Proliferation Security Initiative Interdiction Capstone
Areas for improvement, Concerns for future simulations and real-world contingencies
Teams’ Jump to Decision

- Premature leap to “What do we do?”
- Need to incentivize policy-makers’ considerations of:
  - What do we know and not know?
  - What are our assumptions?
  - What new information would invalidate those assumptions?
- Simulation provides valuable experience
  - Repetition would be useful for U.S. policy-makers
Legal Basis for Interdiction

- Most teams ignored this aspect.
- Policy-makers should consider:
  - Existing international law
  - Export control laws of individual states
  - UNSC Resolutions
  - Integrating emerging norms of PSI with existing legal structure
  - Legal implications for disposition of seized cargo
Intelligence Value of Cargo

- What can the cargo tell policy-makers about current capabilities and future programs of proliferators?
- Is intelligence worth risking other factors
  - Russian cooperation
- Future permutations can be used to ‘frame’ American game play.
Would adding players have created greater realism? Over-complicate?

- China (“Choonguk”)
- North Korea (“Pulyang”)
- Iran (“Parthia”)
- Others (EU, IAEA)
Policy-makers need to engage technical experts early in the process
  - Consider technical factors from the outset of a crisis.

Underscores value of simulations in forcing policy/technical dialogue
How did players act under conditions of limited information and time pressure?
Russian assertion in Near Abroad
U.S. readiness to accept Russian lead
  - Rapid move toward cooperation
Would this hold for a real crisis in Central Asia?
  - Was it driven by leader personalities?
Caught between two great powers

- Kazakhstan ("Brazieristan") ready to play both roles
  - Wanted to cooperate with great powers until it felt “ignored” and then it dug in.
  - Sought to impose will on smaller neighbor but failed.

- Kyrgyzstan ("Bevostan") quickly fell into Blagejovich syndrome.

- Small states can hinder PSI efforts
Kazakhstan ("Brazoristan") was unresponsive to North Korean ("Pulyang") protests
  - Is this realistic?

What other capabilities do the proliferators have to retaliate?
  - Military, economic, unconventional (influence of terrorist actors), propaganda, etc.
A conciliatory US strategy is valuable
  - Achieved interdiction
  - Limited ability to acquire illicit cargoes for analysis

Integration of technical & legal counsel is critical

Danger of tunnel vision on actual interdiction
  - Should focus on the dangers and consequences of action

Emphasized strengths of the PSI
  - Flexibility of guidelines
  - Freedom of action for driving players
Questions?