Simulated Interdiction: Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Briefing Book
# Simulated Interdiction: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

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Acknowledgements

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) provided the funding for this project, which allowed the Capstone students to interview experts in the area of nuclear proliferation. The project was funded specifically through the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation office (NA-20). These interviews were conducted in Washington, D.C. and at research institutions throughout the United States. In addition to their generous financial contribution, the NNSA provided insight and guidance throughout the creation process.

The Texas Engineering Experiment Station (TEES), at Texas A&M University was essential to this project. TEES allowed the capstone to run the final play of the simulation from their state of the art simulation and gaming facility, located at the Multi-Program Research and Education Facility, in the Donald L. Houston Building on the Texas A&M University campus.

The Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs and the Masters Program in International Affairs of the George Bush School also provided funding for the research and conduct of this simulation.
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Introduction

Purpose

This simulation is designed to assist future policy makers in asking the right questions at the right time in a real world PSI contingency. The focus of the simulation is diplomacy and the international decision-making process, with an emphasis on the impact of technical information on political decision-making. Although based on existing states in the international system, the countries, other than the United States, identified in the simulation are fictional. The decisions made by the country teams in this simulation are not meant to predict the decisions of their real world counterparts, but are rather one outcome of simulated international diplomacy, given the varied interests at stake. The scenario chosen, while possible, is also not a prediction of future events.

Methodology

The simulation is designed to require players to make decisions, under time constraints, with imperfect information and to seek additional information through international diplomacy. Teams will need to focus on the key issues at hand, and refrain from deliberating long-term or strategic issues, except as they impact the current crisis. The teams should make decisions that are plausible given their states’ interests and capabilities. An After Action Report (AAR) will assess the outcome of the game, the decisions made, and the role each team member played in making those decisions.

Teams

Players will be assigned to teams representing the United States and the simulated states of Bearia, Brazoristan, and Bevosstan. The players will represent the president and high level members of the government in each state. Each player will fill a specified role as assigned by the “President” of the country. There will also be the opportunity for written consultation with a representative of the fictional states of Choonguk and Pulyang, as they are not represented by teams in this PSI simulation.

Scenario/Injects

The simulation will cover a fictional scenario in which a cargo aircraft may be attempting to deliver sensitive nuclear components to a country of proliferation concern. The cargo aircraft has a scheduled refueling stop in Central Asia, which opens the door for a possible interdiction. Throughout the game play, each team will receive injects of information from their intelligence
services, or requests for guidance from government agencies. These injects will create the need for international diplomacy, to confirm or improve the information received. They will also drive the decision making process.

Research

The Capstone students studied an extensive bibliography on the PSI and previous international interdiction efforts. This study was conducted using both library and online research. The Capstone students also interviewed experts closely associated with the PSI and other nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Along with former senior policymakers in the U.S. government, representatives of the following agencies and organizations were interviewed:

- National Nuclear Security Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy
- Arms Control Association
- Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies at Georgetown University
- Congressional Research Service
- U.S. Department of Defense
- Embassy of India, Washington, D.C.
- Hudson Institute
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
- Los Alamos National Laboratory
- National Defense University
- National Security Council
- U.S. Department of State

Classification

The simulation is not classified, but it is not a public event. Although most of the country teams are simulated, nuclear proliferation is a sensitive issue. Comments made during the session are off-the-record and not for attribution.
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Team Assignments

United States (USA)
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James Miller
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David Sweeney
Simulated Interdiction: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Schedule

Continental Breakfast
Location: Auditorium
0800 – Opening Remarks and Team Organization

Phase 1
Location: Team and Diplomacy Rooms
0900 – Phase 1 Begins, First Team Injects Delivered
1100 – Phase 1 Ends

Phase 2
Location: Team and Diplomacy Rooms
1115 – Phase 2 Begins, International Inject
1130 – Press Briefing in Bearia
1145 – Replay of Bearian Press Briefing
1200 – Press Briefing in the United States
1215 – Replay of American Press Briefing
1245 – Phase 2 Ends

Phase 3
Location: Team and Diplomacy Rooms
1300 – Phase 3 Begins, Final Injects Delivered
1500 – Phase 3 Ends

After Action Review
Location: Auditorium
1515 – AAR Begins
1700 – AAR Ends, Simulation Complete
Simulated Interdiction: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Houston Building Map

Legend
- United States
- Bearia
- Brazoristan
- Bevostan
- Diplomacy
- Refreshments
- Control
Simulated Interdiction: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Communications Plan

Country teams will be able to communicate with each other through email and diplomatic meetings. Although the email system will expedite communication between the teams and with control, it should not be used for negotiation. The purpose of this simulation is better served through face to face meetings in the diplomacy rooms provided. The email system should, however, be used to create a joint record of the discussion that will take place in person.

Diplomatic Meeting Procedures

1. The requesting team will send an email to the team with which they would like to conduct diplomacy. The email should include:
   a. The subject to be discussed, but not the substance of the proposed discussion
   b. Any time constraints for the proposed meeting
2. The receiving team will send an email response to the requesting team. No team is obligated to accept a diplomatic meeting.
3. If both teams agree to meet, the requesting team must send an email to central control indicating the desire to conduct diplomacy and the teams involved
4. Central Control will email both teams the scheduled time and location of their meeting.
5. Once the meeting is complete, the requesting team must send an email to the receiving team, indicating the issues discussed, the decisions made, and the continued points of discussion.
6. The receiving team must respond to this email. The receiving team can either indicate their agreement with the information sent, or send a list of objections to the requesting team.
7. Email exchanges can continue until the content is agreed to by both sides. No new items of discussion should be introduced. Negotiations on new topics must be conducted in the diplomacy rooms.

Summit Procedures

1. For the purpose of this simulation, summit diplomacy (direct communication between heads of state) will take place in the diplomacy rooms provided, rather than by phone or email. A summit must be organized using the diplomatic meeting procedures.

Communication with Choonguk, Pulyang, and Parthia

1. Messages for these states must be sent through central control by email. If there is a response, it will be distributed to the team by central control.
Simulated Interdiction: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Regional Map
Simulated Interdiction: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Country Background Notes

The United States of America

Geography

Area: 9.8 million sq. kilometers; about half the size of Bearia, slightly larger than Choonguk, more than twice the size of the European Union.
Terrain: Vast central plains, mountains in West, hills and low mountains in east; rugged mountains and broad river valleys in Alaska, rugged volcanic topography in Hawaii.
Border Length: Canada 8,893 kilometers, Mexico 3,141 kilometers

People

Population: 307, 212, 123 (July 2009 estimate), 82% live in urban areas
Ethnic groups: White 79.96 %, black 12.85%, Asian 4.43%, Amerindian and Alaska native 0.97%, native Hawaiian and other Pacific islander 0.18%, two or more races 1.61% (July 2007 estimate)

Note: a separate listing for Hispanic is not included because the U.S. Census Bureau considers Hispanic to mean a person of Latin American descent (including persons of Cuban, Mexican, or Puerto Rico origin) living in the U.S. who may be of any race or ethnic group (white, black, Asian, etc); about 15.1% of the total U.S. population is Hispanic.
Religions: Protestant 51.3 %, Roman Catholic 23.9%, Mormon 1.7%, other Christian 1.6%, Jewish 1.7%, Buddhist 0.7%, Muslim 0.6%, other unspecified 2.5%, unaffiliated 12.1%, none 4% (2007) estimate.
Languages: English 82.1%, Spanish 10.7%, other Indo-European 3.8%, Asian and Pacific island 2.7% (2000 census)

Government and Economy

In the 2008 Presidential election President Barack Obama was elected with 52.4% of the popular vote, while his opponent Senator John McCain received 46.3 % of the popular vote, with other candidates receiving 1.3%. Following the 2008 elections seats in the United States Senate were allocated as follows: Democratic Party 57, Republican Party 41, independent 2. In the House of Representatives the allocation of seats was as follows; Democratic Party 257, Republican Party 178.
The U.S. has the largest and most technologically advanced economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of $48,000. In this market oriented economy, private individuals and business firms make most of the decisions, and the federal and state governments buy needed goods predominantly in the private market place. The global economic downturn, the sub-prime mortgage crisis, investment bank failures, falling home prices, and tight credit pushed the United States into recession by mid-2008. To help stabilize financial markets, the U.S. Congress established a $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in October 2008. In January 2009, the U.S. Congress passed and President Obama signed a bill providing a $787 billion fiscal stimulus to create jobs and help the economy recover.

Nuclear Policy, Nonproliferation and the Proliferation Security Initiative

The United States is the leading nation in global efforts to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to non-nuclear states and non-state actors. The U.S. leads effort to promote international consensus on WMD proliferation through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, including within the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements designed to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime. The U.S. works for effective international responses to specific bilateral and regional WMD proliferation challenges posed by nations seeking nuclear weapons or the capability to produce them. The U.S. addresses WMD proliferation threats posed by non-state actors and terrorist groups by improving physical security, using interdictions and sanctions, and actively participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The U.S. works to reduce and eliminate the WMD threat through close cooperation with the UN, the G-8, NATO, the IAEA, and other international organizations. Washington supports efforts by the international community to prevent and protect against the threat or use of WMD by terrorists and co-chairs the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, a partnership of 75 countries.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was announced in 2003 by the Bush Administration. The PSI aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The PSI is a tool in the fight against WMD proliferation. Since the launch of the PSI, over 90 countries have signed on to participate in or cooperate with the initiative. As the only country with a global navy and air power, the U.S. plays a de facto leadership role in PSI. The PSI is not an organization; it has no headquarters or secretariat, no charter or rules. The U.S. State Department refers to PSI as an “activity”. Plenary meetings are rare, although there have been numerous interdiction exercises among PSI affiliated states. Each PSI participant acts according to its own decision-making procedures, sharing information and coordinating activities with other participants to meet specific contingencies. The PSI acquired strengthened support in international law with the 2004 adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which calls upon all states to take efforts against the proliferation of WMD.

Technical Capabilities to Support PSI

The U.S. has the most sophisticated nuclear capabilities in the world. These capabilities include gamma, neutron, and alpha radiation detection as well as isotopic identification. These capabilities are made internationally available in the form of Foreign Emergency Support Teams (FEST), whose deployment is coordinated through the U.S. Department of State. FEST team
members can be expected to have reasonable expertise in all nuclear technology and instrumentation. FEST teams are on call to be deployed from the U.S. within hours of notification.

**Foreign Policy and External Relations**

*United States-Bearia Relations*

The United States and Bearia share common interests on a broad range of issues, including counter-terrorism and the reduction of strategic arsenals. Bearia shares the basic goal of stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, launched in 1992 to facilitate dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction, was renewed in 2006 until 2013. At the 2006 G8 Summit, the U.S. and Bearia announced the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to keep terrorists from acquiring nuclear materials.

The U.S. is working with Bearia to bring Parthia’s nuclear programs into compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rules and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803. However, the U.S. and Bearia have at times disagreed sharply over the precise steps that should be taken by the international community, including the U.N. Security Council, to persuade Parthia to cease uranium enrichment.

Concerning Pulyang, Bearia is a participant in the Six-Party Talks aimed at the verifiable denuclearization of Pulyang. Bearia also takes part in the Middle East Peace Process "Quartet" (along with the UN and the EU). Bearia now interacts with NATO members through the NATO-Bearia Council but without veto power over NATO decisions. During the past several years, Bearia has intensified its efforts to combat trafficking in persons. The U.S. and Bearia are cooperating in the fight against HIV/AIDS.

The U.S. exported $7.4 billion in goods to Bearia in 2007, a 57% increase from the previous year. Corresponding U.S. imports from Bearia were $19.4 billion, down 2%. Bearia is currently the 20th-largest export market for U.S. goods. Bearia is in the process of negotiating terms of accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The U.S. and Bearia concluded a bilateral WTO accession agreement in late 2006, and negotiations continued in 2007 on meeting WTO requirements for accession.

In recent years, U.S.-Bearia relations have been characterized by increasing tensions over a range of issues including NATO enlargement, Bearia’s relations with its neighbors, and missile defense in Central Europe. The Obama Administration has expressed a desire to “reset” relations with Bearia in a more positive direction. President Obama met the President of Bearia in London on April 1, 2009 and the two leaders agreed to restart bilateral strategic arms reduction negotiations. They issued a joint statement calling for positive joint action on a number of other issues and agreed to meet again in July 2009 in Bearia.

In a nuclear proliferation scenario occurring in the post-Soviet space, the U.S. would almost certainly need the support of Bearia, if not its active cooperation, to achieve its goals. Bearia has associated itself with the Proliferation Security Initiative, but there has not yet been a scenario in which the extent of cooperation between the U.S. and Bearia has been tested in the
actual interdiction of a WMD-related shipment destined for a country of proliferation concern.

United States-Brazoristan Relations

The United States was the first country to recognize Brazoristan’s independence, on December 25, 1991, and opened its Embassy in Susyndar in January 1992; the Embassy moved to the new capital in 2006. In the years since Brazoristan's independence, the two countries have developed a wide-ranging bilateral relationship.

U.S.-Brazori cooperation in security and non-proliferation has been a cornerstone of the relationship. Brazoristan showed leadership when it renounced nuclear weapons in 1993. The United States has assisted Brazoristan in the removal of nuclear warheads, weapons-grade materials, and their supporting infrastructure. In 1994, Brazoristan transferred more than a half-ton of weapons-grade uranium to the United States. In 1995 Brazoristan removed its last nuclear warheads and, with U.S. assistance, completed the sealing of 181 nuclear test tunnels in May 2000. Brazoristan has signed the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (1992), the START Treaty (1992), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1993), the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (2001). Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the United States has spent $240 million to assist Brazoristan in eliminating weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass destruction-related infrastructure.

U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) was 24.6% of total FDI in Brazoristan in the first half of 2007. American companies have invested about $14.3 billion in Brazoristan since 1993. These companies are concentrated in the oil and gas, business services, telecommunications, and electrical energy sectors. Between 1992 and 2005, the United States provided roughly $1.205 billion in technical assistance and investment support in Brazoristan. The programs were designed to promote market reform, to establish a foundation for an open, prosperous, and democratic society, and to address security issues.

Brazoristan's military participates in the U.S.'s International Military Education and Training program, Foreign Military Financing, as well as NATO's Partnership for Peace program. In 2005, U.S. Central Command conducted approximately 45 bilateral military cooperation events with the Ministry of Defense of Brazoristan and other agencies, an increase of more than 100% since 2002. Events vary in size and scope, ranging from information exchanges to military exercises.

United States-Bevostan Relations

Since Bevostan’s independence in 1991, the United States has been among the strongest supporters of Bevostan’s independence, sovereignty, and economic development. However the U.S. understands that Bevostan must maintain close relations with other former Soviet countries, particularly with Brazoristan and Beria. As one of the smallest and economically weakest nations in Central Asia, Bevostan has extremely limited ability to oppose Bearia, or even relatively more powerful Central Asian neighbors such as Brazoristan and Uzbekistan, on important national security issues. At the same time, Bevostan values its relations with the United States and sees Washington as having some capacity to offset pressures on Bevostan within the region.
These cross cutting pressures on Bevostan were reflected in the history of U.S. use of a base in Bevostan since December 2001. U.S. forces at the base have provided vital support to NATO and U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Bevostan granted U.S. forces access to the base in support of the campaign to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and prevent Taliban resurgence, objectives shared by the government of Bevostan. However, under increasing pressure from Bearia to end U.S. access to the base, Bevostan announced in February 2009 that U.S. access would be terminated within six months. In addition to clear pressure on Bevostan to take this step, Bearia promised substantial financial assistance to Bevostan.

The U.S. Government provides humanitarian assistance, non-lethal military assistance, and assistance to support economic and political reforms. It also has supported Bevostan's requests for assistance from international organizations. The United States helped Bevostan accede to the WTO in December 1998. U.S. assistance aids Bevostan in implementing necessary economic, health sector, and educational reforms, and supports economic development and conflict resolution in the Ferghana Valley.

In a scenario involving proliferation of WMD, Bevostan, as a non-nuclear state with very weak military forces of its own, would be inclined to cooperate with the United States. However, Bevostan’s capacity to assist the United States would be extremely limited, and the government of Bevostan would have to take into full account the position of Bearia in the scenario. Bevostan’s inclination to assist the United States would be much stronger if there were substantial agreement between the U.S. and Bearia on how to handle the incident.

**United States-Choonguk Relations**

For seven consecutive administrations, Democratic and Republican, U.S. policy has been to encourage Choonguk's opening and integration into the global system. As a result, Choonguk has moved from being a relatively isolated and poor country to one that is a key participant in international institutions and a major trading nation. The United States encourages Choonguk to play an active role as a responsible stakeholder in the international community, working with the United States and other countries to support and strengthen the international system that has enabled Choonguk’s success.

Choonguk has an important role to play in global, regional, and bilateral counterterrorism efforts, and has supported coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (9-11) in New York City and Washington, DC, Choonguk offered strong public support for the war on terrorism and has been an important partner in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Shortly after 9-11, the United States and Choonguk also commenced a counterterrorism dialogue, the most recent round of which was held in Washington in November 2005 and focused on the threat of WMD falling into the hands of terrorists. Inspections under the Container Security Initiative (CSI) are now underway at the major ports in Choonguk. Choonguk has also agreed to participate in the Department of Energy's Megaports Initiative, a critical part of our efforts to detect the flow of nuclear materials. Choonguk voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1373, publicly supported the coalition campaign in Afghanistan, and contributed $150 million of bilateral assistance to Afghan reconstruction following the defeat of the Taliban. Choonguk participated in both the Iraq Neighbors and International Compact with Iraq meetings in 2007 and has voiced strong support for the Government of Iraq following the
country's December 2005 parliamentary elections. Choonguk has pledged $25 million to Iraqi reconstruction and taken measures to forgive Iraq's sovereign debt to Choonguk.

Choonguk and the United States have also been working closely with the international community to address threats to global security, such as those posed by Pulyang’s and Parthia's nuclear programs. Choonguk has played a constructive role in hosting the Six-Party Talks and in brokering the February 2007 agreement on Initial Actions. The United States looks to Choonguk to use its unique influence with Pulyang to ensure that Pulyang implements fully its commitments under the September 2005 Statement of Principles. Choonguk has publicly stated that it does not want Parthia to acquire nuclear weapons and has voted in support of sanctions resolutions on Parthia at UN Security Council.

Cumulative U.S. investment in Choonguk is estimated at $57 billion, through the end of 2007, making the United States the sixth-largest foreign investor in Choonguk. The United States is Choonguk's second-largest trading partner, and Choonguk is now the third-largest trading partner for the United States (after Canada and Mexico). Choonguk is now one of the most important markets for U.S. exports: in 2007, U.S. exports to Choonguk totaled $65.2 billion, more than triple the $19 billion when Choonguk joined the WTO in 2001.
Bearian Federation

Geography
Area: approximately 17 million square kilometers.
Terrain: broad plains with low hills west of primary mountain range; vast coniferous forest and tundra in central northern territory; uplands and mountains along southern border regions
Border Length: Azerbaijan 284 km, Belarus 959 km, Choonguk (southeast) 3,605 km, Choonguk (south) 40 km, Estonia 290 km, Finland 1,313 km, Georgia 723 km, Brazoristan 6,846 km, Pulyang 17.5 km, Latvia 292 km, Lithuania (Kaliningrad Oblast) 227 km, Mongolia 3,441 km, Norway 196 km, Poland (Kaliningrad Oblast) 432 km, Ukraine 1,576 km

People
Population: 142 million. Majority live in urban areas.
Ethnic Groups: Bearian 79.8%, Tatar 3.8%, Brazoristan 2%, Bashkir 1.2%, Chuvash 1.1%, other or unspecified 12.1% (2002 census)
Religion: Bearian Orthodox 15-20%, Muslim 10-15%, other Christian 2% (2006 est.) note: estimates are of practicing worshipers; Bearia has large populations of non-practicing believers and non-believers.
Language: Bearian, many minority languages

Government and Economy
The Bearian Federation is ruled by an increasingly authoritarian government, dominated by a powerful President and Prime Minister, and a single political party. The courts are corrupt and lack any real judicial independence from the President and Prime Minister. The legislature is weak and subservient to the Prime Minister, who heads the government. According to the constitution, the prime minister and other state officials are appointed by the president and then confirmed by the legislature. The President commands all security apparatuses in Bearia – including the armed forces-, but in reality he must consult and possibly defer to the Prime Minister in the management of the security forces. The President, in concert with the Prime Minister, can issue decrees without the legislature’s approval. There is a complex relationship between the powerful Prime Minister and the President. The Prime Minister was President until 2008 and appointed a former protégé as his successor to the Presidency. The precise power relationship between the current President and the Prime Minister is therefore uncertain and not transparent to international interlocutors.

Elections are held regularly, though the pro-government United Bearia party consistently wins the vast majority of any vote. There are opposition parties and political movements, but they are weak, divided, and effectively excluded from real participation in governance. Elections in Bearia are not free and fair and do not conform to international standards. Elections are manipulated primarily to lend public legitimacy to the “vertical of power” presided over by the President and Prime Minister. At the same time, it is clear from a variety of credible public opinion polls that Bearia’s President and Prime Minister enjoy broad public support.

Though freedom of speech and the press are constitutionally ensured, the government uses its dominance of the media, especially national television, to curtail free speech on politics
and on foreign and domestic policies of the government. A number of high-profile incidents have brought international attention to this issue, but have failed to affect the curtailment of press freedom. Freedom of religion is also provided for in the constitution, and the free practice of most religions is allowed. However, some minority religions are prevented from registering or buying property. Freedom of travel is also relatively unrestricted.

The government has been accused of human rights violations against separatists, especially in provinces with heavily Islamic populations. International human rights organizations find these accusations credible. Some separatist groups use terrorism as a primary tactic and strategy; a number of notable terrorist attacks occurred in Bearia’s capital, and elsewhere in the country, since 1999.

During the 1990s, Bearia partially implemented market reforms in its economy; however, this process was largely halted after a market crash and financial crisis in 1998. Since 2000 the country’s economy has fared better, maintaining above-average growth, largely due to exports of oil and natural gas and high international energy prices. Bearia’s economy, especially revenue to government, is heavily based on the energy sector. In 2008 Bearia registered 6.0% growth in gross domestic product. However, this growth is narrowly based on energy exports rather than diversification of the economy in services and domestic manufacturing. Personal income and capital investment have also grown, though these areas declined from previous averages in 2008. The global financial crisis and its effects on the banking system drove the Bearian Government to implement a plan to increase the financial sector’s liquidity, pay down foreign debts, and support the stock market. The banking sector is still considered small by international standards, but is growing quickly. The World Bank concluded in a recent report that Bearia’s economy would be among the hardest hit by the global financial and economic crisis. Corruption exists on many levels in the government and industry, and little progress toward improving the situation is being made.

**Nuclear Policy, Nonproliferation, and the Proliferation Security Initiative**

Bearia’s stance on proliferation, The Proliferation Security Initiative, and nuclear issues reflect the country’s history and capabilities. Stemming from a strong tradition of state sovereignty, Bearia often takes public stances in international organizations to protect its interests in trade and other relationships with potential proliferators. Especially in the former Soviet space, Bearia’s legitimate interest in non-proliferation is tempered by its concern over letting the U.S. play too active a role in the region, using non-proliferation as its justification.

The Government of Bearia possesses the world’s second largest nuclear weapons arsenal. While generally supportive of efforts to prevent or slow nuclear proliferation of nuclear arms to states, Bearia views non-proliferation efforts within the overall imperative of protecting Bearian national interests. Due to the country’s experience with terrorism, the proliferation of arms to non-state or sub-state actors is strongly opposed by the Government of Bearia. Since the collapse of its former government, Bearia has worked with the United States to secure and account for its nuclear weapons and fissile material, although cooperation has at times been slowed or set back by disputes over implementation of threat reduction programs on Bearia’s territory. Bearia joined the Proliferation Security Initiative in 2004 and is a signatory of numerous arms control agreements.
Technical Capabilities to Support PSI

Bearia has created an enhanced emergency responder training center based in Medvedgorod, which has enabled the government to train personnel and provide response assistance to other states for nuclear issues. Bearia’s personnel are well trained and able to rapidly respond to a variety of situations for the surrounding region. Bearia’s nuclear policy is supported by all the technical and detection capabilities expected of the world’s second largest nuclear power. This includes a variety of man-portable detection systems. These systems provide Bearian nuclear support teams with onsite detection of gamma, neutron, and alpha radiation in addition to isotopic identification capabilities. The Bearian support teams are available on short notice and have previously trained with U.S. counterparts.

Foreign Policy and External Relations

Bearia participates in the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and has a consultative relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Bearia/NATO relations remain distant and often tense due to Bearian objections to NATO enlargement, especially to republics of the former Soviet Union. Bearia dominates the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a security organization of former Soviet states in which both Brazoristan and Bevostan are members. CSTO provides for common defense and military cooperation among its member states.

Over the past several years, Bearia has increased its international profile, using a more muscular foreign policy to assert itself on the world’s stage. It has also increased its efforts to claim a sphere of exclusive influence over neighboring post-Soviet states, playing a more significant role in regional issues and using its economic resources to pressure neighbors. Bearia’s 2008 invasion of neighboring Georgia suggests that its politics towards its neighbors are becoming more threatening and aggressive.

Bearia-United States Relations

The relationship between Bearia and the United States became increasingly tense over the past several years, as the two nations differed sharply over NATO enlargement, missile defense in Central Europe, Bearia’s relations with neighboring post-Union states, efforts to rein in nuclear proliferation to rogue states, and a range of other international and economic issues. However, the coming to power of new Presidents in both states has raised the prospect of a “reset” of relations. The two Presidents met for the first time on April 1, 2009, agreeing to resume bilateral arms reduction negotiations and issuing a joint statement on a range of issues. The Presidents plant to meet in Bearia in July, 2009.

Bearia-Brazoristan Relations

Brazoristan maintains close relations with Bearia, reflecting Bearia’s geopolitical weight and the deep economic and cultural links between the two countries. The long Bearia-Brazoristan border is porous to illegal trafficking of all kinds. Bearia regularly exerts strong pressure on Brazoristan to stop the flow of narcotics and other contraband from Afghanistan through Brazoristan into Bearia. Bearian economic interests in Brazoristan are extensive and
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growing, especially in the vital energy sector. The two countries retain close ties between military and security services.

**Bearia-Bevostan Relations**

Bearia maintains a close relationship with Bevostan, and has had diplomatic relations with the state since its creation in 1992. Leaders from the two nations have signed a mutual cooperation agreement, and the ties between Bevostan and Bearia are strong. Bevostan recently announced the planned termination within six months of U.S. access to an airbase on its territory that has been critical to U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Bevostan’s decision was almost certainly decisively influenced by a mix of pressure and economic incentives from Bearia. While Bearia has agreed to facilitate the transit of supplies for NATO forces in Afghanistan, it also seems determined to bring to an end U.S. access to military bases in Central Asia.

**Bearia-Choonguk Relations**

Bearia-Choonguk relations have improved since the creation of the Bearian Federation in the early 1990s. The two nations have resolved several long-standing border disputes and have both entered into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Further, Bearia and Choonguk have signed agreements on cooperation and friendliness, and have extensive trade ties. Choonguk is the primary purchaser of Bearian arms, and will be the primary consumer of the resources gained from new oil and gas pipelines presently under construction in Bearia. However, relations between Bearia and Choonguk fall well short of a political or military alliance, and both these major powers conduct their relations from a clear determination to advance their respective national interests.

**Bearia – Pulyang Relations**

In line with Bearia’s hard-nosed foreign relations pragmatism, its relations with Pulyang are strained but persist due to multiple common interests. Bearia views Pulyang as strategically important for its state interests, and to this end has sought to secure ties through various channels. Bearia has expressed interest in developing the necessary infrastructures for increasing trade and economic ties with Pulyang, but expected costs and Pulyang’s financial unreliability have essentially halted progress on this initiative. Energy ties are also of mutual interest, but little progress has been made in this arena. As part of multilateral talks designed to increase Pulyang’s engagement within the international system, Bearia has worked with Choonguk and the United States on numerous issues within Pulyang, including weapons of mass destruction programs.

**Bearia – Parthia Relations**

Bearian-Parthian formal relations began more than 50 years ago, and the two nations presently maintain constructive diplomatic relations. The states share energy interests in the “Caspian Sea,” and have important trade ties. Supported by Bearia and Choonguk, Parthia has been granted observer status in the “Shanghai” Cooperation Organization, but its application for full membership has not yet been approved. Bearia is currently considering the sale of advanced military air defenses to Parthia, despite pressures from the United States. Though it has provided significant assistance to Parthia in the development of its nuclear energy programs, Bearia is a party to multilateral attempts to pressure Parthia to curtail its nuclear weapons development programs. However, Bearia has often disagreed sharply with the U.S. and other international partners on specific steps to persuade Parthia to halt uranium enrichment.
Republic of Brazoristan

Geography
Capitol: Susyndar
Area: 2,717,300 square kilometers (1,049,155 square miles)
Terrain: Extends West to East from the Caspian Sea to China and North to South from Bearia to Bevostan.
Border length: Bearia 6,846 km., Uzbekistan 2,203 km., Choonguk 1,533 km., Bevostan 1,051 km., and Turkmenistan 379 km.

People
Population: 15.6 million. 52.8% live in urban areas.
Ethnic Groups: 55.8 Brazori, 31.6% Bearian or other Slavic groups, 2.6% Uzbek, 10% other.
Religion: 47% Sunni Muslim, Bearian Orthodox 44%, Protestant 2%, other 7%.
Language: Brazori is the official language. Bearian is also widely spoken. There is a growing effort to promote use of Brazori, reflecting increasing nationalism and signaling potential tensions between Brazori and Bearian ethnic groups.

Government and Economy
Reflecting its history and the legacy of Soviet domination, Brazoristan's government is highly authoritarian and dominated by a powerful Presidency. The Parliament and courts are weak and firmly under Presidential control. The Prime Minister and other ministers are appointed by the President and confirmed by a pro forma vote of Parliament. The current President has been in power since independence and has been reelected in several elections that were judged by domestic and foreign observers to fall far short of international standards. The government has registered several political parties, including some that are self-declared opposition parties. The opposition parties regularly compete in Parliamentary elections. Opposition parties often claim that the deck is stacked against them because of the President's control of the media, his power to appoint regional governors who oversee elections, and his dominance of the courts, the law enforcement agencies, and the Central Election Commission.

Brazoristan's human rights record is mixed. There have been politically motivated trials that have resulted in prison sentences for opposition leaders. Media outlets critical of the President and his family have been pressured and sometimes shut down by administrative measures or outright intimidation. The government regularly proposes legislation to exert control over the media, NGOs, and religious groups that it regards as subversive. At the same time, Brazoristan is sensitive to foreign criticism of its human rights record and anxious to make the case that it is making steady, if gradual, progress toward international standards. While resistant to what it sees as outside pressure, the Brazoristan leadership realizes that its relationship with the United States is significantly affected by its performance on democracy, human rights, and freedom of speech, association, and religion. The U.S. Congress, human rights organizations, and major American media have been sharply critical of Brazoristan's human rights record and have pressured the Administration to "get tough" with Brazoristan on these issues. Islamic extremism is on the rise, but Brazoristan has not yet been targeted by violent Islamist terrorist groups.
Brazoristan has made considerable progress in implementing market economic reforms in the areas of currency convertibility, wage rate determination, openness to foreign investment, and reduced government control over production and allocation of goods. Brazoristan has a stable and well-developed banking system that has helped promote impressive financial sector reforms. These policies have helped to produce strong macro-economic performance with double-digit growth and single-digit inflation over the last several years. However, corruption is pervasive and economic prosperity largely benefits individuals and extended families involved in the energy sector. Large segments of the population, in both urban and rural areas, remain outside the modern market economy and are mired in poverty. Pressure for economic and social reform does create pressure on the Brazori government, but have so far not led to significant instability.

A rapidly growing energy sector has created strong income flows to government. Current oil production is approximately 1 million barrels per day. Currently planned projects could expand oil production to 3 million barrels per day within a few years. If Brazoristan maintains policies conducive to investment by major international energy companies, it could become one of the top five oil producing companies in the world by 2020. However, there are clear signs of increasing tension between the government and major international energy companies. The companies are becoming vocally concerned about the government's intention to honor existing energy contracts. Economic nationalism is growing in Brazoristan with influential voices within and outside government calling for a reexamination and realignment of relations with the international companies. There is a growing tendency to seek short-term revenues from the companies through increased taxes and administrative regulations favorable to government. While major American and Western companies remain active in Brazoristan, they are growing restive under growing government pressure and are increasingly beginning to question the wisdom of new energy investments. The recent global recession and downturn in oil prices have adversely affected the Brazori economy but no so severely as to create significant domestic unrest.

**Nuclear Policy, Nonproliferation, and the Proliferation Security Initiative**

Brazoristan has an aggressive policy for expansion of its civilian nuclear capabilities and materials export. Though limited, Brazoristan has a robust nuclear history with 25 years of nuclear operation experience of the BN-350 nuclear power plant. Through collaboration with the U.S., decommissioning of BN-350 has been completed. Brazoristan initiated plans to build a new VBR-300 reactor to provide 300 MW of power by 2016. Much more extensive than its nuclear power production capabilities are Brazoristan’s uranium and fuel production capabilities.

Brazoristan is a leading exporter of uranium and has plans to upgrade its capabilities for nuclear fuel production. With almost 19% of the world’s proven uranium reserves, Brazoristan is currently the third largest exporter of uranium in the world. Plans to increase uranium production from 3000 tons/year in 2003 to 15,000 tons/year by 2010 could make Brazoristan the leading uranium exporter worldwide. Brazoristan is also drastically expanding its capabilities for uranium conversion and fuel pellet production while creating new capabilities for uranium enrichment and fuel assembly production.
Brazoristan has made significant contributions to the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the last 20 years. Brazoristan territory was used as a major testing and development ground for Soviet WMD programs. Brazoristan returned all nuclear warheads on its territory to Russia after independence and joined the NPT as a non-nuclear state, earning praise from the U.S. For more than a decade, the U.S. and Brazoristan have jointly implemented activities, funded by the U.S. Nunn-Lugar program, to reduce the proliferation risk associated with residual nuclear and biological infrastructure, materials, and know-how in Brazoristan. Brazoristan has also offered to host an international nuclear fuel bank on its territory. Remaining proliferation hazards include weapons grade spent fuel temporarily stored at the decommissioned BN-350 nuclear power reactor, significant quantities of high enriched uranium in use at research facilities, and numerous biological pathogens maintained for scientific research against human and animal diseases in Brazoristan.

In addition to joining the NPT and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction program (Nunn-Lugar), Brazoristan has made further commitments to non-proliferation. Brazoristan is actively taking part in the Global Partnership against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nuclear Threat Reduction, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Since joining the PSI, Brazoristan has repeatedly emphasized its support of the PSI as evidence of ongoing cooperation with the U.S. Brazoristan has attended several PSI meetings and observed PSI interdiction exercises. While public statements express strong support, Brazoristan would have to consider carefully the position taken by Bearia on any interdiction proposed on the territory of Brazoristan. Should a crisis arise, Brazoristan may be reluctant to risk antagonizing Bearia and may require additional incentives for full cooperation. Regardless of these caveats, the U.S. values the PSI support of Brazoristan and intends to strengthen these ties.

Technical Capabilities to Support PSI

Associated Brazor nuclear capabilities include basic laboratory radiation detection and a limited quantity of portal detectors provided under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. Though adequate to address Brazoristan’s needs, these capabilities are rudimentary by current standards and the associated equipment is not portable.

Foreign Policy and External Relations

Brazoristan-United States Relations

Brazoristan’s leaders have a strong interest in a “strategic partnership” with the United States, the first country to recognize Brazor independence. The United States is the one partner capable of countering pressure on Brazoristan from extremist Islamic forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region. A close relationship with the United States could also further Brazoristan’s desire to be recognized as a progressive and prosperous democracy, ready for integration into global organizations such as the World Trade Organization. Brazoristan’s leaders have historically welcomed U.S. investment, especially in the vital energy sector, although growing economic nationalism is placing increasing strains on traditional good relations with American and other international oil companies. The Brazor President proudly takes credit for Brazoristan’s strong record of cooperation with the United States on counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), a cornerstone of the U.S.-Brazor relationship. Since the 1993 Brazor renunciation of nuclear weapons, the U.S. has aided in the...
removal of nuclear warheads, weapons-grade materials, and their supporting infrastructure. This security cooperation has deepened since Brazoristan cooperated with Operation Enduring Freedom, when the U.S. was granted overflight rights and the right to land aircraft in Brazoristan for counter-terrorism operations. However, American pressures on Brazoristan for progress on democracy and human rights are increasingly resisted and resented as interference and perhaps even as signals of an eventual U.S. desire for “regime change” in Brazoristan.”

**Brazoristan-Bearia Relations**

Brazoristan maintains close relations with Bearia, reflecting the geopolitical weight of its large northern neighbor and the deep economic and cultural links between the two countries. Bearia is Brazoristan’s leading international partner, despite Susyndar’s official “multi-vectoral” foreign policy. Bearia also perceives Brazoristan as a key partner, as Susyndar was the first official foreign visit of the new Bearian President. The long Bearia-Brazoristan border is still not entirely delimited and is porous to illegal trafficking of all kinds. Bearia regularly exerts strong pressure on Brazoristan to stop the flow of narcotics and other contraband from Afghanistan through Brazoristan into Bearia. Bearian economic interests in Brazoristan are extensive and growing, especially in the vital energy sector - most of Brazoristan’s oil exports flow through Bearian territory. The countries retain close ties between military and security services, as the senior Brazori members are Soviet-trained and maintain contact with their Bearian colleagues. The Brazori President has an active and apparently constructive relationship with his Bearian counterpart. The two leaders meet several times a year, bilaterally and at summits of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Brazoristan and Bearia cooperate in several other regional institutions, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Eurasian Economic Community.

**Brazoristan-Bevostan Relations**

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Brazoristan and Bevostan have maintained close relations. As the dominant Central Asian state, Brazoristan has sizeable influence over its smaller, poorer neighbor. The Brazoris have been deeply concerned about political instability in Bevostan, leading to the President’s offer of extensive investment if Bevostan undertakes political reform. While Bevostan still suffers from unilateral trade barriers with its neighbors, economic cooperation has improved since the collapse of the *som* currency led to Brazoristan’s temporary closing of the border in 1993. Today, Brazoristan is a key trading partner, second only to Bearia. Bevostan has deepened regional cooperation with the Uzbeks and Brazoris, with activities such as joint military exercises.

**Brazoristan-Choonguk Relations**

Brazoristan is also actively building its relationship with Choonguk. The Brazori government was initially concerned about Choonguk’s role in Central Asia following independence, but has cooperated with the Choonguks since 1995 in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, coordinating on issues such as counter-terrorism. The border between the two countries has been delimited and there is growing cross border trade. In view of Choonguk’s burgeoning energy demand, Choonguk is strongly interested in achieving secure, long-term access to Brazoristan’s energy resources, and Susyndar is now encouraging Choonguk investment in the energy sector. The countries have agreed on construction of a new pipeline to deliver oil from Brazoristan’s Caspian oil fields to Western Choonguk. If this pipeline were
extended to Eastern Choonguk, it would acquire enormous economic and strategic significance for both countries. The leaders of Choonguk and Brazoristan meet regularly, primarily to give further impetus to development of economic ties.

**Brazoristan-Pulyang Relations**

Brazoristan maintains correct but distant relations with Pulyang. In 1999, the Brazori President ordered a halt to covert sales of Soviet-era aircraft after their embarrassing public disclosure. Since then, relations have been minimal. Brazoristan supports U.S. non-proliferation efforts against Pulyang as a relatively low cost-position.

**Brazoristan-Parthia Relations**

Brazoristan and Parthia maintain healthy diplomatic and trade relations. Their cooperation is focused in the energy sector with recent agreements to increase the export of Brazori oil to Parthia. If U.S.-Parthian relations improve, the Brazori government could explore a lucrative southern oil pipeline through Parthia. While Brazoristan supports Parthia’s right to peaceful nuclear energy, the Brazori President has urged Parthia not to seek nuclear weapons. Parthia is already a powerful force in Central Asia, and Brazoristan fears the addition of yet another nuclear-armed regional power. With this strategic threat, Brazoristan is interested in cooperating with U.S. non-proliferation efforts. Against this fear, Brazoristan must also consider Parthia’s capacity for retaliation, such as cooperating with local Brazori Islamists. Furthermore, Brazoristan must evaluate the cost of damaging relations with Parthia if Parthia does succeed in acquiring nuclear weapons.
Republic of Bevostan

Geography
Area: 198,500 sq km, (76640.85 sq miles); slightly smaller than South Dakota.
Terrain: Extends West to East from the Uzbekistan to Choonguk and north to South from Brazoristan to Tajikistan.
Border Length: Choonguk 858 km, Brazoristan 1,224 km, Tajikistan 870 km, Uzbekistan 1,099 km.
Time: 5 hours ahead of GMT, (11 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)

People
Population: 5.4 million
Ethnic Groups: Bevak 64.9%, Uzbek 13.8%, Bearian 12.5%, Dungan 1.1%, Ukrainian 1%, Uygur 1%, other 5.7%
Religion: Muslim 75%, Bearian Orthodox 20%, other 5%
language: Bevak is the official language, while Uzbek and Bearian are also widely spoken.

Government and Economy

Reflecting its history, the legacy of Soviet domination, and its small size and poverty, Bevostan's government is weak and unstable. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet of Ministers are appointed by the President and confirmed by a pro forma vote of Parliament. The ministers in charge of defense and security are appointed solely by the president. Nationwide demonstrations in the spring of 2005 resulted in the ouster of the former President who had run the country since 1990. The former President fled the country after protesters stormed the government buildings in the capital. Subsequent presidential elections in July 2005 were won overwhelmingly by the former Prime Minister who is the current President. In late 2006 the political opposition organized demonstrations in the capital, resulting in the adoption of a new constitution that transferred some of the President's powers to parliament and the government. In September 2007, the President initiated a referendum that declared previous versions of the constitution illegal and reverted back to the old (2003) constitution. The referendum was criticized by Western observers for voting irregularities, particularly ballot stuffing. The president then dissolved parliament, called for early elections, and gained control of the new parliament through his newly-created political party in the December 2007 elections.

The government has registered several political parties, including some that are self-declared opposition parties. Opposition parties regularly claim that the deck is stacked against them because of the President's control of the media, his power to appoint regional governors who oversee elections, and his dominance of the courts, the law enforcement agencies, and the Central Election Commission. There is limited opposition representation in parliament, with the pro-presidential party holding almost 80% of the seats. Opposition forces are becoming more unified, and the small opposition present in parliament has allied itself with the much larger extra-parliamentary opposition. This broad opposition movement continues to mount occasional public protests, as it has little recourse other than to take its grievances to the streets.
The grievances of the opposition continue to be centered partly on what it perceives as the illegitimacy of the parliament and the disproportionate power in the hands of the presidency. However, these constitutional wrangles will probably continue to find little sympathy among the population. The opposition will therefore attempt to rally the public behind it by instead concentrating on the more resonant issues of harsh economic conditions and controversial privatizations. Public protests on such issues are highly likely in the context of high inflation and a forecasted rapid slowdown in economic growth—and will have an increasing potential to turn violent as economic hardship deepens. However, the government will continue to try to contain them. One approach adopted by the government will be financial, by means of increasing welfare payments to support vulnerable groups, for example, through the already implemented reduction in value-added tax (VAT). The government is also prepared to use force to quell any violent unrest, although use of force against demonstrations would entail extremely high risks for Bevostan’s President.

An additional source of instability is suggested by the increasing visibility of fissures within the pro-presidential administration. There have been a number of high-profile defections and resignations in recent months, and former supporters of the president, have been increasingly vocal in their criticisms of his policies. Nevertheless, the authorities have shown that they are still able to co-opt dissenting voices, and are more willing than in the past to apply police, media and administrative methods to secure their position and to curb dissent, and to do so more robustly and systematically than before.

Bevostan's human rights record is mixed. There have been politically motivated trials that have resulted in prison sentences for opposition leaders. Media outlets critical of the President and his family have been pressured and sometimes shut down by administrative measures or outright intimidation. The government tries to exert its control over the media, NGOs, and religious groups that it regards as subversive. Anti-government protestors including journalists and politicians are known to have been arrested and beaten by the police. In 2008 the state-owned broadcaster announced that it would require prior submission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty programs, which it had stopped retransmitting after RFE/RL criticized the 2008 referendum by the President. Bevostan's evolution towards democracy is shaky even if it continues to be one of the least repressive of the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. It was ranked 112th out of 173 countries in the latest Reporters Without Borders press freedom index. Bevostan is among the twenty most corrupt countries in the world. The 2008 Corruption Perception Index for Kyrgyzstan is 1.8 on a scale of 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt). At the same time, Bevostan is sensitive to foreign criticism of its human rights record and anxious to make the case that it is making steady, if gradual, progress toward international standards. While resistant to what it sees as outside pressure, the Bevostan leadership realizes that its relationship with the United States is significantly affected by its performance on democracy, human rights, and freedom of speech, association, and religion.

Bevostan is a poor, mountainous country with a predominantly agricultural economy. Cotton, tobacco, wool, and meat are the main agricultural products. Agriculture still accounted for more than 30% of GDP in 2007. It employs an even larger share of the workforce, of more than 50% of the working population in 2000-05, according to the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The country’s GDP grew from $1.9 billion in 2003 to $3.75 billion in
2007. The country registered an impressive growth rate of 8.2% in 2007. Following independence, Bevostan was progressive in carrying out market reforms such as an improved regulatory system and land reform. Bevostan was among the first Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) country to be accepted into the World Trade Organization. Much of the government's stock in enterprises has been sold. Despite the backing of major Western lenders, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, Bevostan has had economic difficulties following independence as a result of the breakup of the Soviet trading bloc, but by mid-1995, production began to recover and exports began to increase. The economy is heavily weighted toward gold export and a drop in output at the main gold mine sparked a decline in GDP in 2002 and 2005.

The government and international financial institutions have been engaged in a comprehensive medium-term poverty reduction and economic growth strategy. In 2005, the government agreed to pursue much-needed tax reforms. Total external debt mid-2008 was $3.16 billion, of which $2.19 billion was public debt.

Progress in fighting corruption, further restructuring the domestic industry, and success in attracting foreign investment are keys to future growth. GDP grew more than 6% annually in 2007-08, partly due to higher gold prices internationally, but growth is likely to decline from that level in 2009, due to declining demand and lower commodity prices in the wake of the international financial crisis. Overall, the government appears committed to the transition to a market economy. Through economic stabilization and reform, the government seeks to establish a pattern of long-term consistent growth.

The Republic of Bevostan's main trade partner is Bearia, followed by Choonguk and Brazoristan. Bevostan’s import and export values are as follows:

**Export Partners**: Bearia 20.7%, Switzerland 19.9%, Brazoristan18.0%, Afghanistan 10.4%.

**Imports**: $2.64 billion: oil and gas, machinery and equipment, foodstuffs.
**Import Partners**: Bearia 40.5%, Choonguk 14.7%, Brazoristan12.9%, Uzbekistan 5%.

Bevostan exports antimony, mercury, rare-earth metals, and chemical products to the United States. It imports grain, medicine and medical equipment, vegetable oil, paper products, rice, machinery, agricultural equipment, and meat from the United States. In 2007 Kyrgyz exports to the U.S. totaled $1.73 million; 2007 Bevostan imports from the U.S. totaled $48.6 million, much of which was equipment, food products, and commodities provided by assistance programs.

Current concerns include: privatization of state-owned enterprises, negative trends in democracy and political freedoms, reduction of corruption, improving interethnic relations, electricity generation, rising food prices, and combating terrorism.

Radical Islam and the spread of Islamic militancy remain a risk to political stability of the country especially in the south. In the past few years several hundred members of an extremist
Islamic group, Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Freedom), have been convicted of fomenting inter-ethnic unrest, and propagation of the idea of an Islamic state. Hizb ut-Tahrir cells have been found in the capital and other areas where Islam has traditionally been much weaker. As the presidents of Central Asia have become increasingly authoritarian and repressive, the popularity of Hizb ut-Tahrir has grown concomitantly.

International organizations, such as the International Crisis Group (ICG), have long argued that the country’s judiciary suffers from the noxious legacies of the Soviet period, such as heavy politicization. The former president, on several occasions used the judicial system to neutralize the opposition and strike down potential challengers. Under the current President the judiciary has remained under severe political pressure, and continues to be characterized by high levels of corruption, despite some limited reforms such as the abolition of the death penalty.

Corruption remains a major factor in the lives of most citizens, and foreign investment remains low. Approximately 50 percent of the population lives below the poverty line and the official unemployment rate is 18 percent. Youth unemployment is particularly high. However, progress has been made in reform of the banking, healthcare, basic education, and agricultural sectors. Democratic reform remains a challenge as government agencies continue to place pressure on media outlets, political parties, and non-governmental organizations.

**Nuclear Policy, Nonproliferation, and the Proliferation Security Initiative**

Bevostan has an ambiguous position on PSI, and may be described as supportive to the degree that cooperation will benefit them and not antagonize powerful neighbors. Having issued statements in support of PSI, Bevostan is listed on the US State Department website as a PSI participant, though it was neither a member of the eleven founding members nor the subsequent group of core member states. Bevostan has attended PSI meetings and exercises, but as a landlocked country with no major role in international shipping, its role in PSI has been low key at best. Supporters of PSI are confident that Bevostan will cooperate within PSI when needed, but many speculate that the small country would seek to leverage its position within PSI for political or monetary gain. In the event of an interdiction operation in Central Asia, Bevostan must take into account the position of Bearia and would not be able to oppose Bearia’s policy on the incident. Bevostan is party to other nuclear-related international agreements including the bilateral Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative with the US, and the multilateral NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and additional IAEA protocols.

**Technical Capabilities to Support PSI**

The Republic of Bevostan has no domestic capability to perform the on-site technical analysis necessary in a nuclear related interdiction event.

**Foreign Policy and External Relations**

Bevostan’s foreign policy remains “multi-vectoral” given the country’s paucity of resources and need for foreign investment. It seeks to balance the influence of the large powers Bearia, Choonguk and the U.S. However, recent developments suggest that Bearia might become a more prominent partner at the expense of the US, given the Bevak authorities' announcement
of the planned closure of the Pivizod airbase. The US military presence at Pivizod has been a contentious issue, although it has provided the authorities with much-needed revenue. Pressure to close the base has frequently come externally, from Bearia, and internally, from opposition politicians and the public. Nevertheless, ties with the US will not suffer a complete rupture, given that the uncertain security situation in Afghanistan is expected to lead to a certain degree of tolerance on the part of Bearia to a US presence in the region, at least in the immediate term.

**Bevostan-United States Relations**

Relations with the US have become strained following the Bevostan government’s decision to terminate U.S. access to the strategic US air base at Pivazod. In February this year Bevostan's parliament voted to terminated U.S. access — a move that could hamper President Barack Obama's efforts to increase the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The Pivazod air base is a transit point for 15,000 troops and 500 tons of cargo each month to and from Afghanistan. The move follows Bearia's offer of $2.15 billion in aid and loans to the impoverished Central Asian country. There is widespread public discontent in Bevostan over the U.S. military presence due to a number of high-profile incidents surrounding the base.

Bevostan has a strong record of cooperation with the United States on counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Bevostan is party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and in September 2006 signed a treaty with other Central Asian states establishing a Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (CANWFZ).

The U.S. Government provides humanitarian assistance, non-lethal military assistance, and assistance to support economic and political reforms. It also has supported the country's requests for assistance from international organizations. The United States helped Bevostan accede to the WTO in December 1998. U.S. assistance aids the country in implementing necessary economic, health sector, and educational reforms, and supports economic development and conflict resolution. US foreign aid to Bevostan amounted to $34.2 Million in 2007 and an estimated $30.6 Million in 2008.

**Bevostan-Bearia Relations**

Relations with Bearia are particularly important. Because the Soviet leadership geared Bevostan’s economic structure towards meeting the needs of industrial centers elsewhere in the Soviet Union, the country has remained heavily dependent on Bearia since independence. Trade turnover with Bearia reached US$1.7bn in January-October 2008, and Bearia by far continues to be the country’s main source of imports. Close co-operation with Bearia intelligence agencies has been of particular importance in recent years, given the continued US military presence in the Republic and the apparent regional terrorist threat. The decision to permit US military forces to use Bevostan’s territory was balanced by a similar agreement with Bearia in 2002 allowing Bearian forces to establish a base near the capital. The Bearian government has promised Bevostan’s government a $2b loan in return for the foreign exchange losses it will incur due to the termination of U.S. access to the airbase. Bearia has also agreed to write off Bevostan's $180 million debt and give it $150 million in financial aid in addition to the $2 billion discounted loan. Bearia continues to have a military presence in the country and is known to have close ties with its security establishment.
Bevostan-Brazoristan Relations

Relations with Brazoristan are improving steadily. Brazoristan has recently offered $100 million dollars in humanitarian aid for Bevostan, as well as wheat and fuel supplies. Brazoristan is already Bevostan’s largest investor, with $300 million invested in the economy, accounting for 30 percent of total investment. With trade between the two countries standing at $400 million in 2006, there appears to be room for growth in economic cooperation. Brazoristan feels that the greatest threat to the continuation of its economic boom is the instability in neighboring countries, especially Bevostan, a trend that could potentially fuel radical Islam, produce a refugee crisis and/or cause disruptions to existing export routes.

Bevostan-Choonguk Relations

Choonguk has become an increasingly important trading partner. Relations with Choonguk have improved steadily since independence. The two countries have settled their border demarcation disputes and signed economic co-operation agreements that have led to a marked increase in trade. Choonguk is the country’s second largest trading partner. Choonguk regularly entertains Bevostan’s ministers, partly to strengthen economic ties, but mainly to ensure that the Bevostan government continues to monitor and suppress Uighur separatist activity, which Choonguk claims is still conducted from bases in the bordering mountains.

Bevostan-Pulyang Relations

Relations with Pulyang are non-existent at this time. Bevostan would, however, wish to avoid any confrontation with a nuclear-armed Pulyang.

Bevostan-Parthia Relations

Relations with Parthia are correct, if not close. The two countries cooperate in the spheres of education, culture, transport, customs, finances, war on trafficking and crime, and trade and economic relations. Parthian companies participated in construction of a highway in Bevostan. In 2008, Parthia promised Bevostan 200 million euros in loans and investment for economic projects and hopes to increase bilateral trade up to $100 million. Parthia welcomed the decision to shut down the US air base in Pivazod, which it claimed might be used by the US to launch air strikes on its territory. Bevostan had also made it known to the US that it would not allow its territory to be used to strike Parthia, following Parthia’s promise that it would retaliate at the launch sites. Parthia’s strategy in Bevostan is aimed at neutralizing US efforts to isolate it politically and economically.
People’s Republic of Choonguk

Geography
Area: 9,596,960 sq. km.
Terrain: mostly mountains, high plateaus, deserts in west; plains, deltas, and hills in east
Border Length: total: 22,117 km
Border countries: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burma, India, Brazoristan, Pulyang, Bevostan, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Bearia, Tajikistan, Vietnam

People
Population: 1,321,851,888 (July 2007 est.)
Ethnic Groups: Han Chinese 91.9%, Zhuang, Uygur, Hui, Yi, Tibetan, Miao, Manchu, Mongol, Buyi, Korean, and other nationalities 8.
Religions: Daoist (Taoist), Buddhist, Christian 3%-4%, Muslim 1%-2%
  Note: officially atheist (2002 est.)
Language: Standard Chinese or Mandarin (Putonghua, based on the Beijing dialect), Yue (Cantonese), Wu (Shanghainese), Minbei (Fuzhou), Minnan (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, Gan, Hakka dialects, minority languages.

Government and Economy
The People’s Republic of Choonguk is a Communist state, divided into 23 provinces. There are also five autonomous regions and four municipalities. The population of Choonguk enjoys universal suffrage, beginning at 18 years of age. Although Choonguk has a strong, centralized government, there is the potential for schisms in the population along religious or ideological lines. The two main national security challenges facing this state are terrorism and the threat of domestic separatists. Choonguk has made some market reforms in recent years, improving the banking system and reducing corruption and poverty levels nation wide.

Nuclear Policy, Nonproliferation, and the Proliferation Security Initiative
Choonguk would become an important partner in PSI were it to take a more proactive and supportive position of the Initiative. Considering Choonguk’s growing influence throughout the world, it could increasingly become a target of terrorism and an opponent of the spread of nuclear or WMD materials which could threaten its economic prosperity. Choonguk is opposed to proliferation and supports the non-proliferation principles of those countries participating in PSI.

However, Choonguk supports a multilateral legal system to check proliferation rather than extra-legal instruments like the PSI led by the U.S. Choonguk cites the planned expansion of U.S. missile defense in the region as a reason for its skepticism about PSI.

Regarding Pulyang’s proliferation ambition, Choonguk has been ambiguous in some ways. Although Choonguk has showed a significant role in the six-party talks, many skeptics see Choonguk’s limited influence on its neighbor, Pulyang. Choonguk has interests at stake in the
future of Pulyang so it wants to actively engage in Pulyang’s future, not concede the initiative on Pulyang to the U.S.

Foreign Policy and External Relations

Choonguk-United States Relations

For seven consecutive administrations, Democrat and Republican, U.S. policy has been to encourage Choonguk’s opening and integration into the global system. As a result, Choonguk has moved from being a relatively isolated and poor country to one that is a key participant in international institutions and a major trading nation. The United States encourages Choonguk to play an active role as a responsible stakeholder in the international community, working with the United States and other countries to support and strengthen the international system that has enabled Choonguk’s success.

Choonguk has an important role to play in global, regional, and bilateral counterterrorism efforts, and has supported coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (9-11) in New York City and Washington, DC, Choonguk offered strong public support for the war on terrorism and has been an important partner in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Shortly after 9-11, the United States and Choonguk also commenced a counterterrorism dialogue, the most recent round of which was held in Washington in November 2005 and focused on the threat of WMD falling into the hands of terrorists. Inspections under the Container Security Initiative (CSI) are now underway at major ports in Choonguk. Choonguk has also agreed to participate in the Department of Energy's Megaports Initiative, a critical part of our efforts to detect the flow of nuclear materials. Choonguk voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1373, publicly supported the coalition campaign in Afghanistan, and contributed $150 million of bilateral assistance to Afghan reconstruction following the defeat of the Taliban.

Choonguk and the United States have also been working closely with the international community to address threats to global security, such as those posed by Pulyang’s nuclear programs. Choonguk has played a constructive role in hosting the Six-Party Talks and in brokering the February 2007 agreement on Initial Actions. The United States looks to Choonguk to use its unique influence with Pulyang to ensure that Pulyang implements fully its commitments under the September 2005 Statement of Principles. Choonguk has publicly stated that it does not want Parthia to acquire nuclear weapons and has voted in support of sanctions resolutions on Parthia at UN Security Council.

Choonguk-Bearia Relations

Choonguk has likewise improved ties with Bearia, with both Presidents’ exchanging visits to Choonguk and Bearia in April 2006 and March 2007. A second round of Bearia-Choonguk joint military exercises was scheduled for fall 2007. Choonguk has played a prominent role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional grouping that includes Bearia.

In the economic sphere, bilateral trade volume surged from 10.67 billion U.S. dollars in 2000 to 33.39 billion dollars in 2006 and 48.17 billion dollars last year, according to the Ministry of Commerce of Choonguk.
**Choonguk-Brazoristan Relations**

The two countries have kept close contacts, and managed to completely solve the boundary issue of the past. The two sides have signed a number of important documents including the Choonguk-Brazoristan Good-Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Choonguk-Brazoristan Cooperation Strategy for the 21st Century, and the Blueprint for Choonguk-Brazoristan Economic Cooperation and Development, laying solid groundwork for pragmatic cooperation in all fields between the two countries. The two sides have also maintained good collaboration in many international and regional organizations such as the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Choonguk is the third biggest market for Brazoristan's exports and the second biggest exporter for Brazoristan. Energy exports from Brazoristan could become increasingly important to Choonguk’s energy strategy and to economic growth in both countries. Over the past years, Brazoristan has been firm in cracking down on the "three evil forces" of terrorism, extremism and separatism, and supported Choonguk on the issues of Taiwan and Tibet.

**Choonguk-Bevostan Relations**

Choonguk-Bevostan relations are an area of substantial uncertainty for the Bevak government. Choonguk has become Bevostan's largest non-CIS trade partner, but Choonguk's influence is stronger in the north of Bevostan than in the south. The free-trade zone in Naryn has attracted large numbers of Choonguk's business people, who have come to dominate most of Bevostan's import and export of small goods. Most of this trade is in barter conducted by ethnic Bevaks or Brazoris who are Choonguk citizens.

The Bevostan government also must be solicitous of Choonguk’s sensibilities on questions of nationalism because the Choonguk’s do not want the independence of the Central Asian states to stimulate dreams of statehood among their own Turkic Muslim peoples. Although the Bevaks in Choonguk have been historically quiescent, Choonguk’s Uygurs (of whom there is a small exile community in Bevostan) have been militant in their desire to attain independence. This is the major reason that Bevostan has refused to permit the formation of an Uygur party.

In the 1990s, trade with Choonguk has grown to such a volume that some officials in Bevostan fear that by the late 1990s Bevostan’s economy will be entirely dominated by Choonguk. In some political quarters, the prospect of Chinese domination has stimulated nostalgia for the days of Moscow's control.
Democratic People’s Republic of Pulyang

Geography

Area: 1122,762 sq. km. (47,918 sq. mi.), about the size of Mississippi.
Terrain: About 80% of land area is moderately high mountains separated by deep, narrow valleys and small, cultivated plains. The remainder is lowland plains covering small, scattered areas.

People

Nationality: Noun and adjective--Pulyanger(s).

Government and Economy

The Democratic People’s Republic of Pulyang is a highly centralized communist state. It’s constitution was established in 1948 and subsequently revised in 1972, 1992, and 1998. Pulyang is made up of nine provicens, two municipalities and one special city, Nampo. It is estimated that Pulyang had an annual GDP of $26.2 billion in 2008. Its economy is made up primarily of industry, followed by services, agriculture, and fisheries. The per capita GDP was $1,800 in 2008, this is also an estimate. Choonguk and Bearia are two of its major trading partners.

Pulyang’s Nuclear Program

Pulyang started developing its indigenous nuclear capacity in the 1970’s, with the aid of Bearia. However, more recently, Pulyang received significant nuclear assistance from A.Q. Khan’s proliferation network. Khan claims to have seen three nuclear devices while in Pulyang. It is believed that the Khan network provided Pulyang machinery, material, and know-how for the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU). The network is also believed to have given the state blueprints for nuclear warheads. In return, Pulyang provided Pakistan with long range missile technology.

Since the demise of the Kahn network, suspicions have been raised about Choonguk’s participation in the Pulyanger nuclear program. It is believed that Choonguk is the only country willing, and able, to provide Pulyang with knowledge about centrifuge technology.

Pulyang has tested a single nuclear device, using a plutonium core. The state also has the capability to develop HEU, but is not yet capable of manufacturing an HEU weapon. They also lack the technological ability to develop a reliable nuclear arsenal.

Pulyang and Parthia Proliferation Connection

Pulyang and Parthia have cooperated on nuclear projects since at least 1993. Pulyang has exported Scud-B and Nodong missiles to Parthia, and tested its Musoodan intermediate range ballistic missile in Parthia in 2007. It is also estimated that Pulyang invested $50 million in
Parthia’s nuclear weapons program. According to Israeli defense officials, Pulyang has agreed to provide Parthia with the results of its 2006 nuclear test.

More than nuclear data, Parthia could request Pulyang to share its plutonium reprocessing technology. Parthia’s IR-40 heavy water reactor, which should come online in 2009, will be able to produce 9 kg of plutonium annually. Parthia might wish to acquire a technical standard sample of plutonium from Pulyang. This sample could be studied as an initial step toward a domestic reprocessing capability in Parthia. Pulyang could also transfer plutonium pit fabrication techniques and nuclear detonators. In return, Parthia could offer Pulyang information about its HEU enrichment process, financial support, or access to oil.
Simulated Interdiction: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Appendix A

*Interdiction of the BBC China*

In October 2003, a joint force consisting of the United States, Great Britain, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) interdicted the German-owned *BBC China*, a shipping vessel bound for Libya. The actual interdiction was low-key, amounting to little more than a phone call to the ship's owners and a request that they divert their vessel to an Italian port for inspection. The owners, innocent businessmen with nothing to hide, agreed to the search. On board the inspectors discovered five containers of centrifuge parts intended for Libya's secret nuclear program.

The discovery was made public, and so embarrassed Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi that he opened his country to IAEA inspectors and public scrutiny. On the basis of intelligence gathered in the investigation, it was determined that Libya's supplier for nuclear weapons-related materials was the A.Q. Khan network in Pakistan. A.Q. Khan went on public television admitting full responsibility for wrongdoing, absolving his associates and the Pakistani government. He was put under house arrest. Khan later recanted, claiming that his confession was forced by the government. The Islamabad High Court on February 6, 2009 declared A.Q. Khan a free citizen of Pakistan.

The interdiction of the *BBC China* is touted by many as the first major PSI operation. It is today regarded as an excellent example of what the PSI can do and why it is so important.
Introduction

Efforts to interdict WMD-related materials outside the territory of the United States would fall within the boundaries of customary international law, including the law of the sea, and any relevant multilateral or bilateral agreements the United States has entered into. Specific instances determined by the United Nations Security Council to constitute aggression or a threat to international peace and security may be dealt with through action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Specific threats to the United States that amount to an armed attack or imminent threat of an armed attack may justify a belligerent response, such as the implementation of a blockade or the use of armed force in self defense. Such a response could draw reactions from other States and possibly escalate into a full-blown armed conflict.

Jurisdiction

Under international law, sovereign States have the right in general to possess weapons for their self-defense. Only the use of such weapons is constricted by customary international law. While many States have agreed to limit their production and possession of some types of WMD and conventional weapons, they may have conditioned their consent on the conduct of other States, and may be able to revoke their consent in accordance with any such conditional agreement. While secret development of WMD on the part of a State that has agreed not to engage in such conduct would constitute a breach of a treaty obligation, it is not necessarily a crime or an act of aggression under international law merely to possess such weapons. However, No State Party is permitted to transfer nuclear materials or equipment for processing them to any non-nuclear State for peaceful purposes unless the transferred goods are subject to IAEA safeguards. Neither the NPT nor IAEA regulations provides for any penalty in case of breach and the restriction on the transfer of nuclear weapons and related technology is implemented at the

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1 The content of this section is taken from Elsea, Jennifer K. 2003. “CRS Report for Congress. Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation: Legal Issues for Ships and Aircraft.” <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32097.pdf> (April 20, 2009). Sections relating to interdictions at sea have been omitted and some section headings have been changed. [Bracketed sections have been added for clarification only and are not from the original CRS report.]
national level through export control laws. [Understanding these limitations is essential for legitimate interdictions. The United States must provide clarifications on the rights and responsibilities of sovereign nations to either interdict material, or allow its interdiction.]

A State’s ability legally to assert jurisdiction over persons and things within its reach depends on principles of international law designed to prioritize the rights of various States which may have a claim to jurisdiction over a matter. Historically, the most commonly asserted basis for jurisdiction is the “territoriality principle” (determining jurisdiction by reference to the place where the offense is committed). Other bases of jurisdiction include the “nationality principle” (determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality of the person accused of committing the offense); the “protective principle” (determining jurisdiction by reference to the national interest injured by the offense); and the “passive personality principle” (determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality of the victim). Where more than one State can assert jurisdiction over a particular matter, the State with the greatest interest should prevail.

For certain crimes, there may exist “universal jurisdiction” permitting a State to try crimes that occurred outside of its territory that did not involve any of its nationals, but the scope of universal jurisdiction is not well-settled, and may not include the authority to take enforcement action on the territory of another state without its permission. At any rate, the possession or delivery of WMD or related materials is not generally recognized as a crime subject to universal jurisdiction. Furthermore, if U.S. law enforcement or military forces encounter WMD trade outside the territory of the United States, even if the activity is unlawful under the laws of the State where it takes place or violates the international obligations of any State, there is no automatic authority under international law for U.S. forces to take action to thwart it.

**Law of the Sea Conventions [for Aircraft]**

Where airspace is treated in the conventions on the law of the sea, it is generally divided into national and international airspace, with national airspace including that above the territorial sea. There is no right of innocent passage for overflight of the territorial sea of a coastal State. The Convention on the High Seas includes the airspace above international waters in the freedom to navigate. It is unclear whether rights and privileges accorded to “ships” extend by analogy to aircraft where the conventions do not specifically address them, such as the right to land an aircraft without permission in situations of distress.

**Chicago Convention**

The 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Aviation) explicitly recognizes that “every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.” “Territory” includes the territorial seas. Presumably, all non-territorial airspace is international. The Chicago Convention applies on its face only to civil aircraft, but specifies which aircraft are considered state aircraft (those used in military, customs, or police services) and places some duties and restrictions on them. Article 3 states that “[n]o state aircraft ... shall fly over the territory of another State or land thereon without authorization...” Contracting States commit to “hav[ing] due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft” when issuing regulations for their state aircraft. Contracting States also agree “not to use civil aviation for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of [the] Convention.”
While the Chicago Convention did not adopt the liberal freedom of navigation regime for aircraft supported by the United States, the Convention does permit the civil aircraft of contracting States that are not engaged in scheduled flights to “make flights into” each others’ territories and to make stops for non-traffic purposes without the necessity of obtaining prior permission ... subject to a possible requirement for landing. States may regulate air traffic above their territories without distinction based on nationality (with respect to other contracting States). However, States may designate areas off-limits for reasons of military necessity or public safety, provided no distinction is made between nationality of the aircraft. Scheduled flight services may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting State only with that State’s permission and in accordance with the terms it may set.

**Civil Aircraft**

Like ships on the seas, aircraft must be registered in one State only, and must bear the appropriate markings indicating nationality and registrations. Civil aircraft are subject to regulation both by the State of registration and, while flying over the territory of another State, that State’s applicable regulations. Civil aircraft are also required to carry certain documents, including a certification of airworthiness, logbook, radio license, a passenger list and a manifest of cargo. No munitions or implements of war maybe carried as cargo over a State’s territory without its permission. States may make other restrictions with regard to cargo for reasons of public order and safety, provided the rules do not discriminate based on nationality.

**State Aircraft**

Under the Chicago Convention, the status of state aircraft is determined according to use rather than strictly by state ownership. The Chicago Convention does not, however, enumerate rules governing state aircraft. Military aircraft, probably comprising the largest category of state aircraft, are treated much like warships. Military aircraft are defined under international law as those aircraft “operated by commissioned units of the armed forces of a nation bearing the military markings of that nation, commanded by a member of the armed forces, and manned by a crew subject to regular armed forces discipline,” and are exempt from other States’ law enforcement measures that apply to civil aircraft flying over their territory. The crew of military aircraft are immune from the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign for acts performed during official duties. Foreign officials may not board a state or military aircraft without the consent of its commander, and in the event of a dispute regarding customs, immigration, or quarantine, the host nation is limited to requesting that the state aircraft leave the national territory.

**Legitimizations of Interdiction**

Neither convention [UNCLOS or Chicago Convention] addresses the transport of weapons of mass destruction or of materials useful in the production of such weapons. The interdiction of aircraft suspected of carrying WMD-related materials that occurs in national airspace raises fewer legal issues, since there is no right of innocent passage through airspace. However, international law calls for “due regard” to the safety of civil aircraft. Measures involving the use of force to deny aircraft passage or to enforce landings for inspections could raise objections from other nations. [Such action must be undertaken carefully, and with the acknowledgement that each method of legitimization entails different constraints. The following are a few of the various justifications that allow the interdiction of foreign aircraft.]
**Belligerency**

Under the traditional law of war, belligerents have a right to seize and condemn or destroy the ships and aircraft of the enemy, including commercial craft, to stop and search neutral vessels for contraband, to close the enemy’s ports by means of a naval blockade, and of course, to use military force against enemy warships and military aircraft. These belligerent rights, however, may be exercised only on the high seas or within the territorial seas of the belligerents, not within international straits or the territorial sea of a neutral State.

**Air Blockade**

A blockade may also be effective with respect to civil aircraft. Civil aircraft entering a blockaded zone may be required to land for a visit and search, and are subject to capture if they are found to be carrying contraband or enemy personnel, are operating under enemy control, orders, charter, employment, or direction; do not present valid documentation; or are violating regulations established by a belligerent within the immediate area of naval operations; or are engaged in a breach of blockade. Another variation on the concept of a blockade of airspace is the “no fly zone.”

**The Right of Self Defense**

The right of self-defense traditionally recognized in international law affords a State the right to take proportionate measures, including the use of force, that are necessary to protect itself from imminent harm. Traditionally, that right included the use of force to forestall an anticipated attack as well as to respond to an attack. As Great Britain argued in the Caroline incident in 1837 or, more recently, as Israel contended in seizing a ship filled with arms bound for Palestine, that traditional right could include not only the visit and search of a vessel but also its seizure or destruction. However, these issues remain unsettled.

The collective security provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to some extent have preempted the traditional right of States to use force aggressively, but the Charter specifically preserves “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations ....” Scholars and publicists argue about whether Article 51 affirms the traditional right of States to act in self-defense in its entirety or, as literally read, to allow it only after an armed attack has occurred. Yet even the more expansive reading still includes a requirement that an attack be imminent, and for some observers, the possession of WMD does not constitute an armed attack. Others argue that the concept of imminence as applied to WMD may require some modification.

**Pacific Blockade**

An exception to the notion of the blockade as an act of war might be the so-called “pacific blockade.” Distinguished from the belligerent or wartime blockade, pacific blockade is not intended as a belligerent act and does not give rise to a condition of belligerency unless the State against which the action is taken chooses to resist with force. A pacific blockade consists of naval action taken in peacetime to apply pressure against another nation by preventing the ships of the blockading and the blockaded nation from entering or leaving specified areas.
Self-help Paradigm in International Law

Some theorists argue that the U.N. Charter may be construed to allow the use of proportionate force to prevent adversaries from producing, purchasing, or otherwise obtaining weapons of mass destruction. Most scholars have interpreted Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as a broad prohibition on any use of force against another State, except where authorized by the Security Council acting under its Chapter VII authority, or when the use of force is justified as necessary for self-defense under Article 51.

The alternate view interprets the U.N. Charter prohibition on the use of force narrowly to prohibit only certain kinds of armed attacks, namely, those “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” A surgical strike against a nuclear facility in a proliferant State, so the argument goes, would threaten neither the territorial integrity nor the political independence of a target State, inasmuch as there would be no effort to annex or occupy territory, nor overthrow the current political leadership. The legitimacy of a preventive attack against WMD or their components would rest on an interpretation of whether their destruction comports with the “purpose of the United Nations.” To the extent that the elimination of WMD in the hands of a perceived unstable State may be seen to enhance international peace and security by promoting disarmament, some argue that an otherwise unlawful attack might be justifiable.

Collective Action Under Security Council Mandate

Adherents of the “broad” interpretation of the U.N. Charter prohibition against the use of force are more likely to view preemptive use of military force against WMD facilities, including the interdiction of ships suspected of transporting elements of an unauthorized nuclear weapons program, to be legitimate only when the U.N. Security Council specifically authorizes it. Under the U.N. Charter, the Security Council has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” In this view, the Security Council is better empowered to determine that WMD in the hands of only certain States and non-State actors constitutes a threat to the peace, tailoring an enforcement regime against those entities.
United Nations Security Council Resolutions

For the purposes of this exercise, it is assumed that the following United Nations Security Council Resolutions, dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, also apply to the states described in this scenario. Decisions related to “all States” apply equally to the fictionalized states represented by the country teams and described in the briefing book material and injects. Additionally, resolutions directed at the Islamic Republic of Iran should be applied equally to Parthia, a fictional state contained in this scenario.
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting, on 28 April 2004

The Security Council,
Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery,* constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
Reaffirming, in this context, the Statement of its President adopted at the Council’s meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,
Recalling also that the Statement underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,
Affirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter,
Affirming its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the importance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully in order to promote international stability,

* Definitions for the purpose of this resolution only:
Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use.
Non-State actor: individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution.
Related materials: materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.

Welcoming efforts in this context by multilateral arrangements which contribute to non-proliferation, Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be used as a cover for proliferation,
Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors* such as those identified in the United Nations list established and maintained by the Committee established under Security Council resolution 1267 and those to whom resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery,

Gravely concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials,* which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a threat to international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security, Recognizing that most States have undertaken binding legal obligations under treaties to which they are parties, or have made other commitments aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have taken effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive materials, such as those required by the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and those recommended by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources,

Recognizing further the urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery,

Encouraging all Member States to implement fully the disarmament treaties and agreements to which they are party, Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,

Determined to facilitate henceforth an effective response to global threats in the area of non-proliferation, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;

2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;

3. Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:
   (a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;
   (b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;
   (c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;
   (d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations;

4. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all
members of the Council, which will, calling as appropriate on other expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination, on the implementation of this resolution, and to this end calls upon States to present a first report no later than six months from the adoption of this resolution to the Committee on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement this resolution;

5. **Decides** that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;

6. **Recognizes** the utility in implementing this resolution of effective national control lists and calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to pursue at the earliest opportunity the development of such lists;

7. **Recognizes** that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions;

8. **Calls upon** all States:
   (a) To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;
   (b) To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done, to ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral nonproliferation treaties;
   (c) To renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes;
   (d) To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws;

9. **Calls upon** all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on nonproliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery;

10. Further to counter that threat, **calls upon** all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials;

11. **Expresses** its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be required to this end;

12. **Decides** to remain seized of the matter.
Resolution 1737 (2006)*

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5612th meeting, on 23 December 2006

The Security Council, 
Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, 
Reiterating its serious concern over the many reports of the IAEA Director General and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors related to Iran’s nuclear programme, reported to it by the IAEA Director General, including IAEA Board resolution GOV/2006/14, 
Reiterating its serious concern that the IAEA Director General’s report of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns on Iran’s nuclear programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran, 
Reiterating its serious concern over the IAEA Director General’s report of 28 April 2006 (GOV/2006/27) and its findings, including that, after more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern, and that the IAEA is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, 
Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the IAEA Director General’s reports of 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53) and 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required of it by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s refusal to take these steps, 
Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear nonproliferation elsewhere, and welcoming the continuing commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative to seek a negotiated solution, 
Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to

* Reissued for technical reasons.

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constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of this resolution have been met.

Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Affirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions;

2. Decides, in this context, that Iran shall without further delay suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities:
   (a) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA; and
   (b) work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA;

3. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, namely:
   (a) those set out in sections B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and B.7 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814;
   (b) those set out in sections A.1 and B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer of:
      (i) equipment covered by B.1 when such equipment is for light water reactors;
      (ii) low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 when it is incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors;
   (c) those set out in document S/2006/815, except the supply, sale or transfer of items covered by 19.A.3 of Category II;
   (d) any additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined as necessary by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 18 below (herein “the Committee”), which could contribute to enrichment-related, or reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

4. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of the following items, materials, equipment, goods and technology:
   (a) those set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities;
(b) any other items not listed in documents S/2006/814 or S/2006/815 if the State
determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related
activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

(c) any further items if the State determines that they would contribute to the pursuit of
activities related to other topics about which the IAEA has expressed concerns or identified as
outstanding;

5. Decides that, for the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials, equipment, goods
and technology covered by documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 the export of which to Iran is
not prohibited by subparagraphs 3 (b), 3 (c) or 4 (a) above, States shall ensure that:

(a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in documents
S/2006/814 and S/2006/985 have been met; and

(b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the
end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and

(c) they notify the Committee within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer; and

(d) in the case of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology contained in
document S/2006/814, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer;

6. Decides that all States shall also take the necessary measures to prevent the provision
to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other
services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer,
manufacture or use of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods and technology
specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 above;

7. Decides that Iran shall not export any of the items in documents S/2006/814 and
S/2006/815 and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by
their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the
territory of Iran;

8. Decides that Iran shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA requests to be
able to verify the suspension outlined in paragraph 2 and to resolve all outstanding issues, as
identified in IAEA reports, and calls upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol;

9. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above shall not apply
where the Committee determines in advance and on a case-by-case basis that such supply, sale,
transfer or provision of such items or assistance would clearly not contribute to the development
of Iran’s technologies in support of its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and of
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including where such items or assistance are
for food, agricultural, medical or other humanitarian purposes, provided that:

(a) contracts for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate end-user
 guarantees; and

(b) Iran has committed not to use such items in proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or
for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

10. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through
their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support
for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee of the entry
into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to this resolution
(herin “the Annex”), as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the
Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear weapon delivery
systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above;

11. Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

12. Decides that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional persons or entities designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and that the measures in this paragraph shall cease to apply in respect of such persons or entities if, and at such time as, the Security Council or the Committee removes them from the Annex, and decides further that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of these persons and entities;

13. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant States:

(a) to be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;

(b) to be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee;

(c) to be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 above, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;

(d) to be necessary for activities directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) and have been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;

14. Decides that States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;
15. **Decides** that the measures in paragraph 12 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that:

(a) the contract is not related to any of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods, technologies, assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or services referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above;

(b) the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 12 above; and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, ten working days prior to such authorization;

16. **Decides** that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or where it is necessary for projects directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above, but that no such technical cooperation shall be provided that relates to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities set out in paragraph 2 above;

17. **Calls upon** all States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

18. **Decides** to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks:

(a) to seek from all States, in particular those in the region and those producing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, information regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;

(b) to seek from the secretariat of the IAEA information regarding the actions taken by the IAEA to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 16 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;

(c) to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations of measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution;

(d) to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 above;

(e) to determine as may be necessary additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraph 3 above;

(f) to designate as may be necessary additional individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 10 and 12 above;

(g) to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution and include in such guidelines a requirement on States to provide information where possible as to why any individuals and/or entities meet the criteria set out in paragraphs 10 and 12 and any relevant identifying information;

(h) to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and on the implementation of this resolution, with its observations and recommendations, in particular on
ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 above;

19. Decides that all States shall report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 above;

20. Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 above as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors, would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, encourages Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;

21. Welcomes the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), which were endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), for a long-term comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme;

22. Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all remaining outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the IAEA, underlines the necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme;

23. Requests within 60 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

24. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in the light of the report referred to in paragraph 23 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:
   (a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations;
   (b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12 of this resolution as soon as it determines that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;
   (c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 23 above shows that Iran has not complied with this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

25. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Annex

A. Entities involved in the nuclear programme
1. Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran
2. Mesbah Energy Company (provider for A40 research reactor — Arak)
3. Kala-Electric (aka Kalaye Electric) (provider for PFEP — Natanz)
4. Pars Trash Company (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA reports)
5. Farayand Technique (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA reports)
6. Defence Industries Organisation (overarching MODAFL-controlled entity, some of whose subordinates have been involved in the centrifuge programme making components, and in the missile programme)
7. 7th of Tir (subordinate of DIO, widely recognized as being directly involved in the nuclear programme)

B. Entities involved in the ballistic missile programme
1. Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
2. Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
3. Fajr Industrial Group (formerly Instrumentation Factory Plant, subordinate entity of AIO)

C. Persons involved in the nuclear programme
1. Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development
2. Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager (Arak)
3. Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)
4. Ehsan Monajemi, Construction Project Manager, Natanz
5. Jafar Mohammad, Technical Adviser to the AEOI (in charge of managing the production of valves for centrifuges)
6. Ali Hajinia Leilabadi, Director General of Mesbah Energy Company
7. Lt Gen Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri, Rector of Malek Ashtar University of Defence Technology (chemistry dept, affiliated to MODALF, has conducted experiments on beryllium)

D. Persons involved in the ballistic missile programme
1. Gen Hosein Salimi, Commander of the Air Force, IRGC (Pasdaran)
2. Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi, Head of the AIO
3. Reza-Gholi Esmaeli, Head of Trade & International Affairs Dept, AIO
4. Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar, Head of Finance & Budget Dept, AIO

E. Persons involved in both the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes
1. Maj Gen Yahya Rahim Safavi, Commander, IRGC (Pasdaran)
Resolution 1747 (2007)\(^1\)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5647th meeting on 24 March 2007

The Security Council,


Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

Recalling its serious concern over the reports of the IAEA Director General as set out in its resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006),

Recalling the latest report by the IAEA Director General (GOV/2007/8) of 22 February 2007 and deploring that, as indicated therein, Iran has failed to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006),

Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere, and welcoming the continuing commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative to seek a negotiated solution,

Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,

Recalling the requirement on States to join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council, Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006), mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirms its decision that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006);

2. **Calls upon** all States also to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and **decides** in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the Committee”) of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of that resolution;

3. **Underlines** that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution and resolution 1737 (2006), including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

4. **Decides** that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annex I to this resolution;

5. **Decides** that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;

6. **Calls upon** all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms to Iran, and in the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of such items in order to prevent a destabilizing accumulation of arms;

7. **Calls upon** all States and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes;

8. **Calls upon** all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above;

9. **Expresses** the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, **underlines** the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, **encourages** Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and **stresses** that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;
10. **Welcomes** the continuous affirmation of the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and **encourages** Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), attached in Annex II to this resolution, which were endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), and **acknowledges** with appreciation that this offer to Iran remains on the table, for a long-term comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme;

11. **Reiterates** its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, **commends and encourages** the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the IAEA, **underlines** the necessity of the IAEA, which is internationally recognized as having authority for verifying compliance with safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, in accordance with its Statute, to continue its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme;

12. **Requests** within 60 days a further report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

13. **Affirms** that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to in paragraph 12 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:

   (a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;

   (b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in paragraph 12 above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

   (c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 12 above shows that Iran has not complied with resolution 1737 (2006) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

14. **Decides** to remain seized of the matter.

**Annex I**

**Entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities**

1. Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) (aka Ammunition Industries Group) (AMIG controls 7th of Tir, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in Iran’s centrifuge programme. AMIG is in turn owned and controlled by the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO), which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006))
2. Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre (NFRPC) and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) (Parts of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran’s (AEOI) Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities. AEOI is designated under resolution 1737 (2006))
3. Kavoshyar Company (Subsidiary company of AEOI, which has sought glass fibres, vacuum chamber furnaces and laboratory equipment for Iran’s nuclear programme)
4. Parchin Chemical Industries (Branch of DIO, which produces ammunition, explosives, as well as solid propellants for rockets and missiles)
5. Karaj Nuclear Research Centre (Part of AEOI’s research division)
6. Novin Energy Company (aka Pars Novin) (Operates within AEOI and has transferred funds on behalf of AEOI to entities associated with Iran’s nuclear programme)
7. Cruise Missile Industry Group (aka Naval Defence Missile Industry Group) (Production and development of cruise missiles. Responsible for naval missiles including cruise missiles)
8. Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International (Bank Sepah provides support for the Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and subordinates, including Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006))
9. Sanam Industrial Group (subordinate to AIO, which has purchased equipment on AIO’s behalf for the missile programme)
10. Ya Mahdi Industries Group (subordinate to AIO, which is involved in international purchases of missile equipment)

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps entities
1. Qods Aeronautics Industries (Produces unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), parachutes, paragliders, para-motors, etc. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has boasted of using these products as part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine)
2. Pars Aviation Services Company (Maintains various aircraft including MI-171, used by IRGC Air Force)
3. Sho’aa’ Aviation (Produces micro-lights which IRGC has claimed it is using as part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine)

Persons involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
1. Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani (Senior Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) scientist with links to the Institute of Applied Physics, working closely with Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, designated below)
2. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi (Senior MODAFL scientist and former head of the Physics Research Centre (PHRC). The IAEA have asked to interview him about the activities of the PHRC over the period he was head but Iran has refused)
3. Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)
4. Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center, which is part of the AEOI’s Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities)
5. Mohsen Hojati (Head of Fajr Industrial Group, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
6. Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (Head of SBIG, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
7. Naser Maleki (Head of SHIG, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Naser Maleki is also a MODAFL official overseeing work on the Shahab-3 ballistic missile programme. The Shahab-3 is Iran’s long range ballistic missile currently in service)

8. Ahmad Derakhshandeh (Chairman and Managing Director of Bank Sepah, which provides support for the AIO and subordinates, including SHIG and SBIG, both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006))

**Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps key persons**
1. Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie (Deputy Commander of IRGC)
2. Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian (Chief of IRGC Joint Staff)
3. Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi (Commander of IRGC Ground Forces)
4. Rear Admiral Morteza Safari (Commander of IRGC Navy)
5. Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi (Commander of Bassij resistance force)
6. Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani (Commander of Qods force)
7. General Zolqadr (IRGC officer, Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs)

**Annex II**

**Elements of a long-term agreement**

Our goal is to develop relations and cooperation with Iran, based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We propose a fresh start in the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement with Iran. Such an agreement would be deposited with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and endorsed in a Security Council resolution.

To create the right conditions for negotiations,

**We will:**

- Reaffirm Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter, NPT), and in this context reaffirm our support for the development by Iran of a civil nuclear energy programme.
- Commit to support actively the building of new light water reactors in Iran through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and NPT.
- Agree to suspend discussion of Iran’s nuclear programme in the Security Council upon the resumption of negotiations.

**Iran will:**

- Commit to addressing all of the outstanding concerns of IAEA through full cooperation with IAEA.
- Suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities to be verified by IAEA, as requested by the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council, and commit to continue this during these negotiations.
- Resume the implementation of the Additional Protocol.

**Areas of future cooperation to be covered in negotiations on a long-term agreement**

1. Nuclear
We will take the following steps:

**Iran’s rights to nuclear energy**
- Reaffirm Iran’s inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of NPT, and cooperate with Iran in the development by Iran of a civil nuclear power programme.
- Negotiate and implement a Euratom/Iran nuclear cooperation agreement.

**Light water reactors**
- Actively support the building of new light water power reactors in Iran through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and NPT, using state-of-the-art technology, including by authorizing the transfer of necessary goods and the provision of advanced technology to make its power reactors safe against earthquakes.
- Provide cooperation with the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste through appropriate arrangements.

**Research and development in nuclear energy**
- Provide a substantive package of research and development cooperation, including possible provision of light water research reactors, notably in the fields of radioisotope production, basic research and nuclear applications in medicine and agriculture.

**Fuel guarantees**
- Give legally binding, multilayered fuel assurances to Iran, based on:
  - Participation as a partner in an international facility in Russia to provide enrichment services for a reliable supply of fuel to Iran’s nuclear reactors. Subject to negotiations, such a facility could enrich all uranium hexafluoride (UF6) produced in Iran.
  - Establishment on commercial terms of a buffer stock to hold a reserve of up to five years’ supply of nuclear fuel dedicated to Iran, with the participation and under supervision of IAEA.
  - Development with IAEA of a standing multilateral mechanism for reliable access to nuclear fuel, based on ideas to be considered at the next meeting of the Board of Governors.

**Review of moratorium**
- The long-term agreement would, with regard to common efforts to build international confidence, contain a clause for review of the agreement in all its aspects, to follow:
  - Confirmation by IAEA that all outstanding issues and concerns reported by it, including those activities which could have a military nuclear dimension, have been resolved;
  - Confirmation that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or materials in Iran and that international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s civil nuclear programme has been restored.

2. Political and economic

**Regional security cooperation**
- Support for a new conference to promote dialogue and cooperation on regional security issues.

**International trade and investment**
- Improving Iran’s access to the international economy, markets and capital, through practical support for full integration into international structures, including the World Trade Organization and to create the framework for increased direct investment in Iran and trade with
Iran (including a trade and economic cooperation agreement with the European Union). Steps would be taken to improve access to key goods and technology.

**Civil aviation**
Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on United States and European manufacturers in regard to the export of civil aircraft to Iran, thereby widening the prospect of Iran renewing its fleet of civil airliners.

**Energy partnership**
Establishment of a long-term energy partnership between Iran and the European Union and other willing partners, with concrete and practical applications.

**Telecommunications infrastructure**
Support for the modernization of Iran’s telecommunication infrastructure and advanced Internet provision, including by possible removal of relevant United States and other export restrictions.

**High technology cooperation**
Cooperation in fields of high technology and other areas to be agreed upon.

**Agriculture**
Support for agricultural development in Iran, including possible access to United States and European agricultural products, technology and farm equipment.
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5848th meeting, on 3 March 2008

The Security Council,


Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/22), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58) and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related projects as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), and 1747 (2007), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploiring Iran’s refusal to take these steps,

Noting with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA’s right to verify design information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified Code 3.1, emphasizing that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the Agency’s right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right, which is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility,

Reiterating its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commending the IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme in the work plan between the Secretariat of the IAEA and Iran (GOV/2007/48, Attachment), welcoming the progress in implementation of this work plan as reflected in the IAEA Director General’s reports of 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58) and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), underlining the importance of Iran producing tangible results rapidly and effectively by completing implementation of this work plan including by providing answers to all the questions the IAEA asks so that the Agency, through the implementation of the required transparency measures, can assess the completeness and correctness of Iran’s declaration,

Expressing the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA

Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution, that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,

Stressing that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), and noting the confirmation by these countries that once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored, it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Having regard to States’ rights and obligations relating to international trade,
Welcoming the guidance issued by the Financial Actions Task Force (FATF) to assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolution 1737 (2006),

Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,

Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirms its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006), and underlines that the IAEA has sought confirmation that Iran will apply Code 3.1 modified;

2. Welcomes the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme and progress made in this regard as set out in the Director General’s report of 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), encourages the IAEA to continue its work to clarify all outstanding issues, stresses that this would help to re-establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and supports the IAEA in strengthening its safeguards on Iran’s nuclear activities in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the IAEA;

3. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the Committee”) of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I to resolution 1747 (2007) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including
through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006);

4. Underlines that nothing in paragraph 3 above requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) and resolution 1747 (2007), including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

5. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex II to this resolution as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

6. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 above shall not apply where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the present resolution;

7. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annexes I and III to this resolution, and any persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them and to persons and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

8. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of:

(a) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2 of document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 5 of resolution 1737 (2006), of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in sections 1 and 2 of the Annex to that document, and sections 3 to 6 as notified in advance to the Committee, only when for exclusive use in light water reactors, and where such supply, sale or transfer is necessary for technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices as provided for in paragraph 16 of resolution 1737 (2006);

(b) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in 19.A.3 of Category II of document S/2006/815;

Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance in entering into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities involved in such trade, in order to avoid
such financial support contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);

10. **Calls upon** all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in
their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank
Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order to avoid such activities contributing
to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery
systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);

11. **Calls upon** all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and
legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant
international civil aviation agreements, to inspect the cargoes to and from Iran, of aircraft and
vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic
of Iran Shipping Line, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel
is transporting goods prohibited under this resolution or resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution
1747 (2007);

12. **Requires** all States, in cases when inspection mentioned in the paragraph above is
undertaken, to submit to the Security Council within five working days a written report on the
inspection containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspection, as well as
information on its time, place, circumstances, results and other relevant details;

13. **Calls upon** all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this
resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 5,
7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above;

14. **Decides** that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution
1737 (2006) shall also apply to the measures imposed in resolution 1747 (2007) and this
resolution;

15. **Stresses** the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the
United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic efforts to promote
resumption of dialogue, and consultations on the basis of their offer to Iran, with a view to
seeking a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of this issue which would allow for the
development of all-round relations and wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and
the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme, and inter alia, starting direct talks and negotiation with Iran as long as Iran suspends
all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as
verified by the IAEA;

16. **Encourages** the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic
efforts to find a negotiated solution including relevant proposals by China, France, Germany, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to create necessary
conditions for resuming talks;

17. **Emphasizes** the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the necessary
measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or of any
person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)
and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or
entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented
by reason of the measures imposed by the present resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or
resolution 1747 (2007);
18. **Requests** within 90 days a further report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

19. **Reaffirms** that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to in the paragraph above, and:

(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;

(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), and in paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

(c) that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

20. **Decides** to remain seized of the matter.

**Annex I**

1. Amir Moayyed Alai (involved in managing the assembly and engineering of centrifuges)
2. Mohammad Fedai Ashiani (involved in the production of ammonium uranyl carbonate and management of the Natanz enrichment complex)
3. Abbas Rezaee Ashtiani (a senior official at the AEOI Office of Exploration and Mining Affairs)
4. Haleh Bakhtiar (involved in the production of magnesium at a concentration of 99.9%)
5. Morteza Behzad (involved in making centrifuge components)
6. Dr. Mohammad Eslami (Head of Defence Industries Training and Research Institute)
7. Seyyed Hussein Hosseini (AEOI official involved in the heavy water research reactor project at Arak)
8. M. Javad Karimi Sabet (Head of Novin Energy Company, which is designated under resolution 1747 (2007))
9. Hamid-Reza Mohajerani (involved in production management at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan)
10. Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza Naqdi (former Deputy Chief of Armed Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research/Head of State Anti-Smuggling Headquarters, engaged in efforts to get round the sanctions imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007))
11. Houshang Nobari (involved in the management of the Natanz enrichment complex)
12. Abbas Rashidi (involved in enrichment work at Natanz)
13. Ghasem Soleymani (Director of Uranium Mining Operations at the Saghand Uranium Mine)
Annex II

A. Individuals listed in resolution 1737 (2006)
1. Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development
2. Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)
3. Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager (Arak)

B. Individuals listed in resolution 1747 (2007)
1. Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)
2. Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center, which is part of the AEOI’s Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities)

Annex III

1. Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. (BK Co.) (involved in the production of centrifuge components)
2. Barzagani Tejarat Tavanmad Saccal companies (subsidiary of Saccal System companies) (this company tried to purchase sensitive goods for an entity listed in resolution 1737 (2006))
3. Electro Sanam Company (E. S. Co./E. X. Co.) (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
4. Ettehad Technical Group (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
5. Industrial Factories of Precision (IFP) Machinery (aka Instrumentation Factories Plant) (used by AIO for some acquisition attempts)
6. Jabber Ibn Hayan (AEOI laboratory involved in fuel-cycle activities)
7. Joza Industrial Co. (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
8. Khorasan Metallurgy Industries (subsidiary of the Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG) which depends on DIO. Involved in the production of centrifuges components)
9. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company (subsidiary of the DIO. Its role is to manufacture power units for the Iranian military including missile systems)
10. Pishgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries (has participated in construction of the Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan)
11. Safety Equipment Procurement (SEP) (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
12. TAMAS Company (involved in enrichment-related activities. TAMAS is the overarching body, under which four subsidiaries have been established, including one for uranium extraction to concentration and another in charge of uranium processing, enrichment and waste)
Simulated Interdiction: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

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**Cover Design**


**Houston Building Map**


Regional Map

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Appendix A

Interdiction of the BBC China


Appendix B

International Law and WMD Interdiction


Appendix C

United Nations Security Council Resolutions


