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HUMAN SECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM: 
NEW PATHS FOR INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP

INTRODUCTION

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Integrating Human Security into America’s Soft Power:
The Iraqi Refugee Test
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HUMAN SECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM: NEW PATHS FOR INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP

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This special edition of Texas A&M University’s European Union Center of Excellence Atlantic Affairs Journal includes Capstone research papers by several 2008 graduates of the Bush School’s Masters Program in International Affairs. The Capstone course provides a research experience for our graduate students, normally in their final semester, as they operate in teams of 6 to 8 students to address important policy issues, under the direction of a faculty member. Students draw on the coursework and experiences of their Bush School education to develop specific recommendations for a government client. This Capstone group focused on the topic of human security, as an important area of international affairs research. Interest in the topic was further stimulated by a speech by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, a former Bush School Dean and Texas A&M University President. Speaking in Indonesia, in February 2008, Dr. Gates stressed the need for “new thinking” from traditional national or military security towards a focus on humanitarian elements in both foreign and defense policy:

What we have seen in Asia in recent years is a very real shift that reflects new thinking in U.S. defense strategy overall. A shift away from the permanent presence of, and direct action by, U.S. forces – and toward the building of the capacity of partners to better defend themselves. A shift away from conventional military deterrence as traditionally understood – think of mechanized divisions poised along the Korean demilitarized zone or the central plains of Germany. A shift toward a mix of the so-called “hard” and “soft” elements of national power – where military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and humanitarian elements are integrated in an effort to ensure long-term security based on our own capabilities but also on the enhanced capabilities of our partners.1

The attached papers contribute to this new thinking by addressing the topic of human security as policy area for increasing the United States international leadership in world affairs. The client for this project is the United States Defense Department. The Capstone group thanks the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, especially the Principal Director for Stability Operations, BG-Ret. Joe McMenamin, Dr. Janine Davidson (now on the faculty of George Mason University) and their excellent staff for sponsoring this project. Thanks also to the European Union Center for its continual support of Bush School educational, research and outreach programs.

As Henry Kissinger reminds us in his book Diplomacy, new roads are made by walking. This Capstone project examines the path that the topic of human security provides for thinking in new ways about U.S. international leadership in the 21st Century. Defining the human security dimensions of national security policy and strategy remains unfinished business of course. The Secretary of Defense calls for learning lessons from ongoing operations and appreciating the significance of the non-military dimensions of policy making “beyond security.”

Iraq and Afghanistan remind us that military success alone is insufficient to achieve victory. We must not forget our hard-learned lessons or allow the important soft power capabilities developed because of them to atrophy or even disappear. Beyond security, essential
ingredients of long-term success include economic development, institution building, and the rule of law, as well as promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications.2

Most importantly, the calls for U.S. national security reform and “whole of government” approaches for tracking current and future complex contingencies also demands attention.3 The following papers highlight topics in the area of human security as well as governmental reform. The topics include: transformational diplomacy; women and microfinance in development; Iraqi refugees; and genocide.

The intent of this publication is to highlight this research and propose some ideas for policymakers. The current Defense Secretary's call for adapting defense capabilities for soft power instruments will have to be answered in the next presidential administration. There can be no doubt, however, that the problems of economic and political development, institution and state building, rule of law and reconciliation, governance and civil society will remain on the international security agenda for some time to come.

The father of European institution building, Jean Monnet, was inspired by a story about Ibn Saud’s secret for success. Ibn Saud is reported to have said: ‘God appeared to me when I was a young man, and said something which has guided my actions throughout my life. He told me: “For me, everything is a means – even obstacles.”’4 Of course obstacles can stop action instead of inspiring innovation. As George Ball writes in his introduction to Monnet’s Memoirs: “Optimism to Jean Monnet is the only serviceable hypothesis for a practical man or woman with a passionate desire to get things done.”5 Starting with an optimistic, problem solving approach would be Mr. Monnet’s advice for policy leaders responsible for charting a path for the next American administration.

Project Description


The 2007 Capstone study included analyses of interagency efforts in the conduct of U.S. and NATO operations in counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. Integral to this 2008 study is analyzing how U.S. national security policies, strategies and objectives have changed since 2001 and estimating the effectiveness of (and gaps in) the contemporary national security system (institutions, organizations and leadership) for addressing what international security experts are calling “human security,” or threats to the survival of societies, groups and individuals.6

Are major interagency and national security reforms needed to adjust to changing traditional and nontraditional threats? And, if major reforms are needed, what should a national security and interagency reform agenda include? Differing views of international leadership, human security, national security and interagency reform are presented in the 2008 Capstone studies. In addition, the project addresses whether national security reform proposals address human security challenges and add to the U.S. capacity for strengthening its international leadership in a post 911 world.

“Traveler,” says a Spanish proverb, “there are no roads. Roads are made by walking.”

Notes


3 See new efforts for linking State-Defense-USAID efforts through the Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO): “The CCO is a developing ‘community of practice’ of civilian and military complex operations training and education institutions and practitioners. Complex operations consist of counterinsurgency; stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations; and irregular warfare. The CCO’s goal is to enhance the U.S. Government’s ability to prepare for complex operations by catalyzing cooperation, coordination and synchronization among education, training, lessons learned, and research institutions and organizations.” [http://ccoportal.org/]


The Role of Women in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Case of Iraq

Abstract:
Recent research into the area of women’s rights within post-war contexts has established the important role that women play in their country’s rehabilitation and reconstruction. The United Nations passed Resolution 1325 in recognition of this research and calls on all member-states, non-state actors, humanitarian agencies, and civil society to ensure women’s protection and participation in reconstruction.

Iraq provides a perfect example of a country emerging from the shadows of war. Women in Iraq have traditionally enjoyed rights unheard of within the Arab region. Women’s rights, however, have since suffered with the rise of Saddam Hussein, and thereafter under the Shi’i dominated interim government. The introduction of Shari’a Law into the Iraqi Constitution presents serious obstacles to women’s rights in Iraq.

Whereas political empowerment programs have often suffered in the face of religious and cultural barriers, there are no such barriers to the economic empowerment of women. Microfinance, the concept of lending services/loans to women in order to foster entrepreneurship, does not violate Islamic law and can therefore be used as a powerful tool towards empowering women.

The global women’s movement is poised at the edge of a new millennium. It offers a holistic vision of social transformation, articulating new norms, linking issues of development, the environment and human rights with standards of participation, transparency and accountability in decision-making.

-Ambassador Nancy Rubin'

Introduction
Striving for women’s rights within post-conflict societies is not just good ethics; it is an effective means towards promoting stability and development where these are otherwise wanting. As recently as the early nineties the international community was focused solely on women as victims of armed conflict. However, the Fourth UN Conference of 1995 signaled a new era of perceptions on the role of women in peace and rebuilding efforts worldwide. It recognized the stabilizing effect that women have on societies and their potential for economic, social, and political reform. The deliberations of the Conference gave birth to UN Security Resolution 1325; a directive that mandates the participation of women in post-conflict reconstruction.

The case of Iraq provides a remarkable opportunity for the directive to implement reform in a society still suffering from the repercussions of a repressive Ba’athist regime. Efforts to integrate women politically and socially into the reconstruction process have come up against significant barriers embodied in religious and cultural impediments. Progress in the area of women’s rights and participation will require fresh and innovative approaches to the problem. This paper advocates gender-directed micro financing as an alternative, economic approach to the empowerment of women. It builds on successful models of implementation within Asia and Africa as a premise for adoption within the Iraqi context. Given the current status of women in Iraq, the objective of women’s empowerment through microfinance is not far from realization.

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Atlantic Affairs Journal
UN Security Council Resolution 1325: A Change in Perspective

On October 31, 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. The Security Council resolution is unprecedented in that it recognizes the role women play in peace-building efforts and recommends their participation within the development process. The resolution further mandates the support of the United Nations, member states, and all other parties (i.e., non-state actors, humanitarian agencies, and civil society), to ensure the protection of women in conflict situations and promote their participation in reconstruction.

Iraq offers an avenue for Resolution 1325 to be applied given its post-war context. The resolution calls on the United States and other relevant actors to ensure women’s participation within Iraq’s transition process. This participation has meant consulting with Iraqi women locally, as well as internationally, to ensure that their voices are heard and their concerns met. Furthermore, reconstruction programs have been designed to include gender-specific approaches to ensure that women’s issues are addressed within the political, social, and economic arenas.

While there has been much vocal support for women’s empowerment in Iraq, little has been seen by way of their tangible involvement within the institutions that have been created. This is a shame since Iraq has a critical mass of highly educated women with prior professional experience, and whose participation in decision-making would only add to the transition process and guarantee that the voices of a sizeable portion of Iraq’s population—its women—are heard. By supporting Resolution 1325 in Iraq, “the United States and the international community at large would not only signal their commitment to gender equality, but also establish a model of democracy for the Arab world and other states emerging from conflict.”

The Potential Role of Women in Post-Conflict Iraq

Post-war Iraq provides an opportunity for women to emerge out of the Ba’athist shadows and become active participants in the reconstruction process. However, women in Iraq are currently underrepresented in political as well as economic structures, and play a minimal role in the country’s movement towards democracy. If opportunities to integrate women into the new legal framework are not capitalized upon, there may be little hope to reform the structures later. This would be a shame since women are available to lead. Not only do they make up some 55 percent of the population of Iraq, but they are well-qualified professionals who can bring much in the way of experience and innovation to the table. Owing to years of sporadic violence and conflict, Iraqi women have been seasoned in the art of steering their families through turbulent periods in their country’s history.

What we have before us in essence is the unlikely trinity of demand, resource and skills,
all present and ready to be put to use in the case of Iraq. It would be unfortunate not to recognize and capitalize on the role that women can play in fostering the transition to a pluralistic, democratic Iraq. Their extensive involvement will be critical in sustaining peace and democracy, both because they broaden the talent pool, and because their presence is a deterrent to religious extremism. Women in government will ensure that extremist laws are not passed. Women need to be involved in the earliest drafting of key instruments to ensure that the Iraqi transition process does not permit the erosion of women’s rights.

Why are women not at the forefront of Iraqi society despite the international community’s directive to involve them at all levels of decision making? Why are they still treated as second-class citizens despite the opportunity to reverse the status quo? The answer lies in the deep-rooted cultural, and more importantly, religious impediments that are embedded within Iraqi society. These obstacles to empowerment will be discussed in detail in a later section.

Background - Women in Iraqi Society

The history of Iraqi women is unique. Iraqi women have traditionally enjoyed rights that were unheard of in neighboring Middle Eastern countries. They sported high literacy rates and did not suffer discrimination in regards to hiring and pay. Women in Iraq began attending universities since the 1920s. They organized grassroots political movements as early as 1952. The earliest such organizations were the Iraqi Women’s League (which was founded to protect the rights of women and children), and the Kurdish Women’s Federation, which as its name suggests, promoted the independence of Kurdistan and the end to British rule. Together the two organizations sparked political participation among women, making significant inroads in the areas of employment, education and inheritance right for Iraqi women. Iraqi women were granted equal rights with men in 1970. By 1980, they could vote and run for elections. Brennan argues that, “women during the mid-eighties held 20 per cent of Iraq’s parliamentary seats, which is more than the 14 per cent held by women in the U.S. Congress.”

However, women’s legal rights took a turn by the 1990s. The sanctions placed on Iraq by the international body had, for various reasons, primarily affected women and children. A United Nations survey reported that women’s illiteracy had risen from 25% in 1987 to about 45% in 2000. Girls were forced to earn wages and assist their families by partaking in domestic duties. Their school attendance suffered as a result.

In 1990, Saddam Hussein, in a bid to maintain power and garnish support from his constituents, introduced Article 111 into the Iraqi penal code. In so doing, he permitted men to perform “honor killings,” i.e. the killing of women who committed or were accused of committing sexual improprieties that brought shame to their families. This permission was broad enough to even include cases of rape. Hussein also introduced the practice of public stoning to death for women convicted of adultery.

Many hailed the fall of Saddam as an opportunity to recover the rights once enjoyed by Iraqi women. However, if serious effort is not put into re-integrating women within the transition process now, their voices may be stifled for much longer than expected.

Women in Post-Saddam Iraq

Interim Iraqi Prime Minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari (a Shi’a), stated that he endorsed the rights of women, including the right to be elected as President. The new constitution and more so, the active role of the U.S. in the drafting of the new constitution, sparked widespread hope that the human rights abuses experienced under Saddam were over and a new age of women’s empowerment loomed over the horizon. Yet there are those who caution against the belief that women have been granted equal rights under the civil and legal institutions of the new government.

What cannot be forgotten is the central role that Islam plays within most Middle Eastern legal frameworks. Iraq is by no means an exception despite its history of liberal freedoms for women. Shi’ism and the patriarchal culture of the country may hinder women’s participation and visibility in prominent political and social positions. Some analysts are wary of an imitation of Saddam’s so-called “cosmetic rights.” Shiite extremists could clash with secular Iraqis on key social issues such as polygamy, honor killings and property rights. While many hail the involvement of women in the National Assembly as unprecedented, few others

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note that women do not enjoy local governance in any of Iraq’s 18 governorates/judiciaries.21

The Impact of Shari’a

Article 14 of Iraq’s new constitution states that Iraqis are equal before the law “without discrimination because of sex.”22 However, the constitution also contains a clause which states that no law that contradicts Islamic law may be passed. This precedence of Islamic law over secular law presents severe setbacks for Iraqi women.23 Yanar Muhammad, a leading secular activist and the head of the Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq, worries that the Islamic provision will turn the country “into an Afghanistan under the Taliban, where oppression and discrimination of women is institutionalized.”24

Islamic law is more popularly referred to as Shari’a law. Shari’a was developed by religious scholars (ulema) shortly after Prophet Muhammad’s death. Shari’a was written with the intention of providing moral and legal guidelines for Muslims. Shari’a is based on the Koran and the Sunna (the recorded sayings and traditions of the Prophet). The Koran contains 80 verses referring to the role of women in society and to important family issues such as inheritance, marriage and divorce.25 Polygamy, for instance, is regarded as the God-given right of a Muslim man. The right to divorce is also exclusive to men, while women have no right to initiate divorce proceedings. Women also suffer biases in the area of child custody. In the event of divorce, men are granted the right to their children, and their wives are not permitted to invest into their child’s upbringing. Unequal distribution of inheritance is another area of discrimination against women.26

Iraq’s personal-status laws had for nearly fifty years protected women from these injustices granting women some of the broadest rights in the region.27 Isobel Coleman states that the 1959 law, “included several progressive provisions loosely derived from several schools of Islamic jurisprudence. It set the marriage age at 18 and prohibited arbitrary divorce. It also restricted polygamy, making the practice almost impossible (the code required men seeking a second wife to get judicial permission, which would only be granted if the judge believed the man could treat both wives equally). Finally, it required that men and women be treated equally for purposes of inheritance.” 28

Religious scholars were not happy with the personal status laws from the start. Shiite clerics despised the imposition of Sunni interpretations of Islamic law as a standard for the entire Iraqi population.29 Thus, with the overthrow of Saddam in 2003, Shiite leaders made very clear that they expected the new Iraq to be an Islamic state. In December 2003, a conservative contingent of the U.S. appointed Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), voted behind doors to annul the personal status law and placed family issues under Shari’a law. 30

Women’s groups across the country quickly protested the new regulation. They appealed to moderates and American authorities alike, held press conferences, rallies and meetings to make their voices heard. At the end of it all, the IGC regulation was overturned, but the intentions of the Islamic clerics were made clear-to broadly assert Shari’a law over a number of legal issues.31

Few researches are worried that Islamic conservatism is gradually creeping into Iraqi society and threatening the rights of liberal, secularist and non-Muslim women who do not wish to be governed. Certain areas within Iraq such as Shia-dominated Basra have made wearing head scarves mandatory, even for Christian women.32 Some Kurdish women fear that the rights they enjoyed under autonomy may well be erased by the inclusion of Kurdish areas within an Islamic Iraqi State.33

Still others argue that Islamic law does not inherently discriminate against women. The Islamic Women’s Movement (based in Baghdad), argues that Islamic Scriptures do, in fact, accord women considerable rights ranging from the right to inherit property to dealing with an unwanted husband. These rights are infringed upon when male authorities decide to interpret them unfairly. Women therefore need to be taught Islamic law to realize which rights are granted to them and thereby fight any injustices they may have experienced.34

Recent surveys nevertheless indicate a degree of indigenous resistance to women’s rights particularly within Shi‘i dominated regions, where men and women do not support women’s rights to political office and the freedom to move about in public.35

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U.S. Programs for Women in Iraq

Both Congress and the Bush Administration have attached particular importance to women’s issues in Iraq. The U.S. included $10 million in addition to the $18.4 billion for Iraqi construction to be directed towards women’s programs in Iraq.36

Most of these programs, however, have been focused on empowering women politically. As discussed before, the political empowerment of women often runs up against Islamic Law, and programs only help incite retaliation to what many Islamists would call Western cultural imperialism. A comprehensive summary of U.S.-led programs and their initiatives is included here to indicate the scope of the work that is being done and, in so doing, evaluate their weaknesses and perhaps recommend a shift in current approaches to the empowerment issue.

In February 2004, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz announced that “the United States is giving special emphasis to helping Iraqi women achieve greater equality and has allocated $27 million for women’s programs.” He added that “education for women is one of the highest priorities, and the United States has committed more than $86.8 million to education projects, with special emphasis on ensuring that girls are registered and attending school.”37

In March 2004, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a $10 million Iraqi Women’s Democracy Initiative (WDI), intended to “train Iraqi women in the skills and practices of democratic public life. Programs will include education for democracy, leadership and political advocacy workshops, entrepreneurship projects, media training for women aspiring to careers in journalism, and activities to help non-governmental organizations build capacity.”38

The Secretary also announced the formation of a “U.S.-Iraq Women’s Network” (USIWN). Iraqi women’s issues and women’s programs have also received an indeterminable amount of funding through other Iraqi reconstruction funds, targeting women in education, local governance, health care, and civil society.39

Since 2004, the United States has promoted democracy-building initiatives that help Iraqi women gather important organization and political skills.

Overview of Reconstruction Programs for Iraqi Women

USAID has taken the lead role in implementing a number of programs for Iraqi women, particularly within the area of governance. Some of these programs have been managed under the Iraq Local Governance Program (LGP), a program intended to provide Iraq with a smooth transition to democracy. The LGP has also invested a great deal of time and effort into overcoming obstacles presented by Iraqi culture to the idea of women in key government issues. The LGP further organized an offshoot namely, the Iraqi Women in Local Governance Group (IWLGG), in order to “enhance the political participation of women through civic education and training and monitor the progress of female participation in each local government.”40

The LGP also funds local women’s groups to develop their own NGOs, civil societies, and grassroots organizations. The project also encourages women to join city councils.41 USAID held a number of workshops for women throughout Iraq, specifically in cities such as Arbil, Hillah, Karbala, and Baghdad, through the LGP. USAID has not only catered to women but girls as well, supporting accelerated learning programs to make up for years of their lost education. The programs equip young girls with basic skills as well as a formal education so that they could be adequately prepared for life. A USAID report from March 2004 indicates that USAID had restored 2,351 schools and educated over 32,000 teachers and administrative workers. The report indicates that these efforts “have resulted in children returning to school. Notably, female attendance... surpassed male attendance, and overall attendance during exam week was 97 percent.”42

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), in tandem with USAID, focused on building the organizational capacity of NGOs targeting women through training and other assistance programs, in order to encourage the work of NGOs in Iraq. Other U.S.-based NGOs have also conducted workshops for women. For instance, Women for Women International is helping the NGO community in Iraq by partnering with various agencies to develop women’s centers throughout the country, some offering leadership training and others career development.43
U.S. Activities for Iraqi Women

Women’s Democracy Initiative (WDI)

Since Iraqi women are relatively inexperienced in the area of governance, U.S. programs such as the Women’s Democracy Initiative (WDI), aim at training women to perform competently within the political arena. The WDI is unique in that it not only provides training in politics but encourages projects like training women broadcasters to run television shows. The organization also established the Women’s Leadership Training Institute which helps women rise to positions of authority within Iraqi society.\(^{44}\)

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED)

The NED targets human rights groups and NGOs by teaching them the fundamentals of political participation, party organization, and building coalitions. Specifically, the NED researches and promotes understanding of Iraq’s history and its potential for democracy.\(^{45}\)

National Democratic Institute (NDI)

NDI provides technical assistance to Iraqi women so that they are viewed as credible and effective leaders.\(^{46}\) NDI furthermore builds up a network of women leaders which provides an effective forum for assistance that crosses party lines and helps women establish themselves as capable leaders.\(^{47}\)

The International Republican Institute (IRI)

The IRI provides women with skills for campaigning, polling and coalition-building. The organization at one point called on women to conduct a door-to-door campaign denouncing violence.\(^{48}\) The campaign was so successful that it caught the attentions of interim Iraqi Defense Minister Hazem Sha’alan and President Ghazi al-Yawar, who both committed championing their cause. Since then, the IRI has established a structure to manage Iraqi NGOs committed to decreasing inter-communal violence.\(^{49}\)

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

The USIP works on women’s issues within the broader context of civil society, inclusion, and tolerance. A component of USIP’s program is to foster the development of civil societies that encourage women to become active in public life.\(^{50}\) The USIP has also awarded grants to organizations thatpropounded tolerance among Sunni and Shi‘i women.\(^{51}\) USIP also provides training to women in the areas of voting mechanisms, political participation, and conflict management.

While these programs are undoubtedly making headway in the area of women’s rights, they seem to be pre-occupied with political issues. Given the existence of Shari’a law in politics, pushing women’s advancement in this arena often rubs the Islamist rulers the wrong way, producing disastrous results. Women who have assumed seats of power within Iraq have often been targeted and killed for their non-compliance with Shari’a Law.

Furthermore, top-down legal reform does not necessitate compliance. A better approach for U.S. policy makers would be to work at the grassroots level in order to lay a foundation for women’s empowerment that could not be overturned with a change of regime or policy.

Washington is presenting signs of compromise on women’s issues in Iraq.\(^{52}\) On the one hand, it has placed women’s rights high on its reconstruction agenda. U.S. officials meet frequently with female Iraqi leaders, emphasize the importance of women’s rights, and have channeled several million dollars to local women’s groups. On the other hand, Washington has bowed to pressure from Shi‘a leaders, backing down from appointing several female judges and designating only three women to the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and none to the 24-member Constitutional Committee, in order to achieve compromises on more critical issues.\(^{53}\) It is therefore necessary to find alternative ways to push forward women’s empowerment while curbing the undesirable effects of ignoring culture and religious law.

An Alternative Approach?

As previously discussed, the status of Iraqi women is often marginalized due to the implementation
of discriminatory religious laws. The rights of the women often get pushed to the back seat as Washington bargains for the inclusion of democratic processes within the new government system. Although the international community and Iraqis have devoted considerable attention to boosting the status of women in Iraq, most of these efforts have focused on the social and political empowerment of women. Political and social advances in the area of women’s rights are hard to deliver due to the existence of laws that restrict women’s participation in government and certain social arenas. Full democratic consolidation in Iraq can only be achieved by guaranteeing, in addition, a leading economic role for women in Iraq.

It is essential to recognize that women do not suffer religious discrimination within the economic sphere. The main tenets of Islam do not prevent women from working and even acknowledge women’s property rights. As a result, many women are engaged in government, health professions, and universities. However, despite this engagement, few women are involved in the private sector, although great efforts have been made to award grants to women-owned businesses. Many qualified women are prevented from working due to the state of the economy and scarcity of formal sector employment. Due to cultural biases, men are preferred over women for those jobs that do exist, pushing women to the periphery of the employment sector. Women also lack basic information about loans requirements, qualifications and credit. A UN/World Bank survey recorded after the fall of Saddam revealed that despite the fact that “women represented about 55 percent of Iraq’s population, they made up only 23 percent of the workforce.”

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP), in coordination with the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), has identified the potential for women’s advancement through the groundbreaking role of microfinance. Microfinance is the provision of loans or services to the poor. The poor in turn become entrepreneurs, using these loans to start small businesses that contribute considerably to their family income. Over the past two decades the growth in numbers of microfinance borrowers around the world has been impressive. Microfinance has become popular in areas ranging from Latin America to Africa and Asia, and has empowered the poor to use what little they have to generate income and become sufficient. Business typically range from “home-based crafts to poultry and dairy initiatives and refrigerated push carts.” One interesting innovation has been the emergence of “telephone ladies” in South Asia and Africa, who used their loans to buy cell phones, and ride their bicycles through remote villages offering minutes to those who require them.

Although microfinance is not going to solve the Iraq’s job creation problem, microfinance businesses on average employ only a few people) it can help create employment opportunities where few exist. Microfinance also promotes free markets and entrepreneurship, reduces the dependency of poor people, and contributes to the emergence of a middle class, all of which are critical to Iraqi reform efforts.
Microfinance and Women’s Empowerment

Microfinance has been praised for its financially sustainable method of alleviating poverty. However, its greatest by-product could be its social impact on women. Women today account for 80 percent of the world’s 70 million micro borrowers. Women in less developed countries have a tendency to be the downtrodden of society. By enabling women to earn incomes, microfinance has the potential to initiate virtuous spirals of empowerment within the domestic, social and political spheres as well.

Although the empowerment process would seem to carry distinctive elements for each culture, several advancements can be seen to be relevant across a range of cultures. Some of these include increased participation in decision making, higher status within the family and community, increased political power and rights, and increased self-esteem. While microfinance institutions offer several anecdotes pointing to success, there remains much in the way of research to establish a definitive correlation between microfinance and its impact on women. The information and evidence that are available give us a mixed picture, showing successes as well as some limitations.

Impact on Decision Making

The ability for women to influence or participate in decision-making that profoundly affects their lives is one of the principal areas of empowerment. However, there is still some ambiguity on what types of decisions, and what degree of influence would render the decision-making indicative of empowerment, notwithstanding the bearing of varying cultural contexts on the issue. Despite the obstacles, several microfinance institutions are attempting to evaluate the impact of microfinance on women’s decision making. The Women’s Empowerment Program in Nepal, for example, conducted a study indicating that an average of “89,000 out of 130,000 or 68 percent of women in its program experienced an increase in their decision-making roles in the areas of family planning, children’s marriage, buying and selling property, and sending their daughters to school—all areas of decision making traditionally dominated by men.”

The Centre for Self-Help Development (CSD) also noted that women were able to make independent purchases of basic items like groceries now that they could afford the costs. World Education, an organization that provides education and literacy to credit and savings groups, discovered that a blend of education as well as credit put women in the position of being able to access food, education and medical care for their female children. TSPI, an organization based in the Philippines, reported that the percentage of women who stated being the primary fund manager within their households rose from 33 per cent to 51 per cent after they had participated in the microfinance program.

Impact on Self-Confidence

Self-confidence is one critical area of change for empowerment, yet it is also one of the most difficult to evaluate or measure. Self-confidence is complex in that it relates to both women’s discernment of their capabilities and their actual level of skills and capabilities. A study in Nepal showed that increased self-confidence and larger spheres of influence were the top two developments reported out of 200 sampled groups. URWEGO in Rwanda supported this finding when it found that 69 percent of its clients reported increased self-esteem after having participated in their empowerment program.

Self-esteem and self-confidence have a direct correlation with knowledge as well. Fifty-four percent of the same URWEGO clients reported an increase in their level of knowledge about issues that affect themselves and their families, and 38 percent of clients reported an increase in business knowledge.

Impact on Women’s Status and Gender Relations in the Home

Access to credit and involvement in income-generating activities strengthens the bargaining position of women within their households, thereby allowing them greater influence on a number of strategic decisions. This is true despite the fact that in many cultures, men’s domination of women is strongest within the household. Susy Cheston and Lisa Kuhn argue that “men are almost as powerless as women in access to material resources in the public domain, but remain privileged within the patriarchal structure of the family. In some societies, being seen by neighbors as in control of his family and wife is a key element of men’s social prestige—particularly in impoverished communities where men may be able to boast of few other status symbols.” Despite the issues many men would have
with wives playing a greater role in decision-making within the household, most studies report improved relations between husbands and wives since the programs. Research into changes in gender roles within the household, however, is limited.

**Impact on Women’s Involvement and Status in the Community**

Numerous microfinance programs have observed progress in women’s status within their communities. The ability to contribute financially to family, as well as community, entitles women to express their views and helps legitimize their concerns. Studies show that the women themselves perceive a positive shift in the way they are treated by family and community, and more particularly by male members, once they achieved greater financial independence. Where women have the freedom to move about publicly, their success in business is often highly visible in the community. Their success can pave the way for them to become respected and valued members of society.

**Impact on Political Empowerment of Women and Women’s Rights**

The political empowerment of women is seen to be a fairly atypical consequence of microfinance programs. Although the programs offer services and products that can enhance individual women’s abilities to participate effectively in politics, few of them explicitly seek political mobilization. Nevertheless, there seems to be a correlation between women’s participation in lending centers and groups and increases in their knowledge of political parties, processes, and channels of influence. Even programs that do not set out with the motive to address women’s rights or encourage political participation have ended up having some impact on political and legal empowerment. “By contributing to women’s knowledge and self-confidence and by widening their social networks, many microfinance programs give women the tools and skills they need to participate more effectively and successfully in formal politics and to informally influence decisions and policies that affect their lives.”

These visible outcomes and individual success stories help explain why extending microfinance to women has become such a powerful force for development.

**Is it all Good News?**

While microfinance seems to hold great potential for success, one must be careful to explore its handicaps as well. For instance, maintaining a loans programs is not cheap, and while the interest rates charged by microfinance institutions are lesser than those of local money lenders, they still exact tolls on borrowers.

Furthermore, while women benefit highly from microfinance and invest the income they generate into the health and education of their children, it also puts extra strain on them. Running a business not only adds to their workload but changes relationships within the family. In some cases men have abused the system and used up microfinance loans for themselves, expecting their women to repay the loans on their behalf. These problems only help illustrate the critical need for lenders to include gender training into their programs.

Finally, while microfinance is often hailed as the key to ending poverty and championing women’s issues, it must perform as part of a network of basic services. Microfinance can only be one component of a broader process of social and economic development.

**Iraq: A Microfinance Success?**

As of January 2007, over 16,000 Iraqis have borrowed $18 million from USAID-related programs, with an average loan size of $1,140, and a loan repayment rate of 98%. Microfinance has to proved to be a popular concept in Iraq with loans made in At’ Tamim, Salah ad Din, Arbìl, Al Basrah, An Najaf, Karbala, Babil, and Baghdad Governorates. A U.S.-supported lending institution was able to use microfinance successfully to revitalize the economy of Ninawa Governorate in Mosul. USAID was also instrumental in partnering with local microfinance institutions in an effort to indigenize the concept. The U.S. poured $250,000 in operational capital from the U.S. military’s Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), and another $250,000 in lending and training capital supplied by USAID, into the microfinance initiative for Iraq. The combine effort of the two branches of government is a successful example of interagency cooperation in the wake of urgent stabilization efforts in Iraq.
Since the microfinance initiative began, there has been a growing focus on providing business opportunities to women. One program in central Iraq helped women entrepreneurs gain a footing in non-traditional careers such as construction, engineering, computers, and publishing.\(^1\)

While microfinance has gotten off to a good start and is gradually being used as a tool for women’s empowerment, much remains to be done. Introducing gender-specific programs for women that include training and additional supplements, increasing the number of programs available to women, locating the remotest areas where women would otherwise have no access to alternative lending institutions, and diversifying the employment options (i.e. promoting a shift from agrarian to business entrepreneurship), would all help increase the gains to empowerment-directed initiatives.

### A Gender Strategy for Micro-Finance

Not surprisingly, programs that set out to impact women are more likely to achieve better results. This is especially true when these programs encourage women to exercise authority and independence in their decision-making. Microfinance institutions that place women in charge of their own banks, allow them to make decisions on each others’ actions, elect their own leaders, or set the terms and conditions of loans, will be more successful in promoting women’s empowerment in the long run. Regular meetings also help develop women’s spheres of influence and the education received encourages their self-esteem.

Author Linda Mayoux argues that although the available material does not permit firm conclusions about the relative merits of different micro-finance models, it does suggest the need for a ‘minimal gender package’ of strategies and program elements, in particular:

1. **Conditions of microfinance delivery** should be tailored to fit the needs of women. This means allowing the women to negotiate the size of their loans, the amount they will save and the income they wish to generate. This control nevertheless should be checked so as to protect development agencies from losing all their loans and savings from being completely absorbed into household consumption. Conditions of loan should be context-specific but allow women as much control over their finances as is possible.\(^2\)

2. **Complementary services** to include:
   - **Awareness training in gender issues** to prevent domestic conflict occurring due to changing roles within the family setting. Microfinance should affect positive growth and understanding between men and women. If the reverse occurs, the microfinance program will have done more harm than good.\(^3\)
   - **Provision of services** to allow women more time to participate socially and politically. This would mean changes in household division of labor as well as provision of services to make it easier for women to get the same amount of work done quicker thereby avoiding negative impacts on girls and their education.\(^4\)
   - **Gender advocacy at local and national levels** to provide a voice for women who have suffered from domestic violence and an avenue to raise awareness on related issues. Gender advocacy would also ultimately contribute to changes in perception, legislation, and access to resources, which all serve to constrain women in all programs.\(^5\)

3. **Structures for participation** whereby women will be able to actively practice decision-making and formulate strategies that will generate more resources towards empowerment from lending groups, so that these groups will not only be concerned with loan repayment but women’s issues as well.\(^6\)

4. **An institutionalized gender policy** within the lending programs themselves, including a commitment to gender equality in the recruitment and promotion of their staff. This is crucial if any progress is to be made.

### Priorities for Further Research

The evidence collected gives us reason to qualify much of the rhetoric surrounding the concept of microfinance.\(^7\) At the same time it offers microfinance as a powerful tool towards empowerment if it is applied correctly. Either way, there is a pressing need for deeper organizational and cross-contextual research on microfinance and its effect on women.
Areas begging further research are:

- **The impact on gender relations of microfinance programs.** Scholars have not been able to definitively link microfinance and gender issues. Studies are largely anecdotal and often portray contrasting views. Few studies investigate the impact of different microfinance strategies in detail.

- **Program re-orientation** in order to resolve the two apparently conflicting aims of empowerment and financial gain. Many microfinance programs are only concerned with loan repayments and dividends. However, if microfinance is to affect gender relations, a gender-specific strategy that accords greater control to borrowers (and potentially a loss for the lender) should be pursued.

- **Innovative strategies** to improve training and the provision of services so that they are relevant to the needs of the women as well as self-financing in the long run.

- **Microfinance services for very poor women.** The poorest of the poor are not concerned with empowerment issues, starting a business, saving or insurance. Microfinance institutions should tailor some of their programs to target this category of women, so that they are able to sustain themselves and in turn become more attentive to social and political issues.

- **Identifying and protecting women** from unintended consequences either legally or physically. This may warrant program revision or even abandonment where required.

Although this study may have raised more questions than it has answered, it may serve as a trigger to provoke more systematic and policy-focused research into those programs that are already functioning within the Iraqi context. Context seems to be the key-word here, deciding the success or failure of each microfinance program.

**Conclusion**

The international community has recognized the potential that women hold in promoting peace and stability in post-conflict societies. UN Resolution 1325 mandates action in response to the recognition, calling on nations to actively include the participation of women in the stabilization process. Women are crucial for success because of their roles as primary educators and caretakers of their families. They look to the well-being of their children and in so doing, invest at the most basic level of community. If empowered beyond their roles as wives and mothers, they could significantly broaden Iraq’s talent pool and present a check to religious extremism. Efforts to integrate and empower women politically and socially within Iraq have been impeded by religious and cultural factors. *Shari‘a* law, which takes precedence over secular law, discriminates widely against women. Culturally, men are favored over women and the latter receive limited opportunities for employment within the formal sector. Progress in the area of women’s rights can only be achieved through fresh and innovative means.

Microfinance is one such approach to the empowerment problem. It has been proved effective since the economic participation of women does not violate Islamic Law. It is able to overcome cultural impediments to employment since it is a self-employment strategy. The logic behind gender-directed microfinancing is the perception that economic independence will in turn perpetuate a cycle of social and political empowerment for women. Thus the approach advocates reform at the micro-level to produce change at the macro-level. This paper, however, does not tout microfinance as the one and only solution to women’s empowerment. To be effective, reform must be diversified and occur at various levels in order to obtain comprehensive results. Microfinance is just one innovative and context-advantageous way to approach the empowerment issue.
Endnotes


2 The full-text of the resolution can be found at www.un.org.


4 Ibid.

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6 Ibid.


8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.


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HUMAN SECURITY AND THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS: TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE CIVILIAN STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION FORCE

Abstract:

As evidenced by current experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States military and civilian agencies have had major difficulties in meeting the unique and varied challenges of stabilization and reconstruction operations. This study examines the current interagency effort, headed by the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, to develop a civilian reserve corps to engage in these types of operations, freeing the military to focus mainly on its conventional roles and missions.

The civilian reserve corps model has the potential to correct the flawed approaches to stabilization and reconstruction operations through the institutionalization of recruitment, training and deployment practices. Through the successful engagement of historically underutilized civilian and, more specifically, private sector capabilities, the civilian reserve corps would increase the United States’ capacity to respond to the international community’s most pressing human security challenges.

So far, the potential of the civilian reserve corps model remains untested. Urgent action, such as the passing of Congressional authorization and appropriations, are required to make this initiative a reality. This State Department initiative has the potential to take full advantage of all forms of U.S. power and influence to successfully face the prevailing national security threats confronting this generation.

The scope and complexity of the changes facing the nation demand that the United States transform and strengthen its foreign affairs institutions. Military power is critically necessary, but is insufficient on its own to secure the interests of the American people. The effectiveness of our diplomatic and development capabilities must equal that of our armed forces. In the face of unprecedented strategic and technological changes, the Committee supports an enhanced diplomacy that orchestrates all instruments of national power, engages the full range of international partners and the public, and proactively shapes long-term global conditions in ways consistent with our national interests.

-The Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy

In the post-Cold War period, it has become evident that the United States national security apparatus is unprepared to face the most pressing challenges of this century. Most recently, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have put U.S. capabilities to the test, and the results have been less than satisfactory. There is no question that American military forces remain the best equipped and most well trained worldwide for conventional warfare. However, the types of conflict in which U.S. troops have been increasingly engaged in recent years require more than traditional military prowess. Engagements such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, known as stabilization and reconstruction

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Understanding Stabilization and Reconstruction

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has initiated stabilization and reconstruction operations every 18 to 24 months with an average duration of five to eight years.5 What, exactly, are stabilization and reconstruction operations? Though there has been some debate as to the proper definition of such an operation, some consensus has emerged in recent years. Army doctrine identifies multiple types of operations that can be classified as stability operations, including counter-insurgency operations, peace operations, security assistance, and combating terrorism.5 In a more general sense, the Defense Science Board identifies stabilization and reconstruction as “the period following the cessation of high-intensity conflict”.5 During this key transitional time period, essential steps must be taken to “re-establish security, strengthen governance, rebuild infrastructure, and improve social and economic well-being”.6 In countries that have been torn by interstate war or civil strife, the successful and timely execution of these and other related tasks could make the difference between state failure and the beginnings of effective governance.

In an attempt to further enumerate the components of a successful stabilization and reconstruction operation, the U.S. Department of State and other interagency partners developed a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix in April 2005. The framework divides essential tasks into five main technical sectors, or categories: security; governance and participation; humanitarian assistance and social well-being; economic stabilization and infrastructure; and justice and reconciliation.7 Upon further study of this matrix, it becomes evident that individuals working in a post-conflict setting could be required to engage in activities as diverse as performing civilian police functions such as crowd control, crime investigation, and arrests, to developing new legislative procedures and being aware of local crop cycles to estimate food needs for the local population. Each task identified in the matrix is divided into implementation phases by identifying specific activities appropriate for given time periods. This provides reconstruction officials with guidelines for how to progress from responding to immediate needs, to establishing foundations for security or development, to institutionalizing long-term programs and processes. For example, an economic advisor dealing with small businesses would first identify constraints to business development and take steps to remove obstacles in the short-term. He would then develop a strategy for addressing challenges to small business development and draft an accompanying legal framework. Finally, he would collaborate with organizations such as the International Finance Corporation to develop micro credit opportunities for the long-term.8

Given the breadth and depth of activities involved in stabilization and reconstruction, it is evident that these operations require the leadership of well-trained professionals from various areas of expertise. The complexity of these types of operations is increased when one recognizes that no single operation will be exactly like another. Weak and failing states are not limited to a particular region of the world, and their effects are felt across national and cultural borders. Americans have been involved in stabilization and reconstruction efforts.
in nations as diverse as Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia and Kosovo. Individuals involved in these operations must be knowledgeable not only in their technical fields, but also in conflict transformation strategies and the language and customs of the country in which they are working. Undoubtedly, stabilization and reconstruction is one of the most challenging endeavors in which the United States has been and will be engaged and provides significant challenges for policymakers and practitioners alike.

Assessing Military Capabilities in Stabilization and Reconstruction

Because the stakes of stabilization and reconstruction operations are high and the demands they place on those involved are so taxing, it is essential that the group of individuals best equipped to succeed undertake these operations. While the U.S. military has traditionally taken the lead, the type of intervention in which the United States is becoming involved is changing. Factors such as “increased operational tempo, rapid success on the battlefield, and an ever-expanding list of post-conflict objectives” mean that U.S. troops are victorious on the battlefield, but were often sent into combat too quickly to develop extensive plans for the reconstruction phase of the operation. Soldiers thus find themselves engaged in stabilization and reconstruction activities for periods that far exceed the duration of the initial military intervention. This is largely due to the limited participation of civilians in U.S. post-conflict interventions. Because there are no other agencies or individuals capable of taking its place, the military suffers from “mission creep” as soldiers are forced to stay on to complete non-military tasks.

Although the military has done its best to adapt to the changing nature of U.S. interventions, their involvement as the primary actor in stabilization and reconstruction operations remains less than ideal. As the Center for Strategic and International Studies aptly explains:

“...despite the best intentions and tireless efforts to learn from each mission, the U.S. military has little or no comparative advantage in many of the tasks associated with such operations, particularly those that fall outside the security sector. With the exception of civil affairs units that are specifically trained for reconstruction work, the U.S. military is not adequately trained or equipped to build civil administrations, act as mayors of villages, establish national financial systems, rebuild health and sanitation infrastructures, instigate judicial reform, hold elections, and so on.”

When soldiers are forced to conduct tasks that are not security related for extended periods of time, the military is put under great strain. Those few civil affairs officers with the requisite training and experience necessary to succeed in these challenging operations are over utilized and stretched to their limit. Currently, 98 percent of the military’s civil affairs corps is drawn from reserve forces. The U.S. has already been forced to rely heavily on its military reserves, a limited resource in an era of extended U.S. involvement in ever more complex operations. If the United States intends to continue its current patterns of global involvement, it must find a new source of capable individuals willing to serve in the most difficult of circumstances.

Tapping Civilian Capabilities

Though historically under utilized by the U.S. government, civilians have proven themselves to be an excellent source of expertise in post-conflict settings. Unlike soldiers, civilians cultivate many of the skills necessary for reconstruction and stabilization on a daily basis in their chosen careers. Some even have development and reconstruction experience abroad, which has provided them the opportunity to acquire specific cultural knowledge and communications skills. In some cases, civilians gain this experience as employees of government agencies such as the U.S. Department of State or USAID. In addition to possessing relevant skills, these individuals have direct knowledge of how the government functions, and may have already served in various hardship posts around the world. They are comfortable engaging host country government officials, sometimes in their local language. Government civilian employees have been incorporated in stabilization and reconstruction operations in the past, and are presently engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan as members of Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

In addition to government employees, individuals employed by state and local governments or in the private sector can also contribute significant skills to these operations. Those with highly specialized skills such as lawyers or police could serve as advisors to the military or other
government employees in the field to fill the critical need for rule of law experts in the immediate post-conflict period. Once security and rule of law has been established, bankers or business managers and entrepreneurs could help restore financial stability and spur the development of local small businesses by providing microfinance loans or serving as advisors to government economic planners, providing a foundation for long-term development. While these individuals may not have worked abroad previously, they can be trained to apply their knowledge in an international setting.

Finally, employees of nonprofit or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often possess technical or reconstruction skills, foreign language skills, and on-the-ground experience in locations around the world that have traditionally been under served by the U.S. government and for-profit sectors. U.S. based international NGOs are a fast-growing, highly adaptable group. From 2001 to 2003, the average age of international NGOs dropped from 14 to 12 years and the median age decreased from 9 to 7 years as new organizations were formed. In fact, over 60 percent of all international nonprofits received IRS recognition in the 1990s and 2000s. These organizations are involved in addressing the most pressing needs of the international community, and are engaged in activities such as providing relief and humanitarian aid, fostering understanding between the United States and foreign countries, and building democratic institutions and civil society. Employees of the international nonprofit sector do have experience interacting with the U.S. government and military in the field, and are often relied upon as force multipliers to conduct operations for which the government does not have the capacity. These individuals could be better or more directly engaged with government stabilization and reconstruction activities through innovative partnerships with U.S. government agencies.

Unfortunately, these groups of highly skilled civilians have not been effectively mobilized to perform the essential tasks of stabilization and reconstruction operations in the past. Until the U.S. government devises a plan for reaching out to these individuals and involving them directly in the reconstruction process, the military will be forced to continue to take the lead in all aspects of these crucial operations.

Considering the Options

Given the differing skills and abilities of military and civilian employees, one must consider how best to organize them to achieve the desired outcome in stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, in its call for comprehensive reform of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, identifies four possible models for coping with the current lack of deployable civilian expertise.

First, the government could make a concerted effort to create “rapidly deployable capabilities” in agencies outside of the Department of Defense. This would require extensive organization and training efforts throughout other agencies in the U.S. government, but would allow the military to resume responsibility for those security-related tasks in stabilization and reconstruction operations in which it does possess a comparative advantage. This option has been the most championed in recent years and is likely the most promising model for effective civilian engagement.

The second model would basically maintain the status quo, with the military remaining in the de facto lead in all aspects of stabilization and reconstruction operations. Under these circumstances, the military would be obligated to continue to learn from its experience in traditionally non-military related tasks to improve stabilization efforts to the greatest degree possible. While the U.S. might be forced to accept this model in the short-term while more attractive options are pursued, this remains the least desirable option for future engagements. The current military structure cannot long sustain its current level of involvement in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

If other government agencies prove unwilling or unable to create deployable civilian capabilities, a third model envisions the development of a civilian cadre within the U.S. Department of Defense. In this case, the military would train and equip its own civilian experts for stabilization and reconstruction by building on its experience, organizational culture and capabilities. However, many feel that this would be a duplication of effort, since the latent capacity for civilian engagement and technical expertise already exists in many other agencies. Furthermore, expanded Department of Defense presence in post-conflict settings, albeit with a
civilians face, might elicit negative responses from NGOs and international allies who would prefer to see representatives of other civilian agencies take the lead in these types of operations.\textsuperscript{18}

Finally, if no progress can be made toward developing a deployable American civilian force, a fourth model would center on greater cooperation with and reliance upon U.S. allies in the field. Some U.S. allies, such as those in the European Union, have significant experience with and resources for stabilization and reconstruction operations.\textsuperscript{19} They pride themselves on their ability to wield soft power in difficult settings to great effect. If U.S. international partners would agree to take on increased reconstruction responsibilities in future operations, the U.S. military could once again focus its attention on those security tasks for which it is best equipped and trained. Unfortunately, while U.S. allies do certainly have a comparative advantage in training and equipping civilian forces, the U.S. cannot assume that they will always consent to deploying their forces in support of U.S. operations. Even countries that have historically been reliable partners of the United States may be unwilling to continually clean up the mess following U.S. military interventions with which they do not agree.

Given that it is unlikely that the United States will cease to be involved in stabilization and reconstruction operations, one of these models must be pursued to guide future U.S. policy. Although efforts to enhance civilian participation in these missions are still relatively new, some important advancements have been made in recent years. Still others are in the planning phases, and promise to make significant progress towards institutionalizing civilian involvement in stabilization and reconstruction for the betterment of the overall mission.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the Founding Idea for Civilian Involvement

A first step in increasing official civilian involvement in stabilization and reconstruction operations was taken in Afghanistan in 2002. At that time, it had become evident that the U.S. and its allies were unable to deploy sufficient troops to effectively control the full extent of Afghanistan’s vast territory, especially since this was a nation particularly wary of a large foreign presence within its borders.\textsuperscript{20} Nevertheless, something had to be done to extend Afghan central government influence to remote provinces throughout the country to allow stabilization and reconstruction efforts to take hold. U.S. policymakers thus developed the idea for the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). PRTs provided an innovative approach to the involvement of civilians in reconstruction. In addition to the 60 to 100 soldiers deployed in each PRT, representatives from civilian agencies such as the State Department, USAID, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture were also present to contribute their expertise.\textsuperscript{21} PRT commanders in the field also acted as liaisons between the military and those NGOs working in areas of PRT operation, providing another means for engaging civilian actors in reconstruction efforts.\textsuperscript{22} By October 2005, there were 22 PRTs operating in Afghanistan pursuing the three goals of enhancing security, strengthening the central government’s reach, and facilitating reconstruction.\textsuperscript{23} Since their initial deployment in 2003, significant analysis has been conducted to determine the strengths and weaknesses of this model in terms of military-civilian cooperation in stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

In general, assessments of U.S. provincial reconstruction teams have concluded that interagency collaboration varied in its degree of effectiveness.\textsuperscript{24} Although PRTs experienced some important successes in Afghanistan, there were five significant barriers to true interagency cooperation. A basic understanding of the main problems associated with the PRT model will be essential for developing new interagency initiatives in the coming years.

First, there was an overall lack of direction and objectives for PRT personnel that hampered their ability to function well as members of an interagency team.\textsuperscript{25} For example, newly arriving PRT members were not provided with job descriptions before their deployment and were expected to improvise upon their arrival in the field. Veteran team members were often unable to offer clarification or guidance, as they had equally amorphous ideas about the details of their own role in reconstruction efforts. The result was a lengthy period of adjustment for the team when newcomers arrived, diminishing the overall effectiveness of the PRT.

Second, although the intent of the PRT was to incorporate civilian expertise into the stabilization
and reconstruction process, PRTs remained predominantly military structures, with U.S. Army officers holding the lead position in all U.S. PRTs.26 Although civilians were supposed to have authority over reconstruction issues, in practice the fact that the majority of PRT personnel and funding were provided by the Department of Defense meant that the military played a disproportionate role in all matters.27 Civilian affairs team members were sometimes looked down upon by combat troops as “bogus soldiers who required protection” rather than professionals with significant expertise to impart to the effort as a whole.28 This imbalance resulted in some civilian participants feeling marginalized and in the development of civil-military tensions in many PRTs.

Third, PRTs were plagued by “poor tour synchronization and team deployment policies”.29 Civilian deployments were often much shorter than those of their military counterparts, and there was even significant variation between civilian deployment lengths, with some team members remaining in country for as little as 90 days. Short deployments, combined with the lack of clear job descriptions mentioned previously, meant that many members had little time to develop expertise in their particular positions. Variable rotation schedules led to inevitable gaps in staffing, with many civilian positions going unfilled for significant periods of time.

The fourth major obstacle to interagency effectiveness in PRTs was the lack of training for PRT members prior to their deployment.30 Civilian participants, some with little prior experience interacting with the military, were thrust into mentally and physically challenging situations with no preparation for the PRT interagency environment. Neither military nor civilian team members were provided with language and cultural training that could have greatly facilitated interaction with the local population. PRT members were expected to learn and adapt in the field, though the brief length of their deployments often precluded any significant training opportunities. While civilian and military personnel alike may have possessed significant expertise in their respective fields, lack of training prevented them from applying their skills within the strained PRT interagency environment and in a foreign linguistic and cultural context.

Finally, the fifth barrier to a successful interagency experience was the inability of U.S. government civilian agencies to provide adequate staffing and financial resources for PRTs.31 This created both funding and experience disparities between civilian and military assets. For example, while most military officials serving on PRTs had as many as 16 to 20 years of experience, civilians provided by the Department of State and USAID were often junior officials or contractors.32 This experience gap contributed to misunderstandings and even a lack of respect between the military and its civilian team members. The inability of civilian agencies to adequately fund their representatives in the field meant that the Department of Defense provided the majority of reconstruction funding through programs such as the Commander Emergency Response Program.33 These discrepancies acted to limit the influence of civilian PRT members and decrease interagency understanding and effectiveness.

While provincial reconstruction teams did experience a significant degree of success, especially considering the innovative nature of their composition, improvements must be made to the PRT model in future interagency deployments. The United States must build on the positive components of PRTs while continuing to seek a higher level of meaningful civilian engagement in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

**Restructuring for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations**

Several significant steps were taken beginning in 2004 to initiate reforms in the interagency process in terms of how it addressed complex stabilization and reconstruction operations. First, in August of that year, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the Department of State.34 This new office would lead an interagency effort to “coordinate U.S. efforts to prepare, plan, and resource responses to complex emergencies, failing and failed states, and post-conflict environments”.35 The establishment of this office was largely the result of Senate bill S. 2127, introduced by Senators Lugar, Biden, and Hagel in 2004 to “encourage and support a well-organized, sufficiently resourced and strongly led civilian counterpart to the military in post-conflict zones”.36 The S/CRS web site clearly describes its core objectives.37 First, the organization monitors potential areas of concern around the world in order to prevent conflict
wherever possible. It also develops plans for engaging areas where confrontation is inevitable. In those instances in which a response is necessary, the S/CRS will deploy U.S. civilian resources and work with other U.S. and international partners to bring stability to the region. Finally, the S/CRS will compile best practices from lessons learned during these deployments and incorporate them into training for future deployments.

Following the formation of S/CRS, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44 in December 2005 to identify a focal point to “improve the coordination, planning, and implementation of reconstruction and stabilization operations”. This directive gives the Secretary of State the primary responsibility for planning and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations utilizing the full range of U.S. government civilian departments and agencies, an authority that the Secretary has delegated to the S/CRS. The directive stipulates that other executive departments and agencies enable the Secretary of State in these endeavors by identifying those personnel and resources within their own organizations that would be of use in addressing stabilization challenges. It also specifically addresses the relationship between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense with regard to stabilization and reconstruction operations. The directive calls on the Secretary of State to coordinate efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure “harmonization” between civilian and military operations, and tasks both Secretaries with developing a framework for “fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate”. Finally, NSPD-44 requires the Secretary to lead the development of a “strong civilian response capability including necessary surge capabilities,” an instruction that led to the development of the Civilian Stabilization Initiative.

The Civilian Stabilization Initiative

In his 2007 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush alluded to the development of a civilian reserve corps that would function much like the current military reserve system. As President Bush stated, this civilian reserve corps would “give people across America who do not wear the uniform a chance to serve in the defining struggle of our time”. Though this brief comment did not provide much detail, it referenced one of the key initiatives of the U.S. State Department’s Civilian Stabilization Initiative, a set of reforms initiated in 2004 to address many of the weaknesses identified in the current interagency response to stabilization and reconstruction operations. Though certain components of this initiative remain in the planning phase, the Civilian Stabilization Initiative appears promising in its ability to mobilize civilian expertise, especially nongovernmental expertise, for future U.S. missions.

In order to better engage civilians in future stabilization and reconstruction operations as mandated in NSPD-44, the Department of State initiated planning for three civilian response corps beginning in 2005: the Active Response Corps, the Standby Response Corps, and the Civilian Reserve Corps. These corps, in varying stages of implementation, draw from different pools of civilian expertise to accomplish their mission.

The Active Response Corps

The Active Response Corps (ARC), the first civilian body formed under the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, was first developed in 2006 and was designed to deploy during the initial stage of stabilization and reconstruction operations. In terms of staffing, the ARC is an internal unit, made up entirely of State Department employees who volunteer to serve one-year rotations and to deploy with 24 to 48 hours notice for up to three to six months. These individuals possess expertise in skills that allow them to oversee or provide basic government services in stabilization operations abroad, such as economics, public administration, law making and enforcement, public health provision or city planning. Staffing for the ARC is underway, and members of this corps have already been deployed in multiple conflict settings. At present, the ARC has fifteen temporary staff positions, eleven of which were filled in 2007. The Department of State hopes to expand this number in coming years to achieve a government-wide capacity of 265 by working with other government agencies to help them develop their own deployable civilian expertise. If ARC recruitment efforts proceed according to plans, Department of State personnel would fill 40 percent of ARC positions, USAID employees would fill another 40 percent, and experts from other agencies such as the Departments of Justice,
Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce would make up the final 20 percent. The State Department estimates that it would be able to deploy 80 percent of these individuals continuously in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations worldwide, if necessary.

Although the ARC is still relatively new and limited in size, it has been put to the test in the field. Members of the ARC have been deployed to conflicts in Sudan, Eastern Chad, Lebanon, Kosovo, Liberia, Iraq, and Haiti. In these regions, ARC personnel have participated in missions as diverse as implementing peace agreements, monitoring displaced persons, and initiating reforms in local governments, and their involvement in these activities has been positive. Because the ARC has been granted dedicated staff positions, its members work full-time on ARC activities and do not hold other jobs within the government. When these individuals are not deployed, they participate in development activities such as training and planning exercises with other State Department bureaus to prepare for future assignments.

The Standby Response Corps

The second body of civilians developed as part of the Civilian Stabilization Initiative is known as the Standby Response Corps (SRC). The SRC, like the ARC, is an internal unit made up of State Department employees. By 2007, the SRC had developed a roster that included 91 active State Department personnel and 209 retirees willing to deploy within 30 to 60 days for up to six months. This group of individuals would be activated during the second or surge phase of a stabilization and reconstruction operation to support ARC personnel on the ground when additional staff or skills are required. Unlike the ARC, the SRC has not been granted full-time staff positions. Therefore, SRC personnel perform other jobs throughout the State Department when they are not deployed. The State Department hopes to expand the roster of the SRC to include 500 individuals by 2008 and 2,000 individuals government-wide by 2009. Again, in order to meet this goal, the State Department is working with other government agencies to create similar bodies within their own organizations. It estimates that only between 10 and 25 percent of all SRC members would be able to deploy continuously, given that these individuals have full-time commitments in other U.S. government agencies.

The SRC, though not as experienced as the ARC, has been deployed in two stabilization and reconstruction operations. SRC personnel participated in efforts to support the Darfur Peace Agreement in Sudan and in complimentary activities in Chad to support refugees from Eastern Darfur.

The Civilian Reserve Corps

The final body envisioned within the Civilian Stabilization Initiative is known as the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). The CRC is the most innovative of the three civilian corps and differs from the ARC and SRC in that it is not an internal State Department unit. In fact, it would not draw its members from any U.S. federal government departments or agencies. The CRC would introduce entirely new civilian expertise into the stabilization and reconstruction process by recruiting volunteers from state and local governments and the private sector, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Traditionally, employees from these sectors have had little to no official involvement in U.S. government stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Why, then, should these individuals be brought into the picture at this point through the CRC? As the Project on National Security Reform has noted, “national security matters are now the subject of a multifaceted process involving many actors, which do not always include U.S. government agencies, but may instead involve the private sector, foreign governments, state and local governments, multilateral organizations and non-governmental organizations.” In short, state, local, and non-governmental actors have important skills to offer in facing modern national security threats and should now be an integral part of the interagency process. These groups must be moved from the sidelines to participate directly in stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The CRC offers an original model through which to accomplish this goal.

The CRC would recruit employees from NGOs, the private sector, and state and local governments who possess skills not readily available within the federal government. These individuals would agree to place their names on a roster to be deployed within 30 to 60 days for up to one year. Names would remain on the register for a period of four years. If, during those four years, the CRC were deployed, those individuals on the register would become full-time term government employees for the duration of their deployment. Far from the
typical in-field liaison relationship between the U.S. federal government and NGOs, the CRC process brings non-federal civilians into the government as fully empowered actors. In a deployment setting, a CRC member has “the authority to speak for the U.S. government and manage U.S. government contracts and employees”. In exchange for their service, deployed CRC members would receive compensation and benefits similar to those of Foreign Service employees. In this manner, non-federal civilians with significant expertise who previously lacked a voice in stabilization and reconstruction operations would be granted an opportunity to become central contributors to the decision-making and implementation process.

Although civilian volunteers would bring a variety of professional and technical skills to the government through the CRC, the State Department recognizes that they would benefit from training that would teach them how to apply their particular skills in the interagency and international contexts. As such, CRC volunteers would be required to complete training upon joining and would also participate in annual training during the four years that their names remain on the CRC register. In the event of their deployment, CRC members would receive additional, more targeted training relevant to their particular operation prior to departure. These training opportunities, when combined with the professional skills and experience that each CRC member brings from his or her career, would yield the type of well prepared, knowledgeable civilian that has been overlooked in stabilization and reconstruction operations in the past.

Obstacles to CRC Development

The CRC differs from the ARC and SRC in that it is still in the development phase and has not yet been staffed or deployed. In 2007, Congress authorized the State Department to reallocate up to $50 million of Diplomatic and Consular Programs to support and maintain the CRC. However, this authorization, part of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-28), also stated that these funds could not be obligated without specific authorization in a subsequent Act of Congress. Due to this stipulation, CRC recruitment and deployment efforts have been unable to progress. New legislation was introduced in both the House of Representatives (H.R. 1084) and the Senate (S. 613) in February 2007 that would legislatively establish S/CRS, expand the existing ARC and SRC, and provide access to the $50 million allocated in P.L. 110-28. This would allow S/CRS to recruit, hire, and train the first CRC members. Without Congressional approval, the U.S. government will continue to be hampered in its ability to field qualified civilians for stabilization and reconstruction operations. Some positive progress has been achieved in the House of Representatives. On March 5, 2008, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1084, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008, with broad bipartisan support. If corresponding progress can be made in the Senate, the CRC might finally have the opportunity to be tested in the field.

Pressing Forward

The State Department has laid out ambitious goals for the recruitment, implementation and maintenance of the Civilian Reserve Corps. While initial funding of $50 million through the 2007 supplemental would have allowed for the training and recruitment of 500 CRC members, S/CRS remains optimistic that it will receive funding sufficient to develop a roster of 2,000 individuals by 2009. Despite skepticism at the State Department’s ability to recruit this many qualified individuals among non-federal civilians, S/CRS insists that interest has been high. Since President Bush alluded to the Civilian Reserve Corps in his 2007 State of the Union address, S/CRS claims to have been “deluged” with contacts expressing enthusiasm for joining the CRC. In response, S/CRS has developed a means for tracking individual interest in the CRC, even though formal recruitment has not yet been initiated. Citizens who are not currently employed by the U.S. government are invited to register their interest in joining the CRC on the S/CRS website. By following the link, individuals can select the category of stabilization and reconstruction expertise that most closely matches their areas of interest and experience. After making this selection, individuals proceed to fill out an online form requesting information on availability, foreign language skills, educational background, previous reconstruction and stabilization experience, and security clearance status. Visitors to the site are reminded that submitting information through the form in no way obligates them to serve in the CRC. Data submitted
through this form is reviewed by the S/CRS, and additional contact may be made with candidates to obtain more specific information about their qualifications. Through this online process, S/CRS is better able to gauge public interest in the CRC and to engage in informal recruitment prior to CRC’s official authorization by Congress.

Undoubtedly, a CRC with a roster of 2,000 people will require funding for initial costs, maintenance, and deployment. At the time of a 2007 Government Accountability Office study, S/CRS identified $135 million in total costs for fiscal years 2008 and 2009. The breakdown for this amount is described in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding Purpose</th>
<th>CRC Established with 500 Personnel</th>
<th>CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marketing, recruiting, screening, and enrolling</td>
<td>$7.7</td>
<td>$17.2</td>
<td>$24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment Purchases</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$25.7</td>
<td>$109.0</td>
<td>$134.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of State documents and staff.

Current budget requests for fiscal year 2009 appear to reflect this need for additional funding for all Civilian Stabilization Initiative reserve corps. On February 4, 2008, President Bush submitted his Administration’s proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2009, which includes $248.6 million for the CSI. This level of funding would allow S/CRS to expand the existing ARC and SRC, which it hopes will become government-wide bodies. A total of $75.2 million of the overall CSI budget would provide for expansion and training of these two response corps. Approval of the 2009 budget would also significantly increase funding for the CRC. As mentioned previously, S/CRS hopes to recruit 2,000 individuals for the CRC by 2009 provided that Congress authorizes its establishment and funding. The $86.8 million designated for CRC expansion in the Administration’s 2009 budget proposal would greatly facilitate this development goal. The remainder of the budget proposal includes $63.6 million for initial civilian force deployment and protection and $23 million for leadership and management of reconstruction and stabilization operations as envisioned in NSPD-44 through S/CRS. S/CRS is currently maintaining a high profile in Congress to raise awareness and support for this crucial initiative.

The Civilian Stabilization Initiative – An Improved Interagency Model?

Under the guidance of S/CRS, the Civilian Stabilization Initiative aims to develop civilian capacity to meet the government’s needs to respond to national security threats in a changing world, and to do so in a way that facilitates improved interagency collaboration. An analysis of current programs underway in the Active Response Corps and the Standby Response Corps, as well as of projected capabilities of the proposed Civilian Response Corps reveals that the Civilian Stabilization Initiative has indeed addressed several shortcomings identified in previous stabilization and reconstruction operations. S/CRS efforts to provide enhanced training for civilian participants in stabilization and reconstruction operations, to specifically reach out to non-federal civilians, and to collaborate with international partners have already experienced success, and have done so while maintaining a focus on improving interagency communication and collaboration.
Training

A key weakness in recent stabilization and reconstruction operations as identified in evaluations of Provincial Reconstruction Teams was a lack of appropriate training for civilian participants. Individuals arriving in a foreign country were not sufficiently prepared for the challenges they would face, and struggled with language and cultural barriers and navigating the interagency process. S/CRS has taken steps to remedy this situation by working with the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) to develop training curriculum for stabilization and reconstruction participants.75 A three-part series of introductory courses offered at FSI beginning in May 2008 provides students with a review of the rationale and goals behind efforts to reform U.S. government involvement in stabilization and reconstruction operations. Participants in this course will become more familiar with government directives such as NSPD-44 and Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, and with new interagency tools available to “transform conflict” such as the Interagency Management System and Essential Tasks Matrix developed by S/CRS. Once participants understand these tools, they will be expected to apply them to specific stabilization and reconstruction scenarios. FSI also offers a course on the key technical sectors for stabilization and reconstruction. Students in this course gain a better understanding of each of these sectors and their interplay, and learn to adapt their technical skills to the stabilization and reconstruction environment. Other, more advanced courses to be offered in the future include: Leading and Managing Interagency Coordination for Reconstruction and Stabilization; Tools for Early Warning and Conflict Assessment; Interagency Planning for Conflict Transformation II; Pre-Deployment Mission Readiness; and Reconstruction and Stabilization Response Team Leadership and Management. Descriptions for each of these courses are included at the end of this chapter.

A careful reading of these course descriptions reveals that S/CRS and FSI have developed courses that address many of the concerns of previous civilian stabilization and reconstruction participants. Course attendees will not only learn how to apply their technical skills in the stabilization and reconstruction setting, but also in the interagency setting by studying organizational cultures and capabilities. Pre-deployment training will provide reserve corps members with an understanding of individual roles and responsibilities prior to arriving in the field, preventing lost time in the critical first stage of a deployment. Finally, instruction on the interagency planning process and methodology developed by S/CRS will allow participants to practice managing an entire conflict transformation, from strategic planning to implementation and assessment.

Stabilization and reconstruction course offerings are not limited to the Foreign Service Institute. Other agencies and organizations have developed similar or related courses that would also prove valuable for individuals involved in these difficult types of operations. For instance, the United States Institute of Peace offers a Certificate Course in Conflict Analysis that is highly recommended by the State Department’s S/CRS. This course, available online on the Institute’s website,76 provides instruction on conflict analysis and teaches students to apply analytical tools to case studies of Kosovo and Rwanda. Participants in this training will become proficient in identifying the phases of conflict and selecting appropriate interventions for each phase. The course material is also offered in Arabic.

The National Defense University’s School for National Security Executive Education (SNSEE) has also developed courses on stability operations and interagency collaboration. As the University notes in its course descriptions, from 1990 to 2006, stability operations have cost 6 times more lives, and 5 times more money than major combat operations.77 As such, the focus of the majority of the courses offered in the SNSEE program is on improving U.S. participation in stability operations. Students learn techniques for interagency communication that will better enable them to “work across interagency stove-pipes”78 to plan a unified interagency response to national security threats. Participants will also develop their conflict management and leadership skills within the international and interagency contexts. Descriptions of these SNSEE course have been included at the end of this chapter.

As more organizations develop courses in this subject area, a significant gap in knowledge is slowly being filled. Civilian participants in stabilization and reconstruction operations will no longer be thrust into complex interagency settings abroad and expected to fend for themselves. Future ARC, SRC, and CRC members will deploy with a more
sound knowledge of how their technical skills can be incorporated into a collaborative operation to achieve conflict transformation in the world’s most unstable regions.

Interagency Improvement

One of the principal goals of S/CRS is to develop foreign policy tools for stabilization and reconstruction that utilize the full range of government organizations and expertise. This requires continual efforts to involve actors from various agencies and organizations in the planning and decision-making process. Previous attempts to work effectively across organizational lines in stabilization and reconstruction operations often resulted in strained relationships and miscommunication, as was the case with PRTs in Afghanistan. In order to prevent discord of this nature in future operations, S/CRS has specifically focused on improving interagency relations at all levels.

At the strategic planning level, S/CRS has included experts from multiple agencies in its initiatives. Some of the most qualified leaders from the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and USAID have served in S/CRS staff positions as subject matter experts. For example, U.S. Army Colonel William Lee has served S/CRS as its Military Advisor since the office was first established in 2004. He is one of four Department of Defense representatives currently assigned to S/CRS and has used the wealth of experience from his 27-year military career to help draft the Interagency Management System for stabilization and reconstruction. Although communication between the State Department and the Department of Defense is sometimes strained, Colonel Lee attempts to bridge the gap that exists between these two organizations. S/CRS has also benefited from the presence of Joseph M. Jones from the Department of Justice, who has served as Special Rule of Law and Criminal Justice Advisor for S/CRS since December 2007. Jones’s work with the American Bar Association’s Central and East European Law Initiative, and as the Department of Justice’s Chief of International Development and Training Programs has given him significant experience with transforming legal systems and training judicial officials in foreign countries. Given the importance of rule of law in stabilization and reconstruction operations, Jones’s access to a wealth of Department of Justice resources is a true asset for S/CRS. This type of interagency communication at the highest levels of planning will be essential in preparing for and conducting successful operations in the future that address the full spectrum of stabilization and reconstruction needs.

In another specific effort to improve interagency coordination, the S/CRS Conflict Prevention team worked with the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to lead an interagency team in conducting the second Unified Action Limited Objective Experiment. This experiment, dedicated to improving U.S. capacity to assist weak and failing states, was the first JFCOM-sponsored event led by civilians. This widely attended event provided members from across the U.S. government with the opportunity to share their approaches to stabilization and reconstruction operations. Similar events are already planned for 2008 to continue and deepen this process of joint planning.

Finally, individual civilian deployments led by S/CRS have been similarly focused on improving the interagency process in a variety of operational and field level settings. Historically, the Department of State and the Department of Defense have not engaged in a significant degree of joint regional planning. State Department regional bureaus and Defense Department geographic combatant commands have operated largely on a separate basis. In an attempt to remedy this lack of communication, albeit on a small scale, S/CRS decided to deploy two ARC members, one to AFRICOM and one to SOUTHCOM. The ARC member stationed at AFRICOM will work to establish better interagency relations between the Departments of State and Defense at this newly created combatant command. Various ARC members have been deployed to Sudan and Chad to facilitate the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and to work with refugees, providing S/CRS with a source of important on-the-ground experience in stabilization operations in Africa. This knowledge could prove beneficial to the ARC member currently stationed at AFRICOM. The ARC member deployed to SOUTHCOM is providing support for a major interagency exercise to improve civil-military coordination in conflict areas. In the field abroad, ARC members have worked to advance civilian participation in Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, ensuring that the specialists requested matched the
conditions on the ground and that the different agencies involved in the operation worked in harmony.87 A similar process was undertaken in Afghanistan, where five S/CRS employees facilitated interagency planning in all U.S.-led PRTs. Lessons learned during this process were taken back to the U.S. and were incorporated in interagency pre-deployment training for the next generation of PRT teams at Fort Bragg.88 Through these various deployments, S/CRS is transforming interagency operations on the ground in current deployments and developing best practices to guide reforms in future stabilization and reconstruction settings.

**Attracting New Sources of Civilian Expertise**

Traditionally, the federal government and the private sector have worked together at arms’ length. It was often assumed that the two entities did not share the same goals or, if they did, certainly would not agree on the proper means of achieving those goals. With the rise of U.S. participation in stabilization and reconstruction operations following the Cold War, this lack of collaboration has proved to be a detriment to the U.S. federal government. There is now a small, but growing call for the government to devise a means of reaching out to individuals and organizations in the private sector to harness expertise that is critical to the success of U.S. missions abroad, but is not present within the government itself. As mentioned previously, the proposed Civilian Reserve Corps is an innovative response to filling this need for highly qualified civilians. Its approach to recruitment, in which activated members would become full-time government employees for the term of their deployment, offers civilians powerful new incentives for government service. Congress is presently deliberating on the feasibility of providing deployed CRC members with benefits including: danger, hardship, and other mission-specific pays, benefits, and allowances; recruitment bonuses for hard-to-fill positions; overtime pay and compensatory time; leave accrual and payment for unused leave upon service completion; competitive hiring status; federal health, life, and death benefits, and medical treatment while deployed; dual compensation for retired federal workers; and the ability to count deployed time toward retirement benefits.89 These financial incentives, coupled with the opportunity to directly influence U.S. operations on the ground as empowered managers and decision-makers will help encourage private sector representatives to consider serving in the CRC. Through its proposal and advocacy for the creation of the CRC, S/CRS is responding to the call of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy to engage the private sector. S/CRS is proving itself to be “an integrated interagency entity with the expanded mission of creating multi-sector, international partnerships across USG agency boundaries”.90

**Engaging International Partners**

The U.S. decision to use military force in Afghanistan and Iraq alienated many countries that had traditionally been U.S. allies. In deciding to “go it alone,” the U.S. burned many bridges that it will have to go to great lengths to repair. S/CRS’s effort to develop active and standing civilian reserves for stabilization and reconstruction operations is a first step in this long process of regaining international support. Many countries, especially those in the European Union, are of the opinion that civilian resources are better suited to preventing terrorism and conducting stabilization operations than is military power. As such, the Civilian Stabilization Initiative has provided a means of rapprochement between the U.S. and those nations with which this proposal particularly resonates.

In March 2008, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Ambassador John Herbst traveled to Brussels, Belgium, to establish a cooperative relationship with the EU regarding civilian stabilization forces. Herbst signed and exchanged diplomatic notes with Slovene Presidency Representative Metka Ipavic that confirmed the implementation of the U.S.-EU Work Plan on Technical Dialogue and Increased Cooperation in Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention.91 Initiated in 2005, the Work Plan creates a framework for increasing U.S.-EU cooperation by providing opportunities for training, sharing of analysis, and capacity building in other international organizations.92 This visit served as a visible sign that the U.S. is taking its commitment to build civilian capacity seriously and is willing to forge new partnerships with the EU to do so. The U.S. has much to gain from this agreement, given the EU’s significantly greater civilian power. With over 11,000 experts on its roster, the EU certainly has a comparative advantage in deployable civilian
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Corps, and has already committed 2 billion Euros to the development of the Work Plan over the next six years. Experience with this level of civilian participation and funding makes the EU an excellent source of guidance for the neophyte U.S. Civilian Stabilization Initiative.

Ambassador Herbst also took advantage of his Brussels trip to consult with NATO’s International Staff. Through events such as a proposed workshop at NATO headquarters in May, Herbst plans to work with NATO partner countries to improve the Alliance’s ability to help form national civil-military capacities for stabilization and reconstruction operations. As S/CRS moves towards the successful establishment of a thriving U.S. civilian reserve, international linkages such as the U.S.-EU Work Plan and enhanced NATO cooperation will be essential. The obstacles inherent in stabilization and reconstruction operations worldwide are best overcome jointly. The Civilian Stabilization Initiative has provided some common ground upon which to begin to rebuild America’s international relationships and restore its ability to forge successful alliances in future operations.

Remaining Obstacles and Areas for Future Research

The Civilian Stabilization Initiative has made significant strides in addressing shortcomings in the U.S. response to stabilization and reconstruction challenges. Whereas civilians were previously left out of these operations entirely or thrust into them with little prior preparation, S/CRS has begun to mold a cadre of civilians who have been trained in how to apply their technical knowledge in a foreign and often unpredictable setting. Interagency communication and collaboration has also been enhanced through strategic planning in Washington, D.C. and through ARC and SRC deployments in the field. Opportunities for a more extensive engagement of private sector expertise and international partners appear promising with the development of the CRC. Although considerable progress has been made, some obstacles or areas for improvement remain.

Securing Funds for Expansion

First and foremost, S/CRS must press on to secure funding and approval from Congress for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative. With a fiscal year 2009 budget request of nearly $250 million, a great deal is riding on the ability of S/CRS to convince Congress of the importance of developing a civilian stabilization force. Without this critical source of income, it is doubtful that S/CRS would be able to proceed with desired expansions and the development of new programs. Previous and ongoing deployments of ARC and, in some cases, SRC members to Sudan, Chad, Lebanon, Kosovo, Haiti and Iraq have been impressive, but limited. With only 11 ARC members and 91 active SRC members, S/CRS faces constraints in the number and types of operations it can launch without additional recruitment and staffing efforts. If Congress does not approve funding to allow for expansion in 2009, the U.S. will face several less than desirable scenarios for present and future stabilization and reconstruction operations: a continuation of the status quo, with an overstretched military taking the lead in stabilization and reconstruction; heavy reliance on international partners to pick up the slack in these crucial operations; or avoidance of these types of operations altogether in the future. S/CRS’s work with the ARC and SRC, albeit on a small scale, has proved that alternatives do exist. Congress must move forward and provide S/CRS with the funding it needs to make these alternatives a reality.

Ensuring Adequate Compensation and Benefits

S/CRS has recognized that in order to recruit highly skilled civilians for the CRC, it must provide attractive compensation and benefits. As mentioned previously, legislation currently pending approval in Congress would grant deployed CRC members many of the same benefits afforded Foreign Service employees. While this package would likely be an incentive to join the CRC roster, other unresolved issues might dissuade some from considering government service. For instance, it remains unclear whether those civilians who serve in the CRC would, in fact, be entitled to competitive hiring status for other positions within the Department of State. It is equally uncertain whether time deployed with the CRC would be permitted to count towards federal retirement benefits should these individuals remain employed by the government. While these two ambiguities could certainly prove unsettling to some potential CRC members, they would only affect those individuals who plan to seek full-time government employment following their time
of service in the CRC. Nevertheless, these issues should be taken into account and a clear position established prior to initiating recruitment efforts.

More serious, indeed, is the fact that there are currently no provisions that grant re-employment rights to civilians who deploy with the CRC. The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act ensures that military veterans are able to reclaim their civilian employment upon returning from military service or training. No comparable guarantee exists for civilians who would be deployed with the CRC. As a result, each individual contemplating temporary government service through the CRC would have to consult with his or her current employer to arrange for a leave absence, or would have to be prepared to seek a new job upon returning from deployment abroad. This level of uncertainty could severely hamper recruitment efforts among those civilians who are currently employed – likely a large portion of the recruitment pool – and could force S/CRS to settle for accepting lower quality candidates in the essential first stages of CRC development. Though S/CRS has stated that the Civilian Reserve Task Force would reassess the necessity of re-employment rights after the recruitment of the first 500 CRC members, a more proactive approach to resolving this issue may be essential. If S/CRS initiates widespread recruitment efforts before it is able to ensure re-employment for deployed CRC members, it may find it difficult to reverse this message if it causes early interest to lag.

Other unanswered questions remain, as well. Neither the Government Accountability Office studies nor any S/CRS documents prepared thus far have addressed other key human resource issues that could pose potential problems for CRC development and recruitment. Nevertheless, many challenges and shortcomings in the current military system should raise red flags for CRC developers. For example, numerous soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan are experiencing the negative effects of posttraumatic stress disorder, but are receiving limited support and treatment from the military. S/CRS has not stated whether CRC members experiencing similar mental health problems would be entitled to treatment following their deployment abroad. Would they be entitled to extended medical care if physically wounded during an operation? Under what circumstances would CRC members be forced to deploy to an operation they considered to be too dangerous, or outside the scope of stabilization and reconstruction activities? These are all questions that should be studied and addressed before civilians are put in such demanding situations abroad.

Evaluating and Standardizing Training Programs

A final but formidable challenge for S/CRS is the need to develop the quality and quantity of training courses necessary to sufficiently prepare the three civilian corps for deployment. As mentioned previously, FSI is already offering a series of three basic courses on stabilization and reconstruction and is in the process of developing and scheduling a wide range of more advanced courses. The U.S. Institute of Peace and the National Defense University have developed similar or complimentary curricula. Given the urgent need for qualified civilians, it is likely that other institutions and agencies will begin to offer courses as well. As the list of available courses and educational providers expands, two important questions emerge: who should determine which curriculum best meets the needs of civilians seeking to prepare for stabilization and reconstruction operations, and how should such a curriculum be standardized to ensure quality across multiple institutions? Given the structure and mission of S/CRS, it is uniquely equipped to take the lead in this decision-making process.

A core function of S/CRS is to monitor and evaluate lessons learned from U.S. civilian participation in stabilization and reconstruction operations. As ARC and SRC members return from deployment overseas, S/CRS staff work with them to determine which aspects of their mission were successful and to identify opportunities for improvement. Based on the lessons learned from these individuals in the field, S/CRS formulates best practices to be incorporated in future operations. Throughout this debriefing and learning process, S/CRS staff members should also assess the education and training ARC and SRC members received prior to their deployment. All returning civilian corps participants should be asked to evaluate the courses they completed in light of their experience on the ground and to identify those courses or training programs that proved to be most useful to them in practice. By analyzing the experience
of these returning ARC and SRC members, S/CRS could begin to formulate a list of courses that most directly correlated with successful performance in the field. This list could form the foundation of a basic stabilization and reconstruction curriculum to be approved by S/CRS and its interagency advisors and partners.

If S/CRS is able to secure funding to expand the three reserve corps in the coming years, it must also be prepared to expand the number of qualified training programs available to prepare them for deployment. Recruitment of civilians, particularly for the CRC, will likely take place on a nationwide scale. Developing training opportunities to match such recruitment efforts would require broad support from institutional partners across the country and the formation of a certification process for prospective educators. The interagency structure of S/CRS would facilitate this endeavor, as it has already worked to develop contacts that go beyond traditional government boundaries. By leveraging these interagency and private sector relationships, S/CRS can begin to incorporate into the classroom environment those best practices derived from on-the-ground experience to ensure that civilians placed on the CRC roster will meet a high standard of preparation for deployment.

Conclusion

With the formation of S/CRS in 2004, the Department of State took a critical first step toward improving interagency relations to enhance U.S. performance in stabilization and reconstruction operations. In the intervening years, significant progress has been made in engaging new actors in a collaborative planning effort to address emerging human security concerns worldwide. In spite of obstacles and setbacks, the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, the culmination of these efforts, is poised to transform and modernize the U.S. approach to the prevailing national security threats facing this generation. Urgent action is required, however, to make this initiative a reality, as the status quo is quickly becoming unsustainable. It will truly take a whole-of-government approach to ensure that legislation is passed to afford new practices the opportunity to take root and bear fruit. Although this process promises to be lengthy and will not be undertaken without risk, the stakes are high and the alternatives grim. If the United States hopes to preserve its effectiveness in all forms of global engagement, it must ultimately create a civilian capacity that is the true equal of its military power.

Foreign Service Institute - Joint FSI-S/CRS Courses on Stabilization and Reconstruction

Course Descriptions:

- **Coordination for Conflict and Instability: S/CRS and Interagency Response**

  This one-day overview course is the first in a series offered in cooperation with the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The course is designed to review the rationale, history, mission and goals behind recent initiatives to improve USG involvement in failed and failing states, provide an overview of the dynamics of conflict and instability, and explain the roles and tools applicable to collaboration among USG agencies and other relevant organizations in reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) activities.

- **Interagency Planning for Conflict Transformation**

  This one-day overview course is the second in a series offered in cooperation with the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The success of the USG’s conflict stabilization and transformation efforts will depend heavily upon the ability to plan early and develop an integrated, interagency approach to deal with the interdependent civilian and military responsibilities on the ground. The purpose of this course is to get a broad understanding of the planning framework developed by S/CRS, related tools, and the role of the framework in fostering an integrated approach to future conflict transformation efforts. The framework enables USG civilian agency planners to identify and gain policy-level approval for the overarching policy goal, achievable major mission elements, and the essential tasks of an integrated USG response. The process coordinates a resource strategy to achieve the mission goal, identifies lead agencies responsible for essential tasks, and incorporates a structure for metrics and evaluation.

- **Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Response Operations**

  This three-day course is the third in a series offered in cooperation with the Office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). This offering is intended to help participants understand and implement the concepts, tools and current evolving doctrine for USG reconstruction and stabilization operations. The course will cover relevant mechanisms and processes required to deploy civilians to respond to conflict situations. It will also focus on concepts and processes for communication, decision-making, planning and joint operations among interagency partners.

- **Overview of Reconstruction and Stabilization Sectors**

This two-and-a-half-day course focuses on the key technical sectors in R&S (security, justice and reconciliation, economic stability and infrastructure, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, and governance and participation) and the interplay among them in reconstruction, stabilization and conflict transformation situations. This course uses scenarios to emphasize adaptation of technical skills to R&S environments and to consider tradeoffs that may be necessary among technical areas for better country-level results. This course will equip participants with knowledge needed to work across sectors, as well as across interagency and international boundaries.

- **Leading and Managing Interagency Coordination for Reconstruction and Stabilization**

This two-day course is designed to strengthen skills of participants in more effectively coordinating and managing interagency reconstruction, stabilization and conflict transformation efforts. The course will address issues of organizational communication and culture.

- **Tools for Early Warning and Conflict Assessment**

This one-day course is designed to introduce participants to the concepts, methodologies and tools used to identify countries at risk of instability, conflict, or state failure and the criteria for moving from assessment to response.

- **Interagency Planning for Conflict Transformation II**

This three-day course is designed to prepare individuals to take part in multi-level, interagency conflict transformation planning efforts, from policy formulation to strategy development and implementation planning for countries at risk of, in or in transition from conflict. Participants will learn and practice the SGRS-developed interagency planning process and methodology for reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict transformation. The course will cover relevant organizational cultures, Agency planning methodologies and processes, and operational capabilities and capacities, including resource options and constraints that planners need to factor into the plan. Participants will practice collaborative approaches for integrating the various interagency actors and establishing roles and responsibilities. They will learn to use an array of planning tools designed to provide policy-makers with a clear and focused conflict transformation plan that includes all USG agencies and can, as needed, be expanded to include international and non-governmental partners.

- **Pre-Deployment Mission Readiness**

This three-day course is intended for people selected by S/CRS to participate in response teams that are scheduled to deploy in a specific situation. Participants will review basic roles, responsibilities, structures, communications, security requirements, authorities and tools guiding the team.

- **Reconstruction and Stabilization Response Team Leadership and Management**

This two-day course is designed to prepare staff selected by S/CRS to lead response teams, either in Washington or in countries where teams are deployed. Participants will review the responsibilities of a team leader related to interagency coordination, planning, staffing, operations, communications, collaboration with local government and other key responsibilities.

**National Defense University - School for National Security Executive Education**

**Course Descriptions:**

- **Statecraft: Peacekeeping and Nation Building**

This course will help the student explore the changes in the nature of conflict in the last decade of the 20th century and the implications for the 21st century by examining the boundaries of peace operations, the actors, the organizational
structures and the resources required to perform these extremely complex missions. The purpose of this course is not to provide answers, but to help the student develop a framework for analysis of peace operations in the 21st century. This course will examine the roles of the United Nations, the United States, NATO, and nongovernmental organizations across the range of peace operations—from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and peacemaking to peacebuilding. The focus is on developing a framework for analyzing the nation’s approach to and future participation in peace operations. Building on a foundation provided in the first four lessons, the course will analyze sources of intrastate conflicts, conflict management techniques, and civil-military coordination. A discussion on the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction will highlight the difficult, but fundamentally interdependent, relationships among the military, political, humanitarian, and economic developmental aspects of peace operations. Other emphasis is given to ethical and legal issues related to peace operations. This course will examine current and past operations in Bosnia and East Timor as case studies and will conclude with a simulation requiring students to apply lessons learned in class. The course, therefore, reinforces the entire NDU curriculum by detailing the political-military and economic implications of peace operations, the decision making process, and the role of international organizations and nongovernmental organizations.

Adapt and Overcome Through Stability Operations

Stability Operations, from 1990 to 2006, have cost 6 times more lives and 5 times more money than major combat operations. “Adapt and Overcome” is all about understanding how to work across interagency stove-pipes to deliver orchestrated and integrated Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) outcomes. NSPD 44 appoints State as the lead for Stability and Reconstruction (S&R) and DoD’s Directive 3000.05 places Stability Operations equal with combat operations. This seminar adopts an ends, ways and means framework of analysis of relevant case studies looking in detail at outcomes for security, governance & participation, humanitarian assistance & social well-being, economic stabilization & infrastructure, and justice & reconciliation. Students leave the course thinking strategically and better able to derive integrated interagency outcomes across the spectrum of conflict.

Interagency Communications for Stability Operations

The ability to communicate effectively is a vital tool for interagency leaders working Stability Operations. Messages must be conveyed rapidly and with due clarity in order to generate the strategic effect required. Leaders must develop their ability to harness and leverage various forms of communication media to convey their intent. In a seminar environment, students will focus on real-life stability operation case studies and role play appointments to practice and improve their abilities to brief, present questions, interview and actively listen. Students will also learn the pros and cons of various types of communication media.

Conflict Management for Stability Operations I: Future Interagency Outcomes

From 1990 to 2006 stability operations have cost 6 times more lives and 5 times more money than major combat operations. Conflict Management includes stability operations and the military support to government stabilization and reconstruction. It aims to (a) prevent conflict, (b) restore peace by resolving or terminating conflict before escalation (c) and to assist with rebuilding the post-conflict peace. The course starts by looking at NSPD 44, State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS), the QDR 2006, DoDD 3000.05 and the interagency process. It adopts an ends, ways and means framework of analysis of relevant case studies looking in detail at outcomes for security, governance & participation, humanitarian assistance & social well-being, economic stabilization & infrastructure, and justice & reconciliation. Students leave the course thinking strategically and better able to derive integrated interagency outcomes across the spectrum of conflict.

Conflict Management for Stability Operations II: Gearing of International and Interagency Actors

Over the last 16 years, 6 times more lives and 5 times more money has been expended on stability
Operations than on major combat operations. Conflict Management includes stability operations and stabilization and reconstruction activities. It aims to prevent conflict, restore the peace by resolving or terminating conflict before escalation, and to assist with rebuilding the post-conflict peace. The course starts with a Culture Game and then looks in detail at outcomes for security, governance & participation, humanitarian assistance & social well-being, economic stabilization & infrastructure, and justice & reconciliation. Adopting an ends, ways and means approach across relevant case studies, a framework of analysis examines how DoD, State, DHS, the intelligence agencies the UN, NATO and EU and various NGOs, plus companies and contractors and various private volunteer organizations, wrestle within the interagency process. Students leave the course better able to think interagency, strategically, culturally and internationally.

- Conflict Management for Stability Operations III - Leadership Development

Six times more lives and 5 times more money has been expended on stability operations than major combat operations over the last 16 years. Conflict Management includes stability operations and government stabilization and reconstruction. It aims to (a) prevent conflict, (b) restore peace by resolving or terminating conflict before escalation and (c) to assist with rebuilding the post-conflict peace. The course enhances the understanding of the nature, function and qualities of leadership required within the interagency process. Students leave the course thinking strategically and better able to get their way through the tools of presentation, negotiation and influence. The course concludes with a Decision Game.

Endnotes


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THE CONVERGENCE OF HUMAN SECURITY THREATS AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

Abstract:

The five countries of Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan - are rife with human security problems which stem from pervasive corruption, organized criminal groups and networks for trafficking in humans, drugs, weapons and other illicit goods.

Although human security issues such as corruption and drug trafficking are ostensibly humanitarian in nature, and have traditionally been handled in this manner, these issues also have implications for U.S. national security interests such as regional instability, increasing extremism and nuclear proliferation.

While organizations like the U.S. State Department and the UNODC can take steps to mitigate these problems, the Department of Defense should also have a more active role in imparting lessons learned from Afghanistan, such as training and equipping law enforcement and supporting regional cooperation on counter narcotics.

The past two decades have witnessed immense political, economic and social change in Central Asia. Although the fall of the Soviet Union and the U.S.-led toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan might ultimately herald a period of prosperity for the region, these developments have not been without immediate challenges. The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Taliban regime, combined with widespread poverty, weak states and a location along ancient trade routes, have led to an upsurge in transnational criminal activity in the five countries of Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The increased criminalization of Central Asia takes the form of pervasive corruption, organized criminal groups and networks for trafficking in humans, drugs, weapons and other illicit goods, and has elicited responses from agencies ranging from the U.S. Department of State to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Although human security issues such as corruption and drug trafficking are ostensibly humanitarian in nature, and have traditionally been handled in this manner, these issues also have implications for U.S. national security interests, particularly those involving Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror. The widespread poverty and social malaise created by human security problems in Central Asia is behind the rise of extremism, while the corruption and weakness inherent in these states contributes to problems such as nuclear proliferation and the movement and longevity of terrorist groups.

Background

Throughout much of the twentieth century, the five Central Asian republics - Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan - were part of the Soviet Union. Lying along the fabled Silk Road and strategically located between China, the Soviet Union and the Middle East, the region also boasted valuable natural resources, including oil, minerals and fertile land. As such, “the entire region was a primary producer of raw materials, with underdeveloped and specialized industries,” and a “dependence on Moscow and incomplete modernization.” The fall of the Soviet Union and the region’s subsequent

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independence in 1991 has not engendered an easy transition. In a post-communist environment, Central Asia’s previous economic dependence on Moscow has resulted in “massive environmental problems, highly skewed trade patterns and distorted production bases. Since independence [from the Soviet Union] they have all suffered to one degree or another from hyperinflation, the growth of unemployment, the loss of traditional markets and trade outlets, and limited investment capital.”

Besides the aforementioned economic factors, other tensions exist as well: “the five republics are largely social constructs, the product of Stalin’s attempts to limit opposition and connect vast and disparate lands. It was a deliberate strategy to create ethnic mixes in the republics” and “interdependence” in Central Asia.

Border tensions exist between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the fertile Ferghana Valley, where all three states have a vested interest in the valley’s trade routes, agriculture and water access (refer to Map 1.1). State borders in the Ferghana Valley, which are “contented in at least 50 places,” produce hardship by “[separating] families into different nations” and imposing visa requirements on “everyday life.”

Unfortunately, the Ferghana Valley, as well as the Central Asian region as a whole, has also experienced another post-Soviet development: increased criminalization. “Once on the margins –or more accurately in the shadows– of the Communist systems, in the post-Soviet world these phenomena have moved to the center of political and economic life” and include “drug trafficking, organized crime, shadow economies, and corruption and rent seeking.” Many of these illicit activities also have a “transnational” quality, as defined by the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, because the crimes themselves, their effects, their perpetrators, or their “preparation, planning, direction or control” cross national boundary lines.

In addition to the border disputes and the weak state institutions mentioned in the preceding paragraph, another underlying factor of criminalization in Central Asia is severe and pervasive poverty. Per capita income in Tajikistan is just $1356, earning it a rank of 155 out of 174 countries measured by the UN. “The collapse of collective state-owned farms and local industry [following independence] has also created significant unemployment” and economic disruption. The World Bank considers all five countries to be in the “lower rung of economic development, all classified as either lower-middle (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) or low-income countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan).” The Human Development Index (HDI), a metric developed by the UN Development Program, provides a more holistic view of quality of life in the region. The HDI assesses “a broader definition of well-being,” by studying income, education and literacy rates, standard of living and life expectancy to produce a numerical score for every country. Although their scores vary, the five Central Asian countries have consistently scored poorly on this index. In the 2007/2008 report, Tajikistan was ranked 122 out of 177 countries, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan scored 116 and 113, respectively. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which ranked at 73 and 109, respectively, received the best scores from the region due in part to their
vast energy reserves. In the face of this economic deprivation, “organized crime, drug trafficking, and the operation of shadow economies and informal markets give to many citizens means of economic advancement that are not available in the legal economy.”

Regional conflict, notably the civil war in Tajikistan from 1992-1997 and, more recently the U.S. led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, have also impacted criminalization in Central Asia. Although peace accords were signed in 1997, a group of disillusioned opposition forces from Tajikistan and nearby Uzbekistan rejected the agreement and formed the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a group which still causes problems in the region today. The Tajik civil war also set the stage for a lucrative drug trade with Afghanistan. “Afghan heroin played an important part of the war economy, enabling the purchase of weapons and personal enrichment,” and this economic dependence on the drug trade still exists for many individuals in Central Asia today. The Tajik state remains severely undermined by the civil war, particularly in border areas which had supported the opposition fighters.

Operation Enduring Freedom has also had significant effects on criminalization in Central Asia, primarily because of its effect on the drug trade emanating from Afghanistan. Prior to OEF in 2001, poppy cultivation already had a long history in Afghanistan. Opium poppy “used to grow wild” in Central Asia and, once its more nefarious uses became well-known, a substantial opium trade developed. Between 1999 and 2000, Afghanistan produced approximately 2,900 to 4,600 metric tons of opium, according to the UNODC. In 2001, the Taliban “began enforcing its long-stated but long-ignored ban on opium production,” resulting in “an almost total eradication of the annual poppy crop in Afghanistan.” In 2001, the Taliban “began enforcing its long-stated but long-ignored ban on opium production,” resulting in “an almost total eradication of the annual poppy crop in Afghanistan.” Since the Taliban’s ouster, the cultivation of opium poppy has resumed, leading to record levels of opium production: “In 2007, the volume of opium cultivated in Afghanistan rose to 193,000 hectares, a 17 percent increase over 2006. An unprecedented 8,200 tons of opium can be harvested, making Afghanistan virtually the sole supplier of the world’s deadliest drug accounting for 93 percent of [the] global opiates market.”

For those living in the region’s smaller countries, “the allure of the drug trade cannot be overstated considering the condition of most other sectors of the economy.” Many women “agree to traffic drugs in order to support children and family and often agree to a lower payment than men,” and represent an increased participation in the drug trade.

Although drug trafficking is still prevalent in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, its economic appeal is somewhat diluted by their larger economies: “The stronger, larger countries with a more varied economy, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, have experienced this problem but at a level that is

Characteristics of Criminalization

Drug Trafficking

Heightened criminalization in Central Asia has several hallmarks, including trafficking networks for illicit drugs, people and goods, organized crime, the emergence of a shadow economy and endemic corruption. As mentioned above, Afghanistan’s booming poppy crop has had a tremendous impact on drug trafficking in Central Asia. Although some heroin production facilities from northern Afghanistan appear to have relocated to Tajikistan following Operation Enduring Freedom, for much of the region, involvement in the drug trade comes from the trafficking of narcotics, not production:
unlikely to risk taking over the entire state.” Oil-rich Kazakhstan has a strong economy relative to the rest of Central Asia, meaning that “the relative value of the drug trade is lower compared to the total economy of the country; the incentive to involve in the drug trade is hence lower. Likewise in Uzbekistan, the country’s economy is more varied and provides other opportunities than the drug trade.” That is not to say, however, that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have been immune from drug trafficking. The 137 kilometer Afghan-Uzbek border provides ample opportunity for smugglers to bring heroin bound for Russia into Uzbekistan. Similarly, Kazakhstan remains “attractive to traffickers because it sits between the major heroin-producing regions of the Southwest Asia and major markets in the former Soviet Union and Europe.” Additionally, drug trafficking occurs in Kazakhstan because it is a member of a “customs union,” with Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, and “transportation of sealed goods across the borders of these four countries is not subject to any serious inspection as they are treated as domestic cargo.”

Roughly 25% of the drugs trafficked through Central Asia is consumed domestically. As a result, the five Central Asian states have felt the scource of drug-related public health problems, most notably skyrocketing drug addictions and HIV/AIDS cases. The numbers of both drug users and registered HIV cases have increased regionally. According to estimates by the World Health Organization (WHO), opiate addiction in Kyrgyzstan tripled from 1993 to 2001. Driven by the use of intravenous drugs, the sex trade and a scarcity of information about HIV, Uzbekistan represents “the biggest epidemic in Central Asia,” according to the WHO.

(Refer to Table 1.1) Since 2001, reported HIV cases in Uzbekistan have more than doubled, and current estimates show the number of HIV cases to be around 31,000.

However, accurate information concerning the spread of HIV in the region is difficult to come by, due to the “high level of misinformation and stigma concerning HIV… suicide is a significant cause of mortality among infected people.” For example, Turkmenistan had only reported 2 HIV cases by 2004, a figure which almost certainly grossly underestimated the actual HIV infection rate in the country.

Organized Criminal Groups

Organized criminal groups in Central Asia have also grown in strength, leading to “the emergence of large shadow economies that encompass illegal economic activities and information activities that are beyond the reach of the state.” Experts estimate that there are approximately 22 criminal organizations currently in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz criminal groups place a special emphasis on revenge and frequently maintain groups of strongmen, who are employed in front companies such as gyms or sport clubs for “wrestlers, boxers and martial arts enthusiasts,” to “engage in racketeering, kidnapping or political intimidation on their behalf.” Mafia-style assassinations have grown increasingly common, particularly during periods of power redistribution, such as the 2005 so-called Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. In Tajikistan, criminal groups smuggle drugs from Afghanistan to Russia and are heavily involved in politics. Kazakh criminal networks appear to be

Table 1.1: Trends in HIV Prevalence, 2003–2005 (Adults 15–49 Years)
involved in everything from “racketeering and organized prostitution,” to “forged letters of credit to conduct large scale financial fraud,” and “[heavy involvement] in the oil sector in Kazakhstan.”

Arms Trafficking

The development of networks for trafficking illicit goods, including weapons, have also been driven by organized crime. The collapse of the Soviet Union effectively flooded the former Soviet republics with small arms and weapons. Regional conflicts, particularly the civil war in Tajikistan and the Northern Alliance’s activities in Afghanistan, further fed the demand for arms trafficking. Although accurate estimates are scarce, an increasingly active drug trade in Central Asia is probably indicative of an active arms trade as well: “one can expect an increase in the flow of SALW [small arms and light weapons] used for security by traffickers or perhaps transshipped alongside drugs.” In Tajikistan, officials frequently find large caches of weapons, often accompanied by stashes of drugs, along border areas: “The continued existence of large-scale weapons caches and the illicit trafficking of SALW poses a threat to the security of Tajikistan, suggesting that various criminal and political groups continue to have access to large volumes of weapons.” Thefts from stockpiles of Soviet weapons in Kazakhstan “have been regularly reported,” although the “scope and the ultimate destination of the stolen SALW remain unclear.” Many of these weapons were probably funneled to “areas of ongoing or latent conflict, in either Afghanistan or the Caucasus, [however] significant numbers of weapons could have leaked to organized crime groups or terrorists.” The 2001 arrest of management personnel at the Kyrgyz ammunition-producing plant, the Bishkek Machine Building Plant…on corruption and misappropriation charges,” raised fears “that individuals within the Kyrgyz Republic have been able to sell or transship the SALW relatively freely.”

Human Trafficking

A number of characteristics combine to make Central Asia a haven for human trafficking networks. Contested national boundaries, porous borders, corruption, already established trafficking routes for drugs and a large population of agricultural workers who migrate regularly are some of the reasons most frequently cited by experts. The U.S. Department of State uses a three-tier system to categorize nations by their level of compliance with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. Tier 1 countries are in full compliance, Tier 2 countries are actively working toward full compliance and Tier 3 countries are neither in compliance, nor are they making efforts to be. Countries on the Tier 2 watch list either have a “significant” number of human trafficking victims, have not produced evidence of their compliance efforts, or have based their compliance efforts on “additional future steps over the next year.” In 2007, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were in Tier 2, Kazakhstan was on the Tier 2 Watch List and Uzbekistan was in Tier 3. Although Turkmenistan was excluded due to insufficient information, the report did note that there are currently “no laws prohibiting trafficking in persons” in Turkmenistan, nor does the government “publicly acknowledge trafficking as a problem” or “actively investigate cases of trafficking.” Reliable estimates on the number of people trafficked are difficult to come by because states tend to minimize the problem. Experts use a variety of indicators, such as “detections in country, returns/repatriations of nationals who claim to have been trafficked from other countries and those assisted by support agencies,” to approximate figures. Women trafficked for sexual exploitation often go to destination countries in Asia, the Middle East or Western Europe. Thailand, Russia, Israel, South Korea and the United Arab Emirates are some of the most common destinations. Current estimates show that there are approximately “2000 Kazakh women in the South Korean sex industry,” while Uzbek women “are the most common nationality of trafficked women detected in Israel.” The International Organization on Migration estimates that 4000 Kyrgyz women and girls are trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation per year, and an estimated 10% of these are minors. Trafficking for labor purposes is equally difficult to estimate, although it is believed to occur on a greater scale than trafficking for sexual purposes because “the majority takes place within the region, and the costs for transport and crossing borders are relatively affordable.” Labor trafficking occurs primarily between the relatively wealthy Kazakhstan and its poorer Central Asian neighbors, or between Central Asia and Russia. The International Organization on Migration estimates that, between 2000 and 2003,
roughly half a million migrant workers arrived, an estimated 10% of which had passports.\textsuperscript{51} Most victims of trafficking are lured by recruiters, often females, who “[promise] jobs as nannies, domestic workers, [or] positions in the hotel, catering and entertainment sectors.”\textsuperscript{52} Although many of these victims “lack the necessary knowledge to make well-informed migration and employment choices, the scale of impoverishment suggests that even if accurate information were to deter some, other slightly more desperate individuals would rapidly take their place. The combination of the sheer scale of numbers, dearth of options and inadequate information, combine to create a large group vulnerable to recruitment and exploitation by traffickers.”\textsuperscript{53}

\textit{The Emergence of a Shadow Economy}

The emergence of a shadow economy, such as those provided by trafficking in humans or illegal goods or weapons, can provide new manpower for criminal organizations: “it is a slippery slope to the illegal economy and the black market. Certainly, they [individuals participating in the informal economy] are a potential target for criminals seeking new recruits.”\textsuperscript{54} The so-called shadow economy is “outside the taxation system and therefore deprives the state of much-needed revenues that could contribute to the building of state capacity.”\textsuperscript{55} In turn, the lack of state funds and widespread poverty “[sparks] popular discontent and sometimes [makes] the state dependent on economic aid.”\textsuperscript{56} As shown in Table 1.1, both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have shadow economies which are approximately as large as their actual formal economies, representing a significant amount of power and influence that the state is not able to access.\textsuperscript{57}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Shadow Economy Size Relative to Official GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1: Central Asia’s Shadow Economy\textsuperscript{58}

The loss of potential government revenue, especially in a region as poor as Central Asia, means a lack of services which could save or improve lives in the region.

\textit{Corruption}

One of the most problematic results of criminalization in Central Asia is widespread corruption in political and official circles. Corruption of public officials is fueled by, and allows the continuation of, both organized crime and the Afghani opium trade along Central Asian trafficking routes. Judicial systems and security forces in Central Asian states are particularly vulnerable to corruption. Organized crime groups thrive in states where the judicial systems are “unable to detect and prosecute criminals and terrorists,” and since, “criminal and terrorist groups depend on unimpeded cross-border movement... border guards, customs officials and immigration personnel are notable targets of corruption.”\textsuperscript{59}

Profits from drug trafficking have “been shared generously with local law enforcement and other key actors throughout Central Asia.”\textsuperscript{60} Public officials from high-ranking political appointees to entry-level workers have been implicated in corruption scandals. For example, in 2000, the Tajik ambassador to Kazakhstan was arrested following an attempt to smuggle 63 grams of heroin.\textsuperscript{61} In 2002, a former Tajikistan Deputy Minister of Defense was found guilty of using a government helicopter to traffic in drugs.\textsuperscript{62} In December 2003, a Chief Prosecutor in Turkmenistan was arrested after her husband was caught with 15 kilograms of heroin.\textsuperscript{63} At lower levels of public service, corruption is used to augment a dismally low paycheck. Reportedly, “customs and other law enforcement officials in all five countries customarily pay some thousands of dollars in bribes just to get an entry-level job. Even though the salary is low, it is understood that they will earn back their investment in a short amount of time.”\textsuperscript{64} Corruption in law enforcement is widespread in Kyrgyzstan, where “most drug dens in the country are known to the law enforcement authorities and [and where] previously confiscated drugs are sold.”\textsuperscript{65} In 2000, Turkmenistan had the dubious distinction of becoming the first and only former Soviet country to have its loans from the World Bank halted.\textsuperscript{66} Even Uzbekistan, with its economic strength relative to the rest of Central Asia, has surprisingly high levels of corruption due,
in part, to “moves towards authoritarianism [which] make it difficult to determine corruption levels… since powerful officials are in a strong position to cover and threaten their way out of exposure.”

Because many government officials are complicitous in corruption and have a vested interest in minimizing their own involvement, corruption is a difficult problem to study. One index for measuring corruption comes from Transparency International, a non-governmental organization which uses a scale of 0 to 10 (0 being the most corrupt) to analyze corruption based on citizens’ perceptions of government. In 2007, all five Central Asian countries scored exceedingly low: Kazakhstan scored 2.1, Uzbekistan scored 1.7, Tajikistan scored 2.1, Turkmenistan scored 2.0, and Kyrgyzstan received a score of 2.1. As a reference point, the U.S. received a score of 7.2 out of 10. Additionally, all five Central Asian Countries were ranked 150th or worse, out of a total of 179 countries worldwide.

State Infiltration

According to some experts, corruption is so pervasive that criminal interests essentially own government institutions. This “state infiltration” connotes “not a passive taking of bribes to allow crime to occur, but the active facilitation of criminal enterprises by that institution or its leaders.” Corruption on this scale has huge costs for the state, including “a reduction in state building capacity, increased gaps between elites and publics, a loss of faith in government and the free market economy, the radicalization of political opposition, and the alienation of youth groups and political activists.” Numerous examples of corruption have emerged throughout the region and, “while this evidence is fractional, the similarities that exist make the trend clear: [there has been] an alarming increase of criminal infiltration of state authority, that has been exacerbated by the stagnation of political reform in the region.” Underlying the problem is a “rapid growth of organized crime, led by drug trafficking, in an environment of heavily weakened state authority due to the collapse of communist state structures, warfare or a combination of both.” Independence from the Soviet Union meant vast social restructuring, including programs of privatization in various Central Asian countries. Because this process was largely unregulated, it “enriched a small number of people, many of whom profited from the black economy [and then] proceeded to develop political ambitions.” Throughout Central Asia, many politicians have been connected to the drug trade, and vice versa, and use this influence in the underworld to gain political power. For example, Bayaman Erkinbayev, a man suspected of “being the leading drug kingpin of southern Kyrgyzstan,” was also a member of the Kyrgyz parliament. Erkinbayev, as well as other corrupt politicians, use their ill-gotten wealth to build social infrastructure and community projects in their hometowns, in turn gaining electoral support. The conflation of criminal and government interests occurs particularly in rural areas, where state rule is weak. In some cases, government leadership, such as the administration of former Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev, has been “known to use criminal leaders in order to connect with the periphery and threaten political rivals.” In these semi-lawless peripheral areas, government officials “relied on the help of criminal leaders to help them compete in politics” and “a balance of informal relations between state officials and criminal leaders was formed with both sides seeking co-operation when their interests converged.”

Criminalization and Implications for U.S. National Security

Although at first glance, the criminalization of Central Asia appears to have mostly humanitarian consequences, it also has significant implications for U.S. security interests. In recent years, the region has experienced a rise in Islamic extremism, a development which is deeply rooted in the endemic criminalization discussed above. Although Islam itself is by no means a new phenomenon in Central Asia, recent independence from the Soviet Union has led to an “Islamic revival” that is a “natural return to spiritual values following decades of Communist atheism.” At the same time, the suppression of religion that occurred under communism “implies a limited popular knowledge of the tenets of traditional Islam, which benefits a radical, unorthodox movement” and has led to a rise in Islamic extremism.

Broad societal problems, such as poverty, unemployment and corruption, that pervade Central Asia have contributed to a rise in extremism. The “poor economic performance by some Central Asian governments has denied them
[the governments] a high level of popular support among people who feel they lack opportunities for socioeconomic improvement.”

The combination of government corruption and oppression has also led to general frustration among the public. According to testimony before the House Committee on International Relations by The Brookings Institute’s Dr. Fiona Hill, “harsh government repression of dissent is as much, if not more of” a cause of extremism and regional instability “as radical Islam movements.” Groups like Hizbut-Tahrir (HT) “gained popular support in Central Asia not by denouncing the United States or Israel, but by distributing leaflets and holding meetings to address the range of post-Soviet social grievances in the region -including poverty, official corruption, the spread of drug addiction, prostitution and HIV/AIDS- and to criticize the governments’ failures to pursue reform.” Indeed, much of the criticism leveled against the U.S. involves the way the U.S. has “[embraced] the corrupt Uzbek government as an ally and [given] personal support to Uzbekistan’s President, Islam Karimov.” Because actual ethnic demographics do not follow the arbitrary Soviet-era national boundaries, movements like Hizb-ut-Tahrir have also found support along border regions in the Ferghana Valley, where “the substantial Uzbek minority feels its interests are inadequately promoted and protected by the local, as well as central, Kyrgyz and Tajik governments. HT is now viewed as the champion of social justice for many Uzbeks in these regions.”

The prevalence of poverty and corruption has created “disenfranchised, poor and alienated populations [that] provide an excellent recruiting pool for criminal organizations, insurgent groups, or fundamentalists intent on replacing the dominant secularism with a religious state. Criminal groups offer economic advancement and higher status; insurgents offer opportunities for political expression; and religious groups offer salvation and an alternative vision of political life.” Although they belong to ostensibly religious organizations, many recruits “are not necessarily in favor of the creation of an Islamic state, but are instead frustrated by their lack of opportunity and poor prospects for advancement under prevailing political and economic conditions;” membership in a radical organization is seen as a means of “pushing for a faster pace of reform.” In the face of such widespread oppression, protest movements, whatever their origin or impulse, will very likely garner widespread support, not necessarily because of their intrinsic appeal to populations but as a means of channeling broader political and economic dissatisfaction. Indeed, Central Asia has already witnessed the emergence of an Islamic insurgent movement fueled not only by support from elsewhere in the Islamic world but also by the alienation of populations that are politically oppressed and economically depressed.

This desire to express societal frustrations has contributed to the rise of extremist groups throughout the region.

**Extremist Groups in Central Asia**

Arguably the most well-known example of the rise of extremism in the region is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a group which is affiliated with, and has received funding from al-Qaeda. Despite the word ‘Uzbekistan’ in its title, the group operates throughout Central Asia. Its primary goal is the dissolution of Uzbekistan and the unifying of Central Asia under a single Islamic state. During the early 1990s, a political crackdown in Uzbekistan forced radical Muslims to flee to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, where they began networking with other Islamist groups and were involved in the Tajik civil war. The formation of the IMU was announced in 1996 and, from then until the Taliban ban on poppy cultivation in 2001, the IMU is believed to have controlled two thirds of the drug trade from Afghanistan to Kyrgyzstan. In 1999 and 2000, IMU guerrillas invaded Kyrgyzstan, “[seizing] hostages and several villages [and] allegedly seeking to create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan,” but were eventually driven out by Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Kazakh forces. In 2003, the IMU was linked to a plot to bomb the U.S. embassy in Kyrgyzstan and “since Operation Enduring Freedom, the IMU has been predominantly occupied with attacks on U.S. and Coalition soldiers in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Since 2000, the U.S. Department of State has designated the IMU as a foreign terrorist organization, calling it “a threat to the security of Uzbekistan and to the region.” Although much of the IMU’s leadership, including its leader Juma Namangani, were killed when they joined forces
with al-Qaeda and the Taliban during OEF, experts remain concerned about future terrorist attacks by the group. As recently as 2007, the U.S. Department of State warned Americans to forego nonessential trips to the region due to the possibility of a terrorist attack.\textsuperscript{53} The IMU’s continued presence is due in large part to “the underlying alienation of the population: the IMU benefits considerably because it is the most obviously available funnel for political, social, and economic dissatisfaction.”\textsuperscript{94}

Another regional terrorist organization is the Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan (IJG), an organization that is responsible for the “first use of suicide bombers in Central Asia.”\textsuperscript{95} Like the IMU, the Islamic Jihad Group supports the overthrow of Uzbekistan’s government. In 2004, IJU suicide bombers attacked the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Uzbekistan, as well as the Prosecutor General’s Office of Uzbekistan. These attacks, which coincided with the trial dates of individuals accused of bombing an Uzbek bazaar earlier that year, “were done in support of IJG’s Palestinian, Iraqi, and Afghan brothers in the global insurgency.”\textsuperscript{96} Thwarted plans to bomb the U.S. Ramstein airbase in Germany and various other U.S. and Uzbek interests during September 2007 have reportedly been linked to the IJG. The U.S. Department of State designated the IJG as a foreign terrorist organization in 2005.

The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is a “small” but “militant” terrorist organization “pursuing an independent Eastern Turkistan, an area that would include Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Western China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.”\textsuperscript{97} The ETIM has been designated as a terrorist group since 2002 and has received both “training and financial assistance” from al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{98} ETIM members fought with al-Qaeda and Taliban members in Afghanistan and in 2002, “two ETIM members were deported to China from Kyrgyzstan for plotting to attack the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan as well as other U.S. interests abroad.”\textsuperscript{99}

Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), a non-violent movement active in the Ferghana Valley and with a growing presence in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, wants to “infiltrate government and society from below,” and “its aim, much like the IMU’s, is the restoration of the caliphate.”\textsuperscript{100} Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s “decision not to use violence stems from a pragmatic policy, having learned from the experience of other Islamist groups… that the ‘peaceful’ overthrow of authoritarian or corrupt governments receives international commendation, whereas violence and coup attempts lead to imprisonment or worse.”\textsuperscript{101} HT is known for a savvy public relations campaign consisting of brochures, leaflets and websites and “members are urged to reach out to the liberal politicians and media, as well as pro-democracy and human rights” groups.\textsuperscript{102} The group has sparked debate in western countries. Though “democratization and human rights advocates” argue that its non-violent nature makes it a legal organization, opponents feel that “the party’s strongly anti-Semitic ideology, and its ambition to create a caliphate that is incompatible with democracy or modern nation-states, makes it inherently revolutionary and anti-constitutional.”\textsuperscript{103} Although the group currently espouses non-violent means of change, Hizb-ut-Tahrir “openly acknowledges that violence may eventually be necessary in order to overthrow the regimes standing in the way of the Caliphate…[Hizb-ut-Tahrir] cannot be called ‘non-violent;’ rather, its ideology suggests that it is not using violence yet but will do so when the time is right.”\textsuperscript{104} Following Operation Enduring Freedom, Hizb-ut-Tahrir vocally supported the use of suicide-bombers and jihad against the Jewish people and U.S. forces. For these reasons, Germany banned the group in 2002.\textsuperscript{105} Despite its non-violent methods, Central Asian governments have responded with repression and by jailing those who espouse views associated with Hizb-ut-Tahrir.\textsuperscript{106} Estimates concerning the group’s strength vary widely. It is believed to be strongest in Uzbekistan, where the number of members could range anywhere from 7,000 to 60,000, while neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan play host to an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 members.\textsuperscript{107}

**Terrorist Financing**

The criminalization phenomenon in Central Asia also serves as financial lifeblood for terrorist groups that badly need funding in a post-Cold War, post-9/11 world. The bipolar character of the Cold War allowed terrorist organizations and insurgent groups to play the reigning superpowers against each other in order to encourage monetary backing. During the Cold War, “simply being in
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opposition to a communist or non-communist regime” could garner “financial support from one of the superpowers or their proxies.”¹⁰⁸ The end of the Cold War, along with the aggressive pursuit of terrorist funding in the aftermath of 9/11, has put a huge financial burden on terrorist groups. Terrorist funding sources, including donations funneled from charities, money laundering and, with the invasion of Afghanistan as a demonstration of U.S. resolve, state-sponsored terrorism, were all drastically reduced. Paradoxically, “this crackdown on terrorist financing has led some terrorists to transform their organizations by creating ‘in-house’ criminal capabilities in order to generate revenue; these units then engage organized crime groups to meet financial and operational needs.”¹⁰⁹

In some ways, a connection between criminal rings and terrorist groups, especially those motivated by religious or political ideology, seems absurd: “The terrorist is fundamentally an altruist: he believes that he is serving a ‘good’ cause designed to achieve a greater good... The criminal, by comparison, serves no cause at all, just his own personal aggrandizement and material satiation.”¹¹⁰ However, this conflation is natural, given that “both organized crime and terrorist groups run in the same circles – they already operate outside of the law and they often need the same resources, including false identification, shipping documents, operators, transportation networks, and counter-surveillance techniques.”¹¹¹ Where cooperation between these once distinct entities occurs, it “is because there are gains available to both parties valuable enough to merit collaboration.”¹¹² For example, illicit trafficking networks can provide an important source of funding for groups, such as terrorist groups, that do not have access to many legal forms of income. In return, “a terrorist’s access to explosives may benefit a narcotic trading organization.”¹¹³ The two groups also share know-how, such as criminal groups’ “expert knowledge of methods and routes for illicit transfer of their shipments and transportation of narcotics, information that can be of use to terrorists for the relocation of goods and people.”¹¹⁴ Additionally, both criminal groups and terrorists share a common interest in “the need of non-exposure and... remaining undiscovered by the authorities.”¹¹⁵ In light of this shared goal, both criminal groups and terrorist groups tend to organize themselves using, “widespread cells, comprised of few individuals, that run day-to-day operations is common. The cell-structure also represents a shared concern by both entities to prioritize security, since the use of a cell structure significantly limits the information available to officials in the case of arrests, thus ensuring the survival of the organization.”¹¹⁶

One of the most lucrative enterprises for terrorist organizations, especially those in Central Asia, is drug trafficking: “narcotics remains the most common and most lucrative form of organized crime used by terrorist groups such as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), al-Qaeda, and Hezbollah.”¹¹⁷ According to the testimony of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency before the U.S. Senate, this phenomenon, called narco-terrorism, can “be characterized by the participation of groups or associated individuals in taxing, providing security for, or otherwise aiding or abetting drug trafficking endeavors in an effort to further, or fund, terrorist activities.”¹¹⁸ Experts estimate that the amount of money generated by the worldwide narcotics trade lies between $500 billion and $1.5 trillion.¹¹⁹ According to the UNODC, an estimated $2.3 billion “ends up in the hands organizations like al-Qaeda.”¹²⁰

The IMU is one such organization known for its reliance on funding from the drug trade. Prior to the fall of the Taliban, the IMU had a preeminent position in drug trafficking from Afghanistan through Central Asia: “Indeed, the IMU was singularly-well-placed to control the drug trade from Afghanistan to Central Asia: it had well-established links with the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the former Tajikistan opposition (now in government) which in turn had close links with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.”¹²¹ The IMU is one of the first organizations to be labeled by Interpol as a sort of “hybrid organization in which criminal interests often take priority over ‘political goals.’”¹²²

The U.S. Department of State points out another perceived benefit for using drug trafficking as a means of funding: “Some terrorists not only obtain operational funds through drugs, but also believe they can weaken their enemies by flooding their societies with addictive drugs...drug trafficking occupies a special position both in terms of profitability and as a perceived direct weapon used against the United States and certain other countries.”¹²³ Although connections to drugs may
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seem paradoxical to groups with either political or religious purposes, many terrorist organizations “use this argument to rationalize their involvement in illicit activity to their membership or base.”124

Nuclear Proliferation

Although nuclear proliferation is truly an “international scourge,” proliferation experts have particular reason to worry about the security of nuclear material in Central Asia: “these states have represented an abundant, often unsecured, and highly targeted source for traffickers.”125 With numerous Soviet nuclear weapons located within its borders, Kazakhstan has the distinction of having been born a nuclear state. However, Kazakhstan worked with the U.S. to destroy and dismantle nuclear weapons, missiles and silos: “On April 21, 1995, the last of about 1,040 nuclear warheads had been removed from SS-18 missiles and transferred to Russia, and Kazakhstan announced that it was nuclear weapons-free.”126 Despite this progress, Kazakhstan sits on vast amounts of uranium deposits and the Ulba Metallurgy Plant in the Kazak city of Kamenogorsk is “often alleged to be the source of uranium smuggled from the former Soviet republic.”127 In the 1990s, “Russians allegedly trafficked enriched uranium in lead pipes, stolen from a nuclear plant in Kazakhstan, to Mazar-e-Sharif, in northern Afghanistan.”128

However, even when illicit nuclear materials do not originate from facilities within Central Asia, its geographical proximity to countries with nuclear abilities and/or aspirations, notably Iran, Pakistan and India, combined with “weak law enforcement and porous borders,” make Central Asia ideal for traffickers.129 Such cases are difficult to document; however, “it can be expected that nuclear traffickers who obtain materials in the FSU [former Soviet Union] follow the oft-exploited narcotics trafficking routes, including the old silk roads, from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, into Afghanistan and Pakistan, and then potentially continue on to India, Iran or Southeast Asia.”130 A number of examples demonstrate the danger of existing trafficking networks, porous borders and corrupt border officials. During the 1990s, “Afghans illicitly transferred enriched uranium in small jars, along established smuggling routes through Turkmenistan and northern Afghanistan, and then into the Pakistani border city of Peshawar,” while other smugglers used “lead-lined backpacks” to transport uranium “from Tashkent, Uzbekistan, to Afghanistan, through a pass in the Pamir mountain range.”131 More recently in 2000, Kazak officials halted smugglers bringing uranium via Kazakhstan and Afghanistan and reportedly destined for Iran.132

Regional Instability

Although the end of Taliban rule in Afghanistan and the weakening of the IMU have increased prospects for stability in the region, political tensions and the potential for instability still exist. U.S. success in Operation Enduring Freedom is dependent on maintaining regional stability and cooperation with Afghanistan’s neighbors and continued “access to airspace and territory in the heart of Asia.”133 Increased criminalization in Central Asia threatens U.S. goals by contributing to instability and the insecurity of governments in the region, making them less open to both cooperation and reform.

The presence of vast criminal networks continues to undermine state stability in Central Asia by:

[eroding] statehood, and [complicating] both economic development and the building of legitimate ruling structures. Widespread corruption and mismanagement prevent reform and democratization, and as a result, inefficient government structures of questionable legitimacy often remain in power in the region. Corruption ensures resistance to press freedom and transparency, thereby furthering opacity and unaccountable governments. All this destroys popular trust in secular government and makes alternatives, including extremist movements more appealing.134

Corruption and criminalization also underlie economic and political inertia, which exacerbates the region’s instability.

The Tulip Revolution, a 2005 coup in Kyrgyzstan that stemmed from frustrations with political disenfranchisement, is a recent example of the possibility for instability that exists in Central Asia. Although national elections in February 2005 were
heralded as a chance for improved transparency and democracy in Kyrgyzstan, the election results were soon questioned by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and various other outside observers. Opposition candidates accounted for less than 10% of the available seats and the OSCE noted that “serious irregularities had taken place, including the questionable exclusion of several opposition candidates from running, biased state-controlled media and other heavy government use of administrative resources, and problematic voter lists.” The fact that close friends and family of both the president and prime minister were running for office also sparked criticism. When an opposition protest was “dispersed by police and armed Akayev supporters” on March 23, 2005, angry crowds swarmed official government buildings in Bishkek. As President Akayev fled, “the existing balance between the state and the criminal underworld was disturbed,” and widespread violence occurred as political and criminal figures grabbed for power. As a result, a number of political assassinations, many of which appeared to have drug trafficking connections, took place, including the September 2005 assassination of Bayaman Erkinbayev. The next Kyrgyz leader, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, as acting president has pledged to “combat corruption that siphons away investment capital and compromises the educational and legal systems.” Unfortunately, while the 2005 coup in Kyrgyzstan produced a change in leadership, it has not engendered noticeable improvements in the state itself. In 2004, the Kyrgyz government scored 2.2 out of 10 on Transparency International’s corruption index. As noted previously, the Kyrgyz government scored 2.1 in 2007. This score was based upon the citizen perceptions regarding government corruption, an underlying factor in the widespread dissatisfaction preceding the 2005 coup.

Although Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution has had relatively innocuous results, other Central Asian countries took note of the coup with unease: The coup in Kyrgyzstan appears to have belied the views of some who asserted that the relatively authoritarian regimes in Central Asia would endure for the foreseeable future. The coup has galvanized opposition throughout the region and caused palpable unease among regional elites...Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, for example, told his citizenry that the coup was the work of 5,000 convicts who had escaped from jail and were looting Kyrgyzstan.” Uzbekistan took similar steps, “strictly [censoring] news about the Kyrgyz coup, [restricting] public gatherings in regions near Kyrgyzstan, and [closing] the border.

Instability in the region could have potentially disastrous results. As the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Thomas Fingar, noted in his July 2007 congressional testimony, “there is no guarantee that elite and societal turmoil across Central Asia would stay within the confines of existing autocratic systems. In the worst, but not implausible case, central authority in one or more of these states could be challenged, leading to potential for increased terrorist and criminal activities.”

Dissatisfaction with political corruption and economic malaise in other Central Asian countries also carries the seeds of instability. For instance, protests in Uzbekistan, as illustrated by the 2005 Andijan Massacre, sparked harsh political repression. On May 13, 2005, Uzbek troops opened fire on a crowd protesting the jailing of 23 businessmen accused of being Islamic fundamentalists in the town of Andijan. Uzbek officials estimate that 187 people were killed in the incident, while “unofficial sources estimated the dead at nearly 800, most of them unarmed civilians.” Karimov’s administration blamed Islamic extremists for being behind the demonstration, but international observers reported that many of the “protesters appeared to have been motivated by economic and social grievances.” The Uzbek government has rejected international calls for reform and investigation into the incident. When the U.S. government repeatedly called for independent inquiry into the Andijan massacre, the Uzbek government responded by giving the U.S. six months to vacate the Karshi-Khanabad base, which the U.S. had been using for operations in Afghanistan. During the apparently “stage-managed” trials of Andijan protestors, the defendants all confessed that they were part of a coup attempt financed and supported by the U.S. and Kyrgyz governments, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the international media and various NGOs and human rights groups. Since 2005, “Uzbekistan has closed down over 200 NGOs, many of them U.S.-based
or U.S.-supported, on the grounds that they are involved in illegal activities,” further denying the Uzbek people contact with the outside world for assistance with basic needs and as an outlet for social grievances.146

An Overview of U.S. Policy Regarding Human Security in Central Asia

The U.S. government has made an effort to mitigate the human security problems in Central Asia. In 1992, the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) was passed in response to concern over the fate of Central Asia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Between 1992 and 2005, U.S. aid to Central Asia, both through FSA and other initiatives, “amounted to $3.8 billion, 13.6% of the amount budgeted to all the Eurasian states, reflecting the lesser priority given to these states prior to 9/11. Budgeted spending for FY 2002 for Central Asia, during OEF, was greatly boosted in absolute amounts ($584 million) and as a share of total aid to Eurasia (about one-quarter of such aid).”147 Later, the 1999 Silk Road Strategy Act “[called] for enhanced policy and aid to support conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.”148

Additionally, several successive presidential administrations have tried to elicit commitments to democratic reform from their Central Asian counterparts: “During Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President Clinton signed a Charter on Democratic Partnership recognizing Kazakhstan’s commitments to the rule of law, respect for human rights, and economic reform.”149 Nazarbayev made similar pledges during a 2001 visit to the U.S. and meeting with President George W. Bush. And in March 2002, “a U.S-Uzbek Strategic Partnership Declaration was signed pledging Uzbekistan to ‘intensify the democratic transformation’ and improve freedom of the press. During his December 2002 U.S. visit, Tajikistan’s President Rakhmanov pledged to ‘expand fundamental freedoms and human rights.’”150

The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent War on Terror catapulted Central Asia into the sphere of U.S. national security interests. The five Central Asian states have been crucial to U.S. operations in Afghanistan. All five countries allowed the overflight of U.S. forces and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan allowed coalition troops to operate from within their respective countries.151 Tajikistan allowed the U.S. to use the Dushanbe airport for refueling purposes. Kazakhstan has provided military engineers to Operation Iraqi Freedom and, although it did not send troops or personnel, Uzbekistan publicly endorsed U.S. operations in Iraq and, before the disagreement between the two countries regarding the Andijan massacre, Uzbekistan also allowed U.S. troops to use the Karshi-Khanabad base.152 Kyrgyzstan offered the use of the “Manas international airport for trans-shipping personnel, equipment, and supplies to support coalition operations in Afghanistan and the region.”153

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

Although the Central Asian states have been a valuable asset to U.S. operations in Afghanistan, this security relationship may also have proven detrimental to human rights. Many regional experts and human rights advocates warn that “the war on terrorism, and America’s embrace of states like Uzbekistan as allies in this effort, have provided further justification for eliminating political dissent and social protest, and for clamping down on unsanctioned forms of religious expression and observance.”154 Unfortunately, because “their geographical location has given them a role in the war in Afghanistan,” some of the more repressive Central Asian governments have been able “to continue their abuses with much less concern about international reactions... Their ‘utility’ has convinced many countries, including the United States, to turn a blind eye to their abuses.”155 Despite an increased U.S. presence in Central Asia following 9/11 and OEF, this has translated into little progress in political liberalization in the region. Various heads of state “have been able to withstand Western demands for liberalization and use the argument of anti-terrorism to maintain a strong hold on political power.”156 Paradoxically, unqualified U.S. support for those who cooperate in the War on Terror but continue to oppress their own citizens could fuel a rise of terrorism in the long run: “There is a danger that the international community, in its understandable eagerness to combat terrorism, will give the regions’ governments a free hand to
continue and expand repression of all groups that are viewed as political threats – a dynamic that will only boomerang and further destabilize the region over time.”

In Uzbekistan, President Karimov has “set the tone for political backsliding” across Central Asia. To many human rights advocates, “Tashkent’s decision to permit the deployment of U.S. troops on its territory for search-and-rescue and humanitarian operations was widely seen as an effort to obtain various concessions from the United States and its allies, including economic assistance, security guarantees, and reduced criticism of its poor human rights record.” U.S.-Uzbek relations have chilled substantially following the 2005 Andijan Massacre and the U.S. needs to maintain pressure on the Karimov regime to improve basic human rights: “Unqualified support for the Karimov regime that allows it to perpetrate repressive policies would buy short-term stability at a high price. It would involve a loss of legitimacy for the United States that, in turn, could intensify an impending legitimacy crisis for the Karimov regime.”

In a positive manner, Kazakhstan may prove to be the foil to Uzbekistan’s poor human rights record. Although the nation has been criticized for suppression of the press, it has made some strides in democratic reforms. Kazakh President Nazarbayev oversaw constitutional changes that included the limitation of presidential terms, requiring a court order for arrests, and the legislature’s ability to override presidential changes to bills. Although critics have called the changes “superficially reformist,” others “praise some of the changes as progressive if fully implemented.” During a 2007 visit to Kazakhstan, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher stated that “these constitutional amendments go in the right direction. The overall effect over the long term could be to strengthen political parties, strengthen the power of parliament.” Kazakhstan’s successful bid to chair the OSCE in 2010 is curious, considering that its most recent elections were deemed “progressive but still falling short of a free and fair” by OSCE standards. This development sparked criticism from NGOs and government watchdogs who feel that “to settle for a Chairman-in-Office – such as today’s Kazakhstan – that falls so far short of international norms in terms of respect for its own citizens’ basic rights and that flouts OSCE standards, would profoundly weaken the organization’s work in support of democratic governance across the region.” Since the question of Kazakhstan’s chairmanship is now moot, the U.S. should use this as an opportunity to promote reforms in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan appears to be making a bid for acceptance and legitimacy in the global community, and the U.S. can use this as diplomatic leverage to encourage reform. Furthermore, the differences in Uzbekistan’s and Kazakhstan’s approaches to human rights, and the way that these countries are treated by the U.S. and the international community, can provide an important example for the remaining Central Asian states.

In recent years, the U.S. has made attempts, albeit somewhat ambivalent ones, to link foreign assistance with human rights accomplishments. In 2003, congressional Omnibus Appropriations made FSA funds to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan contingent upon the Secretary of State’s assessment that progress was being made in the areas of human rights and democracy. The Secretary’s report that both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were making such progress in May 2003 and July 2003, respectively, sparked criticism in Congress and led to more specific stipulations on funding in 2004. Consolidated Appropriates for FY2004, FY2005 and FY2006 “[clarified] that the prohibition on aid to Uzbekistan pertained to the central government and that conditions included respecting human rights, establishing a ‘genuine’ multi-party system, and ensuring free and fair elections and freedom of expression and media,” but allowed the Secretary of State to waive these requirements on national security grounds. In 2004, the “State Department spokesman Richard Boucher announced that, despite some ‘encouraging progress’ in respecting human rights, up to $18 million in military and economic aid to Uzbekistan would be withheld because of ‘lack of progress on democratic reform and restrictions put on U.S. assistance partners on the ground.’” Ultimately, only $8.5 million was withheld and “notwithstanding authority was used for funding health care reforms, promoting better treatment of detainees, combating HIV/AIDS, combating trafficking in drugs and persons, and supporting World Trade Organization accession.”

From FY 2005 to FY 2007, the Secretary of State has reported that “that Kazakhstan had failed to significantly improve its human rights record, but that she had waived aid restrictions on national security grounds.” The U.S. should continue to press for human rights and democratic reforms in the Central Asian
republics. However, the current practice of waiving human rights-based criteria for funding on national security grounds sends a mixed signal to Central Asian regimes. U.S. strategy needs to “contain clear goals, criteria or benchmarks, and the will to incorporate human rights concerns at the political level.” Furthermore, the U.S. should consider “staggering” the disbursement of aid money “so that some funds would be linked to specific benchmarks. Thus, human rights criteria or benchmarks could be linked to future benefits.” This will most likely require a unique approach for each country, the intricacies of which are beyond the scope of this paper. For instance “Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are donor dependent” and in need of aid money, while Kazakhstan seeks “support for broader political aims,” making it potentially receptive to pressure for increased reforms.

With regard to the War on Terror, Central Asian governments often use a “brutal and blanket approach to clamping down on terrorist suspects” in which dissidents of all sorts are rounded up en masse, tortured and deprived of civil liberties. This approach only serves to make them sympathetic figures to an equally oppressed population:

Terrorism is frequently equated with ordinary political dissent and protest, with no real attempt to distinguish among observant Muslims or political moderates and those with more radical views or affiliations. Mass arrests in the thousands (often of people doing nothing more than handing out HT leaflets), harsh punishments, including the torture of suspected IMU and HT members and the active persecution of their families, have all been well-documented.

It is precisely these kinds of repressive actions that allow extremist groups to propagate. The IMU and the HT “found fertile ground for their development in Central Asia precisely because regional governments like Uzbekistan’s have drastically reduced the space for civic activism, leaving the population with few outlets for political expression and no organized alternative political structures.”

In the future, the United States needs to maintain the distinction between non-violent groups, such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and terrorist organizations, like the IMU, and it needs to encourage its Central Asian counterparts to do the same. While Hizb-ut-Tahrir does espouse radical messages, their members are often motivated by political, economic and societal frustrations, which may be ameliorated with dialogue and compromise. It is also possible that “[expanding the] political participation” and human security safeguards for non-violent dissident groups, such as HT, contingent upon abstention from violence and possibly even a repudiation of their extremist goals, could bring them “out of the shadows and into the political mainstream as well as to force them to participate in tackling social issues directly.” The success of such an approach is by no means assured; the U.S. will need to move cautiously, while carefully observing the fruits of its labor. What is certain, however, is that a terrorist “designation will become a self-fulfilling prophesy and only increase tensions in the region.”

It is equally important that the U.S. continue to provide visible humanitarian aid to the region in order to engender pro-U.S. sentiments. The U.S., particularly the U.S. Department of State, has already been active in mitigating the suffering caused by the human security problems mentioned above. For example, in 2003, the State Department sent an estimated $17 million worth of medicines and medical supplies to Tajikistan, which were distributed to hospitals and medical facilities throughout the country. The U.S. Department of State has directed U.S. aid money to “creating employment, supporting education, improving health care, and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises,” in an effort to “combat the attraction of extremist groups.” U.S.-supported microcredit institutions are working to improve economic opportunities in Uzbekistan and members are expected to number 40,000 in 2006. Continued assistance in this vein will bolster the U.S. image abroad, while decreasing the economic and societal frustrations that lead to instability, the appeal of extremist groups and the criminal activities mentioned above.

Drug trafficking routes through Central Asia contribute to the poverty and corruption in the region, and undermine state control, putting Central Asia at an increased risk for instability. Additionally, smuggling routes and corrupt officials in key positions can be exploited to move weapons or terrorists. With this in mind, improving border security and regional policing capability is a critical
The UNODC and, through it, the U.S., have also been actively involved in security sector reform in Central Asia. The U.S. is the single largest donor to the UNODC and, in 2005 alone, the U.S. donated $25 million to the UNODC, or “approximately 20 percent of all voluntary contributions received by UNODC.” To “enhance border security in the neighboring countries that often serve as transit points for drug traffickers” the U.S. Department of State allocated $9 million to Tajikistan and $2 million to Turkmenistan in FY2005. Working with the UNODC, the U.S. Department of State worked to “equip forensics labs and a police-dog training center,” and “started refurbishing border posts” in Tajikistan. UNODC funding has helped Tajikistan build its own Drug Control Agency. In Turkmenistan, the UNODC and the U.S. Department of State used funds to “properly equip a major border checkpoint and provide relevant training to border control personnel.” U.S. expertise in these areas has also been donated; in addition to the nearly $100 million that the U.S. spent on “counter-narcotics trafficking programs in Afghanistan and Central Asia, [an] army of U.S., international and local Central Asian officials and specialists have been tasked to fight this trade.”

Weak and/or corrupt police departments are another source of the longevity of the region’s drug trafficking problem. Central Asian law enforcement and security sectors are in need of drastic reforms and, to that end, the U.S. recently pledged a “$1.5 million aid package to finance police reform, aimed at rooting out corruption” in the Kyrgyz police forces. Since much of the low-level corruption taking place in these sectors is due to poverty, implementing greater financial incentives for tips that lead to the arrest of corrupt officials or individuals attempting to pass bribes may be beneficial. In many instances, corruption is so deeply ingrained that governments lack the political will to root it out. Strongly encouraging oversight, either by NGOs experienced in these matters, or by supranational bodies such as the UNODC, could rectify this situation. In some cases, this oversight may need to be tied to funding or security aid, so that complicit officials cannot ignore international calls for reform.

Enhanced regional cooperation should also be encouraged both for potential security and interdiction benefits, which will be discussed below, as well as for economic reasons. Despite these potential benefits, regional cooperation in Central Asia remains tenuous:

“In fifteen years of independence the states of the region have developed as closed political entities, often hostile to their neighbors. Borders have been sealed, and in the case of Uzbekistan, mined, while the transport infrastructure of the Soviet period has suffered severe disruption… The trend towards separation rather than integration has settled in, reinforced by competition for the same markets and for the attention of external players.”

The five Central Asian states are relatively weak and insecure and have little interest in losing autonomy in the name of cooperation before they are firmly in control of their own affairs. Consequently, it is imperative that the U.S. and the international community paint the concept of regional cooperation in terms of practical benefits to the Central Asian states, rather than “simply banging the drum for regional cooperation” as a “general principle.” By cooperating, the region has the potential to increase its economic growth and attract investors, something that could help alleviate the poverty that is at the root of so many of Central Asia’s human security problems. As two of the smaller countries in Central Asia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan stand to benefit the most, since their only viable chance to develop “lies in “access to the world outside.” Due to these potential benefits and their implications for sustained development in the future, “there is a need to balance open commerce with controls on smuggling” and other security concerns.

Some signs of hope do exist, however. A regional partnership between China, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan has agreed to set up a center for counterterrorism in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Although it has only met three times,
the Central Asian Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), a loose framework of the five Central Asian states designed to facilitate discussions on various issues of interest, is another indication of optimism in the area of regional cooperation. The U.S. government recently funded a $36 million bridge between Afghanistan and Tajikistan and, “when fully operational [it] is expected to transport more than 150 trucks or 1,000 cars daily. The bridge will enhance economic and commercial opportunities on both sides of the river, allowing goods and people to move across more easily.” More initiatives like this, which enhance the cooperation and commerce between Central Asia and Afghanistan, will benefit all parties involved.

**Recommendations for the U.S. Department of Defense**

Although many, if not most, solutions to Central Asia’s human security problems will fall under the purview of the U.S. Department of State, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), USAID and various international bodies like the UNODC, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) also has a role to play. Due to the importance of military basing and overflight in Central Asia, the DOD has a significant stake in human security issues there. While reforms in the health, human rights, political and economic sectors are desperately needed in Central Asia, improvements involving law enforcement, security and borders will be the most relevant to the DOD.

In conjunction with the U.S. Department of State, the DOD is attempting to fix the source of the opiates trade. Although a detailed account of U.S. operations within Afghanistan is beyond the scope of this paper, some general information about the U.S. role in curtailing the drug trade is relevant. The U.S. has implemented a five pillar plan, which includes promoting alternative livelihoods, poppy elimination and eradication, drug interdiction, reforming justice and law enforcement sectors in Afghanistan and disseminating public information “to convince the Afghan populace to reject poppy cultivation and trade.” The DOD is involved in all of these efforts, with the exception of promoting alternative livelihoods. In this capacity, the Department of Defense has carried out military operations against drug-related targets in Afghanistan, worked to “establish a public affairs capacity,” and supported various interdiction efforts.

Despite these efforts, the opiates trade in Central Asia lives on. One of the reasons for this is that precursor chemicals and materials needed for the manufacture of heroin are able to flow relatively easily into Afghanistan. The UNODC estimates that two thirds of Afghanistan’s opium is converted to heroin within Afghan borders. Drug production on this scale “[requires] the availability of an estimated 1,150 [tons] of acetic anhydride, as well as 12,500 [tons] of other chemicals such as acetone, ammonium chloride, ammonia solution, charcoal, hydrochloric acid and sodium carbonate… Large amounts of water and wood would also be necessary.” To combat the import, legal or illegal, of these materials, the UNODC has launched efforts to intercept precursor chemicals before they can be smuggled into Afghanistan, as well as screening the licit trade in these precursor chemicals. DOD interdiction efforts on both sides of the Afghan border should mirror this focus.

The UNODC has also recommended that mobile interdiction teams be established to respond to specific intelligence regarding regional drug trafficking. In addition to responding to specific intelligence from parent agencies in their respective countries, these mobile interdiction teams could “provide 24-hour road control (checkpoints) on a random basis both on the border perimeter roads and along roads leading off the border perimeter roads to the interior of their respective countries.” These units will need modern technology, such as satellite imagery, cameras and GPS, which the DOD both possesses and knows how to use. In Afghanistan, DOD personnel have been instrumental in giving border police the “small unit and tactical training [that] will enable the Border Police forces to operate as an effective team against potential foes.” The DOD is also active in funding, supplying and training National Interdiction Units as a part of drug interdiction efforts in Afghanistan and has provided “close air security support and some equipment…[and] is financing the refurbishment of an additional MI-8 helicopter.” Because the drug trafficking problem affects both sides of the Afghan border, it can also be addressed on both sides of the border; DOD efforts in Afghanistan would be beneficial if duplicated in neighboring Central Asian countries.
Regular Central Asian law enforcement personnel can also benefit from the training and expertise of their U.S. allies. Increased interactions with U.S. agencies such as DOD or DEA, which can impart expertise about “intelligence-led policing tools such as strategic criminal intelligence analysis (risk assessments, profiling, etc), basic/advanced telephone analysis and informant handling,” border checkpoints and securing information sent electronically to field units will improve their interdiction ability. Again, the DOD has experience with similar matters in Afghanistan. Currently, the DOD is aiding Afghan law enforcement by “providing a communications system…that will extend from the command to the tactical level” and “training on the use of the radios and some instruction on minor repair.” Expanding these efforts to law enforcement in Central Asian countries will be beneficial and are well within the DOD’s area of expertise.

Increased regional cooperation between the Central Asian states and with neighboring Afghanistan would also assist in interdicting criminal and trafficking groups and help the region attain long-term and sustainable prosperity: “Afghanistan’s strategic and central location makes it the essential fulcrum for seeking closer cooperation and expanding trade throughout the region. The drug trade demonstrates in the negative the potential of the country to serve as a land bridge connecting its surrounding regions.” Building closer relations between the five Central Asian states and Afghanistan regarding matters of border security and law enforcement and, eventually about commerce and economic issues, should be a priority for the U.S. and international bodies alike. Because of its role in Afghanistan, the DOD and the U.S. military are uniquely positioned to facilitate this cooperation. Central Asian law enforcement agencies would benefit greatly from learning how to work together on shared problems:

It is evident that Central Asian law enforcement agencies need increased assistance in communication, analysis and exchange of operational information on cross-border crime, as well as in organization and the coordination of joint operations. Assistance provided in those areas should largely improve the efficient activity of and cooperation among competent authorities in the region in preventing and combating trans-border drug-trafficking and international drug related crime.

Due to the opiate trade stemming from Afghanistan, collaboration with Afghan officials is also needed. One possibility is to establish liaison locations in “identified high-risk areas, not only on the Afghan border but at key internal Central Asian border crossings and potentially at the Central Asian borders with China and Iran.” At these locations, law enforcement and intelligence personnel would be able to share information, strategies and experience with the hope that increased law enforcement personnel at high-risk locations would lead to greater interdiction levels. This closely parallels a strategy adopted by the DOD in Afghanistan which involves the development of Intelligence Fusion Centers to “improve the flow of information between intelligence and law enforcement organizations.” Once again, DOD experience and ideas that originated in Afghanistan also have merit when placed in a broader Central Asian context.

Although it was not always an area of strategic importance to the United States, Central Asia has rapidly gained significance in the post-9/11 world. Geographically situated at a crossroads between continents, Central Asia’s potential for growth and progress has been stunted by the deep societal problems associated with criminalization. Increased criminalization has opened a veritable Pandora’s Box of problems for the region, including trafficking in humans, weapons and drugs, corruption, political repression and extreme poverty. These issues have the potential to create instability and extremism and, due to the region’s strategic importance, it is in U.S. interest to mitigate these problems by encouraging human rights and democratic reforms, fostering regional cooperation and strengthening border security. Although many solutions to Central Asia’s human security problems will be the responsibility of the U.S. Department of State, DEA, USAID and various international bodies, the U.S. Department of Defense also has a role to play. Specifically, the DOD should emphasize the apprehension of precursor chemicals in its drug interdiction efforts and encourage regional cooperation between the five Central Asian republics and Afghanistan through training and establishing liaison locations along borders. The DOD should also duplicate its efforts to improve Afghanistan’s law enforcement.
and border police, both in terms of training and equipment, in Central Asia so that transnational problems can be tackled effectively throughout the region.

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**Responding to Genocide in the 21st Century:**
Lessons from Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Sudan

**Abstract:**
This paper uses case studies to analyze U.S. genocide policies during the genocides of Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Sudan. It provides a policy analysis of the U.S.’s responses to these genocides in terms of military involvement, diplomatic actions, humanitarian support, and multilateral commitments. Major findings of this study are that the U.S. has no overarching genocide policy or doctrine outside of the 1948 UN Genocide Convention; the U.S. tends to avoid preventative action and prefers post-conflict humanitarian and judicial leadership opportunities; and the U.S. is very reluctant to commit troops to areas where genocide is taking place. Recommendations are that the U.S. should develop improved genocide prevention capabilities (i.e. utilizing anthropologists, social scientists, and linguists to provide the socio-cultural understanding necessary to respond effectively); the U.S. should provide assistance to partners and allies to build up regional capabilities for timely genocide response in the future that would distribute responsibility and not place as high of a burden on the U.S. for resources; genocide prevention and response need to be human security priorities for U.S. policymakers if real positive change and improvements are to be made; and the U.S. should develop an updated genocide doctrine based off of the 1948 UN Genocide Convention that would provide guidance for appropriate action in the instance of genocide.

**Introduction**
Despite the “never again” pledge following the Holocaust of World War II, genocide continues to be a major human security concern for the United States and the international community. As the multiple cases of genocide in the 20th Century and the ongoing conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan have shown, genocide is still used by political leaders to achieve nationalistic goals. The United States, as the prominent superpower, a signatory of the 1948 UN Genocide Convention, and a leading advocate of human rights, will likely be called upon to take action to address cases of genocide in the future, as it has in the past. These can include military, diplomatic, economic, and informational action. This study will analyze the past genocide policies the U.S. employed in response to the genocides in Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Sudan. These cases demonstrate that the U.S. tends to avoid preventative action and prefers post-conflict humanitarian and judicial leadership opportunities and it is very reluctant to commit troops to areas where genocide is taking place. More importantly, this study reveals that the U.S. currently lacks an overarching genocide policy or doctrine, outside of the Genocide Convention, which hinders the U.S.’s ability to respond to genocides effectively.

**Genocide Defined**

*Background of the Term*
According to Adam LeBor (2006), “[G]enocide is now often defined as the organized extermination of a nation, people, or ethnic group.” However, future leaders and policymakers of the United States need to understand the definition and application

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of the term *genocide* before real improvements in policy responses are made. As noted by Adam LeBor (2006), genocide is not a modern crime, but it is a modern term.² Rafael Lemkin, a Polish Lawyer, invented the word *genocide* from *genos*, Greek for people or race and Latin *caedere*, to cut or kill in 1944.³ Lemkin in the 1930s lobbying the League of Nations to pass international laws “against the destruction of a people and its culture” after studying the Armenian and Assyrian massacres of the Ottoman Empire during WWI and writing a legal essay proposing that crimes of “Barbarity” be a violation of international law.⁴ Continuing his work on this concept, in 1944 Lemkin published *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress*, which analyzed Nazi occupation and violations of law. This was the first piece of work to contain the word “genocide.”⁵ Lemkin defined genocide as a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be the disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.⁶

**Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC)**

In the wake of the Holocaust, there was a call from members of the international community to take the initial steps in addressing the crime of genocide and prevent its occurrence in the future “never again.”⁷ They wanted to create a “new world order based on international law and respect for individuals’ rights and dignity.”⁸ In 1948, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly drafted and approved the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide for ratification by member nations and it came into effect in January 1951. The UNGC, an internationally recognized definition of genocide, is based on Lemkin’s writings⁹ and establishes, as per Article I of the Convention, that “[t]he Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.”¹⁰ President Truman first presented legislation for joining the UNGC to the senate in 1949. However, not until 1988, under President Reagan, did the United States officially become party to the UNGC, with reservations, alongside 97 other members. Specifically, the United States opposed the terms of Article IX of the UNGC which state,

Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application, or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide of for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.¹¹

As a result, the U.S. added this reservation to Article IX,

That with reference to Article IX of the Convention, before any dispute to which the United States is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under this article, the specific consent of the United States is required in each case.¹²

Nevertheless, as noted by President Reagan, the ratification of the UNGC “represent[ed] a strong and clear statement by the United States that it will punish acts of genocide with the force of law and the righteousness of justice.”¹³

**Internationally Recognized Definition of Genocide**

In accordance with Article II of the Convention, genocide is defined as any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:

- Killing members of the group;
- Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

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• Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.\textsuperscript{14}

Additionally, the following acts are punishable under Article III of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:

• Genocide;
• Conspiracy to commit genocide;
• Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
• Attempt to commit genocide;
• Complicity in genocide.\textsuperscript{15}

\textit{Ethnic Cleansing}

“Ethnic cleansing” is a term often associated with genocide. However, it is important to note their differences for the purpose of this study. According to Andrew Bell-Fialkoff (1993), on the one hand, ethnic cleansing “is virtually indistinguishable from forced emigration and population exchange while at the other it merges with deportation and genocide.”\textsuperscript{16} At the most basic level, it is understood to be “the expulsion of an ‘undesirable’ population from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic, or ideological considerations, or a combination of these.”\textsuperscript{17} The primary difference between ethnic cleansing and genocide is the intent of the perpetrator. Unlike genocide, which seeks the destruction of a particular ethnic, racial, or religious group, the primary purpose of ethnic cleansing is to establish ethnically homogenous areas, which can be secured through a variety of means including genocide.\textsuperscript{18} “Whereas ethnic cleansing aims to force the flight of a particular group, genocide targets the group for physical destruction.”\textsuperscript{19} However, as declared by the UN General Assembly in 1992, ethnic cleansing is also a “form of genocide,” and therefore, both are interconnected terms.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Case Studies}

\textit{Cambodia}

\textit{Summary}

During the genocide in Cambodia, the United States determined that military intervention was unrealistic. The U.S. instead turned toward public diplomacy, humanitarian assistance to refugees, and post-genocide justice initiatives. Because the United States was not a party to the Genocide Convention, it was not obligated to act on Cambodia’s behalf. Sovereignty was a top concern for the U.S. and the international system. The U.S. lobbied throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s for a UN tribunal to try those accused of genocide and crimes against humanity. Although the U.S. practiced a policy of relative inaction during the Cambodian genocide, it attempted to make up for this in judicial efforts later on.

\textit{Pre-Genocide: U.S. Policy during the Nixon Administration}

As noted by Lemkin, war and genocide are almost always intertwined.\textsuperscript{21} Cambodia experienced two wars (the Vietnam War and a civil war) before suffering its genocide.\textsuperscript{22} During the Vietnam War Cambodia tried to stay neutral despite warring Indochina. However, the North Vietnamese (NVA) and the Vietcong (VC) regularly used Cambodian territory that shared a border with South Vietnam to hide, supply, and train their troops during the 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{23} This action caused newly-elected President Nixon, who was still fearful of the domino effect on Indochina, to extend the war into Cambodia, despite vowing to end the war in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{24} As a result, President Nixon took a more aggressive policy approach to the NVA and VC taking sanctuary in Cambodia and authorized the first B-52 raids on Cambodian soil.\textsuperscript{25} When the bombers were unable to locate the Communist bases, Nixon expanded the mission further.\textsuperscript{26} In all, during the fourteen month first phase of the bombing campaign, U.S. bombers flew 3,875 sorties over Cambodia.\textsuperscript{27} In 1970, President Nixon authorized an “incursion” into Cambodia ostensibly to “prevent the Communists there from staging ‘massive attacks’ on U.S. troops in Vietnam.”\textsuperscript{28} This incursion involved more than 30,000 U.S. troops and almost 50,000 South Vietnamese forces.\textsuperscript{29} As Nixon warned, “If, when the chips are down, the world’s most powerful nation—the United States of America—acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world.”\textsuperscript{30} A month before the ground attack, the U.S. had “welcomed a coup by the pro-American prime minister, Lon Nol, against Cambodia’s longtime ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk.”\textsuperscript{31} The Nixon Administration was “insistent on building up Lon
Nol."32 Despite the corruption and incompetence33 of his regime, the new Khmer Republic received material assistance from the U.S. for its armed forces to help battle the radical, agrarian, Maoist communist rebels, the Khmer Rouge, the North Vietnamese, and the Vietcong.34 On 17 April 1975, after five years of civil war, the Khmer Rouge took over Cambodian capital Phnom Penh and declared victory over Lon Nol's Khmer Republic.35

Genocide

The overthrow of Lon Nol's regime was met with celebration by many Cambodians. As a result, there was a strong desire to purge the former Cambodia from the new.36 The Khmer Rouge, under the leadership of Pol Pot, emptied urban areas and forced all Cambodians into rural life. Cambodians were to be rid of class distinctions, cities, property, money, traditional loyalties, and contact with the rest of the world.37 The Khmer Rouge employed a policy of systematic murder to achieve its goals and to destroy anyone who posed a threat—real or imagined to it.38 Although government soldiers, civil servants, and the intelligentsia were killed because they threatened Khmer Rouge power, Pol Pot targeted distinct groups: Buddhist monks, the Muslim Cham, Buddhists, Vietnamese minorities, ethnic Chinese, and the Eastern Khmer population.39 Under a system of slave labor, starvation, and murder, the Cambodian genocide left roughly 1.5 million dead.40 However, it was difficult for the UNGC to classify these atrocities as genocide because it was set up to apply to regimes that were not killing their own populations.41

U.S. Policies during the Ford Administration

The United States government was oblivious to much of what was going on in Cambodia during this time. Not only was Cambodia not a primary focus for the U.S. as it tried to distance itself from Indochina, but also the Khmer Rouge expelled foreigners from the country, leaving the U.S. with very few intelligence sources.44 Nevertheless, after the fall of Phnom Penh, Secretary of State Kissinger reported to the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations that the administration expected the Communists to “eliminate all possible opponents.”45 In 1975, the Ford administration condemned the violence and President Ford said publicly that there was “factual evidence of the bloodbath that is in the process of taking place.”46 However, the administration had little credibility and the American public learned to “dismiss what it deemed official rumor-mongering and anti-Communist propaganda.” It would not be for another two years before the public realized that the “bloodbath reports” were true this time.47 During this time, the U.S. government under Ford rarely commented on Cambodia except to discuss the general refugee problem in Indochina because the government still lacked hard evidence of the atrocities, despite media coverage.48 In response to the communist takeovers in Cambodia and Vietnam, the policy of the Ford administration, which was deeply anti-communist and continued to support Lon Nol, was to impose economic embargoes against them.50 President Ford did not have a particular interest or commitment to human rights issues and Congress did not raise them with the administration for the most part.51

U.S. Policies during the Carter Administration

The Carter administration broke with his predecessors and pursued policies focused on human rights. President Carter wanted to break with the past by “bringing the conduct of foreign affairs into line with America’s traditional political values and ideals, thus revitalizing American foreign policy and its overseas image.”52 He wanted to do everything he could to turn away from the containment policy, which he believed could be replaced with moral imperatives.53 As a result, human rights issues became the focus and catalyst of President Carter’s foreign policy as he sought to renew faith in American values.54 He said, “I want our country to set a standard of morality. I
feel very deeply that when people are deprived of basic human rights that the President of the United States ought to have a right to express displeasure and do something about it. I want our country to be the focal point for deep concern about human beings all over the world."55 As part of this new U.S. foreign policy, humane purposes became the focus, not an obsession with the Cold War.56 President Carter realized that the United States could “no longer separate the traditional issues of war and peace from the new global questions of justice, equity, and human rights” and wanted a “new world” with “revitalized, optimistic, and value-oriented leadership.”57

Congress was also affected by President Carter’s human rights agenda. For instance, it passed “legislation requiring the government to consider human rights conditions before providing aid and allowing the withholding of American economic and military aid to nations labeled as human rights violators.”58 In the mid-1970s, Congress revised versions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 and the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, passed during Ford administration that allowed the president to ban aid to a government “which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”59 Additionally, a later revision of the International Development and Food Assistance Act let U.S. representatives at development banks to oppose loans for nations violating human rights.60 Unfortunately, this legislation could not be successfully applied to the Khmer Rouge because it had not asked for or been offered military or economic assistance from the United States, and it did not look to international development banks for loans.61 Congress did take the first steps to address the crisis in Cambodia after refugees who fled to Thailand began to share their stories. But, since the U.S. held no diplomatic ties with Cambodia, the United States had very little leverage on the regime.62

It was very difficult for the Carter administration to develop a policy response because of the inability to get complete information on the situation in Cambodia due to its self-imposed isolation from the outside world.63 Although President Carter was deeply concerned about the situation in Cambodia, the administration had very few policy options and no Cambodian officials were allowed to meet with Americans.64 President Carter took the first steps in March 1978 when he requested an investigation of human rights abuses in Cambodia by UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC).65 On 21 April 1978, President Carter released his first formal statement addressing the developments in Cambodia and describing the Pol Pot regime as the “worst violator of human rights in the world today.”66 The UN report confirmed the refugee reports of atrocities, but it did not act quickly or decisively enough against the Khmer Rouge. The delayed action allowed the Khmer Rouge to defend itself against the accusations and brush them off as “American propaganda.”67 In March 1979, the subcommission assigned to the case reported to the UNHRC in Geneva that the actions by the Khmer Rouge “constituted nothing less than genocide.”68 Unfortunately, this evaluation came two months after the 1979 Vietnamese invasion and overthrow of the Pol Pot regime.

The Carter administration reduced the importance of human rights in Cambodia in favor of a Sino-American relationship that would help the U.S. counter the Soviet Union.69 The idea was to use China to pressure the Pol Pot regime, but after the Vietnamese invasion, the U.S. did not feel that intervention was a viable option despite human rights abuses.70 In fact, the U.S. called for all foreign troops to be withdrawn from Cambodia to “oppose Vietnam’s actions in the name of peace.”71 According to a statement by Congressman Stephen Solarz, “while the desirability of a simultaneous withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia and China from Vietnam is virtually self apparent, the need to prevent the restoration of the Pol Pot regime seems to have been overlooked by the Administration. What concerns us, Mr. President, is that the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces... would result in the re-establishment of the genocidal Pol Pot regime... thereby... guaranteeing the continued suffering of the Khmer people.”72 After the invasion of Cambodia by China, President Carter delivered a foreign policy speech saying, “We will not get involved in a conflict between Asian Communist states. Our national interests are not directly threatened, although we are concerned about the wider implications of what has been happening. We have been using whatever diplomatic means available to encourage restraint on all parties.... While our influence is limited only because our involvement is limited, we remain the one great power in the world that can have direct and frank discussions with all the parties.
However, the necessity of the China card kept the U.S. from pursuing any real effort at "frank discussions" with the Chinese. Instead the Carter administration focused its efforts on helping Cambodian refugees.

**Carter’s Post Conflict Policy**

In the aftermath of the Cambodian crisis, the post-conflict policy of the United States focused on the humanitarian crisis. The administration changed the U.S. immigration policy to allow an additional 15,000 Indochinese refugees to enter the country and in 1978 the U.S. agreed to accept an additional 25,000 refugees from the region each year. The United States also demonstrated its commitment to human rights by providing food and other supplies to Cambodians struggling in their homeland. However, those most in need of assistance were the Khmer Rouge rebels. This assistance was rationalized by the idea that giving assistance to the Khmer Rouge would help them fight the Vietnamese occupiers. In the end, 20-40,000 Pol Pot guerillas benefited from this policy. As Carter’s tenure came to an end, the last significant policy toward Cambodia was to vote in favor of granting the ousted Khmer Rouge regime a seat at the UN.

**U.S. Policies during the Clinton Administration**

Under the Clinton administration, the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act was passed in 1994 after extensive lobbying by the Campaign to Oppose the Return of the Khmer Rouge. The Act outlined US commitment, consistent with international law, “to bring to justice members of the Khmer Rouge for their crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia between April 17, 1975 and January 7, 1979.” It called for the United States to “assist appropriate organizations and individuals to collect relevant data on crimes of genocide committed in Cambodia” and “to encourage the establishment of a national or international criminal tribunal for the prosecution of those accused of genocide in Cambodia.” President Clinton responded to developments in Cambodia on 8 April 1998 by ordering the State, Defense, and Justice Departments to develop contingency plans for the arrest and trial of Pol Pot. However, he was released by Thailand and died on 15 April 1998. President Clinton said, “Although the opportunity to hold Pol Pot accountable for his monstrous crimes appears to have passed, senior Khmer Rouge, who exercised leadership from 1975 to 1979, are still at large and share responsibility for the monstrous human rights abuses committed during this period. We must not permit the death of the most notorious of the Khmer Rouge leaders to deter us from the equally important task of bringing these others to justice.”

**Bosnia**

**Summary**

During the Yugoslav conflict, there was a strong reluctance by President Bush (who had just wrapped up Desert Storm) and President Clinton to intervene in the Balkans and especially to commit troops. The U.S. preferred to let its European allies take the lead, but did support targeted NATO airstrikes against Serbian forces. The United States instead opted to take a more central role in the post-genocide peace process through the brokering of the Dayton Accords and its support for the establishment of the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

**Genocide**

In the Balkans, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and subsequent war in 1991, coupled with the economic instability of the 1980s, the rise of nationalistic leaders, and the exploitation of historical traumas, set the backdrop for the genocide that was to follow. Despite the fact that the United States granted diplomatic recognition to a newly independent Bosnia in hopes of bringing stabilization, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic continued to employ extreme nationalism to consolidate his power. He portrayed the Serbs as a great oppressed people and developed a policy that systematically set out to rid the territory of non-Serbs (i.e. Muslims) by any means necessary, such as rape, torture, deportation, murder, etc. a practice called etničo čišćenje, or “ethnic cleansing” which falls under Article II of the Genocide Convention. According to a 1995 CIA report, “Serbian authorities made use of concentration camps as tools for their campaign of genocide against Bosnian Muslims. The creation of Greater Serbia required that Muslim civilians be taken from their homes, brought to concentration camps, terrorized, and killed.” Of particular note...
is the Srebrenica genocide, in which 8,000 men and boys were “cleansed” from the “safe area,” to the horror of the international community and the 220 UN troops assigned to defend it.89

U.S. Policy during the George H. W. Bush Administration

During the first Bush administration, there was a general consensus for the U.S. to stay out of the Balkan issues and defer to Europe.90 However, Ambassador Warren Zimmerman was recalled from his position in Belgrade in an act to show displeasure for the Milosevic regime.91 Despite President Bush’s personal revulsion to the Balkan conflict, he considered them out of scope of American interest. He said, “I don’t think anybody suggests that if there is a hiccup here or there or a conflict here or there that the United States is going to send troops.”92 Instead, the United States decided to put pressure on the UN to take action. In 1992, the UN Security Council voted 13-0 to establish a trade embargo against Yugoslavia. President Bush was particularly concerned about the limited food and medical supplies resulting from the summer conflict, and pushed the UN to explore the use of force to ensure safe delivery of humanitarian aid.93 During his reelection campaign, President Bush was criticized by Bill Clinton for not taking a tougher stand against Milosevic and President Bush called on the U.S. to provide the UN with the needed assistance to stop the atrocities, including the use of military force.94 As a result, President Bush publicly denounced the concentration camps that were being broadcast on the news and called for international observers to be granted immediate access to them. The Serbs shut down some of these camps.95 Throughout this time, the Bush Administration tried very hard to avoid using the “G” word, or “genocide,” despite growing pressure from the media, NGOs, Congress, the UN General Assembly, and others closely involved in Bosnian policy.96 The Bush administration submitted evidence of war crimes and atrocities to the UN War Crimes Commission. Before President Bush left office, the U.S. voted with 101 other nations in support of the UN General Assembly Resolution that equated “ethnic cleansing” with genocide.97 As President Bush left office, he supported humanitarian relief, but continued to oppose sending U.S. troops.

The Bush administration’s aversion to the use of military force as a viable option for U.S. policy in the Balkans can normally best be explained by Vietnam Syndrome and exhaustion from fighting the first Gulf War. In 1992, President Bush said, “I don’t care what the political pressures are. Before one soldier is committed to battle, I’m going to know how that person gets out of there. And we are not going to get bogged down in some guerilla warfare. We lived through that once.”98 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, was weary of committing troops without well-defined objectives, use of overwhelming force, and a clear exit strategy. He saw Bosnia as a manifestation of ancient ethnic hatreds and this mission did not meet his criteria for U.S. intervention.99

U.S. Policy during the Clinton Administration

President Clinton began his presidency with tough talk and a need for action in the Balkans. However, President Clinton was a domestically-oriented president and his primary focus was not foreign policy when he entered the White House. As a plurality president, he feared potentially costly foreign policy issues that could weaken him politically and compromise efforts domestically.100 President Clinton devised a “lift and strike” plan to deal with the Bosnian conflict. This plan involved air power and a moderate arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia, with Bosnia being exempt.101 NATO would strike Serb positions and provide cover to the Bosnians while they rearmed and trained.102 Europe, however, did not like this plan for fear of endangering their and UN troops. Many Europeans thought that arming the Bosnians would only lengthen a war that the Bosnians were sure to lose.103 The European reservations caused the U.S. to back away from the plan.

It is reported that after reading Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts, President Clinton saw the conflict in the Balkans differently. The administration moved from describing Bosnia as pivotal challenge to America’s “ability to nurture democracy in the post-cold war world” to labeling it with phrases like “an intractable problem from hell that no one can be expected to solve... less as a moral tragedy... and more as a tribal feud that no outsider could hope to settle.”104 As a result, Bosnia became seen as a humanitarian problem and not of particular
U.S. interest or involvement. Bosnia policy basically disappeared beyond the general position of noninvolvement.

However, after the 1994 siege on Sarajevo which was covered heavily by the media, NATO was pushed to issue an ultimatum to the Serbs to prompt them to move their heavy weapons and artillery out of Sarajevo’s range within 10 days or NATO would lead air strikes.105 In response, the Serbs moved their equipment and began shelling the “safe zone” Gorazde, detained UN peacekeepers, and fired on NATO aircraft trying to protect the no-fly zone.106 On 11 April 1994, NATO undertook for the first time an air-to-ground attack mission to prevent Gorazde’s destruction.107 The NATO ultimatum made some diplomatic progress, and in June 1994 in exchange for European support of military action, the United States agreed to a plan that would split Bosnian territory into two parts, where 51 percent would go to the Muslim-Croat federation and Serbia would get the other 49 percent.108 This plan was very different from the United States’ previous stance supporting Bosnia’s territorial integrity and wanting to avoid settling the conflict in ways like the Vance-Owen peace plan.109 Later that year, the U.S. stopped enforcing the Adriatic embargo and supported the UN General Assembly resolution that called for an end to the embargo.110

The UN Security Council set up safe areas on 6 May 1993 by in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde to give refuge to Bosnian Muslims.111 That same month, the U.S., along with France, England, Russia, and Spain, sponsored a Joint Action Program that promised protection for the six designated safe havens.112 The Security Council provided 220 troops for UNPROFOR to defend Srebrenica and 50 military observers to protect civilians in other areas.113 However, despite a modest international presence, 8,000 men and boys were “cleansed” from Srebrenica by Serbs, which was the bloodiest episode in the Yugoslav war and the worst mass killing in Europe since WWII.114 When Gorazde was threatened with the same fate as Srebrenica, U.S. outrage and resolve increased. The Clinton policy came under attack by members of Congress, and Republican legislators drafted the Bosnia Self-Defense Bill, which threatened to force the government to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally.115 However, Europeans threatened to remove their UNPROFOR troops if the U.S. gave up the embargo because they felt that flooding Bosnia with more arms would only intensify the fighting there and put personnel at risk.116 Additionally, under those circumstances, Clinton would have to honor the commitment to NATO to support evacuations, which would involve 25,000 U.S. military personnel in an overall force of 60,000.117 This would signal defeat, abandonment of Bosnia, and the humanitarian presence would be removed from the war torn area.118 The Clinton administration, therefore, needed to find a way to avoid “disastrous UN withdrawal,” which in effect meant increased U.S. involvement.119 “Determined to keep U.S. troops out of an active Bosnian war zone, the administration needed UNPROFOR and its European contingents to stay put. This required a fully intact arms embargo. The administration knew that they could not fend off the Republican Congress indefinitely. The optimum solution was an end to the war. With mounting pressure at home and abroad, the administration suddenly gave Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke “real authority to act in the name of the United States’ and energized its negotiating efforts.”120

On 4 August 1995, Croatia launched a massive successful military offensive with rebuilt, resupplied, and retrained forces (along with some U.S.-funded personnel from MPRI, a private military company in the U.S.).121 “These results deflated at least momentarily the powerful notions of a supposedly undomitable Serbian juggernaut and the related Vietnam analogies that had helped the West, and particularly the United States, convince itself to stand by as the Serbs committed genocide.”122 NATO approved a number of damaging air strikes against Serbia, and in mid-September, Milosevic delivered and finalized a cease-fire.

The U.S. policy toward war and genocide in Bosnia entered the justice phase with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995.123 In addition to creating a single state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and NATO’s peacekeeping force, IFOR (which included 20,000 American troops), the greatest importance of Dayton in terms of genocide was that it ended the war and ethnic cleansing and it included unprecedented provisions for human rights and attempts to handle the accused and indicted war criminals.124 The key elements were:

- The parties are obligated to cooperate fully with the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in its
investigations of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law and to comply with its orders

- Stipulations that individuals indicted for war crimes who do not comply with the tribunal’s orders cannot run for or hold elected or appointed office in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

- The sanctions suspension resolution adopted by the Security Council following Dayton includes provisions that will assist in enforcing compliance with these provisions.

- On the recommendation of the commander of IFOR or the high representative, if parties are found to be “failing significantly” to meet their obligations, sanctions will be reimposed unless the Security Council decides otherwise.

- In addition, an “outer wall” of sanctions will remain available, if necessary, in the form of denying access by noncompliant parties to international organizations, international financial institutions, and foreign assistance.125

The International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1993 in support of Dayton and was an avenue for the U.S. to take a leadership role the post-genocide situation. This was the “centerpiece of a postwar effort to secure justice for victims of war crimes and genocide.”126 On 22 February 1993, the UN Security Council unanimously passed the resolution for an international tribunal; “an international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.”127 There was a strong need to act quickly to get witness testimony and evidence before there was a chance for tampering to take place.128 The United States and European allies had to seek justice for war crimes and genocidal acts by dealing with some of those responsible for war crimes.129 Under the leadership of Madeleine Albright, U.S. ambassador to the UN, the U.S. led the effort to create the tribunal and became its most important supporter.130 The United States contributed more than $120 million, countless U.S. government personnel assistance, and the Clinton administration provided important information about war crimes and atrocities, including material from classified sources.131 The tribunal began in the summer of 1994 under the guidance of Richard Goldstone, a South African judge.132 As Richard Holbrooke noted, “During our negotiations the tribunal emerged as a valuable instrument of policy that allowed us, for example, to bar Karadzic and all other indicted war criminals from public office.”133 Additionally, President Clinton nominated David J. Scheffer to a new position of ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues and created the War Crimes Office at the State Department, which demonstrated the U.S. interest in dealing with justice for international crimes.134 “With ambassador rank, Scheffer [was] able to better coordinate efforts between bureaus at the State Department, to urge cooperation between U.S. agencies, and to consult with other governments. In this way, the administration created ‘an action office to make sure things get done’ relating to war crimes and genocide.”135

Initially, the U.S. was reluctant to use its peacekeeping contingent, IFOR, as a “posse to round up suspects.”136 Military leaders, with Somalia still fresh in their minds, were concerned about getting wrapped up in guerilla-style warfare and President Clinton preferred to use behind-the-scenes pressure to push Dayton signatories to comply with the requirement that they transfer all alleged war criminals to The Hague.137 In late 1996 and early 1997, the U.S. proposed a plan for the creation of a specially trained police force to track down war criminals in Bosnia, which would take the policing duties away from the increasingly reduced peacekeeping force.138 However, NATO kept its formal policy of arresting suspects only when troops came across them while they were carrying out their regular duties.139 The United States also set up the War Criminal Rewards program for the former Yugoslavia, in which the U.S. continues to offer a reward of up to $5 million for information leading to the arrest of conviction of persons indicted for serious violations of international humanitarian law by the ICTY.140

Despite the relative success of the ICTY in prosecuting Yugoslav war criminals, two of the most wanted war criminals, senior leaders Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, remain at large. More international cooperation is needed to bring them to justice. They are charged with planning the Srebrenica massacre. Slobodan Milosevic was arrested in 2000, but died in prison at The Hague in
2006 before the conclusion of his war crimes trial.141 However, in February 2007, the UN International Court of Justice cleared Serbia of genocide against Muslims in Bosnia’s civil war, although it did say that Bosnia’s former government should have stopped the 1995 Srebrenica massacre and ordered Serb leaders to give up Mladic, whom the ICTY have searched for over a decade.142 This was the first time that a state had been taken to court over accusations of genocide. The ruling said that the slaughter of thousands of Muslims by Bosnian Serbs at the UN-protected Srebrenica enclave constituted an act of genocide.143 But, the court rejected Bosnia’s claim that the “Serbian state was responsible for the killing, saying it did not have effective control over the Bosnian Serb forces it had helped arm and finance. Instead, the judges ruled that Serbia stood by and allowed the massacre to happen.”144 The court’s key finding was its conclusion that no one in Serbia, or any official organ of the state, could be found to have had the deliberate intention to “destroy in whole or in part” the Bosnian Muslim population, as specified in the 1948 Genocide Convention.145 This demonstrates how difficult it can be to apply the only internationally recognized definition of genocide in order to achieve post-genocide justice and future preventions.

Rwanda

Summary

The Rwandan tragedy was the second instance of genocide experienced during the Clinton Administration. Its speed, scale, and location made it difficult for the U.S. to effectively respond to the genocide while it was taking place. The U.S. instead chose to take a leadership position in addressing the post-genocide situation in Rwanda. It provided humanitarian assistance and aid to refugee camps, contributed to the establishment of the Arusha war crimes tribunal and GLJI, and helped Rwanda set up the ACRI to enhance Rwanda’s politicomilitary capabilities.

Genocide

In light of the failure of the 1993 power-sharing Arusha Accords, to resolve the conflict between the rebel Tutsi and Hutu government, the genocide in Rwanda was officially sparked by the death of Rwandan president, Juvenal Habyarimana on 6 April 1994, when his plane was shot down and crashed in Kigali killing him and Burundian president Cyprien Ntariyamiri who was also on board.146 Although it has never been determined exactly who was responsible for the crash, the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) were blamed by the Hutu, setting off a massive campaign of violence against the Tutsi and Tutsi sympathizers. Almost immediately after Habyarimana’s death, “Rwanda’s colonial past, ethnic mythology, economic difficulties, political opportunists, and a vociferous campaign of hate fused seismically to produce a staggering genocide.”147 The Hutus’ genocide campaign was further spread through Kigali via the use of radio broadcasts which blamed the Tutsi and UN forces for Habyarimana’s plane crash and called on Hutu to avenge his death by cleansing the country of Tutsis. It even provided the names and addresses of their targets.148 Outside the capital, provincial militias carried out the genocide with orders from political leadership. As journalist Fergal Keane wrote, “In one hundred days up to one million people were hacked, shot, strangled, clubbed, and burned to death.”149 Also, many more were disfigured, tortured, and raped. The genocide in Rwanda was the fastest in recorded history and claimed an estimated 800,000 lives over the course of only about 100 days and left hundreds of thousands more homeless.

U.S. Policy during the Clinton Administration

The United States has been criticized for its slow response to the Rwandan crisis, despite the fact that the U.S. did not have strong interests in the country, Alan J. Kuperman (2001) states that based on the first two weeks of reporting President Clinton could not have concluded that genocide was taking place in Rwanda until about 20 April 1994.150 This was because first, the “violence was initially depicted in context of two-sided civil war—one that Tutsi were winning—rather than one-sided ethnic genocide against Tutsi.”151 Second, after a few days, the violence was reported to be declining when it was actually accelerating. Third, most of the early death counts were greatly underestimated and fourth, the initial focus was limited primarily to Kigali and failed to indicate the broader scope of violence. Finally, according to Kuperman, no credible and knowledgeable observers raised the prospect that genocide was taking place until the end of the second week of violence.152 However, there were early DIA intelligence reports that strongly suggested within the first days of the Rwandan crisis
that large numbers of Tutsi were being targeted and killed in several areas throughout Rwanda, but the key Washington agencies did not understand or accept this information and, as a result, did not become aware of the genocide taking place until after 20 April.\textsuperscript{153}

The plane crash and its implications for U.S. security interests did not go unnoticed. Immediately following the plane crash, President Clinton issued a statement showing his “shock and sadness” regarding the deaths of the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi.\textsuperscript{154} Within a week after the crash, the United States evacuated U.S. citizens in Rwanda via overland convoy to Burundi. President Clinton also sent 300 Marines stationed off the Somali coast to Burundi to protect the Americans upon their arrival.\textsuperscript{155} The U.S. participated in the evacuation of the remaining UN forces of UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda), after winning support for a reduced peacekeeping force at the UN Security Council on the grounds that the remaining 2,000 troops could no longer carry out their mandate as established at Arusha and their safety could not be adequately protected due to expanding hostilities.\textsuperscript{156} Secretary of State Warren Christopher sent a cable to Madeleine Albright at the UN expressing this concern saying, “The international community must give highest priority to full, orderly withdrawal of all UNAMIR personnel as soon as possible…. We will oppose any effort at this time to preserve a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda…. Our opposition to retaining a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda is firm. It is based on our conviction that the Security Council has an obligation to ensure that peacekeeping operations are viable, that they are capable of fulfilling their mandates, and that the U.N. peacekeeping personnel are not placed or retrained, knowingly, in an untenable situation.”\textsuperscript{157} According to Albright, a “small, skeletal [operation would be left in Kigali] to show the will of the international community.”\textsuperscript{158}

Throughout the Rwandan genocide, the United States was particularly hesitant of any solution that involved expanding the UN presence in Rwanda because it was still reeling from the Somalia relief assistance disaster of 1992. Somalia became a “sobering and formative experience for U.S. policy, one that sent shockwaves through the Pentagon and White House.”\textsuperscript{159} As a result of the Somalia peacekeeping experience, the “equation for intervention in Africa then appeared to have a maximum of risk with limited returns at best.”\textsuperscript{160}

Nevertheless, after the Mogadishu firefight on 5 October 1993, the U.S. reluctantly voted to authorize the UN Security Council resolution for UNAMIR, but made it clear that the United States would not consider sending American troops to Rwanda.\textsuperscript{161} During this time, there was considerable debate and disagreement among top U.S. policymakers about the best course of action, but proponents of stronger U.S. action were out voted. The Department of Defense, according to Ronayne (2001), based its assessment on Rwanda on the Somalia analogy, believing that an “all-too-fine line existed between sending in UN forces and eventually having to follow up with American soldiers. Pentagon officials were quite wary of having to bail out a floundering UNAMIR and, therefore, opposed multilateral involvement at any level.”\textsuperscript{162}

On 5 May 1994, with the genocide in Rwanda still raging, President Clinton publicly released the Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) to redefine the conditions and contexts for American participation in UN peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{163} This directive came after a statement by President Clinton to the UN in September 1993 that said the UN needed to learn “when to say no” and that it should ask the “hard questions” (i.e. Is there a real threat to international peace? Does the mission have clear objectives? Can an end point be identified? How much will it cost to carry out the mission?) before intervening.\textsuperscript{164}

PDD-25, which was called the “first comprehensive U.S. policy on multilateral peace operations suited to the post-Cold War era,” represented a response to when, where, and how the U.S. should intervene in peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{165} Additionally, it stated that the U.S. would not take part in UN peacekeeping missions unless it had a direct impact on U.S. national security interests.\textsuperscript{166} PDD-25 specifically addressed six major issues:

- making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support,
- reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations,
- clearly defining policy on command and control of U.S. forces,
- reforming and improving the ability of the United Nations to manage peace operations,
reforming and improving the ability of the United States to manage peace operations, and
improving cooperation between the executive, the Congress, and the American public on peace operations. 

PDD-25 stresses that the U.S. will only participate in a UN peacekeeping mission when the mission:

- responds to a threat to or breach of international peace and security,
- advances U.S. interests (with unique and general risks weighed appropriately),
- includes acceptable command and control arrangements, and
- includes clearly defined objectives with realistic criteria for ending the operation (i.e. an exit strategy). 

As National Security Advisor Tony Lake said, “Peacekeeping is a part of [U.S.] national security policy, but it is not the centerpiece. The primary purpose of our military force is to fight and win wars.”

In response to the growing refugee problem as a result of the violent conflict in Rwanda, the United States proposed a plan to counter the one proposed by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that called for expanding UNAMIR. The U.S. plan involved establishing protected zones across Rwanda’s borders in neighboring countries, which provided a safer and more realistic alternative to the Boutros-Ghali proposal. In addition, the U.S. presented as an alternative to direct Western intervention, a plan for organizing and paying for an all-African force to combat the violence in Rwanda, knowing that it was likely that the U.S. would have to provide a weak African force with equipment, supplies, and logistical support. On 17 May 1994, the Security Council approved a 5,500-troop deployment for UNAMIR under a broader mandate. Under Resolution 918, UNAMIR was authorized “a) to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees, and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas; b) to provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations.” 

An arms embargo on Rwanda was also voted on by the UN Security Council. Despite the fact that the U.S. accepted Resolution 918, it was able to bring the UN to agreement on sending only 150 unarmed observers at first to assess the situation and then follow up with 800-man force to secure the Kigali airport. The deployment of the other 5,500 troops “would depend on a further report regarding the cooperation of the parties, the duration of the mandate, and the availability of troops.” While later testifying before Congress, Madeleine Albright said that the U.S. insistence on more careful and detailed mission plans in Rwanda was the first implementation of PDD-25. On 19 May, the UN sent a formal request to the U.S. asking for fifty armored personnel carriers which were transported to Uganda. Negotiations over payment and leasing agreements hindered the speedy transport of the vehicles, and once they did arrive in mid-July, the vehicles were out of service and lacked some important equipment and repairs. This only exacerbated the growing feeling that the U.S. was not showing enough compassion and legitimate support for the relief effort. The armored personnel carriers crossed into Rwanda on 30 July and were ready to use the first week of August when the genocide was already over.

Despite the numerous media reports about the tragedy in Rwanda, the Clinton Administration shied away from publicly calling the situation genocide. According to Ronayne, President Clinton, who was predominately interested in domestic policy, saw Rwanda as more of a threat to the legislative agenda and his approval ratings with the American people. Furthermore, the American people were not expressing widespread outcry for action and the State Department and the NSC told their officials to limit their wording to the phrase “acts of genocide have occurred.” As one senior administration official said, “Genocide is a word that carries an enormous amount of responsibility. [If the U.S. described the Rwandan crisis in those terms] it would be natural—and unwelcome—for voters to expect that the response would include dispatching troops.” David Rawson, Ambassador to Rwanda said, “as a responsible government, you don’t just go around hollering ‘genocide.’ You say that acts of genocide may have
occurred and they need to be investigated.” After debates and criticism over the semantics of what was occurring in Rwanda, Secretary of State Christopher said to reporters, “If there’s any particular magic in calling it a genocide, I have no hesitancy in saying that.” However, the Clinton administration argued that the UNCG did not actually obligate its signatories to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. Instead, the White House concluded that the convention “merely ‘enables’ such preventative action.”

The Clinton Administration ordered a humanitarian airlift immediately after the end of the Rwandan genocide on 22 July 1994 in an attempt to address the massive refugee problem resulting from the conflict. Operation Support Hope was intended to provide food, water, shelter, and medical assistance to those fleeing Rwanda, which by this time, were mostly Hutu, since the vast majority of the Tutsi had been murdered. By 24 July, American military personnel had been deployed to Goma, Zaire; Kigali, Rwanda; and Entebbe, Uganda. They set up much needed infrastructure to complement and support the humanitarian response effort. A joint task force was deployed to the region with peak strength of 2,592 and C-5s and C-141s flew 381 sorties throughout the duration of the operation, while C-130s with USAFE support flew 996. Additionally, the U.S. Army aided the Rwandan humanitarian relief effort by providing clean water to combat cholera outbreaks, helping bury the dead, and integrating the transportation and distribution of relief supplies. However, much like the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the Hutu leadership gained power in the refugee camps maintained by the U.S. In the refugee camps, donors and relief providers faced the difficult task of providing aid to those in need without aiding the genocidaires in rebuilding their brutal regime. The media could not capture the Rwandan genocide in action, but it could broadcast the suffering in the refugee camps and bring international pity to those responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi.

The U.S. officially recognized the new RPF government on 31 July 1994. The Clinton Administration strongly supported bringing those responsible for the genocide in Rwanda to justice. The U.S. backed the 8 November 1994 UN Security Council Resolution 955, which outlined a plan to “establish an international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other serious violations committed in the territory of neighboring states, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.” By the end of 2000, the United States had already pledged $80 million to the Rwandan tribunal. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was set up in Arusha, Tanzania, and on 2 September 1998, the ICTR delivered the first ever international conviction for genocide when it found former Rwandan mayor of Taba, Jean-Paul Akayesu, guilty of organizing genocidal massacres against the Tutsi in the Rwandan village. As of April 2007, the tribunal has handed down 27 judgments involving 33 accused criminals.

Additionally, as part of the U.S. post-Rwandan genocide response, the U.S. renewed its commitment to Rwanda and the rest of central Africa through the Great Lakes Justice Initiative (GLJI). This initiative is designed on the belief that in the Great Lakes region (i.e. Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo) violent cycles and instability have created a situation in which “a majority of the population lives outside the rule of law where corruption and violence are perpetuated with impunity.” The GLJI uses a “combined regional, international, and multi agency approach” to allow the public and private sectors to develop justice systems that are “impartial, credible, and effective in combating the culture of impunity and violence that has ravaged Central Africa.” More broadly, it supports independent human rights monitors, assists with conflict resolution mechanisms, and aids educational efforts. In support of GLJI, the U.S. had committed over $30 million as of 2001. In the military realm, the United States also helped draft and sponsor the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) as a way to enhance the capacity of African nations to prevent and contain disasters in Africa. The ACRI “functions as a training partnership among African and non-African militaries with the ultimate goal of creating an effective, mobile African force available to the United Nations for peacekeeping and conflict resolution missions.” This is an international effort to find “African solutions to African problems.”
In March 1998, President Clinton visited Rwanda to deliver an apologetic speech at the Kigali airport. He said, “We come here today partly in recognition of the fact that we in the United States and the world community did not do as much as we could have and should have done to try to limit what occurred [in Rwanda].” He went on to say, “We did not act quickly enough after the killing began. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name—genocide.” This apology demonstrated the remorse felt by the U.S. in its inability to do more to prevent the slaughter of thousands of Rwandans.

Sudan

Summary

The Bush Administration has declared the situation in Darfur to be a national security priority. It is also the first time ever that the U.S. has called a conflict as genocide while it was still going on. The U.S. has helped draft peace agreements, imposed sanctions against Sudan, and provided major funding for peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts in Darfur. While the genocide in Darfur continues to rage on, the U.S. has taken positive action to alleviate the suffering of the Darfurians and put pressure on Khartoum to end its violent campaign.

Genocide in Darfur

Sudan, Africa’s largest country and rich with oil, is divided religiously between Muslims (70 percent), animists (25 percent), and Christians (5 percent); ethnically between Sudanese of African and Arab origin; tribe; and the economic activity of nomadic and sedentary culture. Since its independence in 1956, it has suffered from two major civil wars primarily between the north and south, first from 1956-1972 and then again from 1983-2005. The Darfur province, home to approximately six million people, came to the forefront of Sudan’s civil wars when rebels from the southern Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality movement (JEM) took up arms against the government of the Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir in February 2003. The rebels, who represented non-Arab black African agrarian farmers from a number of sedentary tribes, cited years of political, economic, and social marginalization of the Darfur region. In response to a series of military victories by the rebels in spring 2003, the Sudanese government armed the Janjaweed militias, mostly Arab black African Muslim livestock herders, to “clear civilian population bases of African tribes thought to be supporting rebellion.” The Janjaweed “wiped out entire villages, destroyed food and water supplies, and systematically murdered, tortured, and raped hundreds of thousands of Darfurians. These attacks occur with the direct support of the Government of Sudan’s armed forces.” The Sudanese government has adopted a scorched earth campaign against the sedentary farmers of Darfur, in addition to direct violence, disease, and starvation, which has killed almost 500,000 people. Also, about 2.5 million Darfurian refugees have been displaced and fled to Chad and the Central African Republic, or reside in UN-dependent internally displaced persons camps in Darfur, with at least 200,000 more living in refugee camps in Chad. However, another estimated one million Darfurians continue to live in their homes, with their safety dependent on the African Union (AU) peacekeeping force of 7,400 troops. Unfortunately, this peacekeeping force lacks a civilian protection mandate.

U.S. Policy under the George W. Bush Administration

On 9 September 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that genocide had taken place in Sudan and that the Sudanese government in Khartoum and government-sponsored Arab Janjaweed militias “bear responsibility” for rapes, killings, and other abuses that have left more than a million black Africans homeless. President Bush echoed this sentiment in July 2005 by saying that the situation in Darfur was “clearly genocide.” This is the first time in U.S. history that a conflict has been labeled in this way while it was still happening. The fact that the U.S. was so quick to label it as such, shows that there has been a policy shift in the U.S. that acknowledges that human security issues should be elevated in importance for policymakers.

Sudan is currently one of the highest foreign policy priorities of the Bush Administration in the post-September 11 world and the United States is the single largest donor to the country. As noted by the State Department, “The United States is committed to ending the violence in Darfur through a political settlement, providing
humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations, enabling the deployment of an international peacekeeping force, and promoting democracy in Sudan. On 29 May 2007, President Bush ordered the U.S. Department of the Treasury to block the assets of three Sudanese individuals connected to the violence in Darfur. He also authorized the sanction of 31 companies owned or controlled by the Government of Sudan, which is intended to “increase the political pressure on Khartoum to end the violence, and supplement sanctions that the United States has maintained on Sudan since 1997.” These sanctions place restrictions on imports from and exports to Sudan, freeze the assets of the Sudanese government, and prohibit U.S. arms sales and transfers to Sudan. As President Bush said, “The brutal treatment of innocent civilians in Darfur is unacceptable—it is unacceptable to me, it is unacceptable to Americans, it is unacceptable to the United Nations. The status quo must not continue.” Since 2005, the United States also provides support for Darfur peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance through more than $4 billion in humanitarian, peacekeeping, and development assistance to the people of Sudan and eastern Chad. The U.S. has funded 25 percent of the hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping operation, helped construct and maintain 34 Darfur base camps for AU peacekeepers, and, as the largest food donor, gives 40,000 metric tons of food aid to Sudan each month.

The U.S. continues to push for the full implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signed in May 2006 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005. The CPA ended a civil war lasting more than two decades between the North and South and called for democratic elections at every government level by July 2009. The U.S. also supports the rapid deployment of over 20,000 peacekeepers to Darfur as authorized by the UN. The United States supports the leadership of the UN and AU in pressing for further negotiations between the Sudanese government and those rebel groups that did not sign the DPA. In FY 2007, the U.S. budget for Sudan is estimated at more than $1 billion for humanitarian, development, and peacekeeping assistance and similar levels of contribution have been requested by President Bush for FY 2008.

In recent developments, the U.S. and Sudanese governments are scheduled to meet for talks in Rome that began on 16 April 2008. According to a document provided to the New York Times by a U.S. official, the U.S. is considering removing Sudan from the American list of state supporters of terrorism and normalizing relations with the Government of Sudan in exchange for allowing Thai and Nepalese peacekeepers in Darfur. The papers reveal that the U.S. is demanding that Sudan expedite the visa process for humanitarian workers and allow private aid organizations to work in Darfur. Sudan wants the U.S. to end its decade-long economic sanctions and to support its bid for membership in the World Trade Organization. Also, Sudan wants U.S. support in the cancellation of Sudan’s foreign debts and “the immediate release of the Sudanese detainees at Guantanamo.” Sudan also wants a formal apology for the Clinton administration-era cruise missile strike on the Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, which was targeted in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on the American Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Since the attack, American officials have acknowledged that the evidence that spurred President Clinton to order the strike was not as sound as first portrayed and that there was no proof that the plant had been linked to Osama bin Laden, who was a resident of Khartoum in the 1980s. However, the U.S. has not ruled out the possibility that the plant was linked to chemical weapons production. Bush administration officials have acknowledged in the past that they have offered to restore full diplomatic ties, lift economic sanctions, and remove Sudan from the American list of state sponsors of terrorism in exchange for concessions on Darfur.

Conclusion

The Clinton Doctrine says, “If the world community has the power to stop it, we ought to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing.” There is no doubt that the United States does not condone genocide. However, much of the literature on the subject is extremely critical of the U.S. response, or the lack thereof, as authors on the subject like to point out. Leading genocide scholar, Samantha Power, for instance, blames the United States for “standing idly by” during post-Holocaust genocides. She attributes this to her belief that the U.S. failed to act quickly on important intelligence reports or take early reports seriously, that the U.S. felt that its influence could do little to stop the violence
anyway, and above all that the United States lacked the political will necessary to take decisive action in putting a stop to the violence. Critics of the U.S. point to the fact that the United States has the manpower, funds, and ability to aid those affected by genocide and yet the U.S. did not do enough, be that committing troops, taking diplomatic action, or providing humanitarian assistance, to reduce the scope or duration of the genocidal violence in the case studies explored in this study. However, as Jerry Fowler (2004) states, “Translating the moral imperative of responding to genocide or threats of genocide into practical and effective policy is not easily done. And even the predicate step -translating the articulation of the moral principle into a commitment to find ways to act- is not automatic.”

Kuperman (2001) notes that intervention is not a substitute for prevention. If the West primarily relies on military intervention to prevent genocide or ethnic cleansing, it is destined for failure. Instead, it should focus on averting the outbreak of genocide in the first place. Large-scale ethnic violence is usually the result of escalating civil wars; therefore, the West should focus most of its efforts on de-escalating these conflicts. In an interview with a senior defense official, he suggested one method of addressing the problem of prevention is socio-cultural intelligence that would take into account understanding the cultural dynamics of the affected area to leverage U.S. and allied capabilities accordingly. To understand what is going on on the ground during genocide, it is crucial to have someone on the ground that can see and understand the situation and provide guidance to policymakers and commanders in the field. This can be done by placing American personnel and experts in the conflict zone and by recruiting native sources that can provide the interaction needed to adequately assess the situation on the ground, similar to the Human Terrain Teams (HTT) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Alternatively, George W. Bush, during his presidential campaign, said that U.S. military troops should not be deployed for solely humanitarian reasons. He later said that the United States should use its military resources to assist others who want to intervene in genocide cases. Creating other stakeholders through coordination and cooperation among allies and regional partners can be an effective way to respond to genocide more quickly and with fewer burdens placed on the United States.

Despite the fact that the United States is opposed to genocide, some argue that the U.S. should not intervene in genocides unless there is a direct nexus to U.S. national security. Many in the international community share the idea that the U.S. should be involved everywhere, but this is not feasible or responsible especially if the U.S. adheres to its obligations under UN conventions. Genocide is a political issue, not a military issue. It involves diplomacy, economics, and information early in the conflict. The United States cannot throw its military forces, which are already tied up in Iraq and Afghanistan, into every conflict because there are just too many. As described by Karin von Hippel (2000), before the United States commits itself to intervention, the U.S. government “now tends to adhere to a mixture of guidelines set out by John M. Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Warren Christopher, former Secretary of State, and Anthony Lake, former National Security Advisor.” These three gentlemen also represent the defense, state, and intelligence agencies. According to Shalikashvili, there are three instances when the U.S. should use the military to protect its interests:

- First in priority are our vital interests –those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security, and territorial integrity of the United States. At the direction of the NCA, the Armed Forces are prepared to use decisive and overwhelming force, unilaterally if necessary to defend America’s vital interests:

- Second are important interests –those that do not affect our national survival but do affect our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live. The use of our Armed Forces may be appropriate to protect those interests

- Third, armed forces can also assist with the pursuit of humanitarian interests when conditions exist that compel our nation to act because our values demand US involvement. In all cases, the commitment of US forces must be based on the importance of the US interests involved, the potential risks to American troops, and the appropriateness of the military mission.
Christopher’s prerequisites include:

- Clearly articulated objectives;
- Probable success;
- Likelihood of popular and congressional support; and
- A clear exit strategy.  

Lake described the times that could lead to the use of force by the U.S.:

- To defend against direct attacks on the United States, its citizens, and its allies;
- To counter aggression [e.g. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait];
- To defend our key economic interests, which is where most Americans see their most immediate stake in our international engagement;
- To prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crime, and drug trafficking;
- To maintain our reliability, because when our partnerships are strong and confidence in our leadership is high, it is easier to get others to work with us, and to share the burdens of leadership [e.g. Bosnia];
- And for humanitarian purposes, to combat famines, natural disasters, and gross abuses of human rights, with, occasionally, our military forces [e.g. Bosnia].

However, sanctions can also breed nationalist solidarity throughout the targeted population in “defiance against the major powers,” instead of causing the public to “rise against their leader as the policy intends.”

John Galtung noted that the “collective nature of economic sanctions makes them hit the innocent along with the guilty;” therefore, an “attack from outside is seen as an attack on the group as a whole, not only on a fraction of it.”

Regardless, the United States and European militaries have an important role to play and they will be called upon to take part in support of future peace operations. This is because the military is “much better than civilian agencies at coordination and logistics, as well as their traditional tasks of enforcement and security.” There is also a clear chain of command in the military, which is missing from many international organizations and crucial for the success of a mission.

If the United States military establishment continues to engage in its isolationist policy and “antipathy for peace and support operations,” then European and other international militaries will have to play a larger role in these missions. This was apparent in Bosnia when Congress in late 1997 threatened to withdraw completely from SFOR unless European militaries took on an even larger burden, although they provided most of the troops. The United States tends to be more suspicious of peace support operations than Europe, which had experience in grey military operations during the colonial period. The only other alternative, it would seem, would be to hire private security firms, which calls accountability into question.

The “Do Something Effect,” perpetuated by round-the-clock media coverage, can also influence the course of action the U.S. government and other Western states will take to respond to genocide. In the case of Bosnia, the televised media coverage of Serb atrocities against Bosnian Muslims helped to prompt serious international dialogue that eventually helped to convince the hesitant public of the United States and Europe of the need for the NATO bombing campaigns and the creation of the International War Crimes Tribunal. Von Hippel says that if the U.S. government is “going to continue to intervene, it has to utilize the media better than it currently does to explain in detail the purpose of the intervention, and what it hopes to achieve before, during, and after, instead of allowing the media to push policy.”
A major obstacle facing the United States and its ability to respond to genocide, aside from the fact that genocide is difficult to see coming, is the lack of an overarching doctrine or policy on the prevention of and response to genocide, aside from the 1948 UN Genocide Convention. According to the National Security Strategy of the United States, “[n]o doctrine can anticipate every circumstance in which U.S. action -direct or indirect- is warranted” because of finite political, economic, and military resources available to meet “global priorities.”

But, without a unilateral policy that can be applied to genocides, the U.S. does not have a clear set of established guidelines and expectations for how to react. This leaves the U.S. to rely on policy guesswork and leaves it open to international and domestic criticism for perceived failures and inadequacies. Creating a genocide doctrine would be very difficult, but it would increase U.S. accountability and give it a starting point for how to react when reports of genocidal acts are received. The Mass Atrocity Response Operations Project of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University is currently working to address this problem by developing a variety of options from which U.S. leadership can choose to respond effectively to genocide. The results of this study are scheduled to be released in three years.

What is clear from the case studies of Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Sudan, is that the U.S., although it has taken important and meaningful steps in responding to genocide, can still improve its efforts, particularly in the area of genocide prevention. As stated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, “Preventing crises from worsening and alleviating suffering are goals consistent with American values. They are also in the United States’ interest. By alleviating suffering and dealing with crises in their early stages, U.S. forces help prevent disorder from spiraling into wider conflict or crisis.” However, the U.S. continues to lag in this area. Positive change in this area will be a challenging endeavor, but extremely important if the United States continues to emphasize its commitment to “never again.” Although genocides will continue to occur, as Darfur illustrates, the U.S. and its allies can develop additional techniques and capabilities to address the conflicts early on and save countless lives. This would involve a deviation from the historic tendency of the U.S. to take a leadership position in the post-conflict landscape, in the traditional form of humanitarian and judicial assistance. However, the United States cannot be expected to take a leadership role in each conflict or potential conflict, militarily or otherwise; therefore, partners and allies need to be utilized to share the responsibility of genocide prevention and response options.

Recommendations

- The U.S. should develop improved genocide prevention capabilities (i.e. utilizing anthropologists, social scientists, and linguists) to provide the socio-cultural understanding necessary to respond effectively.

- The U.S. should provide assistance to partners and allies to build up regional capabilities for timely genocide response in the future that would distribute responsibility and not place as high of a burden on the U.S. for resources.

- Genocide prevention and response need to be human security priorities for U.S. policymakers if real positive change and improvements are to be made.

- The U.S. should develop an updated genocide doctrine based from the 1948 UN Genocide Convention that would provide guidance for appropriate action in the instance of genocide.

Endnotes


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**Integrating Human Security into America’s Soft Power: The Iraqi Refugee Test**

*Abstract:*

American foreign policy must incorporate many soft power capabilities to match and compliment its hard power influence. Human security missions are an important part of demonstrating soft power, and the current plight of displaced Iraqis is an undertaking which requires the efforts of several US agencies to be fully successful. Currently the US interagency has not functioned and cooperated as effectively as it could in this endeavor, dissuading the Department of Defense from an important, integrative role in human security, and overemphasizing the importance of overseas resettlement. This paper reviews three cases studies – Vietnam, Bosnia, and Kosovo – to assess how US and various other agencies have cooperated and dealt with the aid and resettlement of refugee and internally displaced persons IDP populations. These lessons are then applied to the Iraqi case. The study concludes that the US government could better serve this humanitarian mission with Iraq by: (1) streamlining and clarifying the roles of the agencies involved in aid and resettlement; (2) providing the Department of Defense with a clearer and more precise mandate to assist in operations; and (3) focusing on security and aid to displaced persons inside Iraq and neighboring host countries in order to facilitate their return, rather than providing monetary incentives for resettlement outside of Iraq.

**Introduction**

Since early 2007 a rapid infusion of attention has been given to the plight of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) by the international community, especially the United States. This spike of interest followed a dramatic rise in sectarian violence the year before, which caused the previously slow trickle of displaced persons to increase. In reality, the refugee flows to neighboring countries (primarily Syria and Jordan) had been quietly building since before the US-led invasion began in 2003. By the end of 2006, the strains on these host countries became painfully obvious, and were another reason for international attention. In January 2007 the US Senate Judiciary Committee conducted a hearing among a variety of military and diplomatic officials, listened to NGO and think-tank representatives, and heard several direct testimonies from refugees in order to better comprehend the matter and formulate effective solutions.

One result of this and other reviews has been a call emphasizing the need for the resettlement of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons to third countries such as the United States. The US has since begun to implement such plans, albeit at a slow pace that has often been criticized for its bureaucratic entanglements and low resettlement numbers over the past year.

The decision of the US government to highlight this problem and undertake substantial efforts toward refugee resettlement falls in line with a new initiative that is beginning to grow in several US agencies, with the Department of Defense principal among them. When engaging in various missions abroad, this new approach suggests that the US should utilize its full panoply of agencies in concert with each other, instead of simply relying on one or a handful of departments (i.e., the Department of Defense) to handle a given scenario separately, according to their own individual doctrines and mandates. Such a multifaceted approach would allow the US to more comprehensively address the multitude of interrelated issues that may be inherent to a particular case – for example, human security issues (such as refugees and IDPs) that may be present during a reconstruction operation such as Iraq. This idea was exemplified by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates during his November 26, 2007 confirmation hearing.

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2007 lecture at Kansas State University, in which he called for the United States to use its interagency cooperation to strengthen American soft power capacity in tandem with its hard power capabilities. He states, “If we are to meet the myriad of challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad.”

The case of Iraqi refugees and IDPs represents an important opportunity for the US interagency reform by implementing a coordinated approach. In effect, a new, interagency refugee policy (with coordinated, supporting programs) can be a litmus test for how the United States should conduct future humanitarian and human security operations. Yet, there will be a considerable amount of friction to overcome when implementing these changes. Although agencies such as the Department of Defense have previously put forth directives encouraging interagency cooperation, it is also normal for bureaucracies to adhere to their originally defined missions, narrowly interpret mandates that call for their cooperation, and be resistant to changes that might extend or overlap their responsibilities too closely with those of other departments. This can either lead to an isolationist version of collaboration where agencies shy away from stepping too far into the others’ realms, or an egocentric version with every agency expecting the others to adopt supporting roles. Neither version is effective. Figuring out how to balance, integrate, and streamline the interagency process in these operations will be a formidable but important leadership challenge for the next presidential administration.

The third section of the paper contains the description and analysis of three instances where the US interagency has been involved in providing aid or resettlement to refugees or IDPs during conflicts: Vietnam, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The goals of this section is to observe the roles, behaviors, and circumstances in each case to assess the effectiveness of each policy, to discern observable patterns or trends in the US provision of aid and resettlement, and to determine what factors (if any) caused changes in US interagency responses over the course of three decades. Because a purpose of this study is to analyze how the US interagency can reform to handle this problem (and not simply a study of the Iraqi refugee crisis itself), it will principally focus on the actions and roles of US agencies, and will not address every single intricacy regarding refugees. “The US interagency” in this study will therefore be principally defined as the collective of the Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, and USAID, with peripheral support from various US non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While it should be noted that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and various international NGOs also play very important agency roles in refugee (and, in general, human security) operations, their mandates and roles do not operate on the federal level. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, they will only be mentioned when their activities provide pertinent, transferable lessons to the current US interagency.

Finally, the fourth section includes several recommendations on how the US interagency could reform to more effectively handle this and future humanitarian crises, based on the analysis of past trends and the current circumstances. In brief, the study concludes the following:

1. The US interagency requires clarified, detailed, cooperative roles in human security operations such as refugee and IDP assistance. In particular:

   a. The Department of Defense must be prepared to assist other departments and entities by providing an adequate security role for these agencies to effectively carry out aid and refugee resettlement operations. This should be codified in a clearer, more specific directive.

   b. Interagency cooperation may be enhanced by the formation of regional interagency teams.
2. In order to serve refugees, IDPs, host countries, and US objectives more fully, the interagency should shift its primary focus away from resettlement programs and concentrate most on effectively providing security and substantial amounts of aid to Iraqi IDPs, refugees, and refugee host states.

3. If the US refugee resettlement program becomes part of a US human security policy, it must be redefined in terms of its scope, timing, and staff and resource levels. The current resettlement program costs much, and benefits few. The Department of Homeland Security must also improve its screening and processing procedures for refugee relocation.

Background Demographics and Statistics:
Who, Where, When, and Why

At the time of this writing, there are over 2.5 million Iraqi refugees dispersed in neighboring host countries and over 2.77 million who are internally displaced inside Iraq. Among those who fled to neighboring countries, the most went to Syria (an estimated 1.2 to 1.6 million), while the second greatest amount went to Jordan (between 450,000 and 750,000). Significantly smaller amounts sought refuge in the Gulf states, Iran, Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey. Other refugees scattered to various European destinations. This study focuses on the refugee populations in Syria and Jordan for analysis of displaced persons outside the country, as these are the largest, most representative groups of Iraqis.

February 2006 marks an important dividing line for analyzing the displacement of Iraqis. Prior to this time, only a slow and unsteady trickle of Iraqis left the county or relocated to safer regions inside Iraq as a result of the 2003 invasion. Even as sectarian fighting began to build and security began to deteriorate in late 2005, most of the population held its ground. In 2006, the February bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra (a holy Shi'a shrine) sparked a series of violent retaliations between Shi'a and Sunni militias, including reprisal attacks.

The dispersal volumes and locations of Iraqi refugees and IDPs in the Middle East.
on neighborhoods and families. The dramatic rise in sectarian violence forced massive amounts of Iraqis, regardless of their demographics, to flee their homes and seek shelter elsewhere.

The vast majority of displaced Iraqis are from urban centers with mixed communities, as these have been the focal points of sectarian violence and fighting between radical groups and Multinational Forces (MNF). Baghdad, the largest city and urbanized governorate with the most diverse communities (and the center of MNF operations in Iraq), is the source of most refugees and IDPs. Following Baghdad are cities in Iraq’s most violent provinces: Fallujah, Ramadi, Habbaniya, and ar-Rutbah (Anbar governorate); Tikrit (Salah ad-Din governorate); and Diyala (Diyala governorate), among others. Violence comes from and affects multiple sects; therefore, nearly all of Iraq’s various communities are represented among the refugee and IDP populations (although more Sunnis tended to leave Iraq than relocate inside it). The only notable exception seems to be with the Kurdish population, most all of which resides in the comparatively stable northern provinces, and (barring a few tensions with Turkey) had little reason to migrate inside or outside of Iraq.

Most all Iraqis who have fled to Syria and Jordan have settled in the respective capitals of Damascus and Amman. Not only are these terminal points of transit, but they also offer the most diverse communities, living conditions, goods and services. Unlike many other refugee scenarios, Iraqi refugees are not clustered together in camps. Rather, they have settled into the urban populations, and have tried to establish normal lives in their new homes; this makes their case unique. It was only after February 2006 that significantly large groups of Iraqis began to settle together in defined neighborhoods within the cities. Among those who have been displaced inside Iraq, most have tended to relocate to areas (often in their same city or governorate) where their sect is a majority and where they feel most secure. As of March 2008, Baghdad governorate leads all other provinces by a factor of five in the amount of registered IDPs (over 560,000). Others have risked traveling north across the country to settle in the peaceful northern governorates of Nineawa and Dahuk (just over 100,000 each).

The socioeconomic demographic of displaced Iraqis has changed since February 2006, particularly among those who have fled the country. The 2003 invasion of Iraq initially precipitated only a trickle of refugees to Damascus and Amman. These few were mainly wealthy families (some of whom were tied to the Hussein regime), and many settled in the most affluent neighborhoods of the capitals. Even after Sunni insurgents clashed with US troops in Fallujah and militants from both sects began to tighten control over areas in 2004, it was still mostly “secular and often more affluent families” who sought refuge elsewhere. Following the Samarra mosque bombing, however, the unrestrained reciprocal violence between Shi’a and Sunni militias led to the swift displacement of hundreds of thousands, irrespective of wealth or status. Since that point, “most refugees come from what used to be the (largely secular) middle class,” and even some of the poorest have fled their homes. Additionally, the increased danger of the circumstances served, in a way, to close the gap in wealth between displaced persons, especially those leaving the country. Travel in Iraq has become progressively more perilous. “Kidnappers now target all levels of Iraqi society, including middle class and even poor people.” As a result, Iraqis have generally stopped carrying large sums of money and valuables with them when they move, and instead often rely on hawala money transfers from trusted friends and family still in Iraq, or the largesse of kin in their new homes. These dependences have their limitations, which will be discussed below in greater detail.

Although violence among religious sects and between Multinational Forces (MNF) has been the predominant cause of most displacement in Iraq, it is not the only reason Iraqis have chosen to take flight. In some cases, young men have left to avoid being pressed into service by local militias. Some individuals and families have been specifically targeted, either because they held ties to the former Ba’athist regime, or because they had worked with the new Iraqi government or MNF. Others wished to remain, but found it impossible to continue their way of life because their homes, businesses, or access to public services such as electricity, water, food supply, or health care (among others) had been destroyed or disrupted. Refugees and IDPs may also often have family members who reside (or have recently fled to) safer locations.
The choice to relocate inside Iraq or seek shelter abroad also rests on several factors. First among these is the level of danger involved in traveling to a new location. Travel outside Iraq has become increasingly risky since 2006; the roads leading west to Syria and Jordan now hold the threats of insurgent attacks and kidnappings in addition to their commonplace robberies and lootings. Many middle-to-lower class Iraqis may not be able to afford transit outside the country, or be able to sustain a living on their savings once there. It has also become difficult for some Iraqis to obtain entry or, more often, re-entry on their visas to host countries (to be described in the next subsection). Finally, many Iraqis simply desire not to be forced too far away from their homes, in the hope that they might eventually return. Relocating to further distances often reduces this likelihood.

Difficulties Facing Displaced Iraqis and Host Nations

When Iraqi IDPs and refugees are displaced to other neighborhoods, cities, or countries, a number of difficulties still confront them. IDPs must cope with poor access to food and other basic necessities, due in part to an extremely unreliable public distribution system (PDS). They may also still face sectarian pressures, even in areas where they are among the majority. Legal, economic, and social issues complicate the lives of many refugees trying to resettle in neighboring countries such as Syria and Jordan. And the host countries themselves have undertaken significant burdens and strains to accommodate Iraqis, on both an administrative and a societal level.

Access to basic living needs is perhaps the greatest difficulty facing Iraqi IDPs. A March 2008 report by the IDP Working Group emphasizes an “extremely urgent need for emergency food distribution to vulnerable IDPs and host communities,” and identifies “lack of security” and “lack of familial income” as the top impediments toward accessing food and markets. There is also gross inefficiency of the public distribution system in Iraq, which suffers as much from local bureaucracy as it does from a dangerous environment. In numerous instances, IDP families have not even been allowed to register with the public distribution system, and for the past three years distribution of rations has been incomplete in all governorates (especially Baghdad). Surrounding this, unreliable access to utilities (electricity and water), social services (health care, sanitation, and education), and employment exacerbate the situation.

As this report has mentioned, most Iraqi IDPs either choose or are forced to leave their original homes in favor of neighborhoods or cities where they feel safer, which usually corresponds with being among the confessional or ethnic majority. Relocation and majority association, however, is not a guarantor of IDPs’ safety from the rival factions they have fled. Often, family or friends who have been left behind are sought out, threatened, and used to extort IDPs into providing funding, information, or other support to the group. Indeed, “friendly” militias may aggressively demand financial backing, military support, and loyalty from IDPs who have sought their refuge.

Being sheltered among the majority of a community also holds the potential for vulnerable IDPs to be exploited and manipulated by their own sectarian militia leaders for support in a more subtle way – through the forming of dependencies. Because basic needs such as security, food, and staple goods and services cannot always be reliably delivered by the Iraqi government and MNF, local sectarian leaders have stepped in to fill the void. Sectarian violence is a primary reason that basic needs cannot be delivered to IDPs, and groups that are able to control the violence may then assume the role of provider to these populations and win their loyalty. This, in turn, can provide sectarian groups with safe haven, sharing of basic needs resources, recruits, and even political legitimacy. It may also result in the hardening and militarization of the IDP population.

Refugees who fled Iraq, as well as their host countries (principally Syria and Jordan), also face significant legal, economic, and social challenges and strains. Neither Syria nor Jordan officially recognizes these Iraqis as refugees – rather, they are “guests” of the countries. Accordingly, Iraqis are granted tourist visas which must be periodically renewed every three to six months. This propagates two major problems. First, in order renew their visas, Iraqis must exit and re-enter their host country. This oftentimes requires Iraqis to travel back across the Iraqi border via rural desert roads, which makes them targets for kidnapping and robbery. Iraqis might also find themselves denied re-entry because of changes in the host country’s immigration
policies. And, many Iraqis simply cannot afford renew their visas after living off of their savings for several months. This has resulted in many Iraqis illegally remaining in their host countries.

The second major problem resulting from Iraqis’ “guest” status is that it disallows the vast majority of them from seeking employment in their host countries. This leaves Iraqis the choice of either seeking employment illegally, or living off of whatever money they have brought with them or can receive via transfer. A January 2008 field study notes that almost all employment among Iraqi refugees is illegal, “and the problem of earning a livelihood was raised by nearly all refugees that were interviewed.” In some instances, Iraqis have resorted to vice trades. In Damascus, an ICG report notes that women, and even young girls, “are particularly vulnerable, sometimes having no alternative but to resort to prostitution.”

Most Iraqis, however, must simply depend on whatever savings they have to sustain them during their displacement. Because Iraqi refugees tend not to carry large amounts of money with them to their host countries, they also rely heavily on transfers from their savings or families back home. The International Crisis Group reports that in Syria, thirty-seven percent of Iraqis use their savings as their primary financial source and seventy-five percent receive assistance from relatives, while in Jordan forty-two percent rely on transfers and a majority live primarily on savings. Prolonged displacement continues to dwindle or bankrupt the finances of a great many. This leaves these Iraqis open to extortion, risks driving many more toward illegal employment or crime, and is creating an increasingly needy poor class inside host countries.

Refugees have incurred additional burdens on their hosts. In Jordan, the government estimates the total annual cost of supporting Iraqis to be $1.6 billion. Utilities such as water and electricity, which are sometimes in tight supply, have been stretched in each capital. Since 2006, the influx of hundreds of thousands has begun to crowd neighborhoods and decrease the availability of housing. Syrians and Jordanians have also attributed a general rise in prices in their countries to the stereotype that all Iraqis are wealthy. Several studies have noted that Syrian and Jordanian citizens tend to fault Iraqis for a multitude of problems and degraded quality of life, including high fuel costs, inflation, overcrowded hospitals and classrooms, heavy traffic, and degraded infrastructure, whether or not the refugees were actually the root cause.

Overall, these instances have compounded to create a lingering air of resentment and friction from host populations.

Finally, refugees and IDPs face difficulties returning to their homes. An insecure environment, whether real or anticipated, stops the return of most Iraqis. According to interviews by Brookings Institution staff in Syria, “it is clear that many would like to return to their country,” but “an overwhelming majority... do not think that it will be safe enough to return in the near future, and many believe it may never be safe enough.” Some attempt to return home, only to find their houses are occupied by other displaced Iraqis. “According to UNHCR, only a third of a group of thirty families returning from Syria on Iraqi government buses moved back to their original homes. US battalion commanders complained that, as a result of [Iraqi] government inefficiency, they had to improvise solutions to property disputes.” Others cannot return because their homes no longer exist, or because they do not have access to basic utilities, social services, or sustainable employment in their old neighborhoods. Among those who have come back, nearly all belong to the predominant confession or ethnicity of their community; “no members of minority groups... have been reported to be among the returnees.”

This pattern is creating homogenous neighborhoods in what used to be intricately complex, mixed Iraqi societies.

The Importance of US Involvement

Stemming and reversing the displacement crisis is an important human security mission that is deeply tied to many US objectives in Iraq. The displacement of Iraqis inside and out of the country hinders the progress of physical security in Iraq by strengthening the position of radical militias. As previously mentioned, these groups rely, in part, on their ability to manipulate, buy off, and extort displaced Iraqis for recruits, money, information, and other community support. The homogenization, or – to put it starkly – ethnic cleansing of neighborhoods also allows militias to consolidate their control over areas. As one study put it, “Triggered by the violence in Iraq, the refugee crisis indirectly helps sustain and finance it.”
Aside from physical security concerns, the exodus of Iraqis also bears negative implications for US efforts to reconstruct the country’s social, economic, and political institutions. International Crisis Group forecasts that the middle class’ “flight has further impoverished Iraq and potentially deprived it of its professional stratum for a decade or more.”35 The drain of intellectuals, medical and scientific experts, business professionals, engineers, and other “skilled labourers and managers” has stunted the growth of all these sectors.36 Their eventual return is critical to Iraq’s development, and should be a policy priority. The US interagency not only has the capacity, but a responsibility to help solve this problem. The United States played the leading role in dismantling the former regime, and it now has an important opportunity for leadership in rebuilding Iraq’s social fabric.

Current Attempts at Resettlement and Aid

Efforts to assist Iraqi refugees and IDPs only received serious attention at the beginning of 2007, after the strains from the 2006 displacement waves became evident in host countries and Iraq. A great deal of emphasis was placed on resettling the refugee populations from regional hosts to third host countries. The US, UNHCR, and NGOs also made efforts to provide humanitarian aid and support to host nations and their refugee populations. Government agencies and NGOs have also attempted to provide humanitarian assistance to internally displaced Iraqis, but the unstable security environment has made this more difficult.

Refugee Resettlement

The resettlement of Iraqi refugees from host nations to the United States has garnered a great deal of attention since 2007. There has been considerable sentiment in both the United States and international community that because the US has been so highly involved in Iraq, that it bears a major responsibility to assist Iraqis who have been forced from their homes. Out of the nations accepting Iraqi refugees into their borders, the United States has pledged to resettle the highest amount of UNHCR referrals (20,000 since spring of 2007).37 As of June 2008, a grand total of 6,350 Iraqis had been resettled to the US; 4,742 of these count toward the goal of 12,000 resettlements in the 2008 fiscal year.38

However, the US Iraqi Refugee Admissions Program (IRAP) has been criticized for being overly selective in prioritizing which Iraqis are eligible for resettlement. The program places a special emphasis on relocating Iraqis who have worked for the United States or multinational forces. James B. Foley, Senior Coordinator for the Iraqi Refugee Issues Ambassador, states that the US has “special obligations to Iraqis who have been employed by the US or have been closely associated with US efforts in Iraq, who are targeted and under threat for their work on our behalf…”39 While this policy is likely correct in assuming that these Iraqis (and their families) are put at considerable risk due to their actions, they are not the only group of Iraqis who are specially targeted by violence (for example, religious minorities).

The IRAP has also been criticized for its slow bureaucratic action in resettling refugees. This is a result of several factors, not the least of which are the lengthy process and multiple agencies involved, as well as the time needed to set up and staff the program. The process begins with overseas processing entities (OPEs) – private groups inside the host country which are hired by the US to accept UNHCR referrals, pre-screen them to collect large amounts of biographical data and perform Security Advisory Opinion checks, and schedule them for interviews. Passing applicants then meet with Department of Homeland Security staff members, who make scheduled circuit rides through the region to conduct case interviews. These interviews involve fingerprint checks and medical clearances. Applicants must also undergo cultural orientation, their names must pass FBI and CIA database checks, and they must receive exit permission from their host country before they may finally board an airplane to the US.40

Ambassador Ryan Crocker has repeatedly criticized the IRAP process to the Department of State, Congress, and to the media. In a telegram to the Secretary of State, he claimed that the process simply takes too long (an eight month process), and identified particular bottlenecks in “the time it takes for Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) processing, and the long wait for an interview by a DHS officer in Jordan or Syria, where the majority of the refugees are located.”41 Crocker has also stated that it would take two full years to process 10,000 referrals,42 and Ambassador James Foley has commented that many refugees drop out of the process for various reasons.43
Crocker also mentioned that DHS operations in the region take an extremely long time to acquire facilities and set up, and that they are severely understaffed with only one team in Jordan and none in Syria. Foley has also acknowledged the lengthy setup time of operations, but claims drastic improvements have occurred since full infrastructure has come into place. Nonetheless, DHS officials are still only operating with one facility in Jordan, and were denied visas to enter Syria until January of 2008. The US continues to blame restricted access in Syria for delays in processing, although an ICG report notes that their efforts also lagged behind in Lebanon and Jordan, where their access was relatively unhindered.

Nonetheless, DHS officials are still only operating with one facility in Jordan, and were denied visas to enter Syria until January of 2008. The US continues to blame restricted access in Syria for delays in processing, although an ICG report notes that their efforts also lagged behind in Lebanon and Jordan, where their access was relatively unhindered.

The apparent deficiency in DHS staff prompted Crocker to suggest that their role might be more easily filled by Department of State staff, which is readily available in the region, or accomplished via distance by digital video conference.

**Humanitarian Aid**

In his cable to the Secretary of State, Ambassador Crocker also stated that “Most refugees will eventually return home to Iraq. In the meantime, they and the host countries need assistance, as the refugees are putting a huge strain on state-provided services…” In fiscal year 2007, the US provided over $122 million in total humanitarian assistance, and raised that amount to $197 million in 2008, with about $146 million going to the Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (State PRM), and about $51 million going to USAID and its various subsidiaries. US humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees and IDPs is channeled through those two primary agencies.

State PRM works with NGOs to provide assistance to refugees in host countries. Humanitarian assistance to host countries, though, is principally led by the UNHCR, which works directly with many US and international NGOs. State PRM thus plays a supporting administrative role. Jordan has long been the home of many of these NGOs, which originally deployed to assist Palestinian refugees, and the Jordanian government works closely with them. Countries hosting Iraqis (Syria, in particular) are often reluctant to “permit foreign organizations to operate independently in their territories,” and would prefer “projects to be channeled through national entities, preferably national government institutions.” This severely limits the activities of NGOs. Currently, the Syrian Ministry of Health, the Syrian Red Crescent, and some Syrian Christian organizations are the principal agencies providing for Iraqis in Syria, with support from the UNHCR.

USAID and its NGO partners provide humanitarian aid to IDPs throughout Iraq. As a federal agency, USAID plays a more direct and active role in overseeing humanitarian assistance operations than its counterpart does in host countries, but still primarily works through NGOs. According to Denise Herbol, USAID’s Iraq Deputy Mission Director, USAID works with over 3,000 NGO partners on operations that include providing “relief to IDPs and host communities in the areas of health, emergency relief supplies, shelter and settlements, income generation, psycho-social activities, and clean water and sanitation.” USAID has also taken an initiative to help rebuild Iraq’s economy by partnering with microcredit lenders. Loans are distributed locally by US military commanders, and the hope is that taking small steps to rebuild the local economy will help improve the security environment. As one officer commented, if someone can go to work, they no longer “have to go to the insurgency to get money to feed their family.”

**Security**

Nevertheless, an insecure environment still significantly hampers humanitarian and resettlement operations inside Iraq. A March 2008 report notes that the “ability of NGOs to provide assistance is being affected by security restrictions in various locations” throughout Iraq. Iraqis also face physical danger in trying to access NGO services, register for the government distribution program, and meet with US officials in the country to apply for resettlement, as they are often the subjects of threats and random bombings. Attempting to return to their original homes, especially from abroad, is yet another risk for displaced Iraqis.

Despite a commitment to support humanitarian missions in its stability operations mandate, the Department of Defense has not made adequate efforts to include refugee assistance and relocation programs in those missions. This may be because...
the directive includes humanitarian needs as part of the directive, but never defines them. Section 4.2 of DOD Directive 3000.05 states:

The immediate goal [of stability operations] often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.61

Clearly, the aid, resettlement, and especially the eventual return of displaced Iraqis would help fulfill these goals.

What constitutes humanitarian needs, however, is never explicitly defined throughout the rest of the directive, and displaced persons are never mentioned. In section 4.5, military cooperation with civilian teams (including members of other US agencies and NGOs) is deemed “a critical US Government stability operations tool” for carrying out such functions as “developing local governance structures, promoting bottom up economic activity… and building indigenous capacity for such tasks.”62 Yet, there is no mention of the need to support operations to assist and reclaim the displaced indigenous people (especially the educated, skilled, and those of the middle class) that will be required to fill this capacity. Although the Department of Defense has supported and protected the Iraqi population and reconstruction teams in many other instances, overlooking the population of displaced Iraqis is seemingly a crucial omission.

Past Examples of Resettlement and Aid

In order to better understand Iraqi refugee populations and assess the United States’ aid and resettlement policies, it is beneficial to review past examples of interagency aid and resettlement efforts. The following three case studies – Vietnam, Bosnia, and Kosovo – illustrate how strategies for aiding and resettling refugee and IDP populations have changed over the past three decades. In the Vietnamese case, the United States was the only actor providing for resettlement; thus, US interagency policy is the focus of study. In the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, the United States shared much more responsibility for providing aid and resettlement with other nations and NGOs, and functioned under or alongside the authority of international organizations such as NATO and the United Nations. Therefore, the aid and resettlement policies observed are principally of these international institutions. It is important to note, however, that the lessons learned from studying all of these cases may be transferred to the US interagency’s framework and mandate. Further analysis of these lessons and trends in aid and resettlement policy will conclude this section.

Vietnam, 1970s

The first major US efforts toward assisting Vietnamese refugees followed the fall of Saigon in April of 1975. Washington’s policies focused on providing resettlement of refugees to the United States, rather than providing aid to host countries, largely due to the lack of personnel on the ground in the region after the US withdrawal in 1973 and the subsequent collapse of the South Vietnamese government. Refugee relocation occurred in two phases: an initial, massive phase immediately after Saigon’s fall, and the selective, institutionalized Orderly Departure Program (ODP) which emerged four years later and officially lasted two decades. Both initiatives relied heavily on action and cooperation from the Departments of Defense and State, and would define refugee assistance procedures for the rest of the Cold War. After this point, the slow termination of the ODP represented a shift away from such a reliance (particularly on Defense), and signaled the emerging emphasis of cooperation between State and multiple NGOs for implementing resettlement policy in other cases.

At the fall of Saigon, the Ford administration enacted an interagency task force which rushed to resettle between 130,000 and 135,000 Vietnamese (and small, scattered amounts of other Indochinese) to the United States.63 The vast majority of these refugees were initially taken on directly by the United States military as the capital was being evacuated. From this point, they were transported to military bases in California, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, and Florida. The Department of State then coordinated several contracted NGOs, churches, and other nonprofits to screen, process, sponsor, and resettle the Vietnamese out into the surrounding communities.64 According to Julia
Taft, the head of Ford’s initiative, the interagency was able to carry out this mission in a matter of several months.  

While the US’ quick, Herculean effort managed to resettle a very large influx of refugees in a short amount of time, a second Vietnamese refugee initiative would present itself four years later, and would run at a much more drawn-out pace. As the communist Vietnamese government consolidated its power and forcibly relocated many Vietnamese and Sino-Vietnamese during the late 1970s, slow streams of refugees began to hap hazardously escape across the South China Sea to “Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Hong Kong.”

This unorganized exodus of “boat people” led the UNHCR to help establish the Orderly Departure Program between the Vietnamese government, neighboring host countries, and third countries (such as the United States). Again, the purpose of the effort was primarily resettlement rather than direct aid to the displaced persons and their host countries, and focused on facilitating the safe emigration of Vietnamese to countries, especially in cases where other relatives had already become established. In 1988, the Department of State negotiated with the Vietnamese government to expand the program to accept political prisoners. The ODP helped to resettle over 523,000 refugees in the United States in its duration. The program, however, also faced lapses in the 1980s. The Department of State was, in effect, the sole US agency responsible for resettling refugees. When disagreements arose with the Vietnamese government over the eligibility of many cases in the early 1980s, it brought the ODP to a near-standstill until 1987. The program saw resurgence towards the end of the decade, but then steadily declined throughout the 1990s. This decline occurred as the United States began normalizing its relations with the Vietnamese government. As relations were normalized, the US wished to normalize migration “through regular immigration channels” and procedures as well. These channels and procedures increasingly relied on interaction between multiple US agencies and NGOs as the 1990s progressed (as will be discussed below). The ODP formally reached termination by State in 1999.  

Bosnia, 1995

Ethnic cleansing in the Bosnian conflict resulted in the displacement of nearly half of Herzegovina’s population between 1992 and 1995, when the Dayton Accord put a formal end to fighting. Approximately 600,000 of these were IDPs, while an estimated 1,259,000 sought refuge in outside countries. Similar to the current conflict in Iraq, displaced Bosnians belonged to multiple ethnicities, sects, and confessions; thus, the policy lessons learned from their case bear a special significance towards Iraq. This case differs from Iraq to the degree that human security issues were handled across many nations and international organizations, such as NATO, the UN, and many NGOs. Their interactions, however, also merit analysis for the lessons they can lend to US interagency cooperation. It is also important to review how refugee resettlement policies to the United States changed in this case from what they had been during the Cold War. While the Dayton Accord suffered criticism for its ability to handle human security issues (particularly the care and return of displaced persons), its initial shortcomings led to reforms and achievements since 2000, and might serve as a model for how the US interagency can adapt to succeed in these missions.

The Dayton Accord’s military aspects were implemented by IFOR, an international force commanded by NATO and principally comprised of American, British, and French troops. A study by RAND has concluded that NATO (and notably the United States), while well-organized, “adopted a limited view of its responsibilities,” and interpreted its military mandate narrowly, shying away from involvement in nonmilitary missions that were somewhat ambiguously defined. Such supporting assignments included providing assistance to the UNHCR and various other international and nongovernmental organizations in humanitarian missions, protecting the movement of civilian populations (refugees and IDPs), and creating “secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks.” According to the study, IFOR (and especially the United States) was initially reluctant to support humanitarian missions for fear of “mission creep” and possibly creating a “dependency culture” where international organizations and NGOs would rely too much on the military apparatus. This could cause agency missions and lines of authority to become unclear, and confuse the distinction between civilian and military duties.

The UNHCR was selected as the principle agency for aiding and facilitating the return of
refugees and IDPs to their home cities.\(^{76}\) Its efforts, however, were significantly hampered throughout the 1990s by a series of factors. First among these were concerns over security conditions facing refugees as they returned to their homes (or what remained), particularly among ethnic minorities. “Persistent and often-violent attacks on those brave enough to risk returning kept these numbers extremely low”\(^{77}\) in the first years after the Dayton Accord took effect, and were undercut further by IFOR’s reluctance to participate in such missions. The return of displaced persons was also hindered by unresolved legal issues over property, a shortage of basic living materials for those who did manage to return, and a general lack of procedural coordination between the UNHCR and its partner institutions (the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the UN Mission, and the Stabilization Force, for example).

Refugee resettlement to the United States also achieved mixed results, and demonstrates a post-Cold War shift in a relocation policy that heavily utilizes NGOs to support the federal program. The Department of State oversaw the resettlement process through its Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). Refugees were first screened and prepared for resettlement in a pre-entry program operating out of Zagreb, Croatia. This program was run by the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), an NGO funded by the Department of State and tasked with preparing outbound refugees for travel to the United States and helping them adapt upon their arrival.\(^{78}\) Upon entering the US, Bosnian refugees were resettled in communities designated by PRM,\(^{79}\) and were then assisted by one or more nongovernmental voluntary resettlement agencies, which helped arrange services ranging from housing, transportation, medical assistance, employment, and community adjustment, among many others.\(^{80}\) NGOs helped resettle 6,500 Bosnians into the United States during the first two years of the program\(^ {81}\) (between 1993 and 1995), and took in about 200,000 Bosnian refugees overall.

While the program yielded significant numbers, it also suffered many challenges with the refugees. For example, many Bosnians faced numerous difficulties adjusting to their new lives, despite the best efforts of NGOs. These included learning to speak English, finding work, cultural shock, continued trauma, distress over current events in Bosnia, and the general stress of starting life over from scratch.\(^{82}\) Many also arrived in very poor health, but had difficulty finding the treatments they needed at affordable costs. In other cases, the roles and distinctions between NGOs and US governmental authorities were not made clear to Bosnians, and many sought out the wrong agencies for various needs.\(^ {83}\) Finally, it has been reported that some Bosnians came to use their refugee status as a crutch, and expected amounts of sympathy from their new American communities, which in turn often did not understand who the refugees were or what they wanted.\(^ {84}\)

During the first several years of the Dayton Accord’s implementation, it has been “widely criticized for not producing [humanitarian] results more quickly, especially regarding the return of refugees and displaced people.”\(^ {85}\) Since 2000, however, there has been a significant improvement in returns – almost 1 million displaced people have returned to their “prewar municipalities as of 2003, and have partially reversed the ethnic cleansing” which took place.\(^ {86}\) This accomplishment is the result of significant integrative reforms between the agencies involved in managing displaced persons. One of the first steps was to improve the security environments surrounding returnees, which involved greater support of the UNHCR and its subsidiaries by the military missions. The RAND study notes, better multi-agency coordination between “OHR, SFOR, the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the OSCE, and the UNHCR has been the key in creating an environment conducive to returns.”\(^ {87}\) Another important step towards facilitating returns was the creation of the Property Implementation Plan (PIP), which helped define and enforce property laws for displaced returnees who came back to destroyed or occupied homes. Overall, the UNHCR and its partner agencies created return plans, addressed legal and procedural matters, aided physical returns of displaced people, provided physical assistance upon return, and greatly improved their effectiveness towards displaced persons through these reforms.\(^ {88}\)

Kosovo, 1999

Between March 24, 1998 and June 3, 1999, about 863,000 ethnic Albanians in Kosovo were displaced to neighboring Albania, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, while several hundred
In addition, over 100,000 ethnic Serbs became displaced as Serbian forces (at first on the offense) lost their positions to NATO air strikes. While policies towards Bosnian refugees and IDPs were ultimately successful in aiding, relocating, and returning the displaced, their accomplishments came after a decade of interagency reform. Humanitarian (and in particular, refugee) efforts in Kosovo were able to implement Bosnia’s lessons and conduct effective, integrative operations from the beginning. This made it one of the fastest, “best organized and best resourced post-Cold War operations,” due to its “degree of collaboration and burden-sharing” among the agencies and nations involved. On the federal level, the United States also exhibited slightly more integrative behavior in its resettlement policies involving US agencies and NGOs.

Military and human security was jointly overseen by NATO and the United Nations in Kosovo. While NATO’s primary domain was military security operations and the UN was the first authority in humanitarian missions, “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 built in an intentional overlap between the two organizations’ mandates for policing and internal security,” with NATO forces assisting UN humanitarian missions as needed. The purpose of UNSCR 1244’s directive was to clarify the mandate of each entity and eliminate the reluctance to support the other’s missions (particularly on the part of the military in humanitarian operations). It did this by detailing guidelines to create an “international security presence,” which included “establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons could return home in safety… civil presence could operate… and humanitarian aid could be delivered.”

KFOR (NATO’s force in Kosovo) and the UN followed this directive from the beginning of operations, and were able to achieve large and rapid successes by complementing each others’ missions. In addition to securing a region militarily, KFOR was also initially a joint, temporary provider of humanitarian assistance in the area until the UNHCR and NGOs could safely establish their operations. Once humanitarian organizations became operational, they assumed full control, and provided emergency aid shelters and supervised the return of displaced persons. The integrated nature of this initiative allowed for fast returns of refugees and IDPs and the effective distribution of humanitarian assistance. Such benchmarks include: the return of 500,000 displaced persons in the first month after the conflict; the sheltering of 700,000 people during the winter months; and the distribution of food to 1.5 million people. This allowed the major humanitarian initiative of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo to successfully be phased out as early as July 2000.

US domestic policy aimed to relocate approximately 20,000 refugees from Kosovo to the United States. Like the Bosnia case, US agencies relied heavily on the support of NGOs to resettle, aid, and acclimate the refugees to their new homes. In this case, however, the Department of Defense played a minor cooperative role, filling in on many of the screening duties the International Catholic Migration Commission carried out for Bosnians. For example, Fort Dix, New Jersey was used as a reception and screening center, performing medical and security checks on 4,000 Kosovar refugees arriving from Macedonia. This was the first major use of military bases for refugee relocation since the first influx of Vietnamese. The Kosovars generally assimilated well; their refugee status allowed them to seek work permits, and they were allowed to apply for citizenship within one year if they wished to remain in the US. The program also worked quickly; it shut down at the end of June 1999.

Observable Patterns and Analysis

The above case studies display four major themes regarding refugee aid and resettlement policies. The first concerns the flow volume of refugees, and how interagency cooperation has dealt with various sizes of influxes. The second pattern is the significant shift from resettlement and aid policies based almost totally in government agencies to a very significant reliance on NGOs to support these operations, particularly after the Cold War. As a result, the third notable is a growing, general reluctance of military agencies involved in conflicts to participate in human security operations. The final observation analyzes the impact of US resettlement efforts on the likelihood of refugees returning to their home countries.
When analyzing the volume and timeframe of refugee inflows across these cases, several notable observations become apparent. The Vietnam, Bosnia, and Kosovo cases all had mass exoduses of refugees at their beginnings. The Vietnamese case then saw a slow, piecemeal, secondary wave occur a few years later, and last for several decades. Judging by these case histories, when there have been large volumes of refugees and IDPs, there have accordingly been large interagency responses to cope with them (whether on the US federal level, or between international institutions). Further, the most successful efforts at dealing with large volumes have been ones in which the military apparatus has been well-integrated into the process. They provide the security needed to establish and execute refugee assistance and deliver aid to displaced persons. This notion is supported by another study which concludes that problems regarding displaced persons are more likely to be solved once security has been achieved.

Conversely, when the volume of refugees slowed to a regular trickle (particularly in the case of those resettling to the United States), the interagency apparatus has dealt with it through slower, systematized, procedures. For example, when the Vietnamese “boat people” began to flee their country in a disorganized trail over the course of several years, the US government’s response was to establish the ODP. This program became so standardized that its duties were transferred into the Department of State’s regular admissions program under the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration for dealing with non-crisis asylum-program under the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration for dealing with non-crisis asylum-seekers. During the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts, the international, multi-agency responses to the refugee crises on the ground were large; however, compared to the Vietnamese example, the number of refugees relocated to the US was comparatively small, and was therefore manageable within the parameters of PRM’s admissions program.

Coinciding with the shift towards a standardized process, refugee relocation policy also became increasingly reliant on the support of private organizations, both in the field (providing aid and services) and inside the United States (providing relocation assistance). Policy at the beginning of the Vietnamese refugee effort relied primarily on the authority of two large federal agencies: the Departments of State and Defense. Since then, as the process grew larger and more standardized, more NGOs and private aid organizations were integrated into operations to help carry out the workload (this can be seen in the Bosnia and Kosovo cases). This may have occurred for numerous reasons. First, the number of NGOs, nonprofit organizations, and other private entities which could assist relocation and aid operations increased during this time period, particularly since the 1980s. Second, the availability of many organizations dedicated to particular purposes allowed the US government to fill in various humanitarian program needs with people of specific expertise. Finally, the nonprofit and charitable nature of many of these organizations allowed the government to use these partners at a lower cost. As well, other smaller federal agencies became part of the formula. For example, USAID became more involved as a regulator of many of the NGOs and other aid contractors that were now involved. More recently, the Department of Homeland Security has become involved in the refugee relocation process, conducting a portion of the pre-departure screening of candidates hoping to come to the US (this will be discussed further in the next section).

But while the expansion and involvement of NGOs into refugee relocation and aid policies brought expertise and many extra hands to these processes, it has also had unintended consequences. Such a large and diverse involvement of organizations has, in some areas, created an overlap of responsibilities and a confusion of missions. A glaring, problematic example of this existed in the Bosnian case, where instead of fostering institutional cooperation, the overlap between UNHCR and NATO mandates caused IFOR to shy away from participation in nonmilitary operations. IFOR’s interpretation of their mandate erred on the side of caution; it adhered to only purely military actions in order to avoid “mission creep” into the humanitarian sphere and prevent dependence from those organizations. When cooperation between military and humanitarian entities eventually improved, the state of refugees and IDPs also progressed (as did their return numbers). The mission in Kosovo aimed to avoid this failure of cooperation by providing clearer guidelines for military and humanitarian roles in UNSCR 1244. This forced the military to participate by distinctly writing it into their mandate, which definitively overlapped into refugee and humanitarian assistance missions. Accordingly, operations were conducted smoothly and successfully.
The final observation that can be taken from these studies regards the implications of refugee relocation to the United States. In each example (and particularly the last two), the US resettlement programs were complex endeavors that involved the time and resources of many organizations. These programs went to great lengths to assimilate and provide for the health and welfare of relocated persons. The level of involvement and effort put into screening, processing, and relocating refugees suggests that the United States anticipates these people will remain in-country (perhaps eventually seeking citizenship), rather than return to their former communities. Indeed, while refugees in each case were given the option of returning to their home countries at some suitable time, many found their new lives in the United States to be much more preferable than their old circumstances. Some Kosovars being processed at Fort Dix even described their temporary conditions as "heaven." Additionally, refugees who have family members already settled in the United States are more likely to remain permanently; this was one of the main premises that the Vietnamese ODP was based upon.

The anticipated permanence of refugees in the United States is significant because it relates to the US' overall expectations for their home counties. These expectations are reflected in the number of refugees resettled during and immediately after a particular conflict. By the fall of Saigon, the US divested itself from any further missions to support an anti-communist state. Accordingly, very large numbers of Vietnamese who fled the communist regime were granted seemingly permanent relocation (135,000 initially fled, followed by the slow trickle of 523,000 which was handled by the ODP). In comparison, the goals for the Bosnian and Kosovar cases were different. In these cases, the US and the UN sought to restore peace and rebuild these nations’ political, economic, and social institutions. In order to achieve this, both countries needed as much of their populations restored as possible. Therefore, comparatively fewer amounts of refugees were relocated to new countries. Instead, humanitarian efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo focused on securing, aiding, and returning displaced persons to their homes. Based on the comparative analysis of the Vietnam, Bosnia and Kosovo cases, the next section offers policy recommendations to draw on the lessons of these past experiences.

Policy Recommendations

1. The US interagency requires clarified, detailed, cooperative roles in human security operations such as for refugees and internally displaced persons assistance.

   It is clear from the case studies, as well as the current difficulties assisting Iraqi IDPs, that refugee assistance operations function best when agency mandates are specific, overlapping, and involve a military apparatus to secure the operations of its partners. The Department of Defense should follow the lesson learned from the Bosnian case that was corrected in Kosovo by UNSCR 1244, and be prepared to protect and assist USAID and its NGO associates in distributing humanitarian assistance to Iraqis who have been displaced or who are trying to return to their homes. This mandate should be codified by a new DOD directive that more specifically defines humanitarian and human security missions and delineates obligations.

   Agency cooperation in human security missions might also be fostered by the formation of regional interagency teams. For example, leading regional officials from the Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, and USAID might locate themselves together according to Department of Defense combatant commands in order to coordinate refugee policies. This framework could be replicated on any number of sub-regional levels, much like a provincial reconstruction team. This model would also facilitate situations where difficult diplomatic relations hinder aid and resettlement operations, as in the case between Syrian and US officials. Regional interagency teams representing all concerned agencies would then be able to interface simultaneously with other international organizations (such as the UNHCR, which the Syrian government works through) to coordinate policies. Regional interagency teams may also make more accessible, comprehensive representatives to coordinate with the governments in a given region that the US does interface with, such as Jordan’s.

2. The interagency should shift its primary focus away from resettlement programs and concentrate most on effectively providing security and substantial amounts of aid to Iraqi internally displaced persons, refugees, and refugee host states.

   This is a far more effective, further reaching solution that will ultimately serve refugees, IDPs,
host countries, and US objectives more fully. Resettlement is not ideal for the majority of Iraqis. As Ambassador Foley has noted, most want to return home, only a small percentage are eligible for resettlement under US conditions, many drop out of the process, and until they can return “they need to be assisted in place.” The ultimate US-Iraqi goal should be to rebuild and restore Iraqi neighborhoods and societies, particularly the educated middle class. Placing too much focus on resettlement undermines this, and the further away refugees are resettled, the less likely they are to return to their homes in Iraq.

Providing a much larger aid effort to refugees and IDPs would allow refugees in nearby host countries to stay closer to home, thereby increasing the feasibility and likelihood of their eventual return to Iraq. This would also take pressure off of the basic resources of host nations, alleviating at least some of the tension between refugees and their host populations. It would also undermine the efforts of sectarian groups hoping to co-opt the support of IDP populations. If US agencies and their NGO associates (or, eventually and more optimally, the Iraqi government) can provide for IDPs and win their loyalty, it will simultaneously drain support and legitimacy from opposition sectarian groups and shore these up in favor of US and Iraqi authority. The US might also consider emulating the Bosnian Property Implementation Plan to help resolve property rights issues; this would facilitate returns, and provide a measure of assuredness to people who are contemplating return but are unsure of getting their homes back.

3. If the US refugee resettlement program is to remain and be developed as a part of US human security policy, it must be reformed in terms of its scope, timing, and staff and resource levels.

The current resettlement program costs much, requires a large amount of advanced preparation, and benefits relatively few refugees (and, by correlation, barely helps host countries). If the program is to be worthwhile, it must expand the criteria of who it considers and to whom it extends priority for relocation (more than just those who have worked with the US). As another researcher of US refugee relocation policy put it, admissions quotas should be raised and treated “as a target, not a ceiling.” If the program is to be productive, it must be set up far earlier in advance, and expand its staff significantly to deal with processing and resettlement of more refugees. The Department of Homeland Security must either substantially increase its refugee screening personnel in the region, or be prepared to cede some or all of its duties to the Department of State in order to effectively improve screening and processing procedures for refugee relocation, as Ambassador Crocker has suggested. Another study on US refugee policy has also noted that the “split of immigration enforcement and immigration services among three separate bureaus in the new Department has caused some difficulties,” and notes (much like Crocker) that embassy workers or video interview might be better alternatives.

Conclusion

A United States Senate staff report recently concluded that there is a “startling lack of American leadership in a crisis that much of the international community considers a result of our intervention in Iraq.” It will be up to the next presidential administration to step into this leadership role and determine how to help restore Iraq’s social foundation. The current Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, has shown the next President that the key to accomplishing this will be through utilizing the US’ full array of agencies together, in support of one another. Human security challenges should be approached in this holistic manner, and will show that the United States’ soft power capabilities are just as strong and important as its hard military capacity.

But first, there are lessons to be learned about interagency cooperation for the US. Case histories have shown that military support of humanitarian operations is vital to their success. As well, if the end game is a restored civil society, then this goal should drive refugee and resettlement programs that have the potential to contribute to state-building. The United States has the institutions and capacity to apply these lessons to a new policy. It will be the responsibility of America’s next presidential administration to apply these reforms, pursue innovative, new approaches, and integrate human security issues, such as refugee resettlement, humanitarian aid, and internally displaced persons policies and programs into America’s array of effective national security instruments.
Endnotes


4 Wilson, James Q. 1989. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books. On p. 221 Wilson comments on the inherent nature of organizations to be resistant to innovation and changes to their mandates. This is supplemented by his commentary on p. 179, where he describes how agencies place a high value on their autonomy, and may resist being tied to other agencies’ missions.


6 The estimated refugee populations incorporate figures from the UNHCR as well as other field-based data reported in studies by Fagen (2007), al-Khalidi, et al. (2007), International Crisis Group (2008), and IDP Working Group (2008). The figures from Syria hover around the same estimate, while the Jordanian estimates have had more variation. The IDPWG notes a figure as low as 400,000, while Fagen cites numbers as high as 800,000.

7 February 2006 has become a common benchmark among many other studies on displaced Iraqis during this conflict. The 2007 studies by Fagen and al-Khalidi, et al., as well as the 2008 reports by ICG and the IDP Working Group all acknowledge the Samarra mosque bombing as a watershed and a measuring point from which they study the bulk of refugees and IDPs.

8 The IDP Working Group calculates that 69% of IDPs originate from Baghdad (2008, p. 8-9). The Brookings Institution study by al-Khalidi, et al. reports that most Iraqi refugees in Syria are from Baghdad as well (2007, p. 11), and trends suggest the same origin for the majority of refugees in Jordan.


10 al-Khalidi, et al., p. 11.

11 According to a Brookings Institute study, smaller amounts of Iraqis in Syria have also settled in the towns of Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Latakia, and Tartus. See al-Khalidi, et al., p. 23.

12 IDP Working Group, p. 5.

13 Ibid.

14 This served to support the false sentiment among locals that “all Iraqis are rich.” This is a stereotype the author witnessed firsthand in Amman in 2007, as many Jordanians complained about the Iraqis who had moved into the wealthy neighborhoods of Abdoun and Shmeisani. It is also a notion supported by al-Khalidi, et al. in their study of refugees in Syria (2007, pp. 9, 29) and by ICG’s study of refugees in Amman (2008, p. i).


16 Ibid, p. 10.


18 al-Khalidi, et al., p. 17.

19 Ibid, p. 22. This study also asserts that Iraqis may prefer travel to Syria because the road is shorter, compared to the road to Jordan which runs the entire width of the Anbar governorate.

20 IDP Working Group, p. 13.

21 Ibid.

22 This can be attributed to at least three different reasons. The first is related to a strong regional tradition, whereby citizens of Arab countries are not considered “foreigners” in each others’ countries the way other visitors might be. Instead, they are granted easy movement across borders, access to public services such as health and education, and may invest heavily in the economies and properties of each others’ countries. This brotherly hospitality, however, means that there is neither need nor precedent to grant fellow Arabs any status other than “guests.” Jordan, and Syria especially, adhere to this tradition. More detailed explanations of this custom can be found in: Fagen, Patricia Weiss. 2007. “Iraqi Refugees: Seeking Stability in Syria and Jordan.” Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of International Migration and Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University. http://isim.georgetown.edu/Publications/PatPubs/Iraqi%20Refugees.pdf. p. 4-5 and al-Khalidi, et al., pp. 20-21. The second reason for not granting refugee status to Iraqis may be due to the nature in which they first arrived. From 2003 through the end of 2005, both countries had gotten used to accepting Iraqis (most all from the upper class) in a piecemeal fashion, and watched them comfortably settle in accordance with the aforementioned tradition. This further reinforced the idea that incoming Iraqis should be treated as guests. Finally, now that much larger numbers have flooded into both countries, they may be relying on this policy to ensure that the Iraqis do not settle down permanently. This is especially important to Jordan, where the population of Palestinian refugees outnumbers the “native” Jordanian population by a factor of two to one.

23 This was particularly the case in Jordan, which drastically tightened its policies toward Iraqis after the November 2005 hotel bombings in Amman and the upsurge of violence in Iraq after February 2006. See Fagen, p. 8.

24 Although, according to Fagen and several other studies, both the Syrian and Jordanian governments have gone out of their way on numerous occasions to “bend the rules” or look the other way in the name of “humanitarian flexibility” to accommodate Iraqis who must remain in-country illegally. See Fagen, p. 9.

25 Fagen, p. 8, notes that only a select few Iraqis are eligible for employment under this status in Jordan. They must be able to invest the equivalent of $150,000 into the Jordanian economy, or else have a well-educated background in a field of particular desire to the Jordanian government. While many of the very first Iraqis to Jordan fit this description and often bought homes, their case is exceptional when compared to refugees in Syria and the majority of refugees to Jordan.


28 Ibid, pp. 4-5.


31 al-Khalidi, et al., p. 43.


33 IDP Working Group, p. 10.


36 Ibid, p. 28.
Integrating Human Security into America’s Soft Power: The Iraqi Refugee Test


44 Crocker telegram, p. 2.


46 American Friends Service Committee, p. 3.


49 Crocker telegram, p. 3.


51 Ibid.


54 Fagen, p. 10.

55 Ibid, pp. 22-23.


59 IDP Working Group, p. 21.


62 Ibid, section 4.5.

Refugee Resettlement.” In it, she compares the circumstances and program of the 1970s with the circumstances in Iraq today, and ultimately concludes that the two cases are not congruent and merit different responses.


65 Elliott, Debbie (2007).


67 Ibid.


69 Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (1999).

70 Ibid.


73 Ibid, p. 107


76 Ibid, p. 94.


79 For an incomplete list of twenty-two of these communities, see Somach, p. 9.

80 For a listing of forty-two of these NGOs and additional resettlement contacts, see Somach, pp. 29-35.

81 Somach, p. 10.

82 Ibid, p. 22.


84 Ibid.

85 Dobbins, et al., p. 95.


87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid, p. 113.

90 Ibid, p. 127.


92 Ibid, p. 115.

93 Ibid, p. 121. KFOR would continue to escort and safeguard ethnic minorities in some regions.


97 Ibid.
This reluctance to engage in humanitarian missions was probably also rooted in recent history. Just two years earlier, US forces had been deployed into Somalia to execute a humanitarian mission under the United Nations’ Unified Task Force (UNITAF). Their mandate later ballooned far outside this scope, and as Dobbins, et al. (p. 69) explain, “an egregious failure in command” in which neither US nor UN leadership completely understood each others’ mandates led to the demise of the overall mission.

Feyerick.


Ibid, p. x.


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Established in 2001 as one of the regional units of the International Programs Office at Texas A&M University, the EU Center of Excellence (EUCE) is one of ten centers in the nation designated and funded by the European Commission, and is the only such center in the southwestern part of the United States. The mission of the EUCE is to support and enhance the European curricula, academic research, and outreach activities at Texas A&M University, increase the level of knowledge of the European Union, and promote a better understanding of the policies and issues that influence the Trans-Atlantic relationship.

The George Bush Presidential Library Foundation

The George Bush Presidential Library Foundation was established in 1991 as a nonprofit educational foundation to design, build, and support the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum at Texas A&M University. In addition to sponsoring its own programs and activities, the Foundation provides program and financial support to the Library, as well as the George Bush School of Government and Public Service. The Foundation also sponsors a number of outreach programs: an annual domestic and foreign policy conference, the White House Lecture and Exhibit Series, and various other lecture and program series.

Office of the Vice President for Research

The mission of the Office of the Vice President for Research is to provide leadership and coordination in the development, implementation, operation and assessment of programs that support creative scholarship, graduate studies and sponsored research throughout Texas A&M University, an institution that holds a triple designation as a land-grant, sea-grant and space-grant university. The office of the VP for Research supports the university’s participation in more than 500 research projects in over 80 countries and an annual research expenditure of more than $550 million. This office supports research on every continent in the world and formal research and exchange agreements with about 100 institutions in about 40 countries.

Texas A&M University Office of Graduate Studies

The Office of Graduate Studies (OGS) maintains the official record for each graduate student, and in this role serves as the primary administrative body and over arching source of information for graduate education. Once a graduate student is accepted by an academic department or college, OGS assists and facilitates progression towards completion of a graduate degree through maintenance of all official documents. Clearance for graduation, including final review of theses and dissertations when required, is performed by OGS.
The European Union Center of Excellence (EUCE) at Texas A&M University is one of three regional centers within the International Programs Office (IPO) supporting international education as a university tradition.

Designated in 2005 as a ‘Center of Excellence,’ it is one of ten centers in the national network to receive funding from the European Commission to promote a better understanding of the European Union, and the policies and issues that influence the Transatlantic relationship.

In partnership with colleges and professional schools on campus, the EUCE promotes the development and enhancement of the European curricula, research, and outreach activities at Texas A&M University.

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