance with personal experience
	U.S. Military Presence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continues to provide American military targets within Germany
	Drawdown in Iraq/Afghanistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potential influx of experienced terrorists with intent and capability to attack the West Concerns over large amounts of unexploded ordinance leftover in Germany from WWII
Tactics, Training, and Procedures	Drawdown in Iraq/Afghanistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Influx of experienced terrorists would increase terrorist “know how” amongst German jihadist community

DENMARK

Core Liabilities	Accelerants	Implications on the Security Environment/Change in Intents and Capabilities
Muslim Integration	External Engagements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> May continue to provoke moral outrage and the sense that there is a “war against Islam” within certain Muslim communities.
	Credible Propaganda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> May leverage existing dissatisfaction of Muslims in Denmark by provoking moral outrage and the sense that there is a “war against Islam”
	Prison Radicalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Could increase recruitment toward radical Islam Potential development of cohesive, mobilized networks that reinforce jihadist/outsider mentality
	Provocative Media	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potentially develops “us versus them” mentality in same manner as Mohammed Cartoons Creates incentives for release of “credible propaganda”
Border Security	External Engagements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Could increase attempted border penetrations May invoke “credible propaganda”
	Legal/Policy Changes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Could make particular diasporas feel discriminated against; likely to force potential penetrators to pursue alternative methods of entry
Security Apparatus	Credible Propaganda; Prison Radicalization; Provocative Media	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An increase in propaganda, radicalization, and media could cause the non-radicalized Muslim population to become less cooperative with law enforcement, and thus decrease law enforcement’s access and freedom of movement
	Legal/Policy Changes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Changes in Danish laws could alter the legal permissions of law enforcement which would restrict the ability to detect and arrest terrorist cells. However, this is unlikely in the medium-term
Western Identification	External Engagements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> May solidify western identification; increase polarization in Danish society, which produces “us versus them” mentality
	Credible Propaganda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> May leverage feelings of dislocation and dissatisfaction; wedge diasporas apart from Danish identity
Tactics, Training, and Procedures	Prison Radicalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of cohesive, mobilized networks that reinforce jihadist mentality and increase attack capabilities Release of experienced terrorists increases leadership and “know-how” amongst French jihadist community
	Credible Propaganda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> May increase financial/auxiliary support to terrorists

FRANCE

Core Liabilities	Accelerants	Implications on the Security Environment/Change in Intents and Capabilities
Muslim Integration	Economic Downturn	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased sense of moral outrage amongst Muslims over economic conditions Increased unemployment exacerbates sense of societal discrimination, offers time and incentive to plan attacks
	Halal Controversy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exacerbates sense of a societal “war against Islam,” increases polarization between Muslims and native French Moral outrage amongst right-wing groups over “Islamization” of society Moral outrage amongst leftist groups over what they consider inhumane slaughter practices
	Qatar Finance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Spread of Wahabbi ideology within France
	Prison Radicalization/Release	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased recruitment toward radical Islam and spread of Salafism Development of cohesive, mobilized networks that reinforce jihadist/outsider mentality
	Presidential Elections	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public debate about “Frenchness” and the Muslim “enemy within” creates an increasingly polarized society Push for “anti-Muslim” policies could exacerbate feelings of a “war against Islam”
	Mohammed Merah	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Popular backlash against Muslims could increase sense of discrimination felt by Muslim community Aggressive policy responses against “Islamist threat” could increase sense of a “war against Islam”
	Aggressive Gov’t Security Tactics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased sense of moral outrage amongst Muslims that resonates with personal experiences Potential for trigger events (ala 1995 & 2005)
Border Security	Mohammed Merah	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Offers blueprint for “lone wolf” attackers that want to travel to Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc. for terrorist training “Anti-immigration” policy reactions by French government could create moral outrage amongst Muslims
	Qatar Finance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased ability to purchase and transport illicit weapons
	Drawdown in Iraq/Afghanistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potential influx of personnel and equipment with nexus to terrorism
Security Apparatus	Aggressive Gov’t Security Tactics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased sense of moral outrage amongst Muslims that resonates with personal experiences Potential for trigger events (ala 1995 & 2005)
	Passage of More Stringent CT Laws	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Might trade greater ability to prosecute terrorism for an increasingly outraged Muslim population
	Mohammed Merah	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Highlighted shortcomings of French security apparatus for would-be terrorists
Western Identification	Economic Downturn	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Could embolden anti-globalization protestors who see globalization and free trade as a broken ideology
	Decision to Retain Nuclear Sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Could increase anger amongst left wing organizations (i.e. Greenpeace) Continued security concerns over large stocks of nuclear material within France
	Drawdown in Iraq/Afghanistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potential influx of experienced terrorists with intent and capability to attack the West
Tactics, Training, and Procedures	Prisoner Radicalization/Release	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of cohesive, mobilized networks that reinforce jihadist mentality and increase attack capabilities Release of experienced terrorists increases leadership and “know-how” amongst French jihadist community
	Mohammed Merah	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Offers blueprint for “lone wolf” actors who wish to acquire weaponry and other resources for terrorist attacks

	Qatar Financing	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Increased resource base for potential terrorists – money undetectable
	Drawdown in Iraq/Afghanistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Influx of experienced terrorists would increase terrorist “know how” amongst French jihadist community

Endnotes

-
- ¹ Bureau of Consular Affairs. 2012. "Visa Waiver Program". Accessed: May 8, 2012.
- ² See Appendix A.
- ³ See Appendix B.
- ⁴ Bartsch, Matthias, Andrea Brandt and Daniel Steinvorth. 2010. "Turkish Immigration to Germany: A Sorry History of Self-Deception and Wasted Opportunities." *Der Spiegel Online*. Accessed: May 8, 2012 <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,716067,00.html>>.
- ⁵ Hassan, Kabir and Michael Mahlknecht. 2011. *Islamic Capital Markets: Products and Strategies*. West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Pg 238.
- ⁶ Federal Ministry of the Interior, "Preventing Extremism by Foreigners." Accessed May 8, 2012. <http://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/Themen/Sicherheit/Terrorismus/Praevention/Praevention_node.html>.
- ⁷ Der Spiegel. 2012. "Unsurprising that Some Muslims Don't identify with Germany." Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,818880,00.html>>.
- ⁸ Weaver, Matthew. 2010. "Angela Merkel: German multiculturalism has 'utterly failed.'" *The Guardian Online*. <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed>>.
- ⁹ Brettfeld, Katrin and Peter Wetzels. 2008. "Muslims in Germany: Integration, barriers to integration, religion and attitudes towards democracy, the rule of law, and politically/religiously motivated violence." University of Hamburg. PDF.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ Caruso, Raul and Friedrich Schneider. 2010. "The Socio-Economic determinants of terrorism and political violence in Western Europe (1994-2007)". Johannes Kepler University Linz. Accessed May 8, 2012. <http://www.economics.jku.at/members/Schneider/files/publications/LatestResearch2010/DeterminantsofTerror_caruso_0709.pdf>.
- ¹² Schmitt, Gary J, ed. 2010. *Safety, Liberty, and Islamist Terrorism: American and European Approaches to Domestic Counterterrorism*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Pg 65.
- ¹⁴ Khan, Adnan. 2012. "In Europe, Pushed closer to Islam's margins." *The Globe and Mail Online*. Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/opinion/in-europe-pushed-closer-to-islams-margins/article2378337/>>.
- ¹⁵ Rosenberg, Steve. 2010. "Risk of attack remains for Germany." *BBC News Online*. Accessed: March 22, 2012. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8550013.stm>>.
- ¹⁶ Associated Press. 2011. "2 U.S. airmen shot dead at airport in Germany." *MSNBC*. Accessed: May 2, 2011. <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41868361/ns/world_news-europe/t/us-airmen-shot-dead-airport-germany/>.
- ¹⁷ Belkin, Paul. 2007. "Germany's Relations with Israel: Background and Implications for German Middle East Policy." Congressional Research Service. Accessed: May, 8 2012. <<http://www.fas.org/srgp/crs/row/RL33808.pdf>>.
- ¹⁸ Lappin, Yaakov. 2008. "Israel, Germany develop nuclear warning system." *Jerusalem Post International Online*. Accessed May 8, 2012. <<http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1226404751066&pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull>>.
- ¹⁹ Scheuer, Michael. 2006. *Through our enemies' eyes*. 2 ed. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc.
- ²⁰ Shea, Neil. 2012. "Ready to fight: German soldiers' Afghan mission shifts from reconstruction and training to engaging enemy." *Stars and Stripes*. Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.stripes.com/ready-to-fight-german-soldiers-afghan-mission-shifts-from-reconstruction-and-training-to-engaging-enemy-1.165410>>.
- ²¹ BBC News. 2005. "Germany to help Iraq government." Accessed: May 8, 2012. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4236151.stm>.
- ²² Horn, Heather. 2011. "Germany's War with Facebook and Google Over Privacy." *The Atlantic Online*. Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/germanys-war-with-facebook-and-google-over-privacy/248914/>>.
- ²³ BBC News. 2012. "Germany backs neo-Nazi database after far-right murders." PDF. Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16622030>>.

-
- ²⁴ Robel, Sven, Holger Stark and Steffen Winter. 2012. "Secret Report on Investigator's Failures: How Neo-Nazi Terror Cell Gave Authorities the Slip." Der Spiegel Online. Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,806449,00.html>>.
- ²⁵ Pidd, Helen. 2011. "Germany shocked by secret service link to rightwing terror cell." The Guardian Online. Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/15/germany-neo-nazi-terror-cell-doner-killings>>.
- ²⁶ US Department of State. "Schengen Fact Sheet." Accessed May 8, 2012. <http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_4361.html>.
- ²⁷ Vasileva, Katya. 2011. "Population and social conditions." Eurostat 34: Statistics in focus. Accessed: May 8, 2012. <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-11-034/EN/KS-SF-11-034-EN.PDF>.
- ²⁹ Business Wire. 2011. "Research and Markets: Germany Infrastructure report Q4 2011." Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20111019006701/en/Research-Markets-Germany-Infrastructure-Report-Q4-2011>>.
- ³⁰ BBC News Europe. 2010. "Germany tightens airport security over attacks threat." BBC. Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11775436>>.
- ³¹ Hammer, Joshua. 2011. "Germany's Bomb Problem." The Atlantic. Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/04/germanys-bomb-problem/8406/>>.
- ³² Shultz, Stefan. 2012. "Profiting from Pain: Europe's Crisis is Germany's Blessing." Der Spiegel Online. Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,808248,00.html>>.
- ³³ Volkery, Carsten. 2012. "Paying for the Euro Rescue: Germany Under Pressure to Pony Up." Der Spiegel. Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,810331,00.html>>.
- ³⁴ Der Spiegel Online International. 2012. "Italy Warns of 'Backlash': Rome Demands German Help in Refinancing Debt." Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,809549,00.html>>.
- ³⁵ Shultz 2012.
- ³⁶ The Economist. 2012. "What Germany offers the world." Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.economist.com/node/21552567>>.
- ³⁷ Laurence, Jonathan. 2007. "Islam and Citizenship in Germany." *Muslim Integration: Challenging Conventional Wisdom in Europe and the United States*. The Center for Strategic and International Studies. Pg 53-63.
- ³⁸ EUbusiness. 2011. "Immigration to Germany from debt-racked euro states soars." Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.eubusiness.com/news=eu/finance-economy.ea5/>>.
- ³⁹ Economy Watch. 2010. "Germany Economy." Accessed: May 8, 2012. <http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/germany/>.
- ⁴⁰ Chatzimarkakis, Jorgo. 2011. "The Immigration of Knowledge: The Relation of Immigration, Integration and the Free Market in Europe and especially in Germany." <<http://www.vonnisesinstitute-europe.org/pdf/ImmigrationKnowledge.Chatzimarkakis.pdf>>.
- ⁴¹ Peel, Quentin. 2011. "Germany faces big inflow of migrant workers." Financial Times Online. Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9b3f374c-7022-11e0-bea7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1odRbESPb>>.
- ⁴² BBC News. 2012. "Germany backs neo-Nazi database after far-right murders."
- ⁴³ Reuters. 2009. "German teens drawn to neo-Nazi groups – study." Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/03/17/idINIndia-38554620090317>>.
- ⁴⁴ Becker, Sven, Markus Deggerich, Jan Fleischhauer and Gunther Latsch. Translated by Paul Cohen. 2011. "Blind to Extremism: How Germany Overlooked the Threat from the Right." Der Spiegel. Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,798935,00.html>>.
- ⁴⁵ Denmark Ministry of Refugee, Immigration, and Integration Affairs. 2010. "Statistical Overview of Integration". Accessed: May 8, 2012. <http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/373D7D82-3F91-4873-A3F0-1731A37DD18D/0/statistical_overview_of_integration_2010.pdf>.
- ⁴⁶ Pew Forum. 2011. "Rising Restrictions on Religion." 2011. Accessed: April 24, 2012 <<http://www.pewforum.org/Government/Rising-Restrictions-on-Religion%282%29.aspx>>
- ⁴⁷ Jones, Sian. 2009. "Radicalisation in Denmark" Renewal: A Journal of Labour Politics. Volume 17, No. 1.
- ⁴⁸ Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs 2010. p. 19.
- ⁴⁹ Pew Forum. 2011. "The Future of the Global Muslim Population." Accessed: April 24, 2012. <<http://features.pewforum.org/muslim-population/?sort=Country>>
- ⁵⁰ See: DR Forside. 2009. "Not Everyone Denounces Terror." Translated by Google Translate. Accessed: January 25, 2012 <<http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Indland/2009/04/30/061402.htm>> See also: Goli, Marco and Shahmak

-
- Rezaei. 2011. "Radical Islamism and Migrant Integration in Denmark: An Empirical Inquiry." *Journal of Strategic Security*. Vol. 4, Issue 4. p. 85.
- ⁵¹ Tiersky, Ronald and Erik Jones. Editors. 2007. *Europe Today*. Third Edition. Lanham, Md: Rowan and Littlefield. P. 189.
- ⁵² Center for Terror Analysis. 2009. "The Cartoon Case from Al-Qaida's Ideological Perspective." Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<https://www.pet.dk/~media/TheCartoonCasefromAlQaidasideologicalperspectiveunclass.ashx>>
- ⁵³ Wenande, Christian. 2012. "New Immigration Laws Set to Kick in Next Month." Copenhagen Post. Accessed: April 10, 2012 <<http://www.cphpost.dk/news/making-cut-immigration-dk/new-immigration-laws-set-kick-next-month>>.
- ⁵⁴ DR Forside. 2012. "Immigrants Returning Home to Grow Old." Accessed: April 11, 2012 <http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Andre_sprog/English/2012/04/10/134555.htm>.
- ⁵⁵ Stanners, Peter. 2012. "Asylum Seekers Avoiding Denmark." Copenhagen Post. Accessed: April 11, 2012 <<http://www.cphpost.dk/news/international/asylum-seekers-avoiding-denmark>>
- ⁵⁶ Denmark Ministry of Refugee, Immigration, and Integration Affairs 2010.
- ⁵⁷ Deutsche Welle. 2011. "New center-left Danish government withdraws border control plans." Accessed: April 27, 2012 <<http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,15434227,00.html>>.
- ⁵⁸ Copenhagen Post. 2012. "Illegal Immigrants Flocking to Denmark." Accessed: April 28, 2012. <<http://cphpost.dk/news/national/illegal-immigrants-flocking-denmark>>.
- ⁵⁹ Council of the European Union. 2012. "EU Conference on Innovation Border Management, Copenhagen." Memorandum dated March 2, 2012.
- ⁶⁰ Danish Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2012. 2012. "A Safe Europe: Cross-Border Crime." Accessed April 26, 2012. <<http://eu2012.dk/en/EU-and-the-Presidency/Undervisning/~media/Undervisning/PDFer%20Final/A%20safe%20Europe.pdf>>.
- ⁶¹ Central Intelligence Agency. 2012. "Denmark." In *The World Factbook*. Accessed May 8, 2012. <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/da.html>: CIA>.
- ⁶² Central Intelligence Agency. 1998. "Fatwas or Religious Rulings by Militant Islamic Groups against the United States."
- ⁶³ Committee of Experts on Terrorism. 2007. "Profiles on Counter-Terrorist Capacity: Denmark." Council of Europe. Accessed: April 28, 2012 <http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/Source/country_profiles/CODEXTER%20Profiles%20%282007%29%20Denmark%20E.pdf>.
- ⁶⁴ COT Institute. Et. al. 2008. "Mapping Counterterrorism." Accessed April 28, 2012 <<http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP6%20Del%201.pdf>>.
- ⁶⁵ Bureau of Diplomatic Security. 2011. "Denmark 2011 Crime and Safety Report." United States Department of State, OSAC.
- ⁶⁶ Crone, Manni and Martin Harrow. 2011. "Homegrown Terrorism in the West." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 23: 521-536.
- ⁶⁷ Copenhagen Post. 2012. "Four Weeks Remand for Suspected Terrorists." Accessed: April 28, 2012 <<http://www.cphpost.dk/news/national/four-weeks-remand-suspected-terrorists>>
- ⁶⁸ Jyllands-Posten. 2012. "Police uncover large weapons cache." Copenhagen Post. Accessed: April 28, 2012 <<http://www.cphpost.dk/news/national/police-uncover-large-weapons-cache>>.
- ⁶⁹ DR Forside. 2012. "Terrorist Groups Get Millions from Denmark." Translated by Google Translate. Accessed: January 25, 2012. <<http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Indland/2012/01/17/152120.htm>>.
- ⁷⁰ International Security Assistance Force. "Denmark." Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/denmark/index.php>>.
- ⁷¹ Reuters. 2011. "Al Qaeda No.2 Zawahiri Most Likely to Succeed Bin Laden." Accessed: May 8, 2012. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/02/us-zawahiri-ayman-news-maker-idUSTRE7410RF20110502>>.
- ⁷² *Europe Today*. p. 204.
- ⁷³ BBC Monitoring European. 2008. "Somali Terrorist Group reportedly threatens Denmark in a New Internet Video." ProQuest Central. Accessed: January 15, 2012 <<http://libezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/459291088?accountid=7082>>.

-
- ⁷⁴ PET. 2009. "Al-Qaida's Propaganda Technique and Argumentation." Center for Terroranalyse. Accessed: January 25, 2012. <https://www.pet.dk/~media/20091125_AQ-propagandanalyse-UKLAS_engelsk_FINAL.ashx>.
- ⁷⁵ BBC Monitoring European. 2008.
- ⁷⁶ Copenhagen Post. 2011. "Bin Laden called for attacks on Denmark, US officials say." Accessed: March 22, 2012. <<http://www.cphpost.dk/bin-laden-called-attacks-denmark-us-officials-say>>.
- ⁷⁷ Precht, Tomas. 2007. "Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe: From conversion to terrorism." Danish Ministry of Justice Research Report. December 2007.
- ⁷⁸ Gruen, Madeline. 2011. "The Violent Shift in Hizb al-Tahrir's Rhetoric." CTC Sentinel. Accessed: March 22, 2012. <<http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-violent-shift-in-hizb-al-tahrir%E2%80%99s-rhetoric>>.
- ⁷⁹ Ibid.
- ⁸⁰ Andersen, Lars. 2007. *Innocence Lost*.(...)
- ⁸¹ Olsen, Jon A. 2008. "Radicalization in Danish Prisons." Danish Institute of International Studies. Accessed: May 8, 2012. <http://www.diis.dk/graphics/publications/briefs2008/jao_radicalisation_in_danish_prisons.pdf>.
- ⁸² Damon, Dan. 2003. "Lessons from Danish Prisons." BBC, Copenhagen. July 2, 2003. Accessed April 11, 2012 <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3036450.stm>>
- ⁸³ Tansey, Colin M. 2009. "Anti-Radicalization Efforts within the European Union: Spain and Denmark." March 2009. Master's Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, California.
- ⁸⁴ Ibid.
- ⁸⁵ Ibid.
- ⁸⁶ Ibid.
- ⁸⁷ Archick, Kristin, et al. 2011. "Muslims in Europe: Promoting Integration and Countering Extremism." *Congressional Research Service*. Accessed: March 2012. <<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33166.pdf>>.
- ⁸⁸ Dabi, Frederic and Jerome Fourquet. 2010. "Comparative Survey France/Germany on Islam." IFOP. Accessed: March 2012. <http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/1365-2-study_file.pdf>.
- ⁸⁹ Pew Global Attitudes Project. 2006. "Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About Religious and Cultural Identity." Pew Research Center. Accessed: March 2012. <<http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/07/06/muslims-in-europe-economic-worries-top-concerns-about-religious-and-cultural-identity/>>.
- ⁹⁰ Willsher, Kim. 2012. "France's Muslims Hit Back at Nicolas Sarkozy's Policy on Halal Meat." *The Guardian*. Accessed: March 2012. <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/10/nicolas-sarkozy-halal-meat-france-election>>.
- ⁹¹ Sageman, Marc. 2008. *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- ⁹² Sebian, Elizabeth. 2007. "Islam in France." Euro-Islam.info. Accessed: March 2012. <<http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/france/>>.
- ⁹³ Archick 2011.
- ⁹⁴ Body-Gendrot, Sophie. April 2010. "Police Marginality, Racial Logics and Discrimination in the Banlieues of France." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Volume 33, Issue 4. 656-674.
- ⁹⁵ Business Monitor International. 2012. "France Defence and Security Report Q1 2012".
- ⁹⁶ RFI. 2011. "Anti-Globalization Protests Hit French Riviera Ahead of G-20 Summit." Accessed: March 23, 2012. <<http://www.english.rfi.fr/economy/20111101-anti-globalisation-protests-hit-french-riviera-ahead-g20-summit>>.
- ⁹⁷ Body-Gendrot 2010.
- ⁹⁸ Osborn, Andrew. 2012. "French Gunman's Arsenal Spotlights Illegal Arms Trade." Reuters. Accessed: March 28, 2012. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/23/us-france-shooting-guns-idUSBRE82M14620120323>>.
- ⁹⁹ Hosenball, Mark. 2012. "Analysis: French Shooting Case Shows Counterterrorism Limits." Reuters. Accessed: March 28, 2012. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/27/us-france-shootings-intelligence-idUSBRE82Q16U20120327>>.
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid.
- ¹⁰¹ Laurence, Jonathan. 2006. "Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France." Brookings Institution. Brookings Institution Press: Washington D.C. 256-257.
- ¹⁰² *The Economist Magazine*. 2006. "Minority Report: The Trouble with Integration." Volume 381, Issue 8501. 11-12.

-
- ¹⁰³ Schmitt, Gary and Reuel Marc Gerecht. November 2007. "France: Europe's Counterterrorism Powerhouse." American Enterprise Institute. Accessed: March 2012. <<http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/europe/france-europes-counterterrorist-powerhouse/>>.
- ¹⁰⁴ Parussini, Gabriele. March 11, 2012. "Sarkozy Threatens to Exit Schengen Area." Wall Street Journal. Accessed: March 28, 2012. <<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304450004577275313803633368.html>>.
- ¹⁰⁵ Osborn 2012.
- ¹⁰⁶ Hosenball 2012.
- ¹⁰⁷ Body-Gendrot 2010, 695.
- ¹⁰⁸ Body-Gendrot 2010.
- ¹⁰⁹ This does not apply to national level agencies, such as the DCRI.
- ¹¹⁰ 50,000-75,000 tons of munitions are discovered each year. Beardsley, Eleanor. 2012. "In France, Politician Make Halal Meat a Campaign Issue." National Public Radio. Accessed: March 2012. <<http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2012/03/15/148521433/in-france-politicians-make-halal-meat-a-campaign-issue>>.
- ¹¹¹ Mainville, Michael. December 4, 2011. "Greenpeace Breaches French Nuclear Plant Security." AFP. Accessed: March 28, 2012. <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hEG-eAesK3O7F_R8EmIpMcLcTfAg?docId=CNG.272dde88c249b04657842be1af789a26.6d1>.
- ¹¹² Osborn 2012.
- ¹¹³ Beardsley 2012.
- ¹¹⁴ Willsher 2012.
- ¹¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁶ Reuters. 2012. "Weak Recovery, Job Cuts Seen Ahead of French Election." Accessed: March 22, 2012. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/22/france-economy-idUSL1E8EM9ES20120322>>.
- ¹¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁸ Archick 2011, 19.
- ¹¹⁹ Marret, Jean Luc. 2009. "Prison De-radicalization and disengagement: The French case." *ICSR Project on De-radicalization in Jail*.
- ¹²⁰ Siegel, Pascale Combelles. 2006. "Radical Islam and the French Muslim Prison Population." The Jamestown Foundation. *Terrorism Monitor*. Volume 4, Issue 15. <http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=853>.
- ¹²¹ Ibid.
- ¹²² Archick 2011, 16
- ¹²³ Siegel 2006.
- ¹²⁴ Kern, Soren. 2012. "Qatar Financing Wahhabi Islam in France, Italy, Ireland and Spain". Gatestone Institute. Accessed: March 23, 2012. <<http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2833/qatar-financing-wahhabi-islam-europe>>.
- ¹²⁵ This was a record high for the far right in France. Todd, Tony. 2012. "Stakes Are High as Sarkozy Flirt's with France's Far Right". France 24. Accessed: March 26, 2012. <<http://www.france24.com/en/20120424-stakes-are-high-sarkozy-flirts-with-far-right-le-pen-french-presidential-election>>.
- ¹²⁶ Todd 2012.
- ¹²⁷ Laurence, 252.
- ¹²⁸ Ibid, 244.
- ¹²⁹ Ibid, 252.
- ¹³⁰ Ibid, 252.
- ¹³¹ Ibid vv256-257 and Sophie Body-Gendrot, 9.
- ¹³² Khan 2012.
- ¹³³ Straus, Rachel Rickard. 2012. "Sarkozy Bans Imams From Entering France in Fundamentalist Crackdown After Toulouse Shootings." Daily Mail. Accessed March 28, 2012. <<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2120619/Toulouse-siege-Nicolas-Sarkozy-bans-imams-entering-France-fundamentalist-crackdown.html>>.
- ¹³⁴ Most of these attacks used guns and explosives. For specific information see Hoffman, Bruce. 1984. *Right-Wing Terrorism in Europe Since 1980*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. p. 3-5.
- ¹³⁵ Specifically, they might use the Alsace-Lorraine region because of its prevalent nationalism. Boswell, Laird. 2005. *Right-Wing Extremism in Frontier Regions: The French*. Milwaukee, WI: Center for 21st Century Studies.

-
- ¹³⁶ Cruickshank, Paul and Tim Lister. 2012. "How Did Mohammed Merah Become a Jihadist?" CNN World. Accessed: March 2012. <http://articles.cnn.com/2012-03-26/world/world_europe_france-shooting-suspect_1_french-police-french-investigators-french-intelligence?_s=PM:EUROPE>.
- ¹³⁷ Trading Economics. 2012. "France Unemployment Rate." Accessed: March 2012. <<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/france/unemployment-rate>>.
- ¹³⁸ Straus, Rachel. 2012. "Sarkozy Bans Fundamentalist Imams from Entering France After Toulouse Shootings." Mail Online. Accessed April 26, 2012. <<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2120619/Toulouse-siege-Nicolas-Sarkozy-bans-imams-entering-France-fundamentalist-crackdown.html>>
- ¹³⁹ Corbet, Sylvie. 2012. "French Cabinet Oks new Counterterrorism Measures". Associated Press. Accessed: April 26, 2012. <<http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jnxdLBg8SXcdOts249CECGyCfCBQ?docId=049ce13905e5435a86e8b93de752fce9>>.
- ¹⁴⁰ Barzegar, Karine. 2012. "'Fed Up' French Muslims Mobilize to Unseat Sarkozy at the Polls". *The Washington Post*. Accessed: April 26, 2012. <<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/19/french-muslims-mobilizing-to-unseat-sarkozy/>>
- ¹⁴¹ Business Monitor International 2012
- ¹⁴² Sageman 2008, 72
- ¹⁴³ Sageman 2008, 75
- ¹⁴⁴ Sageman 2008, 83
- ¹⁴⁵ Sageman 2008, 84
- ¹⁴⁶ Sageman 2008, 84