From the Six-Party Talks to a Northeast Asian Security Regime?: Cooperative Threat Reduction Strategies and Institutional Development

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Abstract:

Are there relevant lessons from the Nunn Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction case that can inform counterproliferation policy versus the nuclear weapons threats presented by North Korea? During the 1990s, there were various attempts by the Clinton Administration to innovate in national security policymaking. Innovations were attempted in peace operations, the interagency process, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Were the 1990s Clinton policy leadership efforts in stopping the threats of WMD proliferation in North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq all policy failures that could have been prevented? Could more effective Clinton Administration policy leadership have made US counterproliferation efforts more successful? This paper focuses on the Clinton Administration’s Counterproliferation Policy Initiative in the development and implementation of the Nunn Lugar programs for Cooperative Threat Reduction with Russia and the Former Soviet Republics. This case study uses institutionalist theory to explore using a cooperative strategy approach for building a counterproliferation regime in Northeast Asia. The analytical framework includes an examination of the Nunn Lugar, or Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs, from policy relevance and instrumental relevance perspectives. Overall, this paper’s findings suggest the significance of institution and organization-building approaches for improving counterproliferation policymaking. The option suggested here is to nurture a small group of like-minded states and statesmen (the six parties), focused around one specific functional area (counterproliferation), to build effective rules, organizations and enforcement mechanisms for developing an effective Northeast Asian security regime.

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Introduction and Background

On going difficulties in the six-party talks for eliminating North Korean nuclear programs continue to dominate the Northeast Asian security agenda. The public debate over the appropriate US policy and negotiating strategies offers stark choices. On the one hand, the Bush Administration argues for continuing a multilateral approach for bringing regional pressures to bear, especially encouraging Chinese policy leadership. The opposition, especially as voiced by democratic candidates in the 2004 US presidential election, called for the resumption of bilateral talks between the US and North Korea. The objectives of both sides in the debate focus on similar objectives, including eliminating North Korean nuclear weapons along with nuclear weapons and long-range missile development programs. Given the current lack of progress then, is there a better approach for regional or multilateral negotiations?

Bilateralists may point to the earlier success of the Agreed Framework (Perry 1999, p. 123). Critics of the Agreed Framework can point to the breakdown of the Framework in 2000. The Clinton memoir cites the success of the Framework as well as his failed attempts to continue diplomacy with North Korea to reduce tensions and pave the way for additional arms controls regarding long-range missiles (Clinton 2004). Certainly, given the current news, the stalling of the six-party talks provides some pause for reflecting on alternatives for continuing along the current path. The purpose of this paper is to examine the possibilities for improving the current approach to North Korea

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1 Then Secretary of Defense William Perry called the North Korean crisis the most serious in the first Clinton Administration. His first hand perspective is that the real potential for war was prevented because of the Agreed Framework negotiation. Perry writes that: “We were about to give the president a choice between a disastrous option—allowing North Korea to get a nuclear arsenal…and an unpalatable option, blocking this development, but thereby risking a destructive non-nuclear war” (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 123-124).
using a theoretically informed multilateralist perspective. Institutional theory provides an alternative path to consider for addressing the current counterproliferation policy challenges in Northeast Asia. In addition to an institutional theoretical perspective, there is a practical example of a counterproliferation success for comparison with the Agreed Framework’s coercive diplomacy approach.

One widely recognized counterproliferation success is from the Clinton era experience in the Nunn Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programs with Russia and the Former Soviet Republics. Balanced reviews of Nunn Lugar programs note that after a decade their projects have “gained the kind of political, bureaucratic, and budgetary support that has all but institutionalized them” (Sokolski and Riisager 2002, p. 2). For supporters of the Nunn Lugar approach, the question is how to enhance these programs to gain additional benefits beyond the early projects for consolidating and controlling Soviet nuclear weapons in Russian territory. Graham Allison and others call for extending Nunn Lugar type projects to dismantle additional nuclear weapons, control fissile materials, deny terrorists access to nuclear weapons and technology, etc. (Allison 2004).

This paper examines the policy development and implementation of the Clinton era Nunn Lugar programs to provide insights drawn from this positive example of success in counterproliferation policy. The institutionalist approach provides a framework for thinking about a regional security regime that goes beyond the current six-party framework in Northeast Asia. Institutionalist theory also provides scholarly insights for discussing the Nunn Lugar framework to link international relations theory with the practical lessons drawn from a successful counterproliferation policy case.
Another insight this case offers is in contrasting competitive strategies,\(^2\) such as addressed in coercive diplomacy theory, with a cooperative strategic approach, as suggested in institutional theory.\(^3\)

One option for current counterproliferation policymaking regarding North Korea then is to leverage ongoing issues and concerns, the six-party talks, and the episodic crisis atmosphere, while building an institutional approach for a Northeast Asian security regime. Lepgold and Nincic (2002) address the theory and history of international institutionalism and the theoretical knowledge and practical experiences they recount suggests a roadmap for proceeding with institutional development. In brief, they propose a pattern of success based on international relations functionalist theories, as well as the recent history of the EU and NATO.\(^4\) In brief, the option suggested here is to nurture a small group of like-minded states and statesmen (the six parties), focused around one specific functional area (counterproliferation), to build effective rules, organizations and enforcement mechanisms for developing an effective Northeast Asian security regime.

**Institutionalism as a Cooperative Strategy**

As discussed in the previous section, in the North Korean case of the Agreed Framework negotiations, the Clinton Administration engaged in a traditional, diplomatic approach, stressing principles and techniques similar to those drawn from the scholarly

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\(^3\) The author presented a paper highlighting a competitive strategy, that is, using the coercive diplomacy literature to analyze the Agreed Framework case at the 2004 International Studies Association Conference. See Joseph R. Cerami and Benjamin C. Bryan, “Executive Leadership and the Counterproliferation Policy Initiative—the US-North Korea Agreed Framework.” An updated version may be found as Bush School Working Paper #410 at http://bush.tamu.edu/content/research/working_papers/jcerami/CeramiBryan.pdf.

\(^4\) Hemmer and Katzenstein (2001) also compare differences in US Cold War approaches to successful regional arrangements in Europe and the lack of similar approaches in Asia. Their paper is significant for its emphasis on the impact of cultural and historical differences in contrasting favoring multilateral approaches for the US in Europe, and bilateral approaches for the US in Asia.
international relations theories of coercive diplomacy. The North Korean Agreed Framework case is representative of top-down policy leadership. President Clinton, Secretary of Defense Perry, Secretary of State Christopher, and other high level executive branch stakeholders were engaged in developing the Administration’s policy and overseeing the bilateral US – North Korean negotiations. Other US officials and allied governments were consulted, including the US Congress and the governments of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Japan. The implementation of the Agreed Framework included the significant involvement of the United Nation’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as active monitoring by the US government, especially the intelligence agencies.

A second case study examining alternative approaches is significant for gaining insights into the conditions for developing effective national security counterproliferation policies. As argued previously, given the history of the past decade, the Agreed Framework case suggests a failed counterproliferation effort. Given the lack of institutional and organizational roots, the Agreed Framework failed to achieve lasting effects in accordance with the US objective of ending the North’s nuclear weapons program. In comparison then, why is the Nunn-Lugar policy outcome generally agreed to be more successful than the Agreed Framework experience?

Examining a more successful case, one led more directly by the secretary of defense, along with DOD staff, and influenced by other organizational stakeholders, including an engaged Congress and regional players -- all suggests additional insights into the components of effective counterproliferation policymaking. What insights does the Nunn Lugar case provide in terms of an instance where executive and bureaucratic
leadership contributed to successful and lasting policy innovation? What were the roles of the defense secretary and the DOD bureaucracy as well as the roles of the key senators? These executive and legislative branch leadership efforts were designed to address the critical proliferation threats of “loose nukes” from the Former Soviet Republics in the aftermath of the Cold War.

For gaining theoretical insights to guide this case study, this paper introduces concepts drawn from the literature on international institutions. First, the American outlook on international security institutions in the past century will be described briefly. Next, the major ideas and views in institutional theory will be outlined. Then, the known conditions for success or failure in institution building will be discussed. Lastly, these ideas and conditions will guide an examination of U.S. policy as developed by the Secretary of Defense and others involved in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs to prevent WMD proliferation in the Former Soviet Republics.

The twentieth century history of the U.S. posture toward international institutions includes three cycles of engagement followed by withdrawal (Schlesinger 2003, Ruggie 1993, Doyle 1997). With the dissolution of the Soviet Union during the George H.W. Bush (hereafter George Bush) presidency, international institutions came to be viewed more favorably once again. In 1991, George Bush called for a renewed international order under UN guidance after a successful international coalition contributed to the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces in the Gulf War (Bush and Scowcroft 1998). President Clinton continued this wave of engagement, promoting a policy of assertive

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5 These general trends are identified with Woodrow Wilson and the failure of the League of Nations; Roosevelt and Truman and the US leadership in forming the UN and NATO; as well as the backlash against the UN identified with the Presidency of Ronald Reagan and his US Ambassador to the UN, Jeanne Kirkpatrick.
multilateralism, especially pronounced in the coalition diplomacy and difficulties with UN and NATO policymakers regarding the employment of peacekeeping armed forces in the Balkans (Albright 2003, Holbrooke 1999, Clark 2001).

The cycle again showed signs of again reversing away from international institutions, as the second-term Clinton Administration concerns grew regarding U.S. strength being overextended, especially after experiencing difficulties in international peacekeeping efforts in Haiti, Somalia and the Balkans. During the 2000 presidential election, American engagement and intervention abroad through international institutions came under intense criticism in George W. Bush’s campaign. With the second Bush’s election, there was evidence again of a neoconservative backlash against international institutions (Frum and Perle 2003). Soon after the election, the United States pulled out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the Russians. Antipathy toward international institutions could be observed even more clearly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. For instance, in a 2002 UN speech, George W. Bush clearly signaled his intention for the US to go it alone if the UN did not act against Saddam Hussein. He said: “We will work with the U.N. Security Council … But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced – the just demands of peace and security will be met – or action will be unavoidable” (George W. Bush 2002).

The watershed moment for this new posture of US unilateralism for preventive defense was highlighted in America’s war in Iraq starting in 2002, which the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, viewed as illegal in terms of international law. In response to a BBC journalist’s pointed questions about the US war in Iraq, Annan
replied: “Yes, I have indicated it is not in conformity with the UN Charter, from our point of view and from the Charter point of view it was illegal” (Annan 2004). The second Bush Administration had certainly not reduced involvement abroad as promised in the 2000 presidential campaign, and its apparent lack of patience for the diplomacy necessary for gaining UN approval for war (as authorized by the UN Charter’s Chapter VII) is cited as a cause for the rush to war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

Given the prominence of the UN and NATO since World War II, and in light of the ups and downs of various US Administration’s views on the efficacy of international institutions and multilateral organizations, insights on international institutions are important to guide an understanding of the conditions for promoting effective policymaking. For instance, the literature on international institutions addresses the notion of these shifting world views in US foreign and national security policies. Legro explores “why states fundamentally change their long-held ideas toward international affairs” and identifies two stages in such an ideational shift (Legro 2000, p. 254). The “reigning consensus” must collapse, and then follows the consolidation of a new dominant and viable idea (Legro 2000, pp. 263, 265-266). If there is a new shift toward reengagement and multilateralism on the horizon, it remains to be learned what conditions tend to precipitate the collapse of one Administration’s views and, on the other hand, what conditions lead to the emergence of a new strategic approach. Despite periodic American anxiety over institutional attachments, the threats of nuclear weapons and technology proliferation and terrorism require policymakers address these issues. The recent history of US-North Korean relations suggests that the lack of supporting institutional structures account in part for the breakdown in the Agreed Framework.
Were there supporting institutional structures that account for the relative success of Nunn-Lugar programs?

This paper next reviews the major contending scholars’ ideas regarding international institutions in order to inform an understanding of US policy regarding existing and emerging international institutions. The literature on international institutions frames an examination of the origins and purposes of institutions in several ways. In the realist world view, the pursuit of power forms the basis of any institutions that may arise (Mearsheimer 2001). Institutions are, in essence, a formalization of the distribution of power in the international system (Ikenberry 2001, p. 11). In the realist or power politics framework, states define their interests competitively and institutions are weak in comparison with states (Lepgold and Nincic 2001, pp. 148-149). Neorealism, as formulated by Waltz, emphasizes the importance of the balance of power among an anarchical world of states (Waltz 1959, Art and Waltz 1999). Neorealism regards institutions as part of an international order, that is, the “unintended outcome of balancing pressures or a reflection of learned and formalized rules of equilibrium and balance” (Ikenberry 2001, p. 11). One strain of neorealism stresses the important role that a hegemonic power plays in institution formation: preponderant power may allow the hegemon to offer incentives to weaker states that cooperate in the building of a particular order.

In contrast to realism, a liberal-internationalist approach proposes that a natural harmony of interests facilitates institution building (Doyle 1997). According to the liberal worldview, overlapping values and goals are the originators of international norms, regimes, and organizations. Neoliberalism argues that institutions act “as agreements or
contracts between actors that function to reduce uncertainty, lower transaction costs, and solve collective action problems” (Keohane 2002; Ikenberry 2001, p. 15). Increased efficiency is at the core of neoliberalism: by eliminating the need to attend multiple bilateral forums for every single issue, the transaction costs of doing international political business are lowered. Keohane first formulated this view, which stresses the importance of information flows, enforcement, and monitoring. A key concern of neoliberalism is that “institutions provide information to states and reduce the incentives for cheating” (Ikenberry 2001, p. 16).

Following the liberal traditions is a concept known as functionalism, which elevates individual issues as the primary source of institutions. A functionalist argues that the most effective institutions are those that serve practical functions as opposed to “grand political objectives” (Lepgold and Nincic 2001, p. 144). According to functionalist international relations scholars, an institution arises to address a specific concern through a “spontaneous, bottom-up process” (p. 144). 6

Apart from both the realist and liberal traditions stands the more sociologically-based concept called constructivism. According to Ikenberry, institutions are “diffuse and socially constructed worldviews that bound and shape the strategic behavior of individuals and states,” which serve as “cognitive maps” for state actors (Ikenberry 2001, p. 15). Constructivism does not assume that the interests of actors are fixed, but asserts

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6 Lepgold and Nincic are bullish on the utility of international institutions, writing: “In principle, well-designed international institutions provide a way to develop and implement common policies to deal with collective problems, and it is hard to find an international issue that has not become increasingly institutionalized in recent decades.” Furthermore, for breaching the international relations theory-practice gap, they emphasize that “the theoretical and empirical literature on international institutions should carry important practical implications” (Lepgold and Nincic 2001, p. 139). They go on to urge continued scholarship: “If scholarly work on international institutions can shed light on these issues [globalization and the backlash] by illuminating the opportunities, constraints, and consequences of multilateral actions, it should help officials shape external pursuits through multilateral means” (p. 139).
that social structures shape preferences (Lepgold and Nincic 2001, p. 150). Institutions define the group identity of a set of states by embodying and propagating shared norms (p. 151).

Having conducted a brief overview of these major approaches to institutional theory, what do we know about what makes a successful institution? What factors should be taken into account? Ikenberry addresses the initial context for institutions in writing that “Stable political orders tend to be those that have low returns to power and high returns to institutions” (Ikenberry 2001, p. 266). Orders that have low returns to power feature “systematic institutional limits” on what participants can do with their individual power (p. 266). High returns to institutions result in “sticky institutions” which are hard to replace (p. 268). According to Ikenberry then, “The more complex, adaptable, and autonomous” an institution is, the more it can lower the returns to power (p. 269).

Ruggie also addresses the initial conditions for institutional formation and survival, writing that “A permissive domestic environment” in the leading world state or states is very important for setting the scene for a successful institution (Ruggie 1993, p. 8). For example, Ruggie claims that American hegemony was more important than the mere existence of an international hegemon to the flourishing of recent multilateral institutions (p. 8). Thus, a leading state that looks on multilateral institutions in a very unfavorable manner may sow the seeds of destruction, or at least of weakening, for certain institutions that for whatever reasons are perceived as not serving the hegemon’s state interests. In her institutional analysis on the overriding importance of initial conditions for institution building, Zegart strongly emphasizes the critical influence of

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7 Ikenberry does not further define the concept of “stickiness.” Presumably he is referring to regimes that last, such as NATO, in comparison to those that don’t, such as SEATO.
founding moments in the creation of both successful and unsuccessful security agencies (Zegart 1999).

Related to neoliberalism’s emphasis on effective enforcement and monitoring are four key dimensions to take into account when crafting an institution. First, the manner in which information is pooled inside the institution is important. Good pooling of information can mitigate cooperation problems. Second, to what extent are rules crafted so as to be easily enforced? Regulations that come with incentives to comply are easier to enforce. Third, the number of members in an institution is important. The smaller the group’s membership, the easier it is to resolve difficulties. Fourth, the precision of rules and monitoring procedures are significant. Are rules mildly, modestly, or heavily elaborate or detailed? In general of course, more elaborate rules are more difficult to enforce.

In addition to these dimensions, several other issues raised by neoliberal thought may affect the success of institutions, according to Lepgold and Nincic. How many issues does the institution intend to address? The degree of bundling together of different issues is important. This question is highly relevant to the functionalist approach, which view institutions as essentially issue-based forums. Additionally, the way that issues are organized internationally figures into the calculus. How an issue is treated, and by whom, is important to how other actors will respond. Lastly, the “choice of partners” figures prominently. How like-minded is the membership of an institution? Is it generally true that members must share the necessary values to accomplish a particular end with efficiency?

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8 Ideas in this paragraph on the four key dimensions are from Lepgold and Nincic (2001, pp. 154-159).
A summary of several key points will serve to guide the remainder of this paper. Observations include both macro and micro perspectives on the areas guiding an analysis of the Nunn-Lugar case. From the macro-political level the notion of a world view, and especially a hegemon’s world view, is significant. This builds on Legro’s idea regarding changes resulting from the collapse of a reigning consensus and the emergence of a new dominant and viable idea in world politics.

Scholars’ interpretations of worldviews revolve around the four dominant perspectives discussed above: realism, liberalism, functionalism, and constructivism. Each proposes alternatives for policymaking as well as assumptions regarding the relevance of institutions as instruments of statecraft. The state leaders’ worldviews, especially for presidents and secretaries of defense, will have important policy implications. For realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer, the state is the focus of attention and its pursuit of self-interest in an anarchic world is of supreme importance. In Ikenberry’s characterization of neo-realism, however, balance of power matters as much as self-interest as a moderator of state power. In a neo-realist administration for instance, institutions may serve the states interests to the extent that the arrangements reflect learned and formal rules of equilibrium and balance – that reinforce stability and order, and, therefore, the position of dominant nation-states, or great powers.

Liberalism stresses a harmony of interests among nations in an international community. For liberals, institution building is a natural sign of progress. For neo-liberals there are more specific considerations than notions of community for its own sake. The neo-liberals look for agreements and contracts to underpin international relations. Agreements include formal ways to reduce uncertainty, lower transaction
costs, and serve to solve collective actions problems. In this regard the neo-liberal, functionalist, as well as realist approaches align in terms of a harmony of interests in solving problems through collective action that ultimately serves state’s purposes or self interests. Thus, Keohane (2002, p. 3) argues forcefully that international institutions perform state tasks vital for enabling cooperation. In fact, Keohane disdains liberal or neo-liberal labels for his theorizing and instead considers himself a staunch institutionalist.

Constructivism is another approach with more emphasis on creating and developing shared values in world politics. Katzenstein and Ikenberry characterize institutions as a product of diffuse and socially constructed world views. Again there is some overlap with realists in the sense of effective institutions providing high returns to power, or as Katzenstein characterizes it, containing a “stickiness” that makes them hard to replace because they further both state values and interests.

Multilateralist Ruggie and neo-institutionalist Zegart provide further insights regarding the importance of initial or founding conditions as most significant for determining institutional effectiveness. These initial conditions normally reflect the domestic environment of the leading state, or hegemon. Examples would include the importance of the US in the founding of the United Nations post World War II. Other neo-liberal thoughts linked to functional approaches include the idea of bundling together issues and the number of partners involved. Ruggie and other authors, especially in the functionalist school, argue that fewer partners, who share values (like in the European Union) and focused issues that serve common interests (like in halting the regional spread of nuclear weapons), are more likely to succeed.
In terms relative to the international security studies literature discussed above and the Agreed Framework experience, Nunn-Lugar represents a narrative of leadership, primarily as leadership from the top and middle. It includes a wide number of players involved in the program’s founding and evolution throughout the 1990s. The process of tracing Nunn-Lugar’s development will provide insights into Gottemoeller’s observation that: “Stable cooperation, therefore, is likely to require both attention from on high and bureaucratic commitment at a lower level” (Gottemoeller in Nolan, Finel and Finlay 2003, p. 145). One key dimension for examining the conditions for achieving stable cooperation includes the notion of policy relevance.

Policy and Instrumental Relevance

Two aspects of policymaking “relevance” are presented in the literature on international institutions (Lepgold and Nincic 2001). These include policy and instrumental relevance. Policy relevance refers to the macro aspects of policy design in international relations. Instrumental relevance refers to micro perspectives. The neoliberalist and constructivist theorists note that actors’ preferences shape policy choices. The literature highlights five areas that suggest the necessary and sufficient conditions for policy relevance including first, complementary national interests. That is, that the institution includes accepted values, that goals are compatible for the long term, that there is an investment in any changes in preferences. International institutions can change relations though regimes, defined as “norms and rules that regulate behavior in specific issue areas involving international activities” (Lepgold and Nincic, p. 139). As Ruggie suggests, the institution will also be more successful if it assures the hegemon’s support. Hegemon in this context and in this case refers to the United States as the most
powerful nation-state in the post Cold War period, as defined in realist terms regarding national power (Morgenthau 1968, Nuechterlein 1985, Mearsheimer 2001).

The second aspect of policy relevance addresses the hegemon’s committing resources and supporting rules. These rules include a commitment to essential principles and rules of order, along with partners to share burdens and coordinate policy. Third is the perception of the institution as a carrier of norms, identity and knowledge. This includes codifying and augmenting legal norms, and especially norms that empower what are perceived as legitimate claims. One additional condition is that preferences regarding norms, identity and knowledge evolve through interaction and presumably not through domination or forcing. Fourth are the expectations regarding the costs and consequences of activities conducted through international institutions. In brief, are there stable expectations for joint coordination that serve agreed upon state purposes? The fifth variable involves the role of the institution within the policymaking community. The literature suggests that the domain is limited to situations where the states already agree on the policy objectives or ends. Again, the functionalist school suggests the important influence of special, expert agencies.

Instrumental relevance refers to the micro dimensions of policy formation. These include incentive structures, monitoring and enforcement, calculations of future benefits and costs, and tools for facilitating effective, productive bargains. Incentive structures include positive factors to make cooperation more likely, as well as negative factors to prevent defectors. Calculations of future benefits and costs serve to lengthen the “shadow of the future” to increase participants’ rational choices supporting institution

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9 Ideas in this paragraph are drawn from Lepgold and Nincic (2001).
building for the long term. Scholars point to eight factors for strengthening effective and productive agreements. In brief these include: (1) rules that stabilize expectations; (2) information to send and receive signals; (3) clear standards; (4) information about compliance; (5) credible penalties; (6) enforcement mechanisms; (7) cooperation through information sharing; and (8) regulating the number of participants. Policy and instrumental relevance provide a lengthy list of variables for examining the conditions for successful leadership from the top and middle for effective policy and institution building.

**Relating Institutionalist Theory and Practice in the Nunn Lugar Case**

This paper proceeds by examining the Nunn Lugar, Cooperative Threat Reduction case, as a key program in the Clinton Counterproliferation Policy Initiative. Government policymakers and national security scholars engaged in proliferation policymaking were among the first to seize the opportunity for forming new relationships among the US, Russia, and the former Soviet Republics (FSR) following the fall of the Berlin Wall. The George Bush notion of a new world order was significant for the executive branch and especially the state and defense departments’ promotion of new initiatives (Bush & Scowcroft 1998). In the following Clinton Administration, in reflecting on his experiences as Secretary of Defense, Perry notes the significance of the post Cold War period for establishing an “effective U.S. partnership with Russia in the security sphere” (Carter & Perry 1999, p. 51). Carter and Perry point to the early post Cold War discussions urging Russia’s policy elite to become “integrationists” to achieve a new, “self-respecting place in the world order” (p. 51).
The early, fluid nature of the international environment during the first Clinton Administration required adjustments to identify the complementarities of US and Russian national interests. The defense department engaged in repeated redesigns of Nunn Lugar programs in the initial stages to “adapt its existing patterns of cooperation to the realities of Russia at this stage of its continuous revolution” (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 79). The pattern includes the Administration’s interest in shaping the new Russian government’s preferences. Perry writes that the Nunn Lugar programs were launched when the new Russia was in its early state and needed immediate assistance: the “political backdrop and economic motivation of Russian’s leaders” in the early post Cold War period was, as we now know, “totally different” from the values and preferences of the Soviet regime (p. 79).

In the early Nunn Lugar period the nation’s involved also introduced unique, new situations. The defense department efforts had to proceed in accordance with a three party foreign policy approach involving the US, Russia, and the Ukraine (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 83). The US approach evolved quickly into from bilateral to trilateral diplomacy, extending the Nunn Lugar approach to denuclearize the Ukraine, and engage the Ukrainians in extensive military-to-military contacts. Working along constructivist lines, Administration diplomacy and policymaking attempted reforming Russian and Ukrainian values and preferences regarding traditional and long-standing security threats, as well as offering opportunities for a more cooperative future for all participants in the new world, or at least regional, order.

10 In several articles prominent international relations scholars argued for the increased stability and security of post Cold War Europe, with the Ukraine as a nuclear weapons state (Mearsheimer and Waltz).
The idea of specific, cooperative foreign policies and defense programs continued to expand the complexity of shaping complementary national interests. For instance, in negotiating the START II Cold War arms control regime, the US had to engage the still forming Russian democracy with its new, active, and fragmented Duma -- a markedly different environment than the iron rule of the Soviet Communist Party leadership in Cold War era. The parliamentarians concerns about the status of the continuity of the Nixon era Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty were further complicated by historical Russian security concerns reawakened by the initiatives for NATO’s eastward expansion. Administration counterproliferation policy efforts with the Russians continued along the path started by Nunn Lugar to include programs of greater complexity and depth over time.11

Early Administration approaches are discussed in the Carter and Perry book, Preventive Defense, about their experiences as defense department officials in the first Clinton Administration. As discussed above, the George Bush and then Clinton Administrations, in supporting Senators Nunn and Lugar’s initiative, responded quickly to the new threat of nuclear armed former Soviet republics. DOD programs, under the authorizing Nunn Lugar legislation, worked “loose nukes” issues to eliminate nuclear weapons and fissile material in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 69). Special projects, such as Project Sapphire removed weapons grade plutonium and enriched uranium from Kazakhstan and included internal US collaboration

11 For example, in the second Clinton Administration, Defense Secretary Cohen points to the continuation of arms control programs, such as the 1998 Clinton-Yeltsin Moscow Summit, and the development of a joint US-Russian Moscow center for information sharing on ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. The center included the announcement of early launch detection, early warning systems, and technical programs on observation satellites (Cohen 2000, p. 8-76). These extensive program developments reflect the increasing benefits of cooperative and complementary security preferences.
among the Departments of Defense, Energy, State, and the CIA (p. 67). A pattern of similar efforts were taken to incorporate new members to the US’s preferred world order are also evident in the second Clinton Administration, for instance with respect to China.  

In the second Clinton Administration, Defense Secretary Cohen continued the trend toward international institution building or multilateralism (Ruggie 1993). From the defense policy documents, such as the Annual Reports to the President and Congress, there is a drumbeat for the US’s leading role in supporting international institutions. The 2000 Report highlights the significance of the US role in “shaping” the international environment through multilateral alliances, transparency, trust, and confidence building, as well as through limiting dangerous military technologies (Cohen 2000, pp. 4-5). The dangers or threats section focus on reducing or eliminating nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The Report supports existing arms control agreements including the US-North Korean Agreed Framework; Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs with Russia, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan; the Chemical Weapons Convention; the Nonproliferation Treaty; and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Report also highlights the significance of identifying and controlling nuclear fissile materials that can be used for nuclear biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and delivery systems.

The Defense Department also refers to the Administration’s nuclear posture statements and reports. The 2000 Report emphasizes the importance of US nuclear

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12 Secretary Cohen noted similar intentions for bringing China into the international community by: seeking Chinese adherence to international standards on weapons proliferation; international trade and human rights initiatives; and increasing China’s transparency as well as confidence building measures such as military-to-military exchanges (Cohen 2000, p. 11).

13 Examples below from the 2000 Report are illustrative of the Administration’s consistent policies, from 1996 though 2000.
weapons to deter aggression through a wide range of responses along with the ability to hedge against future threats (Cohen 2000, pp. 5-6). The Secretary also reinforces the US commitment to the strategic arms control regime and the Administration’s intent to conduct further arms control talks with Russia by beginning a round of START III negotiations. For instance, the START III initiative was announced after a Clinton-Yeltsin summit in 1997 in Helsinki (Cohen 2000, p. 6).

Secretary Cohen continues to address US support for a multilateral, regional order in Europe (Cohen 2000, p. 9). He stresses US defense objectives in Europe and the significance of cooperative relations with Russia, Ukraine, Central and Eastern Europe, and NATO. The 2000 Report points out that the US, Russia, and Europe “should also work together” with all the “new independent states” to counter the proliferation of WMD and missile delivery systems (Cohen 2000, p. 9-10).

Cohen singles out Asian regional relations as well. He cites the importance of traditional defense relationships with Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea as well as engaging China (Cohen 2000, p. 10-11). Again the significance of the Agreed Framework is trumpeted. The Secretary places special emphasis on the US – Japanese security relationship, which he refers to as the “linchpin” of US security in Asia (Cohen 2000, p. 11). Cohen’s final DOD Annual Report focuses on maintaining “traditional” relationships, but does not emphasize plans or programs for reforming or transforming European and Asian security alliances.14

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14 Note: This is curious in comparison to the drumbeat within the defense department to transform the American armed forces throughout the post-Cold War era, from Clinton to the present George W. Bush Administrations.
The importance of the need for building the norms, identities, and knowledge for developing institutionally relevant policy are not highlighted in DOD documents. There are no references in the 2000 Report to the defense department or US’s broader role in institution building for promoting legal norms, legitimate claims, and preferences for positive interactions and change. The Report does mention early Nunn Lugar barriers in terms of overcoming fifty years of Cold War mistrust with the Russians. In the Carter and Perry account some mention is also made of Clinton and Gore interventions to develop trust with the new governments of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus (Cohen 2000, p. 76). But the official DOD documents are largely silent on building institutional norms, identity and knowledge.

The key costs and consequences of international institutions are also not mentioned in detail in DOD Annual Reports. Carter and Perry do note some of the consequences of Nunn Lugar in terms of budgetary and performance results (1999, p. 76). For instance, they highlight $2.4 billion in funding as of mid-1998. They go on to point to the success of 40 engineering projects in Russia to build safeguards for existing stockpiles, dismantle weapons and missiles and convert defense industry to civilian purposes. Carter and Perry also write of the success of destroying 4800 nuclear weapons, removing nuclear weapons from all non-Russian former Soviet republics and eliminating proliferation threats in Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine. Perry and Carter stress that they “never expected this astounding degree of success” and credit Nunn Lugar initiatives for no early post-Cold War loose nukes problems (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 77). In addition, Carter and Perry attribute part of these great successes to the extraordinary cooperation inside the Washington policy making community. Nevertheless, the Nunn
Lugar programmatic successes are not tied to the larger issues regarding building a community of shared norms, values and identities in terms of international institutions, arms control and security regimes, or multilateral organizations.

The fifth dimension of policy relevance relates international institutions and the role of the policymaking community. The national security “policymaking community” can be an open ended network. The community in this case includes specific US government legislators, departments and agencies as well as universities and research institutes as players or stakeholders in counterproliferation policymaking. The policymaking community here is not limited solely to the US defense department and special agencies involved in Nunn Lugar implementation. As discussed next, one example of effective policy implementation within the wider policymaking community is the DOD’s top-secret Operation Sapphire, conducted in 1994.

Sapphire was the first special operation implemented as part of Nunn-Lugar. Carter and Perry strongly emphasize the success of Operation Sapphire in the first Clinton term (Carter and Perry 1999, pp. 65-68). The operation resulted in the removal from Kazakhstan of 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, or the equivalent of enough fissile material for 60 Hiroshima-Nagasaki nuclear bombs. The US government policy community, or Washington interagency players, included the departments of defense, energy, and state, along with the CIA and US Air Force. Carter and Perry report the successfully internal and external coordination with the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan -- all made possible under the umbrella of the 1992 Nunn Lugar legislation and implementing programs.
Carter and Perry trace the genesis of the Nunn Lugar approach to the Senators' 1980s, Cold War concerns about nuclear accidents (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 70). The Senators were at the forefront of US congressional activities regarding establishing nuclear risk reduction centers. Their initiatives included agencies and organizations outside of government. Early efforts, by Senators Nunn and Lugar and their staffs, involved work with think tanks and universities. Carter’s late 1980s Harvard proliferation studies on the Soviet nuclear arsenal led to a series of meetings hosted by Harvard’s Belfer Center along with Perry’s affiliation with Stanford University (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 77). Workshops included experts from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Brookings Institution. This loosely coupled nonproliferation community set the stage for raising concerns about nuclear and fissile material safeguards following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The astonishingly rapid progress of Nunn-Lugar legislation, which passed within nine days of its first draft, included Senate passage on November 28, 1991 on an 86-6 vote. The House version of the bill, supported by House Armed Services Committee Chairman, and later Clinton’s first Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, passed in the House of Representative though a voice vote.

These preliminary efforts, in building proliferation knowledge and legislation, were extended though the 1993 shift of Carter and Perry from academia to government service. Carter notes that to spearhead Nunn Lugar implementation, to assist Russia in safeguarding nuclear stockpiles, required “a whole new organization” (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 73). He points also to starting by “crafting a set of objectives” and identifying officials in partner countries to coordinate efforts.
Initiating a new national security program required forming a coordinating interagency group as well as overcoming barriers to implementation. Carter and Perry go on to emphasize the significant barriers that challenged Nunn Lugar implementation. The notoriously cumbersome Pentagon acquisition system had to extend to spending dollars in overseas engineering project, which in turn according to Carter and Perry required something “history had never before permitted,” that is, running US programs with and within the Soviet Union (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 74).

The early Nunn Lugar period also meet resistance in the US Congress. The congressional barriers involved reversing a mindset from defense versus the Soviet threat to spending for Russian military housing and defense industry conversion to civilian, commercial pursuits. Give the rapid pace of Nunn Lugar legislation, implementation money had to be reprogrammed from the 1993 defense budget, which of course requires much bureaucratic work in adjusting appropriations (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 740). In addition, the old arms control bureaucracy, centered in the defense and state departments had to shift from Cold War arms control perspectives and patterns to new approaches.

There were also of course barriers within the new and relatively unstable Russia. For instance, Carter and Perry note the problems of coordination with MINATOM the former Soviet nuclear research and development agency, especially in regard to new tasks of dismantling nuclear weapons and the long term safeguards and storage of fissile materials (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 80).

The writing in later defense department documents reveals a moderation, or decline, in the secretary of defense’s initiatives for extending the DOD role and building on the early Nunn Lugar successes. For instance, by the time of the 2000 Annual Report,
Defense Secretary Cohen focuses on a narrower range of issues with respect to counterproliferation policy. He cites the importance of the armed forces capacity to respond to “asymmetric threats” and is mainly concerned with fighting on a NBC battlefield, with a vague sentence on increasing unspecified dollar amounts for “institutions of counterproliferation” (Cohen 2000, p. 19).

Counterproliferation as counter-NBC operations for battlefield forces is a significant operational capability, but at the strategic level falls short of the Nunn Lugar objectives of eliminating and safeguarding nuclear weapons and stockpiles. The focus of the 2000 document and defense policy is mainly directed towards continuing the modernization of existing Cold War “legacy” weapons systems, or platforms, such as tanks, helicopters, aircraft carriers and submarines and jet aircraft while conducting research and development for cutting edge technologies (Cohen 2000, p. 8). The Report proposes the needs for weapons system development using Persian Gulf War scenarios. The Report also presents information on-going modernizations, such as updating internal management, and research and development programs as revolutionary, such as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) for acquiring new technologies, and the Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA) for adopting the presumed better business practices of the corporate sector. Critics charge that these are actually minor and insignificant changes and a normal part of the Pentagon’s internal “fight for defense dollars” (Wilson 2000). The evidence from official documents reveals a downward trend, or at least a leveling off, in DOD’s emphasis on counterproliferation policy and programs.
Findings and Conclusions

The documentary evidence suggests an early peak in Clinton era counterproliferation policymaking. The essential role of key department leaders, such as Defense Secretary Perry and Assistant Secretary Carter, in influencing the Washington policymaking process is most significant. Adding weight in terms of political initiative and legislation, as well as budgetary support, was provided by experienced, senior legislators. In terms of policy relevance several points stand out in addition to the overall assessment of effective leadership from several levels, including the defense secretary, Congress, think tanks, and implementing bureaucracies -- along with similar leadership levels within the other foreign governments involved.

National interests in the Nunn Lugar case were complimentary and expressed clearly by the governmental leaders involved in policymaking. The values of controlling and eliminating nuclear weapons were seen as compatible with long term goals that in the Russian case included radically transforming its defense posture and international diplomacy. There were significant investments in terms of time and money to change preferences for an institutional approach to change relations through a regime change in arms control and fundamental roles of nuclear weapons in a new, post-Cold War order. The remaining superpower, or in institutional terms the US as hegemon, assured its support of this new order. Additional resources were committed to reinforce the essential principles of the new order to eliminate nuclear weapons from non-Russian, former Soviet Republics. Importantly, the former republics were engaged in the process to share the burdens of coordinating the policy and its implementation.
The largely bilateral relationship between the US and the newly emerging Russia solidified the norms, identity, and knowledge for institutionalizing the Nunn Lugar counterproliferation policies. Ironically, the long Cold War history of nuclear mirror-imaging and arms control contributed to common frames of references regarding the process and substance for conducting interstate negotiations on nuclear weapons issues. Common preferences were revealed through interactions that included the former Soviet Republics. The evolving norms regarding the elimination of nuclear weapons, and some fissile materials empowered the diplomats and defense officials to complete counterproliferation policymaking in accordance with shared and legitimate claims of policy relevance. In the Nunn Lugar case, the emergence of shared norms, identity, and knowledge in the window of opportunity following the end of the Cold War empowered US, Russian and FSR policymakers to conduct revolutionary counterproliferation policies.

The costs and consequences of action through the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs also stabilized expectations for joint coordination. Funding through the congressional budget process, reinforced through the defense departments highly regulated planning, programming and budgeting system, provided a degree of stability and transparency for implementing programs, as well as established mechanisms for engaged congressional oversight. In essence, the programmatic processes of the US Congress and bureaucracy for implementing Nunn Lugar programs served the agreed upon Administration purposes in visible ways.

The Nunn Lugar case also provides evidence of the significance of the network aspects of the counterproliferation policymaking community. The functional role of a
wide variety of specialized agencies in the early Nunn Lugar period, all focused in a
common direction on clear goals, served as a forcing function for the policymaking
community. The overarching and clear program goals regarding eliminating nuclear
weapons in former Soviet Republics at a unique time in history served as a strong
foundation for counterproliferation policy efforts.

One area where Nunn Lugar reveals a shortcoming in institution building is as an
early successful innovation, or pilot test, to build on in terms of expanding geographically
beyond Russia and the former Soviet Republics to other areas of proliferation concern,
such as South (India and Pakistan) and Northeast (North Korea) Asia and the Middle East
(Iraq and Iran). In other words, the early Nunn Lugar successes were not replicated in
other areas of proliferation concern. Additional insights into the difficulties of institution
building are revealed in examining the nature and scope of what theorists call the
instrumental relevance of institutions. The high costs of developing effective and
efficient institutions to serve as an instrument of state policy can be seen in the
complexities in the four dimensions for assessing instrumental relevance including: (1)
incentive structures; (2) monitoring and enforcement processes; (3) calculations of future
benefits; and (4) facilitating bargaining.

The American incentives for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs were fairly
obvious. The timing of the Nunn Lugar initiatives was of course related directly to a
unique opportunity at the end of the Cold War to eliminate dangerous proliferation
threats. The weakness of Soviet safeguards and stockpile security were already known in
the defense expert community as a result of the 1980s Harvard Belfer Center studies.
While there were a number of international relations scholars debating the increased
stability of multiple nuclear powers, including the Ukraine and others as a hedge against future Russian aggression\(^\text{15}\) the conventional wisdom in the policy community coalesced around the idea of providing incentives to eliminate nuclear weapons threats in an uncertain post Cold War environment. The US and Russian debates over Nunn Lugar included calculations of the benefits and costs of a new, innovative approach.

Carter and Perry write of the high transaction costs of early Nunn Lugar negotiations (1999, p. 73). The US was mainly interested in dismantling Soviet missiles as a way to serve US national security interests. The Russian and FSR partners were interested in social assistance to convert military forces, scientists, and its vast military-industrial complex to civilian, commercial uses. Incentives were also important to chart a future direction for Nunn Lugar to include fissile materials as well as existing missiles and bombs. In this sense, institution building includes improving the incentives for likely cooperation as well as for preventing later defectors who would still possess materials useful for so-called dirty bombs, as well as nuclear merchandise for the terrorist black market. Thus, institution building initiated through Nunn Lugar provides incentives for continuing to engage Russia and the FSR in an on-going process for ideas such as forming international fissile material repositories with funds from an international consortium to manage the global stockpile for peaceful purposes, such as producing non-weapons grade nuclear reactor fuel (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 80).

Incentive structures in the Nunn Lugar case actually involved a wider range of options than were visible through the lens of traditional arms control negotiations. In the case of the Ukraine, a wide angle perspective reveals three separate sets of incentives

\(^{15}\) See Mearsheimer, Waltz, and de Mesquita for instance.
The first level included trilateral diplomacy conducted by the US, Russia and the Ukraine. These negotiations focused on economic incentives for defense conversions, market reforms, and economic development. At a second level, incentives were necessary to meet the Ukraine’s security concerns. US, European and Russian relations were all involved in the resulting defense programs for military-to-military training for Ukrainian and other Eastern European forces, NATO partnership for peace programs, and ensuing programs for NATO expansion (Ulrich 1999). The third piece included the Nunn Lugar denuclearization program.

Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for institution building include aspects of intra and interstate as well as international relations. For instance, in the Nunn Lugar case, early support was lacking from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 80). On the US side, new organizations were formed within existing Cold War agencies, such as the reorganization and new missions assigned in the transition from the US Defense Nuclear Agency to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Organizational reforms included the newly chartered On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), which was founded to support early post Cold War counterproliferation initiatives.16

In comparison, the later failed North Korean framework relied on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for monitoring and enforcement. Later, in 2000, the last Cohen Defense Report points out the significance of the Agreed Framework freezing North Korean nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon under IAEA inspections (Cohen 2000, p. 11). The resulting collapse of the North Korean

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international monitoring and enforcement again provides a contrast to the effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of the Nunn Lugar programs with included host agencies, such as MINATOM and DTRA, engaged directly. In comparing these two cases, the evidence to date suggests the critical importance of host country involvement in actively supporting monitoring and enforcement arrangements.\(^{17}\)

The phrase “lengthening the shadow of the future” portrays the important perception of institutional arrangements as enhancing the prospects of future benefits and costs. In other words, the potential for future payoffs lends support for institution building. Writing in 1999, Carter and Perry emphasize the successes of Nunn Lugar in the early post Cold War period (1999, pp 77-79). In addition, they project forward to highlight continuing counterproliferation work. In particular, they note that Russia still possesses enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium to produce between 25,000 and 80,000 nuclear weapons. Therefore, they propose reinventing Nunn Lugar with expanding program budgets with greater latitude for nuclear audits and inspections and a new arms control regime. The call is for an expansion of Nunn Lugar for safeguarding fissile materials. The initiative in expanding Cooperative Threat Reduction Program proliferation regimes is echoed in recent work by the Carnegie Foundation and again by Allison of Harvard’s Belfer Center (Perkovich et al 2004, Allison 2004,).

The final dimension for assessing the instrumental relevance of international institutions concerns facilitating bargaining. Facilitation includes establishing rules, procedures, principles and precedents, as well as creating high costs for no agreement.

\(^{17}\) For a comparison of difficulties in arms control inspection, monitoring and verification when the host country refuses to cooperate see recent firsthand accounts of the United Nations’ Special Commission for Iraq (UNSCOM) executive directors, Richard Butler (2000) and Hans Blix (2004).
The extensive nature of the eight components cited for successful negotiations reveals the importance of institutions and regimes, along with supporting organizations, for effective policymaking and implementation. The eight components drawn from the literature on bargaining and negotiations include: (1) rules; (2) information; (3) standards; (4) information about compliance; (5) credible penalties; (6) enforceable rules; (7) cooperation through information sharing; and (8) limiting the number of participants.

In the Nunn Lugar case, making the CTR effective policy instruments required extensive negotiations for rules to stabilize expectations. Carter and Perry point out that managing expectations included more players than the engaged international negotiators. For instance, on the US side there were expectations from the Congress to overcome their traditional, Cold-War security concerns. The new Russian Duma also had to be kept on board. Similarly, in the Agreed Framework negotiations, Ambassador Gallucci highlights the critical nature of his negotiating team’s liaison with influential senators and Congress members (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004).

The signaling of information is also cited as important by the Nunn Lugar negotiators. Carter and Perry point out that it took an official Pentagon internal study, the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, to clearly announce “a new phase of arms control” that was fundamentally different for the Cold War balance of terror (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 85). The Nuclear Posture Review was meant as a clear signal to players domestically and internationally, that the Cold War was over and nuclear weapons would play a smaller role in US defense planning. This new approach includes calls for dramatic cuts in the US strategic arsenal that would drive down the total number of strategic weapons for consideration in on-going iterations of strategic arms reduction talks.
Two other factors in the Nunn Lugar bargaining stand out. Traditional Cold War concerns about security and secrecy had to be overcome. Information about compliance arrangements was crucial for building trust and confidence for continuing the program. In this respect, Carter and Perry (1999, p. 88) emphasize the significance of mutual information between the US and Russia regarding the technical implementation of the de-alerting and de-targeting of strategic missiles. The complexity and high degree of transparency necessary insured that each side had to step up to new challenges for continuing to shape a new post-Cold War relationship.

In a similar manner, the activities required for the success of Operation Sapphire also contributed to lowering the barriers to gaining information about compliance, as well as increasing cooperation by increasing information flows. The cooperative advantages of information sharing led to a cascading effect for additional Nunn Lugar program initiatives. Sapphire was followed by the Russian dismantling of SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles. These security initiatives were then complemented by medical diagnostic programs for cancer tests in and around former Soviet nuclear facilities; by research grants for Russian, Kazakh, and Ukrainian scientists; and by defense industry conversions to commercial pursuits.

The question remains: Does the evidence presented in this paper suggest that Nunn Lugar initiatives have the potential to serves as a comparable case study for thinking about developing a Northeast Asian security regime? This paper focused on the study of the Clinton Administration’s Nunn-Lugar, Counterproliferation Policy Initiatives for reducing the threats of “loose nukes” in Russia and the Former Soviet Republics. The Russian case, as guided by institutional theory, examined US and, in particular, the US
Defense Department’s leadership efforts in countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction, from 1992 to 2000. This paper’s findings suggest the significance and influential of institution and organization-building approaches, for effective counterproliferation policymaking. Adapting the Nunn Lugar approach for Northeast Asia of course requires additional study and analysis. Certainly, developing a framework for synthesizing both competitive strategies versus a stubborn North Korean regime, and cooperative strategies for promoting a common counterproliferation policy for enhancing US, Chinese, Japanese, Republic of Korea and Russian collective security remains a challenge. More study is needed of the organizational, or agency mechanisms necessary and sufficient for developing an institutional approach suitable for Northeast Asian security.

**Postscript: Paths for Further Research--Government and Organizational Performance**

Recent research on government performance as developed in the field of public administration deserves additional attention by international relations and security studies scholars. The ties among executive leadership, policy effectiveness, and government performance are the subject of continuing public management research. For instance, the Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue (2003) book, *Government Performance: Why Management Matters*, offers a performance framework and finds “Big Lessons” such as “Management Matters” and “Effective Leadership is Vital.” The Ingraham studies highlight performance management at the federal, state and local levels. Their insights offers a similar focus on policy leadership, in terms of studying senior executives in public organizations working as policy makers and implementers, integrators and results managers -- or what she terms as “grounded leadership” (Ingraham 2003, p. 152). That
is, grounded leadership as the senior or strategic leaders role in charting the direction and
degree of influence for implementing effective public policy within and across
government organizations. Executive responsibilities include the leaders’ role in
coordinating management efforts to support a vision for achieving government missions,
goals and performance objectives. Ingraham’s public management research highlights
the relevance of strategic leadership and management for coordinating complex
administrative systems across agencies and within government – which their extensive
findings suggest “is clear” in their study of US government organizations (Ingraham
2003, pp. 20-21).

Let me conclude by offering a suggestion for future research needs and an
approach for studying counterproliferation policymaking. In short, there is further
research needed to analyze executive and agency performance in pursuit of
Administration counterproliferation policy objectives in both the contexts of US agencies
and international organizations. The leadership role of public executives, such as the
secretaries of defense, as integrators for government policy development and
implementation should be examined in terms of utilizing the DOD’s management
capacity for integrating various U.S. and international agencies in achieving the
Administration’s policy results for countering WMD proliferation in North Korea,
Russia, Iran and elsewhere. Again, the integrating roles of public executives extend
across U.S. government agencies as well as international organizations.

For instance, the time is right for a detailed case study of Clinton era
counterproliferation policy with respect to Iraq. An Iraq WMD case requires examining
the relationship of US efforts along with the roles and functions of the United Nations and its organization for nuclear matter, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Establishing a robust Iraq case study narrative should proceed along three lines. First, in establishing the official U.S. policy as it evolved during the 1990s, the analyses should trace policy development from government documents, including the Clinton national security and national military strategies, the annual reports of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, and internal Administration WMD strategy and policy reviews.

A second line of inquiry should follow the narratives from the perspective of United Nations proliferation policymaking. United Nations Security Council resolutions from the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 through 2002 and the start of the War in Iraq provide open source documents that shed light on the alignment or misalignment of US and UN policy. In addition, published biographies by UN chief inspectors Richard Butler and Hans Blix add insights into the roles of inspection executives in implementing UN policy and Security Council Resolutions.

A third line of inquiry should include reports by a several US government agencies, such as the General Accounting Office, and nongovernmental organizations, such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative, that provide oversight of WMD policy issues. In addition to internal executive branch and DOD studies of US policy in Iraq there have been numerous external evaluations of US proliferation policy. These oversight functions provide a check on executive branch self-assessments and include Congressional committee hearings and studies, Government Accounting Office (GAO) reports, as well as university and think tank policy reviews. For instance, there are a
variety of perspectives on WMD threats and counterproliferation policy from leading scholars sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation of New York, the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. All offer important insights for evaluating government policymaking and organizational performance (Allison 2004, Levi/O’Hanlon 2005, Campbell/Einhorn/Reiss 2004).

In addition, the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York has sparked a number of government reports, commissions, and personal accounts on issues related to national security and terrorism in general which provides additional unclassified information on Clinton era WMD proliferation efforts. Of particular value are two extensive research reviews by high level government commissions. One is the 2004 Kean-Hamilton et al. “The 9/11 Commission Report.” A second authoritative 2004 report focusing on Iraq and WMD was begun by former US government official and UN weapons inspector David Kay and completed by another IAEA weapons inspector, Charles Duelfer. Duelfer’s three volume report, “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] on Iraq’s WMD provides a detailed review of the relationship of US counterproliferation policy with the implementation by the IAEA’s two weapons inspections teams during the 1990s and leading up to the War in Iraq.

The triangulation of these three research streams will provide a more robust understanding of the leadership patterns and the role of the US agency lead, the department of defense, in terms of forming and implementing WMD policy in both the policy formation and organizational implementation stages. In short, the DOD leadership
and agency role should be considered from a public management framework, including the executive’s role in influence and emphasis, their role in integrating and aligning, and their efforts in managing results (Ingraham/Joyce/Donahue 2003, p. 16). The contribution of this research will extend the understanding of scholars and policymakers, within and across US agencies, as well as across national and international organizations, in the important case study of US counterproliferation efforts directed against Saddam Hussein and Iraq.
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