The Bush School of Government and Public Service
Texas A&M University

Capstone Research Project

“The Interagency Process in Support & Stability Operations:
Integrating and Aligning the Roles and Missions of Military and Civilian
Agencies in Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments”

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Capstone Research Project


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Foreword

This report is the product of a semester-long graduate Capstone course in the Bush School of Government’s Masters Program in International Affairs. The course provides a research experience for students in the final semester of the two-year program, as they operate in teams to address an important policy issue (under the direction of a faculty member) and in support of a client. Students draw on the coursework and experiences of their Bush School education to develop specific recommendations for design, implementation and evaluation of this project task for the government client.

The client for this project is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. The project title is “The Interagency Process in Support & Stability Operations: Integrating and Aligning the Roles and Missions of Military and Civilian Agencies in Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments.” This study addressed the topic by focusing originally on ways to provide insights on five key questions:1

1. What are the military and US government agencies roles and missions in stabilization and reconstruction efforts in counterinsurgency warfare (historical background from case studies)?
2. What are the recommended ways to improve leadership (for integrating and aligning roles and missions) in the interagency coordination of military-civilian operations?
3. What are the military and civilian leadership functions, or skill sets, for conflict and post conflict environments?
4. How should military and civilian agencies develop those leadership skills needed in short term and the long term?
5. Does the U.S. government have a means for rating the effectiveness of civil-military coordination?

Military veterans of Iraq note that they were not fully prepared with the skills needed for support and stability operations, especially cultural and linguistic skills. In the case of the Army, some believe that the military is adapting fairly rapidly to the demands of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan and starting to internalize those lessons. The Department of Defense and National Security Council have published directives on counterinsurgency operations that propose an important role for the military in post-conflict reconstruction and support and stability operations. A newly published field manual on counterinsurgency is a sign that the Army and Marine Corps are internalizing and institutionalizing these directives and their learning from wartime operations. Many with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, note that the “interagency process” for coordinating the efforts of military and other U.S. government agencies is inadequate. In sum, what knowledge is there regarding the development of the current constructs delineating the civilian and military roles and missions in support and stability

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1 These research questions are adapted from a Creative Associates International, Inc. conference panel and report on “Stabilization and Reconstruction: Closing the Civilian–Military Gap,” held in Washington, DC on June 20, 2006. The conference co-sponsors were the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies of the National Defense University, the Bush School of Government and Public Service, and the Triangle Institute of Security Studies. The questions were refined after discussions with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations.
operations? What recommendations are feasible, acceptable and affordable for improving interagency operations as well as the functioning of U.S. government civilian and military agencies? The following papers address these questions. Each section includes research findings, inferences, and recommendations for improving interagency operations in counterinsurgency warfare. These papers reflect the views of the study group’s individual authors and do not claim to represent the views of any government agency, the Bush School, or Texas A&M University.

Dr. Joseph R. Cerami
Study Director
I. Executive Summary: Key Findings and Inferences

Note: the following compilation of ideas and insights are based on a Bush School Capstone seminar, 5/3/2007. Detailed treatments of the questions below are found in the papers below.

1. What are the military and US government agencies roles and missions in stabilization and reconstruction efforts in counterinsurgency warfare (historical background from case studies)?

   The record from this research reflects varying degrees of agency roles and missions in stabilization and reconstruction. There was no evidence in the cases examined that once the hot war ended there was an immediate transition to civilian leadership and control of post-conflict support, reconstruction, or institution building. For instance, in post World War II Japan, the military ran operations for seven years in a hierarchical structure headed by General Douglas MacArthur. Some thinking about a transition to civilian control was discarded after early successes became institutionalized. In other cases, the guidelines on roles and missions were not clear. At times, a desire to be adaptable and flexible became a way to avoid addressing the difficult questions related to interagency as well as organizational responsibilities, accountability and oversight.

   In the cases studied, under ambiguous and dynamic circumstances it is usual for the military, because of its organizational and resource capability, to fill the void. Especially in crisis situations, the tendency for existing routines and established relationships will become hard to change over time, regardless of prescribed agency roles and missions. For instance, in the case of Afghanistan provisional reconstruction teams, there were individual agency guidelines, however, because of the ad hoc nature of team recruiting, lack of interagency training, and short-term deployments and operations, often individual agency representatives were unaware of their agency guidelines, responsibilities and authority. At times, because of ongoing military conflict, civilian agencies were overwhelmed by the better organized and resourced military components. Roles and missions under ambiguous conditions and in times of transition become especially difficult. Research did not find examples of planned transitions or orderly phasing from conflict to post-conflict to reconstruction activities.

   Specific ways of providing incentives for aligning and integrating agency roles and missions may best be coupled with performance management techniques. For instance, in the evolution of provisional reconstruction teams, there were no apparent measures of success. In most cases, successful interagency operations resulted from the efforts of experienced leaders, such as military officers with Balkan peacekeeping service. Synchronizing diverse agencies would benefit from established performance standards, with systematic accountability, reporting, and oversight processes.

2. What are the recommended ways to improve leadership (for integrating and aligning roles and missions) in the interagency coordination of military-civilian operations?

   A common view is that training and education programs are needed prior to deployment. The nature of crisis action becomes an excuse for a lack of preparedness; and the short-term
nature of crises demands a long-term, progressive system for preparing and certifying leaders and teams for complex contingency operations. The history of US government efforts in interagency education and training is not promising. For instance, where is the interagency equivalent to the military’s national training centers? It may be an overstatement, but what is needed is a transformation to create a civilian agency training and education culture. A formal leadership development process should continue to evolve to explicitly link series of synchronized and progressive professional education, training, assignments and promotions that provide opportunities to interact in diverse agency and international contexts.

In addition, there is a need for formal interagency knowledge management processes. The architecture for an interagency knowledge or learning system should include several components, such as: data bases, on-line learning courses and simulation networks; predeployment training and certification systems; individual leadership development survey and planning instruments; subject matter and subject matter expert networks; and an interactive center for interagency lessons learned.

At the same time the Federal Office of Personnel Management efforts to enhance individual leader develop and education should be expanded. The leadership literature stresses the need for continuous learning, constant assessments, 360-degree feedback, and progressive assignments. These efforts to foster the development of a sense of military and civilian professionalism and public service are critical for interagency coordination.

The military services stress the professional ethic. Can we define and develop a notion of an interagency professional that transcends real but sometime harmful agency loyalties? The military services efforts to move officers from branch to combined arms to joint training, education, certification and promotion may serve as a model. A new interagency professional culture that systematically trains, rewards, and promotes a new culture can extend the scope and reach of individuals who can improve the effectiveness and value of their agencies as well as serving the national interest in stability, support and reconstruction efforts. Leadership can be developed over time and with thoughtful approaches based on legitimate research knowledge. Shifting from adhocracy, crisis management, and firefighting to a trained and ready professional interagency cadre is not beyond the reach, capacity, or imagination of the US government.

3. What are the military and civilian leadership functions, or skill sets, for conflict and post conflict environments?

Several researchers highlight the significance of being able to see the nature of individual and collective tasks within the context of the strategy and operational priorities. Linked to this concern for the big picture was the notion of understanding the resource capacities and constraints for all interagency projects and programs for the alignment and integration necessary to achieve a unity of effort on a local, regional, country, area, and wider geographical or regional bases. One researcher also notes the need for guidelines and standards that provide a baseline for integrating interagency functions at each operational echelon, while aligning activities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. It is also necessary to translate the military framework of dividing and synchronizing the levels of war
vertically, as strategic, operational, and tactical levels, to enhance interagency communications and coordination.

Baselines, guidelines, and standards can be perceived as barriers to creativity and innovation. Of course, these findings strongly reinforce the significance of flexibility and adaptability in dynamic situations. Without serious efforts to synchronize efforts, however, there is the open-ended possibility for endless reinvention and inefficiencies. These problems are especially pronounced in situations of high personnel and organizational turnover. The possibilities for false creativity and wasted efforts are very real and, therefore, educated, experienced and high-performing individuals, teams and organizations are a necessary condition for interagency effectiveness.

Communications skills are especially important for enhancing interagency effectiveness at all levels. Real concerns about overcoming turf and stovepipe pathologies cannot be erased by achieving false consensus among diverse agencies for the purposes of group cohesion and conflict avoidance. Time must be allocated for agencies to insure that interagency communications do not water down or camouflage clear core competencies, capabilities, and possibilities. The notion of “I don’t speak State Department” should be the beginning of an in-depth conversation to develop the deeper understanding of the intent and meaning of interagency written and oral communications.

A notion of cross-cultural savvy applies for both interagency and intercultural communications. A common lexicon for unifying the understanding of key terms would improve the possibilities for improving interagency communications. While there is no substitute for face-to-face, on-scene interpersonal relations, there is no excuse for failing to begin by building a common vocabulary as a foundation for developing a deeper understanding among agencies.

4. How should military and civilian agencies develop those leadership skills needed in short term and the long term?

Systematic, progressive, and career long leadership education and development focused on interagency skills must become part of the culture of the US government’s military and civilian agencies. Interagency subject matter expertise and experience should become part of selected individual’s career progression and linked to promotion and other incentives, such as advanced civil schooling opportunities at prestigious schools of public and international affairs. Research studies, reports and publications should expand on the nature and importance of interagency work as important, career enhancing and critical for the US government and the national interest. Formalizing mentoring systems to support non-traditional career paths that extend opportunities for interagency and international work are essential. As previous national studies of US government performance have stressed, in an age of globalization, there is an urgent need to break away from stove piped agency education and promotion systems.

At the same time, developing a reservoir of interagency talent will have to focus on individual as well as team development. Creative solutions, using on-line educational
technology, should provide educational support for individual and team training and development. New and distributed educational networks that can meet individual as well as team and organizational training and educational development needs can substitute or supplement full-time, long-term, traditional schooling. In a period of increasing demands and decreasing personnel, there is a need for more focused and efficient skill development programs.

5. Does the U.S. government have a means for rating the effectiveness of civil-military coordination?

The ad hoc and personality driven nature of many civil-military operations has been a fairly common response by the US government, especially in the crisis atmosphere of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is noteworthy that the successful case of postwar Japan included more than two years of predeployment preparation, study, policy development, and capacity-building among several US agencies. Non-traditional measures of effectiveness are needed for non-traditional missions and tasks, such as those required for successful support, stability and reconstruction activities. What does it mean to conduct successful interagency operations over time? What standards are needed to measure effectiveness in interagency operations in a counterinsurgency context?

The military equivalent of the “nested bowls” of aligning and integrating the strategic, operational and tactical levels provides a framework that should be converted for understanding the analytical levels for coordinating interagency efforts horizontally and vertically. In short, there is a need for rating the links and systems necessary and sufficient for relating local, task oriented, mission essential programs with regional or national level programs, priorities, resources and oversight functions, all in the view of the grand strategy or big picture lens at the US national, host country and, in most cases, international institutional levels.

The amount of information available due to modern information technologies is staggering for any organization. Efficient, real time, and focused information needs for counterinsurgency operations will continue to be a major challenge for improving interagency effectiveness. A search for the “deeper meaning” of useful and actionable intelligence and information requires new ideas, new systems, and real creativity. Along the same lines, more imagination would be helpful for balancing real information needs and countering the false creativity of allowing all agencies to continue to develop and use agency-specific information reporting and coordination documents. There is certainly a need for accurate and meaningful processes for measuring interagency communications and effectiveness. For instance, using surveys to rate employee satisfaction along with program performance measures using “balanced scorecard” techniques for assessment and evaluation with the interagency processes/opinions would be an important step in creating useful knowledge.

Current systems developed by and underpinned by agency traditions, cultures and communication patterns all serve to unwittingly divide, separate and differentiate common management processes in complex information, personnel, finance, accounting, and logistics
systems. The effect is to dilute any potential foundation for creating an interagency culture that aligns and integrates instead of cultures that divide, dilute and fragment individuals, teams, organizations and institutions. Everyone with interagency experience knows that we can do much better. The following abstracts provide an overview of the attached research papers that address the above questions in more detail.
ABSTRACTS

The Interagency Process in Reconstruction of Post-WWII Japan

Kate Rogers

The reconstruction of post-WWII Japan is commonly considered both a great success as a nation-building effort, and completely inapplicable to the problems that the U.S. government faces in nation-building efforts today. By examining initial policy creation in Washington and the application of policy in theater during the occupation of Japan, the paper aims to show that the occupation of Japan succeeded in spite of complications and that this success in the face of adversity yields valuable lessons for the present day. Modern nation-building efforts can apply lessons from Japan on creation of stability and democracy, the role of the military in nation-building operations, and cultural understanding to the interagency process.

US Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan 2003-2006: Obstacles to Interagency Cooperation

Carlos Hernandorena

The experience of US Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan from 2003-2006 provides an excellent case study for evaluating interagency cooperation in a counterinsurgency environment. A detailed assessment of interviews and reports written on PRTs provided insight into some of the major obstacles which impeded the interagency teams’ ability to coordinate effectively. Factors such as the failure to provide guidance on the roles and responsibilities of individual team members; the military’s disproportionate amount of influence and resources within the teams; inefficient PRT deployment policies, failure to provide adequate interagency and cultural training; and the weak participation and logistical support of civilian agencies all played a critical role in hampering interagency coordination within the teams. Recommendations including greater flexibility in PRT leadership structure; specialized pre-deployment training courses; alignment of PRT personnel tour lengths; the establishment of clear guidelines detailing individual roles and responsibilities; and increased civilian involvement and support in PRT operations are all designed to address the major obstacles PRTs faced during their initial deployments to Afghanistan.

An Alternative View: Sri Lanka’s Experience with an Enduring Insurgency

Patrick Baetjer

The current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have led policymakers and war fighters to search for applicable lessons from past counterinsurgency efforts. Typically, these individuals have studied the French experience in Algeria, the British efforts in Malaysia, and the well-documented war in Vietnam. Yet these examples may not be the most applicable and there is a tendency to ignore other examples such as the Sri Lankan government’s more than 30 year-old campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Sri Lanka is riddled with ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic divides much like Iraq and Afghanistan. The Sri Lankan government’s response to the Tigers and to the broader Tamil community have at times alienated Tamils and at other times provided narrow windows of opportunity to end the conflict. Given the complexity of Sri Lankan society, the government’s various campaigns provide important lessons for the US in current and future support and stability operations. These lessons include the significance of understanding the culture the US operates in, the importance of establishing personal
relationships in counterinsurgency efforts, and the utility of joint government-minority population initiatives to build trust and marginalize the insurgents.

**Strategic Communication: Interagency Rhetoric and Consistent Interpretation**

*Amanda Smith*

In complex operations such as today’s conflicts and Iraq and Afghanistan and conflicts of the past such as Somalia, the importance of civil-military communication and coordination is widely acknowledged and essential for success. However, the difficulties of interagency coordination in support and stability operations have proven to be incredibly challenging. Strategic communication, embodied in interagency rhetoric, is of primary importance to the success of the interagency at all levels. Communication and organizational theory have much to say about the manner in which rhetoric is formed and understood by organizations of varying cultures and missions. Building upon that theory and the lessons learned from the conflict in Somalia, this analysis examines the key policy documents for interagency coordination such as Presidential Decision Directive 56 and National Security Presidential Directive 44 in order to best understand how rhetoric is being used and interpreted in the interagency. From these findings, recommendations for understanding and implementing the current documents as well as recommendations for future documents are made.

**Counterinsurgency Doctrine FM 3-24 and Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Bottom-Up Review**

*Tyson Voelkel*

The American Way of War is not doomed to fail in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. The military and other federal agencies have the talent and motivation to achieve success in Stability and Support Operations but are hindered by a desynchronized interagency process in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Reviewing tactical operations compared to the prescriptions in FM 3-24 provides three key findings and eight recommendations for Operation Iraqi Freedom decision makers.

**Leadership Education and Training for the Interagency**

*Brian Polley*

The international environment and the threats to US national security have changed dramatically over recent years, and the current situation in the world requires a different understanding and approach to training leaders to work on interagency teams in dangerous post-conflict environments. Efforts aimed at educating leaders and preparing them for these environments should be based on comprehensive knowledge of leadership theory and careful consideration of the unique challenges support and stability operations (SASO) entail. Three main problems have hampered effective leadership on interagency teams in SASO: the lack of a common lexicon shared across agencies of the US government, few training and education opportunities offered with both civilian and military personnel participating, and no formal system of managing and sharing knowledge of previous experiences and lessons learned. To address the problems and challenges faced in the current engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as those that will be faced in future engagements, American military and civilian policymakers must address these three main deficiencies and better prepare the next generation of leaders to solve difficult problems using the full spectrum of interagency resources.
The Army and civilian government leaders play integral roles in the planning, coordination and execution of stability operations. The publications of National Security Presidential Directive–44 (NSPD-44) and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 challenge the Army professional and civilian leaders, or more specifically public managers in government, to accept stability operations as a core mission with importance parallel to traditional combat operations. At the same time, Army professionals and public managers should adapt their respective cultures to this new operational dimension and evaluate their professional knowledge base and skill sets to achieve success in stability operations.
II. Selected Case Studies of Counterinsurgency Operations

A. The Interagency Process in Reconstruction of Post-WWII Japan

Kate Rogers

As the sole world superpower and arguable global hegemon, the United States has become increasingly involved in nation-building efforts since the end of the Cold War. In these efforts, U.S. forces have encountered some recurring problems. These problems include the destruction of physical infrastructure, dysfunctional institutions, and violent opposition. The inability to cope with these issues would both prevent U.S. forces from gaining any opportunity to leave “gracefully” (i.e. without creating a failed state and without appearing to lose the conflict) and create a loss of legitimacy for any U.S. occupation. To avoid this dilemma, successful state-building is imperative.2

The United States government has successfully dealt with the issues of nation-building in the past, most notably in the case of post-World War II Japan. In seven years, the occupying force under General Douglas MacArthur transformed a nation broken by over a decade of militarism into an economically successful, peaceful democracy. At least, it looks that way in retrospect. This paper looks at the entirety of the occupation of Japan, examining both the achievements and the complications that occurred.

Section 1 describes Japan’s condition immediately following the war. Section 2 describes the creation of initial policy for Japan and the interagency cooperation from which it emerged. Section 3 examines the unique structure of Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers’ General Headquarters (SCAP GHQ) and its function in executing policy, and Section 4 describes the

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2 State-building is defined as “the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones.” Fukuyama asserts that the sense of shared history and culture implied in the word nation makes the term “nation-building” a misnomer, but one commonly used in the United States. Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), ix, 99. In recognition of this common usage, the words state-building and nation-building will be used interchangeably in this paper.
achievements that resulted from SCAP’s policy execution. Finally, Section 5 examines some complications that occurred during the occupation, and Section 6 suggests some lessons learned from the experience.

**Japan’s Condition after the War**

At the end of the war, Japan was devastated. Some 65% of Tokyo lay in ruins from American firebombing runs and only two million citizens remained of the city’s original population of seven million. Nagasaki and Hiroshima had suffered massive structural damage, loss of life, and debilitating radiation sickness from the atomic bombs. The nation lay drained of resources after 13 years of constant military action. After a decade of war, the nation had gained little and lost much. Japan had lost the goodwill of its neighbors; the loss of the territories occupied during the 1930s would cut off all access to imports. Since Japanese textile and food production supplied only a fraction of the public demand, millions of people faced starvation. Nine million citizens were homeless as a result of Allied bombing campaigns, and a further three million were stranded overseas. Economic infrastructure was crushed, with coal production $\frac{1}{2}$ the wartime production rate and steel production $\frac{1}{4}$ the rate of the wartime peak.

As a result of the pitiful state of affairs in Japan at the beginning of the war, the country found itself completely at the mercy of the Allied victors. Because of this the population was willing to accept the long occupation necessary to achieve stability and promote nation-building. For its part, America saw the continued threat of communist expansion in China and Korea as an incentive to invest in a lengthy occupation. David Edelstein remarks that occupation

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interests do not always include nation-building. However, in this case the Americans found themselves with two distinct occupation responsibilities. First, the international politics surrounding the occupation dictated the demilitarization of Japan. Second, the need for continued support from Japan, which the Americans desired in anticipation of the future conflict with the USSR, dictated the requirements for nation-building and democratization. These coincident needs for the advantages of a lengthy occupation provided an opportunity for the United States to succeed in the reconstruction of Japan.

**Initial Occupation Policy**

The Allies laid out their official goals for Japan during the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. The resulting document, known as the Potsdam Declaration,\(^8\) listed five major goals the Japanese would have to accept as part of their unconditional surrender:\(^9\) (1) disarmament of the military and removal of militarists from power; (2) return of occupied territories as specified in the Cairo Declaration;\(^10\) (3) justice to war criminals; (4) strengthening of democracy; and (5) economic demilitarization. Additionally, Japan had to accept military occupation by the Allied forces until it met all conditions of the surrender.

The U.S. State and War Departments played large roles in defining these goals, both before and after the Potsdam Conference. The State Department formulated the Interdivisional Area Committee on the Far East in 1943 to analyze possible occupation solutions in Japan. The

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\(^9\) To ensure these changes, the Declaration also mandated the occupation of Japan by Allied forces until such times as Allied conditions were met.

\(^10\) The Cairo Declaration stated that it was the Allied Powers “purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” Katsutoshi Takami, Reference Service Planning Division, “Cairo Declaration,” National Diet Library, \[http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c03.html\] (Accessed April 15, 2007).
Committee consisted of representatives from the Division of Far Eastern Affairs and other divisions with interests in the area, including the new research division. They considered issues including the optimal composition of occupation forces, the meaning of “unconditional surrender,” the postwar objectives of the U.S. in Japan, and the role of the Emperor in postwar Japan. By February 1944, the War and Navy Departments began to consider these policy questions as well, and asked the Department of State for definitive policy statements on some twenty questions that required answers prior to Japan’s surrender. These questions included many of the same issues the State Department had studied during previous months.  

The War Department also conducted independent studies on occupation policy issues. General John F. Hilldring, the Director of the Army’s Civil Affairs Division, began preparing JCS 1380/15 as early as January 1944. On July 4, 1945, General George Lincoln ordered the Policy Section of the War Department to prepare a study on the post-defeat control of Japan and Japanese territory for the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff. The study was completed on July 9, just in time for the Potsdam Conference.

In November 1944, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy agreed to appoint a committee to “coordinate the views of the three Departments in matters of common interest.” The following month, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) came into existence. Subcommittees like the Pacific Far Eastern Subcommittee submitted recommendation papers to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for military advice, and then to the Committee itself for

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12 The Potsdam Conference was held July 17-August 2, 1945.

approval. After approval, the Joint Chiefs implemented the recommendations.\textsuperscript{14} Over the course of the reconstruction of Japan, the SWNCC approved many documents instrumental in the rebuilding process.

One recommendation paper, the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" (SWNCC150/4), proved particularly useful. SWNCC150/4 reiterated the goals laid out in the Potsdam Declaration and detailed methods for achieving these goals. It was the first document MacArthur received that gave him guidelines for his role as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). SWNCC 150/4 directed the Supreme Commander to work toward two ultimate objectives of the U.S. for the Japanese occupation:

1. To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world, and

2. To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.\textsuperscript{15}

Ironically, SWNCC 150/4 considered the requirements of the Potsdam Declaration means to these ends rather than goals in and of themselves. The document then gave the Supreme Commander more specific instructions as to the extent of Allied authority for military occupation, relations with the Japanese government, military disarmament, treatment of war criminals, economic demilitarization, promotion of democratic forces, resumption of peaceful economic activity, and payment of reparations.\textsuperscript{16} Many of these instructions established specific SCAP policies. These directions included orders to dissolve “ultra-nationalistic or militaristic

\textsuperscript{14} SWNCC Secretariat of Operations, “SWNCC M/I 44,” April 9, 1946.
social, political, professional and commercial societies and institutions,” to “favor a program for
the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of
a great part of Japan’s trade and industry,” and to make reparations “through the transfer of such
goods or existing capital equipment and facilities as are not necessary for a peaceful Japanese
economy or the supplying of the occupying forces.” Further examination shows that SCAP
followed these directions to the letter in its operations.

Although the three departments had considerable clout in creating policy, one might
argue that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had more influence in shaping events as they unfolded in
Japan. The military chain of command placed the Joint Chiefs between the President and the
Supreme Commander, so MacArthur took his marching orders from them. Shortly after the
drafting of SWNCC 150/4, the Joint Chiefs drafted a parallel document called the “Basic
Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper” (JCS 1380/15). This top
secret directive informed MacArthur of “the authority which you will possess and the policies
which will guide you in the occupation and control of Japan in the initial period after
surrender.” JCS 1380 fleshed out the directions of SWNCC 150/4 in the same way SWNCC
150/4 had developed the ideas expressed in the Potsdam Declaration. For example, where
SWNCC states “Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism
will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or
substantial private responsibility,” JCS 1380/15 elaborates as follows:

17 Katsutoshi Takami, Reference Service Planning Division, “U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC
150/4/A),” National Diet Library, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/022_2/022_2tx.html (April 15,
2007).
18 Katsutoshi Takami, Reference Service Planning Division, “Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive to Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan (JCS 1380/15),” National Diet Library,
19 Katsutoshi Takami, Reference Service Planning Division, “U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC
150/4/A),” National Diet Library, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/022_2/022_2tx.html (April 15,
2007).
5b. Except as indicated in paragraph 7c below, in no circumstances will persons be allowed to hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who have been influential members of any Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic, or secret patriotic society, its agencies or affiliates, who have been influential in the activities of the other organizations enumerated in paragraph 5g below, or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the military occupation.20

This degree of detail, as well as the direct address of MacArthur (as opposed to speaking indirectly of the “Supreme Commander”), may have made the military commander more comfortable since it resembled a set of orders more closely than a policy recommendation. By 1946, the SWNCC began filtering its recommendations through the JCS, presumably to minimize this type of duplicate effort.21

Organization in Theater

Any examination of policy in theater must include the role of the U.S. military. The military and General MacArthur, in particular, dominated the operational implementation of occupation policy. Initially, this resulted from the necessity of having military forces present to conduct the war against and later the occupation of Japan. However, in the first year of the occupation the State and War Departments solidified the military approach with an agreement on the division of labor in Japan. In a memo to President Harry Truman, Secretary of State James Byrnes suggested that the State Department bear primary responsibility for the formulation of occupation policy, including chairmanship of the SWNCC, while the War Department take responsibility for execution and administration. The memo also suggested requiring all other agencies to assist the War Department in finding “suitable civilian personnel to complete the necessary field staff to discharge the War Department responsibility for government in these Occupied Areas by assignment of their existing personnel and facilities, by assistance in

21 SWNCC secretariat of operations, SWNCC M/I 44, 9 April 1946.
recruiting specially qualified persons and in all other practicable action." The President approved this memo, and encouraged other agencies to fall in line. In part due to this memo, the reconstruction of Japan remained a military mission for all seven years of the occupation, rather than transitioning to civil authorities. This historical fact directly contradicts current opinions that the job of nation-building traditionally belongs to civilians.

The main responsibility for managing the occupation in theater fell to General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. MacArthur also headed the Far East Command of the Army (also called Army Forces Pacific). To handle his two hats, MacArthur ordered his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Richard Sutherland, to draw up a new organization plan. Due to the dual mission of occupying and reconstructing Japan, Sutherland split the new Civil Affairs section into a separate General Headquarters (GHQ) for SCAP. The Far East Command GHQ and the SCAP GHQ would both operate under MacArthur and the same Chief of Staff, but would operate more or less independently of one another. The Far East Command (FEC) would bear responsibility for the bulk of occupation and security responsibilities. On the other side, the SCAP GHQ managed the many processes associated with nation-building. The majority of the regular Army worked in FEC GHQ, while SCAP GHQ consisted mostly of reserve officers with a civilian perspective. This organizational structure largely removed the career military from the process of democratization, and eased the inherent tension between the necessary autocracy of military culture and the requirements of a budding democracy. SCAP initially consisted of nine sections (Economic and Scientific, Civil Information and Education, Natural Resources, Public Health and Welfare, Government, Legal,

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22 James Byrnes, memorandum for the President, April 18, 1946.
23 The original plan was to add G-5 Civil Affairs to the existing four Assistant Chiefs of Staff: G-1 Personnel, G-2 Intelligence, G-3 Operations, and G-4 Supply. Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 82.
Civil Communications, Civil Intelligence, and Statistics and Reports), and these sections were responsible for the overwhelming majority of accomplishments in reforming Japan.  

**Policy in Theater**

Francis Fukuyama describes successful nation-building as occurring in three phases. In the first phase, the U.S. solves immediate problems of physical infrastructure through the infusion of security forces, humanitarian relief, and technical assistance in restoring physical infrastructure, e.g. water, electricity, etc. The second phase begins once some level of stability is restored, and focuses on building self-sustaining state institutions. Finally, in the third phase, the U.S. helps the state institutions provide public services including public education and protection of property rights. American values may dictate the inclusion of civil liberties and democratic structure in the newly developed institutions during the final phase.  

The original goals of the occupation as stated in the Potsdam Declaration were as follows: (1) disarmament of the military and removal of militarists from power; (2) return of occupied territories as specified in the Cairo Declaration; (3) justice to war criminals; (4) strengthening of democracy; and (5) economic demilitarization. Of these categories, the first three dealt with the aftermath of World War II and the latter two encompassed the accomplishments described by Fukuyama’s concept of nation-building.

Once ensconced in the reconstruction process, SCAP discovered that the disarmament of the military and removal of militarists from power, although means to the same end, required vastly different approaches to accomplish. As a result, one branch of the organization dealt with demobilization of the military and repatriation of Japanese military and civilians from abroad, and another branch dealt with the elimination of aggressive forces in the government, under the

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larger goal of strengthening democracy. Similarly, demilitarizing the economy became one of many goals in the reorganization of economic institutions to promote democracy.²⁶

**Disarmament of the military:** SCAP delegated the initial demobilization of troops to the Japanese War and Navy Ministries, which by December 1, 1945, had completely demobilized the 2.2 million men on the main islands. After that point, the main task of demobilization was the repatriation of approximately 6.5 million Japanese residing in the former colonies as well as the return of some 1.25 million foreign nationals found residing in Japan at the end of the war. By early 1948, virtually all of the Japanese expatriates had been returned to the home islands, with the exception of some 765,000 Japanese citizens in Soviet-controlled areas. By May 1949, the Soviets officially ceased sending ships with Japanese records still unable to account for some 375,000 expatriates. The loss of these Japanese, presumed dead, created a stark contrast between the performance of the Americans and that of the Soviets in repatriation efforts. Repatriation of foreign nationals (predominantly Koreans) largely ended in 1947.²⁷ A large portion of the Korean population chose to remain in Japan, a decision vindicated as conditions deteriorated on the Korean peninsula. However, the large foreign national population later caused security concerns for SCAP.²⁸ By 1948, at least half of the Koreans in Japan were under leftist influence, mirroring the political polarization on the Korean peninsula.²⁹

**Return of occupied territories:** Territorial changes occurred in accordance with the Cairo Declaration, with all changes determined by 1947, with the exception of certain small islands in the Pacific such as the Ryukyus. Japan ceded Manchuria to China and liberated Korea. The loss

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²⁸ Maps in “Employment of Japanese Police” prepared by the Public Safety Division of the Military Intelligence Section, General Staff GHQ SCAP, 1 June 1950 identify ethnic Koreans and Communists as “Dissident Elements.”
of these territories, although considered an accomplishment by the Allies, deprived Japan of many of the resources it had access to during the war and severely handicapped the recovery of the Japanese economy.\textsuperscript{30}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{japanese_empire_map.png}
\caption{Japanese Empire before and after Enactment of Cairo Declaration\textsuperscript{31}}
\end{figure}

*Justice to war criminals:* To try Japanese war criminals, the allied nations chartered the War Tribunal for the Far East. The Tribunal presided over the trial of 28 men on counts of waging war against China and the allied nations; ordering, authorizing, and permitting inhumane treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs); creating or executing a conspiracy to wage wars of aggression; and deliberately and recklessly disregarding their duty to take adequate steps to prevent atrocities. Defendants included four former premiers, three former foreign ministers, four


former war ministers, two former navy ministers, six former generals, two former ambassadors, and three former economic and financial leaders, but did not include the Emperor or any members of the Imperial family. The absence of the Emperor from this list has been a cause of criticism on many fronts, but the United States decided the legitimacy of the Imperial house would serve the occupation better by supporting U.S. measures than by hanging from a gallows. All of the defendants who survived the trial with their sanity were sentenced to death or extended prison terms. Of the seven men sentenced to death, all bore responsibility for mass-scale atrocities, most prominently the Rape of Nanking.\(^{32}\)

In 1937, during the Japanese offensive against Nanking, several prominent civilians established a “safety zone” which both China and Japan agreed to hold neutral so long as it did not harbor soldiers of the opposing force. The Japanese took the city on December 13, and over the next six weeks Japanese soldiers murdered an estimated two hundred thousand Chinese civilians and prisoners of war, many of whom were taking refuge in the recognized safety zone.\(^{33}\) Mr. Tillman Durdin reported to the *New York Times* that “all the alleys and streets were filled with civilian bodies, including women and children.”\(^{34}\)

A contemporary account of the trials considered the exercise unsuccessful, as the trials did not excite widespread feelings of shame or guilt in the Japanese population for initiating the war.\(^{35}\) The trials did not serve the purpose of reducing the legitimacy of the former regime, either. On the contrary, Prime Minister Tojo salvaged his reputation as a loyal Imperialist by


\(^{33}\) The author believes this estimate understates the carnage, as it “did not include those bodies burned or thrown into the Yangtze River or otherwise disposed of by the Japanese army.” Hua-Ling Hu, *American Goddess At the Rape of Nanking: The Courage of Minnie Vautrin*, (Carbondale, IL: Fordham University Press, 2005), 71-79.

\(^{34}\) Hua-Ling Hu, *American Goddess At the Rape of Nanking: The Courage of Minnie Vautrin*, 77.

accepting full responsibility for the war, indirectly absolving the Emperor.\textsuperscript{36} The Nuremburg Tribunals and the Far East Tribunals were some of the first examples of international law enforcement. The Allies conducted the tribunals without judicial precedent, solely on the conviction that some crimes were so great the Allied conscience could not allow the committers of these crimes to walk free.\textsuperscript{37} As a deterrent or a political maneuver, the trials may have failed to serve their purpose, but as a precedent for enforcement of international law, the trials succeeded. 

\textit{Strengthening democracy}: SCAP made its greatest effort in strengthening democracy in the revision of the Japanese Constitution. The revised constitution, written by Americans and forced through the Diet, made four major changes to the Japanese government.\textsuperscript{38} First, it changed the upper house of the Diet to an elected body. Second, it moved executive power from the Emperor to the cabinet, as designated by the Diet. Third, the constitution endowed Japanese citizens with civil rights, similar to those granted to Americans in the Bill of Rights. Finally, the constitution forswore the use of war as a prerogative of the state.\textsuperscript{39} These revisions all still exist in present copies of the Japanese constitution, but many other programs contributed to the democratization of Japan. Unlike the three preceding goals, improving the democratic foundations of Japan proved a multifaceted endeavor. In addition to revising the constitution, the Allies focused their efforts on removing the militarists from government and positions of influence, educational reform, reorganization of economic institutions, labor reform, and agrarian reform.

**Government purge:** As recommended by SWNCC 150/4, many of the reforms were instituted by the Japanese government with SCAP oversight. The Japanese government even established the procedures for conducting the purge. Basically, the government required any person to whom the purge might apply to complete a three-page questionnaire. A series of boards then screened the 2,308,863 completed papers and purged approximately 220,000 individuals.\(^4^0\) The purge affected significantly more people than Washington anticipated. Richard Finn attributes this surprise to the inevitable communication errors that occur when policymakers are not involved in policy execution. The purge also expelled 80 percent of the Diet and half of Shidehara’s cabinet, almost crippling the government.\(^4^1\)

**Educational reform:** The purge also extended to the educational field, where the removal of certain teachers complemented an overall policy of eliminating all militaristic and ultranationalistic influences on the education system. As part of the education reform, SCAP also worked to simplify the Japanese writing system and standardize the education program nationwide. However, the post-war recession limited the amount of money the government could spend on education, limiting the extent to which reforms could be effected. Some of these programs found resonance in the Japanese government, like the institution of compulsory education in the elementary and middle school levels.\(^4^2\) Other reforms, like the attempt to create general education programs at the university level, found little support in the Japanese system. Akihiro Itoh draws a distinction between voluntary, piecemeal reforms and externally enforced reforms. He notes that those of the former category tend to succeed while those of the latter create

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conflicts within the system. In educational reform, as in other areas, a lack of cultural understanding impaired the extent to which the American occupation could make an impact.

**Economic reorganization:** To democratize the economy SCAP began a number of initiatives aimed at disbanding the *zaibatsu*, or large family-controlled banking and industrial conglomerates that controlled large portions of the Japanese economy. SCAP proceeded along four paths to reach this goal: (1) dissolution of *zaibatsu* holding companies; (2) dissolution or reorganization of companies whose relative size restricted competition; (3) enactment and enforcement of anti-monopoly registration; and (4) wide distribution of securities seized by the government from *zaibatsu* in enforcement of anti-monopoly laws.

These efforts might have achieved the desired goal in a nation that truly desired a capitalist government, but Japanese economists heavily supported the *zaibatsu*. Conservative economists saw the conglomerates as necessary for economic growth, much like proponents of big business in the United States. It may surprise Americans that liberals also supported the *zaibatsu*, but wished to nationalize them in the manner of a socialist government. As a result, in spite of American anti-monopoly efforts the *zaibatsu* reappeared as *keiretsu* shortly after the occupation ended.

**Labor reform:** To promote labor reform, SCAP encouraged the organization of unions and implemented protective legislation. Initially, SCAP encouraged the expansion of organized labor across the board. However, a series of strikes in the fall of 1946 and the growing presence of communist sympathizers in the upper ranks of labor unions led to the creation of regulatory laws

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to prevent organized labor from paralyzing the nation on a regular basis. Public safety employees were denied any labor rights, and administrative employees in public service were barred from striking.\textsuperscript{47}

By 1948, the Japanese government had passed legislation creating a comprehensive system of labor standards. The Labor Standards Law regulated “minimum standards for hours of work, rest periods, vacations with pay, safety and sanitation for all non-self-employed industrial workers in Japan.”\textsuperscript{48} Another law provided worker’s compensation to over six and a half million laborers. These laws and the inspectors that enforced them improved labor standards throughout the country. It must be noted, however, that although the improved standards promoted the egalitarian way of life espoused by the American occupation, it also put a serious strain on the already troubled Japanese economy.\textsuperscript{49}

\textit{Agrarian reform:} SCAP policy for agrarian reform tried to promote democracy by eliminating the feudal system commonly seen in Japanese agriculture. They effected this change by buying land from large landowners and selling it to the tenants that farmed the land. The government also fixed money rents at low levels, which encouraged landowners to sell land rather than continuing to rent it to tenants. As seen in Figure 2 the project achieved tremendous success, reducing the overall land tenancy from nearly half of all cultivatable land before the war to approximately 10% in 1950. Tsutomu Ōuchi suggests that this trend quieted rural political movements, which were largely supported by tenant farmers concerned about losing land access.

The dissipation of this political force removed a support base for socialist and communist movements in rural society.50

![Figure 2: Proportions of Owners and Tenants, and Changes in the Tenancy Rate](image)

All of these actions, while promoting economic and political democracy, impaired the recovery and growth of the Japanese economy. Additionally, SCAP made many of Japan’s restitution payments in the form of capital necessary for industries that enabled war. Needless to say, the loss of capital further stunted Japan’s economic recovery.


In addressing the first three concerns of the Potsdam Declaration, SCAP provided some stability within Japan, as recommended by Fukuyama. Similarly, the new constitution was aimed at building a self-sustaining government, and the various reforms forced the government to provide certain public services. However, SCAP addressed all of these issues simultaneously, rather than sequentially as Fukuyama recommends. This methodology led to several notable complications.

Complications

Although the occupation of Japan serves in many ways as a positive example of nation-building, SCAP also encountered some serious difficulties during its seven years reconstructing Japan. Among these difficulties SCAP had to cope with include the influence of communists in unions, the negative effects of pro-democratic policies on the struggling economy, miscommunications and disagreements between MacArthur and policymakers in Washington, and the general problem of creating cultural understanding between two completely different societies.

Unions and communists: SCAP initiated all of the policies mentioned in the previous section more or less simultaneously. As a result, labor unions began to form in 1946, while the economy was still recovering from the war and many of SCAP’s other reforms. In the fall of 1946, with rampant inflation and unemployment, labor unions negotiated wage increases in dozens of industries. In retrospect one could have predicted that the communists in Japan would take advantage of a dissatisfied proletariat. They did so with a vengeance, organizing the diverse labor unions under a single leader and turning their demands on the government. Events escalated over the course of the fall and winter. The Japanese government, deprived of its secret police, feared the labor unions meant to revolt and refused to negotiate. The unions responded
with a threat of a general strike. Ultimately, MacArthur brokered an agreement between the government and the unions, in which the unions would refrain from striking and the government would raise the living wage by 42%. All of this occurred by proxy, without MacArthur so much as leaving his desk, and only the respect the Japanese people had for him prevented disaster.\textsuperscript{52}

\textit{Democracy vs. Stability:} In the three and a half years following the war, MacArthur accomplished all of the tasks laid out by the Potsdam Declaration and gained the adoration of the Japanese people. In Shinto, the state religion of Japan until 1945, the Emperor was revered as one of a pantheon of gods.\textsuperscript{53} When the emperor deferred to MacArthur, the Japanese people logically assumed that MacArthur was a god as well. MacArthur had experience with Eastern philosophy, having served under his father in Tokyo during his early career and having spent several years as the commanding general in the Philippines. He meticulously played the role of the aloof ruler he thought appealed to the Japanese psyche.\textsuperscript{54} During MacArthur’s time in Japan, the Emperor and the Prime Minister were the only Japanese he saw in an official capacity. He refused to leave Japan for the duration of his tenure as SCAP. The Japanese responded by treating MacArthur with a reverence previously reserved for the Imperial family. MacArthur received almost 500,000 letters from the Japanese public during the occupation, many of which addressed him in the formal style of Japanese previously used only for the Emperor.\textsuperscript{55}

As the \textit{de facto} ruler of Japan, MacArthur exhibited tireless enthusiasm and dedication to the cause of Japanese democracy. In the first six months of the occupation, he ordered the removal of the censorship system, the release of political prisoners, the installation of women’s

\textsuperscript{54} Theodore Cohen, \textit{Remaking Japan}, 68.
\textsuperscript{55} Letters often expressed gratitude for MacArthur’s beneficent interest in Japan. Many of these letters accompanied gifts of thanks, asked to bear the general’s child, or offered invitations to gatherings. Sodei Rinjirō, \textit{Dear General MacArthur: Letters from the Japanese during the American Occupation} (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), 120-122.
suffrage, and the abolition of child labor.\textsuperscript{56} This dedication was very much in keeping with the spirit of reconstruction at the time. The Potsdam Declaration, SWNCC 150/4 and JCS 1380/15 all emphasized democratic development in all areas of life, so it came as a complete surprise when Washington turned its focus to economics.

By the end of 1948, most of the programs resolving issues from the war were complete, and many of the programs for promoting democracy were well entrenched. At this point, Washington felt pressure to relieve the tax burden and make Japan self-sufficient. Japanese production and trade had recovered at disappointing rates through 1949 while postwar inflation raised costs at staggering rates. During the period between September 1945 and August 1948, prices in Japan rose more than 700 percent. To remedy this situation, Washington appointed the Young Mission.

The Young Mission consisted of some half-dozen economists from various government agencies, including the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board, which before this point had influence reconstruction very little. The Mission traveled to Japan in early 1949 and spent 18 days examining the economic situation in the country and writing a report of their findings, without the help of the economists stationed in Tokyo. The Mission recommended a 180-degree change in economic policy, evidencing a change in emphasis between promoting democracy in Japan and reducing the tax burden in the United States. The economists at SCAP assured MacArthur that the current approach showed positive results and MacArthur stood behind them, rejecting the report entirely—a historic first (and last) in his time with the occupation. Washington overruled MacArthur, and ordered the change in policy.\textsuperscript{57} This event marked the divergence of interests of the United States and Japan.

\textsuperscript{57} Theodore Cohen, \textit{Remaking Japan}, Ch. 22.
Incidentally, accounts differ on whether the change of policy improved the Japanese economy. Joseph Dodge, President of the Detroit Bank, arrived in Japan and enforced a strict regimen to enforce the new policy. He set an exchange rate between the dollar and the yen and enforced Washington’s demand for a balanced budget. This method may have improved the Japanese economy, given the chance; however, the start of the Korean War in June 1950 created an enormous new demand for military support supplies to which the Japanese eagerly catered. In the second half of 1950, Japan had a surplus in its international accounts for the first time in the occupation.\footnote{Theodore Cohen, \textit{Remaking Japan}, 439-440.} The Korean War saved the Japanese economy.

\textit{The end of MacArthur:} MacArthur sometimes disagreed with Washington on policy issues. As the \textit{de facto} leader of Japan, he was entitled to these disagreements, but for a military officer to countermand a direct order constituted insubordination. As a result of the economic redirection, MacArthur largely lost control of the reconstruction. He ventured two more disagreements with Washington. One involved the treatment of the Chinese government-in-exile on Formosa, who he thought the U.S. should support on principle in spite of political considerations. The other involved the war in South Korea, where a congressman publicized his correspondence with MacArthur after a Presidential Directive forbade MacArthur from stating a public opinion. D. James Clayton largely attributes the escalation of the Truman-MacArthur controversy, as it later became known, to “failures in communication and coordination within the chain of command.”\footnote{D. Clayton James, \textit{Command Crisis: MacArthur and the Korean War} (United States Air Force Academy, CO, 1982), 4.} This failure resulted partially from the physical distance between Truman and MacArthur. They only met face to face once, at Wake Island on October 15, 1950. Consequently, all
communication between the two men was overshadowed by stereotypes and preconceptions derived from third-party information.\textsuperscript{60}

This series of disagreements between MacArthur and Washington led to Truman dismissing MacArthur for insubordination. The dismissal came while the Americans and the Japanese were negotiating the terms of agreement on the peace treaty, and the loss of MacArthur came close to breaking Japanese faith in the U.S. The dearth of communication between Washington and Tokyo and the resulting lack of trust endangered the accomplishments of the occupation.

\textit{Cultural Misunderstandings:} SCAP ran into cultural misunderstandings with the Japanese throughout the course of the occupation. Some of these misunderstandings had comical results, while others proved troublesome. Theodore Cohen relates one such incident:

\begin{quote}
Not knowing the tastes of the Americans, the Japanese devoted themselves to a serious study of them. At one small party (small because of a tiny budget) given for four of us by the two labor bureaus of the Welfare Ministry in February 1946, three of the bureaucrats plied us with whisky, beer, and sake while asking questions about our hobbies and likes. Gradually, as the Japanese became drunker, our responses became more imaginative. When all but one of the Japanese were hors de combat, apparently asleep under the table, we said our farewells to the last surviving host. We had not gone more than a hundred meters in our jeep when one of us discovered he had forgotten his overseas cap. We turned around, and he was back within minutes at the room we had left. There were our “drunken” hosts, suddenly sober, sitting around the low banquet table and comparing notes on their departed guests. I don’t know who fooled whom more that evening.\textsuperscript{61}
\end{quote}

Americans did not always put as much effort into understanding their counterparts. In November 1946 the Hoover Mission made a series of recommendations to liberalize the Japanese bureaucracy. The Americans failed to address the educational elitism in the government and the feudal nature of employer-employee relationships in Japan, opting instead to utilize American concepts like “equal opportunity for promotions” and the nobility of service to the public. As a

\textsuperscript{60} D. Clayton James, \textit{Command Crisis: MacArthur and the Korean War} (United States Air Force Academy, CO, 1982), 4-7.

\textsuperscript{61} Theodore Cohen, \textit{Remaking Japan}, 108.
result, the Mission’s recommendations were “almost totally irrelevant.” Cohen remarked, “I sometimes thought that if the Mission had been sent to the Artic Circle instead, it would have come up with the same prescription for the Eskimos, seals, and seagulls.” Another mission, tasked with making recommendations for reforming the Japanese education system, created a report which “sometimes offers more insight into U.S. education than into Japanese.” This ethnocentric approach to recommendations and reforms appears repeatedly throughout the occupation, and frequently undermined U.S. initiatives. The Americans attempted to minimize these effects by acting through the Japanese government using persuasion and influence rather than by issuing directives. However, the inherent power imbalance between the Americans and the Japanese frequently made this measure ineffective.

Findings

The case of Japan as described above demonstrates several major findings. First, interagency cooperation in Washington creates clear policy, but only cooperation between Washington and the theater results in clear policy execution. Second, efforts to create stability and democracy simultaneously can interfere with each other. Third, extended occupations increase the probability of success, but are difficult to sustain. Fourth, although the U.S. government recognizes the importance of cultural understanding in successful nation-building, it has no systematic approach to create the intellectual capital needed to provide that cultural understanding. Finally, the expected role of the military in nation-building operations has varied

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62 Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 382.
63 Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, 382.
over the course of the last 60 years, but successful nation-building requires cooperation between civilian and military efforts.

Due to interagency cooperation in Washington, the two major documents dictating initial policy, SWNCC 150/4 and JCS 1380/15, agreed with one another and with the Potsdam Declaration on policy in Japan. However, since none of the people in SCAP were privy to the discussions and considerations that created these documents, SCAP had to extrapolate Washington’s policy vision. Ideally, at least one of the people intimately involved with formulating policy would sit down with the person coordinating the execution effort and talk through the strategy and philosophy behind the policy directives, so that the coordinator could execute policy in the frame of reference which the policymakers originally intended. In the real world, where policymakers and executors have many demands on their time, one can achieve approximately the same results by sending a liaison with peripheral involvement to the theater to ensure consistency between strategy, policy, and operations. Washington did send liaisons to Japan, but their roles involved offering technical expertise in economics or politics or agriculture rather than the communicative role I suggest. For this purpose, the military structure did a disservice to MacArthur, because a soldier expects his subordinates to take orders without question, but policy execution requires a unity of vision with the policymakers.

The second complication in Japan stemmed from attempting to achieve stability and democracy simultaneously. As seen in the case of the labor strikes, and suggested by Fukuyama, policies that promote democracy can interfere with stability. Conversely, measures to promote stability can stifle democratic growth. Although it offends American sensibilities, stability should precede democracy. The basic needs of humans for food, water, and shelter supercede liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Democracy exists to allow the greatest number of people to
fulfill their basic needs with the greatest success. Without some measure of stability, democracy is pointless.

Creation and maintenance of stability and democracy often requires an extended occupation. The occupation of Japan lasted 3-4 years longer than originally anticipated. However, maintaining support for an occupation that lasts the greater part of a decade challenges the governments of both the occupied and occupying nations. David Edelstein suggests a paradox in nation-building, namely that it requires a lengthy occupation to work, but that extended presence of external influences often precipitates nationalist movements against the foreign occupation.\(^6\^5\) The occupying government also has trouble rallying support for long occupations. After the initial enthusiasm for national defense fades, wives want their husbands back, mothers want their sons back, and taxpayers want their money back. Governments anticipating the need for an occupation should consider this dilemma before instigating a conflict. Further, the political interests that necessitated the occupation will probably also lead to a semi-permanent relationship with American troops on the ground. Some 65 years after the end of the occupation of Japan, U.S. forces are still stationed in Okinawa and Japan. Similarly, South Korea has hosted American military bases since the beginning of the Korean War in 1951. Instead of looking for ways to minimize occupation time, policymakers should focus efforts on maintaining support for an occupation in both countries involved. By rallying support, policymakers can buy time to create the stability necessary to permanently eliminate the need for foreign occupation.

Some people might question the ability of the United States to create either stability or democracy in occupied nations today, let alone create both, given the end of total warfare and the

elusive nature of America’s current enemies. The use of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki certainly ended the war in the Pacific decisively and demoralized the Japanese people. These two results put the Americans in an enviable situation at the beginning of the occupation. However, counterfactual studies suggest a significant possibility that Japan would have surrendered by the end of 1945 even if the Americans did not use the atomic bombs.\textsuperscript{66} Under interrogation Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, stated, “Our decision to seek a way out of this war was made in early June before any atomic bomb had been dropped.”\textsuperscript{67} It is impossible to gauge the success of an occupation in this counterfactual situation, but the question merits consideration.

As to the elusive character of the Iraqi insurgency, one might suggest that this resistance resulted from a lack of legitimacy\textsuperscript{68} in the invasion. When people accept the legitimacy of their government, they do not start insurgencies. In Japan, a respected leader of the government accepted American occupation. As previously discussed, the Emperor of Japan had legitimacy not only as a political leader, but as an object of religious worship. The support for the Emperor translated to the American occupation with the Japanese formal surrender. In newer nation-states like Iraq, where the government has less legitimacy than tribal relationships and patronage networks, American occupations cannot use government surrender as a method of obtaining legitimacy. In this situation, legitimacy must come from other sources. Occupations can foster legitimacy at the global level through multilateral efforts or at the local level by soliciting the support of local leaders. Either way, policymakers need a modicum of cultural understanding to

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\item \textsuperscript{66} Barton J. Bernstein, “Compelling Japan’s Surrender Without the A-bomb, Soviet Entry, or Invasion: Reconsidering the US Bombing Survey’s Early-Surrender Conclusions,” \textit{The Journal of Strategic Studies} 18:2 (June 1995), 101.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Barton J. Bernstein, “Compelling Japan’s Surrender Without the A-bomb, Soviet Entry, or Invasion: Reconsidering the US Bombing Survey’s Early-Surrender Conclusions,” \textit{The Journal of Strategic Studies} 18:2 (June 1995), 111.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Legitimacy – the right to hold and use power, as decided by the population over which power is exercised.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
anticipate the effects support from various factions will have on the overall legitimacy of the occupation.

Cultural understanding is perhaps the most important factor in occupation success, and the least often taken into consideration. Ironically, policymakers understood this necessity beforehand both in Japan and in Iraq, but the resources simply were not available.\(^6^9\) In the 1940s very few Americans had experience with Japanese language and culture. Similarly, today very few Americans have experience with Arabic, Dari or Pashtu. With major oceans on the eastern and western borders and relatively weak neighbors, the United States has had the luxury of relative isolation for most of its existence. Unlike citizens of nations in Europe or Southeast Asia, Americans had no need to learn foreign languages to communicate and little opportunity to experience foreign cultures. The American education system has failed to compensate for this shortcoming. In many states, high school students can graduate without any knowledge of a foreign language and minimal understanding of international history and culture.\(^7^0\) Similarly, after joining government service Americans find that opportunities for language study can delay their career advancement rather than the reverse.\(^7^1\) Until the United States government decides to make development of this intellectual capital a priority, cultural barriers will continue to frustrate nation-building efforts.

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\(^{69}\) Some 2000 Americans served in the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS). Of these, the majority were first-generation children of Japanese immigrants. Peter Dunn, “The Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS) in SWPA during WWII,” http://home.st.net.au/~dunn/sigint/atis.htm.

\(^{70}\) Information found at state websites linked by the National Center for Education Outcomes http://www.education.umn.edu/nceo/TopicAreas/Graduation/StatesGrad.htm shows that state requirements in Texas, California and New York allow students to graduate from high school without any foreign language study, in contrast to Finnish schools, recognized for extraordinary teaching in the 2000 and 2003, which require students to learn at least two foreign languages by the end of secondary schooling (approximately age 16).

\(^{71}\) Senior government official, “The Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations: The Integration and Alignment of Military and Civilian Roles and Missions,” Research Symposium, Texas A&M University, April 5-6 (2007).
Cultural barriers inhibit cooperation between civil and military elements of occupation forces as well as between occupation forces and local government. The role of the military in nation-building operations has implications from the highest levels of policy-making down to the mentality of the foot soldier on the ground. Policymakers face the temptation to use military forces for occupation operations simply because the Army has the men on the ground. Not only does the military have by far the largest amount of deployable manpower in the U.S. government, but at the outset of an occupation, which often occurs right after the end of an armed conflict, the military already has soldiers deployed in theater. On the other hand, a change in assignment from conflict to reconstruction would effectively require the man on the ground to change vocations overnight. In Japan, SCAP solved this problem by utilizing civilian resources in a military hierarchy.

The five themes seen throughout the occupation of Japan resemble the headlines of newspapers in the last four years. Conflict between creating stability and democracy, tension between the need for a long occupation and the desire to cut and run, and efforts to increase cultural understanding have all been manifested in the war in Iraq. The role of the military and the structure of interagency communication have also required closer consideration in recent years, especially with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the consequent rearrangement of the bureaucracy.

These themes lead to three critical policy recommendations:

- Institute incentives for cultural understanding in government offices and/or raise the standards for cultural education during primary and secondary schooling.

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- Create liaisons between Washington and occupation directors in theater tasked specifically with ensuring that in-theater decisions coincide with overall policy motivations and underlying strategy.
- Focus on rallying support for extended occupations, not minimizing occupation duration.

These three recommendations have universal value, whether in a completely subjugated country or in an atmosphere of limited warfare and counterinsurgency. The need for interagency cooperation between Washington and the theater, the vital importance of stability, and the perennial need for communication transcend the particularities of a given conflict. Indeed, they are as applicable today as they were sixty years ago.

B. US Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan 2003-2006: Obstacles to Interagency Cooperation

Carlos Hernandorena

The aftermath of major combat operations launched by US and coalition forces in October 2001, during Operation Enduring Freedom, presented the United States and other participant nations with the daunting task of rebuilding the fractured Afghan state. Following the rapid collapse of the Taliban and the destruction of al Qaeda training camps, the United Nations Security Council enacted resolution 1386 on December 20, 2001. Resolution 1386 sought to provide Afghanistan’s new interim government with support, establishing security in Kabul through the creation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Efforts were soon made to expand the scope of ISAF into the Afghan countryside as a means to stabilize the war-torn nation.73 Afghanistan remained unstable due to lingering elements of al Qaeda and the Taliban, which began waging an active insurgency against coalition forces and the Afghan Interim Authority. Additionally, tribal factionalism, powerful warlords, and the lack of any

established legal system posed other challenges to peace in the region.\(^{74}\) Coalition and ISAF forces found themselves fighting an insurgency while carrying out Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations.

As a result of the security threats posed to both military and civilian personnel involved in reconstruction missions, and as a way to share the burden of operations among coalition partners, US officials developed the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 2002 and established the first teams by early 2003.\(^{75}\) Consisting of both civilian and military personnel from different government agencies, PRTs were designed to spread the “ISAF effect” through a combination of quick impact reconstruction projects, security sector reform, and the extension of the Afghan Central Government’s influence, all under the protection of embedded military forces. Initially, the United States set up the first few PRTs along with coalition partners such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand. As the PRT program took off, the United States began to hand over some PRTs to Coalition allies and ISAF participants.\(^{76}\) Eventually, by late 2006, all PRTs in Afghanistan were placed under ISAF control.\(^{77}\)

The civil-military and interagency aspects of Provincial Reconstruction Teams make them a unique case study. In order for PRTs to function the way they were intended, high levels of coordination between team components were necessary, yet not always present. Assessing the manner in which different agencies as well as civilian and military personnel interacted,


\(^{75}\) McNerney, 1.

\(^{76}\) The difference between the two is that ISAF forces are an international military force sanctioned by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1385 and led NATO with the task of securing over 50% of Afghanistan. Coalition forces consist of military elements from 21 different states under the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom tasked with counter-terror and counterinsurgency operations.

especially within a counter-insurgency (COIN) environment, provides an excellent opportunity for improvements to future interagency teams.

Although there are many different opinions regarding the effectiveness of PRTs in Afghanistan, much of the literature written about the teams views them as having had a positive impact in the region. A report written by the USAID claims that “Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) have been an effective tool for stabilization in Afghanistan, strengthening provincial and district-level institutions and empowering local leaders who support the central government.”

Another report, written by a specialist on support and stability operations, further explains that PRTs, while plagued with difficulties, made a number of helpful contributions by representing “a positive international presence in places where there otherwise would have been only combat forces conducting kinetic operations.” Indeed, many experts on SSTR believe that PRTs were and continue to be a viable option for countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq with the provision that certain changes be made to maximize the efficacy of the teams and overcome some of the challenges they face.

While the debate over PRT effectiveness is important, the key purpose of this study is to identify obstacles to interagency cooperation in the US PRTs during Operation Enduring Freedom, specifically for the period of 2003-2006. This paper assumes the position that PRTs were useful tools in Afghanistan and models to improve upon for the future. As previously stated, there are many different opinions on the impact PRTs have had in Afghanistan and could have in future SSTR roles. There has also been considerable discourse on the effect and interplay between the provincial reconstruction teams and NGOs operating in the same regions. These are

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79 Perito (2005), 15.
all important issues that must be debated; however, an assessment of interagency cooperation is just as critical.

An analysis of interagency cooperation within provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan is essential for determining the structure and guidelines of future PRTs or other interagency organizations operating in COIN environments. Considering the high probability that future US operations may involve support, stability, and reconstruction functions, it would be remiss to disregard the lessons presented in cases such as Afghanistan. The United States must prepare itself to conduct SSTR operations in similar threatening environments in which insurgencies, terrorism and other dangers constitute a genuine menace to the military and civilian agencies aiding in reconstruction. An example of this need can be seen with the current deployment of provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq where efforts are being made to ameliorate dire security threats to rebuilding efforts there.

The United States Army’s new counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual FM 3-24 has within it a section dedicated solely to explaining the importance of interagency coordination for successful counterinsurgency operations. It clearly states that:

> The integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful COIN operations. All efforts focus on supporting the local populace and Home Nation government. Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency. COIN participants come from many backgrounds. They may include military personnel, diplomats, police, politicians, humanitarian aid workers, contractors, and local leaders. All must make decisions and solve problems in a complex and extremely challenging environment.\(^{80}\)

This quote shows the importance of provincial reconstruction teams in establishing a joint mechanism for dealing with situations, such as Afghanistan, where security threats must be met with a multifaceted approach involving military and civilian resources. Most importantly,

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statements made in the Army’s counterinsurgency manual outline the critical nature of interagency cooperation between the various entities involved in support and stability operations in a COIN environment.

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Development History**

The concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams was not introduced at the outset of US and coalition operations in Afghanistan. It took more than a year from the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom before the integrated civil-military units designated as PRTs were deployed in Afghanistan.81

Planning for civil-military cooperation, deemed essential for reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan from the beginning, coincided with the initial preparations for military operations against the Taliban. The military coordinated with a number of humanitarian agencies to prepare for the rebuilding efforts which would be needed after the conclusion of major combat operations. One author describes how humanitarian agencies, including InterAction the World Food Program (WFP), were invited to participate in a Coalition Coordination Council, based on the US Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida, which was created to enhance coordination between coalition partners, UN agencies, and the non-governmental health agency (NGHA) community.82

As preparations continued for military operations in Afghanistan, General Tommy Franks, the US commander of United States Central Command (CENTCOM), relayed orders to establish the Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF). This task force consisted of a command and control unit designed to direct the actions of all civil affairs teams operating in

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Shortly after the fall of the Taliban, in December 2001, the CJMOTF established the coalition’s first civil affairs teams in country. Labeled as Coalition Humanitarian Cells (CHLCs), outposts of approximately 12 Army civil affairs soldiers, called “Chiclets” were deployed with the intent of winning the “hearts and minds” of the local populace. As Afghan reconstruction expert Robert Perito explains, personnel of the CHLCs were assigned the “task to assess humanitarian needs, implement small-scale reconstruction projects and establish relations with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and non-governmental organizations already in the field.”\footnote{Perito (2005), 2.}

The Army civil affairs personnel, which composed CHLCs, fulfilled a role as non-combat troops with unique technical capabilities, also known as Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). Their background was primarily as reserve unit soldiers with considerable experience in the civilian realm. These “citizen-soldiers” were called to active duty already possessing a vast array of specific knowledge and training in law enforcement, cultural affairs, labor, education, logistics, health care, and various other areas of civil service.\footnote{Robert Borders, \textit{8} originally cited from Department of Defense (DoD). (1995) Joint Publication 3-57: Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs. June 1995.} The purpose of these civil affairs members operating in CHLCs was to provide Army commanders in the field with readily available and deployable sources of civilian technical skills that could be adapted to minor reconstruction projects throughout the Afghan countryside.\footnote{Borders, \textit{8}.}
In November 2002, the deployment of CHLCs was soon followed by a plan to create Joint Regional Teams (JRTs). During a series of meetings in Kabul, attended by NGOs, diplomats, UN representatives, as well as ISAF and coalition military personnel, the concept of JRTs was outlined. During these meetings participants determined that remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda, in addition to increased infiltration of hostile forces across the Afghan-Pakistani border, posed a significant risk to personnel involved in support and stability functions. Key figures also mentioned that operations in Afghanistan had reached “Phase IV.” According to a report by Barbara Stapleton of the British Agencies Afghanistan Group, Phases I and II involved the toppling of the Taliban and al Qaeda, Phase III related to stabilization efforts, and Phase IV was labeled as the reconstruction phase.87

To accommodate reconstruction efforts while simultaneously addressing legitimate security concerns, Joint Regional Teams were designed to consist of three parts. They were to include mobile Civil Affairs Teams (CATs), a civil-military operations center headquarters, and a contingent of combat troops to provide force protection. The JRTs had four primary functions. The first consisted of coordinating the activities of the numerous entities involved in reconstruction, ranging from NGOs to the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA). Second, JRTs would identify possible reconstruction projects that could further improve Afghan civilians’ opinion of coalition and ISAF forces. Third, the teams would conduct village assessments to determine the needs of the local populace. Lastly, JRTs were expected to liaise with regional commanders on matters relating to security and reconstruction efforts.88

When the idea of Joint Regional Teams and their intended mission was developed and presented to Hamid Karzai, the interim president of the Afghan Transitional Authority, in

88 Ibid, 16.
December 2002, he proved eager to have the teams deployed as soon as possible. Karzai did, however, present the United States and its allies with one request: he asked that the title of the teams be changed from Joint Regional Teams to Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The Afghan president felt that the concept of regional teams promoted factionalism and bolstered the idea of regions controlled by warlords. Shifting from the term regional to provincial indicated the purpose of the teams was to “provide support to the government (as opposed to regional power brokers or warlords) and to denote reconstruction as the principal activity of the teams.”

The first PRT was stood up in the city of Gardez in February of 2003. Soon after, teams were deployed to the cities of Bamian, Kondoz, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Herat. By October 2005, there were 22 provincial reconstruction teams operating inside Afghanistan, with 12 of them controlled by US forces. The other PRTs remained under the control of either members representing the Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A) or ISAF, led by NATO members.

**US PRT Model and Mission**

The United States government embraced three primary goals they intended PRTs to work toward, the first of which involved enhancing security. The US, in conjunction with its coalition partners, hoped to create a secure environment where US government agency representatives, international aid organizations, NGOs, and United Nations assistance programs could work to develop Afghanistan’s infrastructure. PRTs were intended to achieve this by helping “defuse
factional fighting, support deployments by the Afghan National Army and police, conduct patrols, and reinforce security efforts during the disarming of militias.”92

The second goal called for a strengthening of the Afghan central government’s reach. President Hamid Karzai’s fledgling government was weak and possessed little influence outside the capital of Kabul. The US PRTs mission demanded that the teams work in conjunction with local provincial leaders on promoting local elections and undertaking quick impact projects. These projects, designed to better the Afghan people’s everyday life, were expected to improve the population’s perception of the central government and thereby solidify Kabul’s influence over the Afghan countryside.

The last mission goal aimed to facilitate reconstruction in Afghanistan. PRTs were designed to directly aid in small reconstruction projects, and more importantly, help representatives from different US agencies to implement civilian funded projects. Additionally, PRTs were expected to work cooperatively with international aid organizations and NGOs. These groups, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders, possessed greater experience in certain areas of development, a deeper understanding of local customs and culture, and had better access to some volatile regions of the country because of their perceived impartiality.93

While all three mission goals were valued as critical components for effective support and stability operations in the region, many countries adopted different priorities for operating PRTs in Afghanistan. The US PRTs primarily worked toward extending the influence of the central government’s authority and on “quick impact” reconstruction projects. The UK, on the

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92 McNerney, 37.
93 McNerney, 36-38.
other hand, focused less on physical reconstruction efforts and worked harder to promote security sector reform and defuse factional fighting between Afghan tribes.\(^{94}\)

Each coalition partner involved in Afghanistan’s reconstruction followed a particular structural model for their PRT. Different states varied the amount of military and civilian personnel in the teams, leadership roles, PRT mission statements, and rules of engagement (ROE). According to a special report written by the United States Institute of Peace, “the size and composition of US PRTs vary depending on maturity, local circumstances, and the availability of personnel from civilian agencies. Combined Forces Command (CFC) does, however, have a model, which US PRTs generally emulate.”\(^{95}\)

As of 2006 American PRTs consisted of less than 100 personnel. The teams were led by an Army Lieutenant Colonel who commanded approximately 82 other civilian and military members. Civilian components included a representative from the State Department, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and Agency for International Development (USAID), although in some cases contractors filled in for USAID officials.\(^{96}\) PRTs also incorporated a member of the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MOI), in most situations represented by an officer from the Afghan National Police, and three or more local interpreters.

The military component of the PRT was represented by a number of specialized Army units. An Army officer, normally a ranking Lieutenant Colonel along with his command staff, always commanded the teams. Each PRT, depending on regional demands, was expected to have two Army civil affairs teams; a military police unit; a psychological operations unit (PSYOP); explosive ordnance/de-mining unit (EOD); intelligence team; medics; force protection unit,

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\(^{94}\) Perito (2005), 3.

\(^{95}\) Ibid, 4.

normally composed of a 40-man infantry platoon; and administrative support and personnel. Each of these PRT elements played different roles in promoting the team’s mission and its interaction with the local civilian population.

The US PRT commander’s duties included, first and foremost, acting as a liaison with key Afghan government and civilian personnel. Considering the primary mission of PRTs demanded an extension of the Afghan government’s control over its territory, constant communication with key local officials remained critical for efficient coordination. The commander maintained contact with provincial governors, police chiefs, mayors, and any other influential figures such as tribal leaders who possessed influence over the region. Because international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often worked in US PRT areas of operations, the commander, while not required to, regularly acted as a liaison with these groups as well. The commander also routinely attended meetings of the Provincial Development Council, where they met with local Afghan officials to coordinate development projects, and with Combined Forces Command (CFC) to coordinate military operations with combat units located within the PRTs vicinity. Lastly, the commander sat in control of the team’s Project Review Committee, which reviewed and decided on which projects to undertake and fund.

According to Robert Perito, an expert on post-conflict peace and stability operations, PRT State Department representatives “have no standard job description,” and served primarily as political advisers to PRT commanders and Afghan provincial governors. They also operated as members of the Project Review Committee and often acted as a key source for reporting PRT activities to the US embassy in Kabul. In many cases, State Department officers represented the PRTs principle source of information regarding local culture and politics.

97 Perito (2005), 4-5.
The representative from the USAID was tasked with acting as the team commander’s and Afghan provincial governor’s main adviser on topics related to development. Much like State Department officials, USAID members reported directly to the US embassy in Kabul on the local government’s suitability and capacity for development projects. Representatives also worked as key members of the Project Review Committee and directly interacted with Army civil affair teams and local NGOs to maximize the impact of development projects.

USDA representatives were selected from a number of different areas of specialty, ranging from veterinarians to soil specialists. According to a report from the USDA website:

> Representatives served as agriculture advisors working actively with the PRT Commander, aid organizations, and the national and local governments to enable, support, and foster reconstruction of the Afghan agricultural sector and to help build the ability of the central government to support and provide services to the agricultural sector.  

USDA projects included cotton and soybean variety trials, animal health issues, water management and irrigation systems, farm planning, and alternative livelihoods to opium poppy production.

Along with the PRT commander, Army Civil Affairs Teams constituted one of the more important military elements involved in actual Afghan reconstruction efforts. These teams, comprised of four soldiers each, were tasked with assessing the needs of the local population and viability of providing for those needs. Each team had a different role to play with Civil Affairs “A” teams:

> Conducting assessments of reconstruction needs and contracting with Afghan firms to build schools, clinics, bridges and wells. Civil Affairs “B” Teams operated the PRTs Civil Military Operations Center and coordinated with the UNAMA regional office and international NGOs engaged in providing humanitarian relief and development assistance.

### Obstacles to Interagency Coordination within US PRTs

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99 Ibid.

100 Perito (2005), 5.
Provincial reconstruction teams were designed and structured to integrate military and civilian agencies so they might coordinate a joint effort in establishing security, extending the influence of the Afghan central government, and promoting reconstruction. In order to achieve this goal, intense cooperation between the military and the various civilian entities proved critical for meeting the diverse security, political, and cultural environments present throughout Afghanistan. FM 3-24, the Army’s new guidebook for counterinsurgency, states: “Military efforts are necessary and important to counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, but they are only effective when integrated into a comprehensive strategy employing all instruments of national power.” Considering that PRTs implement such a strategy, it is imperative to identify any obstacles that hamper or retard the teams’ ability to accomplish their mission.

An assessment of civil-military coordination within US PRTs from 2003 until early 2006 showed an interagency process that varied in its levels of effectiveness. Provincial reconstruction teams were designed to be flexible so they could best fit the different needs of the 34 Afghan provinces. This adaptability also subjected PRTs to different challenges, making it difficult to identify broad problems that affected most US PRTs’ interagency coordination. Additionally, interviews of civilian and military PRT members conducted by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), rather than recognizing uniform problems, indicated that a high turnover rate for PRT personnel presented a diverse array of opinions on the quality of

101 Department of the Army, 2-1.
102 This assessment was conducted by USAID as a joint interagency report. A team of officials consisting of two members from each USAID, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, and the department of state traveled to Afghanistan and conducted interviews in Kabul, visited regional commands as well as PRTs and maneuver units spread throughout the country.
103 These interviews were conducted by USIP’s Professional Training Program which includes US and foreign diplomats, government officials, military personnel, law enforcement professionals, and leaders of non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations, as well as civic activists and tribal leaders in conflict zones. The goal of this program is to integrate training seminars and workshops that real-world practitioners can use to improve their skills and management capabilities. (This information taken from the USIP website, http://www.usip.org/training/index.html,) (Accessed on April 25, 2007).
cooperation between team members. In spite of these challenges, an assessment of US PRTs identified five prevalent obstacles which had a negative impact on the interagency process within these teams.

The first factor causing difficulties for interagency coordination in US Provincial Reconstruction Teams was the lack of clear guidelines and mission goals for key PRT personnel. As previously mentioned, the teams were structured to be flexible and adaptive to regional needs. In order to maintain this flexibility, the designers of the PRT concept believed that creating a static set of guidelines prevented teams from sustaining the malleability necessary for adapting to their region-specific operational needs. One author, however, describes how this mentality adversely affected team coordination:

Absent an established concept of operations and a clear set of guidelines for civil-military interaction, PRT commanders and civilians had to improvise. This was problematic because military officers and civilian agency personnel came from different ‘corporate cultures’ and had different, sometimes competing mandates. Without an interagency pre-agreement on individual roles, missions, and job descriptions, it took time and trial and error to achieve a common understanding of mission priorities.

More often than not, PRT personnel, especially representatives from civilian agencies, found themselves in-country with little understanding of the specific role they were expected to fulfill. The fact that other team members often proved incapable of providing new arrivals with operational guidelines due to the uncertainty of their own specific PRT roles exacerbated the situation.

While adaptability remained an important feature for provincial reconstruction teams, the lack of individual mission descriptions sacrificed productivity and cohesion between team members. A Foreign Service Officer (FSO) who spent four months stationed in the Parwan PRT as the State Department representative, commented that his initial deployment to Afghanistan

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104 Dziedzic and Seidl, 4.
105 Perito (2005), 11.
was devoid of any operational instruction. During an interview with USIP he stated “nobody really gave me any guidance. I was just basically cut loose and told ‘Okay, you’re at the PRT’ and that was about it. Nobody told me anything. I had no idea what my function, what my role was going to be.” Under these circumstances, a key member of an interagency team spent the first few weeks of a relatively short deployment uninformed of his duties and incapable of fulfilling a meaningful role within his PRT.

Not all civilians assigned to provincial reconstruction teams experienced the same lack of instruction. Analysis of other State Department and USAID representatives’ interviews demonstrated that, in some cases, individuals did receive limited instruction from their respective agencies, or the PRT commander, regarding the functions they should carry out. Civilian team members also attempted to identify their roles through research and communication with acquaintances possessing PRT experience. The fact remains, however, that an established system for disseminating guidelines and individual mission statements did not exist and the amount of research, as well as experienced personnel, was minute due to the recent nature of PRT operations in Afghanistan.

The second obstacle impacting interagency coordination in US PRTs involved the rigid and military-oriented structure of teams. A United States Army Lieutenant Colonel, or Major in the case of smaller sized teams, always commanded American provincial reconstruction teams. Officially, PRT doctrine dictated that civilian representatives from the State Department and USAID take the lead on political and reconstruction issues, while the commander had authority over matters related to security. Yet, according to a USAID

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107 Perito (2005), 4-5.
interagency report, “PRT culture, people, and resources were predominantly military.” This factor created a sense of military dominance which, in some instances, caused interagency cooperation to suffer. The combination of a lack of mission guidance, along with the predominance of military staffing, created a scenario in which personalities played a disproportionate role (especially the personality of the PRT commander) in determining the direction of PRT efforts. In a situation where the vast majority of the team was comprised of military personnel, and most of the resources came from the Department of Defense, it became very easy for a commander to feel the unit’s focus and projects should be military in nature.

Civil-military tensions ran highest during the initial stages of PRT development. As previously mentioned, limited or a complete lack of guidance on mission and individual roles resulted in considerable friction between military and civilian personnel. One author describes how:

Many of the State Department personnel and other civilians on the team had military experience, but this did not reduce civil-military tensions. On the contrary, some of the harshest criticisms of the military personnel on PRTs came from retired military members of the team. During one of the author’s trips to a PRT, a member of the team confided, “Those briefing slides look good, but this place is completely dysfunctional.” Civilians complained that the military personnel on the PRTs were reluctant to support them and treated them as outsiders.

In a June 2006 Interagency Assessment written by the USAID, its authors determined that situations, such as the one referred to above, in which the PRT commander failed to integrate “non-DoD” team components into leadership decisions caused the overall mission of the team to suffer.

PRTs not only had to contend with civil-military tensions within the teams, in some instances their attachment to larger combat maneuver units created external influences that

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108 USAID Interagency Assessment, 10.
109 Ibid.
110 McNerney, 36-37.
111 USAID Interagency Assessment, 10.
negatively impacted a wider interagency process. Provincial reconstruction teams, depending on their location and the security environment they faced, often worked alongside larger combat units or task forces. The teams were expected to coordinate with these larger units to supplement their force protection and work jointly to diffuse regional political challenges. The combat maneuver units also provided additional military cover that allowed PRTs to function in wider areas of operations or in regions with greater security threats. These relationships, however, were not always cooperative or cordial. Robert Perito states that “in some cases combat units looked down on PRTs and treated their civilian affairs teams and National Guard units as ‘not real soldiers’ who required protection. In extreme instances, tension between soldiers in PRTs and those in combat units precluded cooperation.”

The case of a PRT civil affairs (CA) member, who was a retired Foreign Service officer, spoke Farsi, and had previous operational experience in Afghanistan, illustrates the interagency difficulty between some teams and the combat units they were attached to. Assigned to the PRT located at Herat for a few months, this CA member’s role was to act as a political and cultural adviser to the team commander and other civil affairs members. Task Force Saber, a combat unit charged with disarmament efforts and general security of the area, was also present in the region. In a situation such as this, the military officer in charge of the task force outranked the PRT commander. The CA member explained that the task force commander assumed a very active role in the political affairs of the region, which was dominated by the volatile warlord Ismael Khan. According to USIP interview transcripts, the task force commander, lacking any civil affairs advisers of his own, refused to accept any counsel from the PRT CA cultural and political

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112 Perito (2005), 8.
specialist and ignored advice from other civil affairs members when it came to selecting reconstruction projects.\textsuperscript{113}

It is important to note that there were many cases in which the high proportion of military staff and resources in PRTs did not hamper interagency coordination. In these instances, PRT commanders went out of their ways to integrate civilian personnel in key decision processes and project implementation. The important factors to consider in these cases are that US PRTs were always led by military personnel, and insufficient guidance existed for directing commanders to integrate civilian team members into key decision-making processes.\textsuperscript{114}

The third challenge that threatened the US PRT interagency process involved poor tour synchronization and team deployment policies. The sudden and ad hoc nature of PRT development resulted in considerable personnel gaps, poorly established team member relationships, and periods of relative disjointedness among PRT staff. The combination of teams being assembled in theater, in addition to different tour lengths for the various civilian agencies involved, ultimately had a degenerative affect on interagency coordination.\textsuperscript{115}

Two main factors influenced the deployment lengths of civilian personnel to PRTs in Afghanistan. The first involved the volunteer basis for acquiring civilian representatives. The Department of State, USAID and USDA could not force employees to accept a posting in a hazardous working environment such as Afghanistan. In the initial stages of PRT development, keeping tour lengths between three and six months acted as an enticement for volunteers who might not want to spend longer periods of time in country.\textsuperscript{116}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{113} USIP Interviews, Interview #1.
\textsuperscript{114} USAID Interagency Assessment, 14.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid, 11.
\textsuperscript{116} USIP Interviews, Interview #3.
\end{flushleft}
The security environment and location of PRTs acted as a second factor. Some locations with higher insurgent activity were viewed as hardship posts and civilian agencies found it difficult to find people willing to spend more than three months at these PRTs. One State Department representative who served two 90 day tours at PRTs in Jalalabad and Tarin Kowt explains:

I basically went to places that nobody else wanted to go, and actually places I didn’t want to go. So, that’s why I went 90 days. But they prefer at least six months and would really like to have you for a year. It was either me at 90 days or nobody. So they took me. Ninety days was their bare minimum.\textsuperscript{117}

Both civilian and military team members regularly admitted that 90-day deployments were too short to establish effective working relationships. They described an environment in which PRT staff cycled in every three to six months, at a time when team members finishing their deployments were up to speed and had a unified vision of the way to proceed with PRT projects. The replacement of these members with new ones forced many teams to start from scratch, thereby nullifying much of the progress previously achieved.\textsuperscript{118}

Poor tour synchronization among the civilian agencies also led to gaps within key PRT positions. Ample cases existed in which teams lacked State Department, USAID, or USDA representatives because former members finished their tours and were not immediately replaced by their corresponding agencies. One PRT commander interviewed commented on this challenge: “there was no consultation about which State officers would be posted at what PRTs, and on what schedule. This resulted in gaps at critical times.”\textsuperscript{119} In these situations PRT commanders often scoured the ranks of military personnel with civil affair training to fill in civilian gaps and took the lead on political and reconstruction issues.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{117} USIP Interviews, Interview #6.
\textsuperscript{118} USIP Interviews, Interview # 31.
\textsuperscript{119} USIP Interviews, Interview # 51.
\textsuperscript{120} USAID Interagency Assessment, 15.
Michael J. McNerney, Director of International Policy and Capabilities in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, stated that toward the end of 2003 plans were made to extend civilian representatives’ tours to one year.\textsuperscript{121} Yet, a review of over 50 PRT members’ tour length, from different agencies, showed a wide span of deployment lengths ranging from three months to one year, with the average being around six months. The deployment of military personnel and commanders appeared far more consistent, however, with most tours lasting approximately one year.

The creation of provincial reconstruction teams in theater was another critical factor related to US PRT deployment. As new provincial reconstruction teams emerged to spread the “ISAF effect,” US team members were simply assigned to their new postings and rarely, if ever, had any contact with other PRT components until they arrived on-site. Consequences of this policy included periods of lost productivity and a lack of civil-military coordination as teams took time to build internal relationships and align their individual mission roles with that of the team’s overarching mission. A lack of civilian representatives with interagency team experience and understanding of the military further retarded initial cooperation.\textsuperscript{122}

The training, or lack thereof, provided to civilian agencies and key military figures composing provincial reconstruction teams represented the fourth obstacle to interagency cooperation. In the case of US PRTs, no implemented training regimen existed for State Department, USAID, or USDA officials prior to their deployment.\textsuperscript{123} One of the primary complaints of these officials was that they received little if any instruction on how to operate within a military-dominated or interagency environment. Additionally, the Department of State,

\begin{flushright}\footnotesize\textsuperscript{121} McNerney, 37.  
\textsuperscript{122} USAID Interagency Assessment, 11.  
\textsuperscript{123} Perito (2005), 13-14.\end{flushright}
USAID and US Army provided minimal guidance or instruction about the cultural and sociopolitical surroundings civilians and military PRT personnel were expected to operate in.

The integration of numerous agencies into a team of individuals expected to coordinate with one another required that the different components have a basic understanding of each other’s institutional culture and standard operating procedures. Thrusting civilian representatives with poor understanding of the armed forces into a military-dominated group such as a PRT often resulted in poor understanding and communication between team members. The same rang true for military personnel with no experience working with civilians. Fortunately, a good portion of the civilian representatives assigned to US PRTs either had prior military service or working experience with military personnel.\(^{124}\) Most PRT commanders also possessed backgrounds working in joint operating environments with civilians. In spite of this fact, no pre-deployment training existed for civilian representatives lacking in civil-military work experience. One State Department official who served in a PRT commented that “getting some sort of acquaintance with military structures and military operations would be very useful. There are a lot of acronyms that fly around and a lot of things that are just common language for everybody involved with the military and really alien for people who aren’t.”\(^ {125}\)

Civilian and military PRT members also complained about the lack of language and cultural training they received prior to their assignments. Civilians and military civil affairs members often acted as political and cultural advisers to team commanders and were expected to use their knowledge to recommend reconstruction projects that would be beneficial to the local Afghan populace. A poor understanding of the local culture or basic native language skills not only affected the ability of PRTs to function within Afghanistan, it ultimately had a negative

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\(^{124}\) Information gathered from various interviewee bio’s in USIP Interviews.

\(^{125}\) USIP Interviews, Interview #4.
impact on interagency cooperation within PRTs. One commander assigned to the PRT in Jalalabad claimed that he inquired about a pre-command course to prepare him for his role, he was told that there would be no pre-deployment training and, in fact, no such course existed.\textsuperscript{126}

State Department representatives vented similar frustrations with their agency’s failure to institute a language or cultural training regimen prior to their assignments. Many PRT Department of State representatives were selected based on their prior backgrounds, experience in the region, and linguistic abilities. In some cases former Foreign Service Officers were brought out of retirement to serve in PRTs. When interviewed by USIP, a high percentage of these representatives stated they wished the Department of State had provided them with more time and resources to either learn, or brush up on language skills and cultural aspects of Afghanistan. One representative from the State Department described his pre-deployment language training as two weeks of self-taught practice and a Rosetta Stone audio guide.\textsuperscript{127}

Ultimately, the absence of sufficient training designed to increase PRT members’ understanding of the cultural environment in which they operated added to the obstacles PRTs faced for interagency coordination.\textsuperscript{128}

The fifth impediment to interagency coordination faced by US PRTs involved the staffing and resources provided by civilian agencies. The Department of State, USAID, and USDA proved incapable of supplying sufficient representatives with proper backgrounds to satisfy the increased demand PRTs created. Civilian agencies also fell short when it came to supplying their representatives with necessary logistics and resources to effectively carry out their missions.

\textsuperscript{126} USIP Interviews, Interview #40.
\textsuperscript{127} USIP Interviews, Interview # 6.
\textsuperscript{128} For instance, the concept of honor and respect for elders is very important to the Afghan population and was a cornerstone of many relationships built in Afghanistan. Learning these cultural nuances allowed US representatives to form a positive bond with the Afghan people was critical to PRT missions.
These two factors increased friction between civil-military relations and impeded team coordination.

Many of the USAID, State Department and USDA representatives were described as being inexperienced junior officials or Personal Services Contractors hired because of staffing shortages.\textsuperscript{129} PRTs lacked senior-level civilian professionals with experience operating under diverse cultures and within interagency teams. This situation created a gap between the military and civilian personnel. A PRT interagency assessment report by the USAID explains this disparity:

\begin{quote}
Military and civilian representatives were doing extraordinary work under very difficult conditions. They were smart, energetic, and dedicated. However, junior or non-direct hired staff civilian representatives often lacked experience with and knowledge of their own agencies. By comparison, most military counterparts had 16-20 years experience prior to PRT command.\textsuperscript{130}
\end{quote}

Because of this experience gap, military commanders, in some cases, felt their civilian representatives were unqualified and therefore alienated them from the decision-making process and project implementation. At the same time, civilian representatives, who represented a minority of PRT personnel, with minimal training and poor logistical support from their respective agencies, found it difficult to establish their credibility and promote their ideas.

Even when civilian agencies were capable of providing provincial reconstruction teams with representatives, they lacked the necessary funding and resources to adequately support their staff in the field. In the initial stages of PRT development neither the State Department nor USAID supplied their team representatives with independent funding for reconstruction projects. The Department of Defense provided all the financing for reconstruction projects using Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) and Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. By 2004, however, funding availability for PRTs improved and

\textsuperscript{129} Perito (2005), 11.
\textsuperscript{130} USAID Interagency Assessment, 15.
Department of State and USAID supplied their representatives with independent financial resources.\footnote{McNearney, 41.} Even with the addition of separate funding, civilian representatives still depended on the PRT military component to provide for transportation, interpreters and other essential operational resources.\footnote{Perito (2005), 13.} One interviewed civilian PRT member stated, “I do wish the Department of State provided more than just one person. I think that we’d be more effective if we had our own interpreters, our own transportation, and some programming funds to be able to bring to the table.”\footnote{USIP Interviews, Interview # 4.} The added burden of providing resources for civilian representatives, which should have been supplied by their corresponding agencies, sometimes frayed interagency cooperation between military and non-DoD personnel.

It is important to note that the five discussed obstacles to interagency coordination in the US provincial reconstruction teams were not present in every situation. There were cases in which PRT commanders eagerly integrated civilian agencies in the decision-making process and accepted counsel on cultural and political matters. Additionally, on certain occasions, US PRTs had no trouble discerning the roles different agency representatives needed to fulfill in spite of an absence of clear guidelines. There were also instances in which civilian representatives had extensive backgrounds in Afghan culture and language abilities, proving indispensable to the team’s mission. An analysis of PRT assessments in conjunction with interviews with former team personnel, however, revealed that on a number of occasions the above-mentioned challenges created significant barriers to effective interagency cooperation, hampering the overall mission.

**Recommendations**
Establishing solutions and integrating operational guidelines to create seamless cooperation between the different components of US PRTs is a far more daunting task than identifying the challenges that obstruct team coordination. Yet, there are reasonable solutions to improving many of the complications that plagued the interagency process within American provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan. These solutions involve a milieu of different approaches, including: changes to team command structure; the implementation of individual mission/role guidelines; various pre-deployment training programs; increased participation from civilian agencies; and assessments of other nations’ PRT models.

The first recommendation designed to improve coordination within US PRTs is the creation of leadership opportunities for civilians. Allowing both military and civilian personnel to command PRTs, depending on the conditions of the region, would create a flexible command structure supporting the concept of PRT adaptability. Second, leadership positions for civilians could address the prevalent complaint denoting PRTs lack of senior-level officials with extensive experience.134

One of the key advantages of provincial reconstruction teams was the notion of their adaptability. The idea that teams remained flexible and molded their missions and operational procedures to fit the various cultural and political environments present in Afghanistan proved essential for effectiveness. Yet, this flexibility did not seem to apply to leadership demands. It makes perfect sense that military commanders take the leading role in a PRT's activities in regions affected by high levels of insurgent activity with poor security conditions. Under these circumstances it is critical that the team’s focus remain on the security of its members and of the Afghan populace within its area of operations. In environments where security is less of a concern, however, a civilian team leader could prove more effective in promoting the PRTs

134 USAID Interagency Assessment, 17.
mission and improving interagency coordination. This rationale is supported by one author who believes that establishing civilian command of PRTs allows the entire team to align its focus along the same axis, establishing more unified operational policies and team coordination.\textsuperscript{135}

There are two additional advantages to creating leadership opportunities for civilian PRT members. First, having a civilian leader within a military-dominated structure could act as a balancing factor. As previously mentioned, PRT staff and resources were predominantly supplied by the Department of Defense, aligning PRT culture with the military and, in some cases, marginalizing civilian representatives.\textsuperscript{136} Placing a non-DoD official in charge of the civil-military teams, in regions where the security environment allows, could present a more efficient way to promote interagency cooperation. One former PRT member mirrored this sentiment and claimed:

\begin{quote}
I think you need, understanding the challenge, senior level experience managers to be assigned for the civilian leadership piece and civilian leadership on interaction with the local government as well as on a PRT. Any other additional staff needs to be subordinate to a civilian leader who can then be the counterpart to the military liaison. I think that would go a long way towards managing relations, managing priorities, and working towards how you can de-conflict and develop complementary approaches between the civil affairs teams of the military and the civilian agencies.\textsuperscript{137}
\end{quote}

While PRT resources and personnel would still be overrepresented by the military, the decision-making process would be mainly under the auspices of a senior civilian representative, most likely from the Department of State. This PRT structure creates a far more uniform dispersal of influence between civilian and military components, forcing the different members of the team to coordinate their efforts in order to achieve their mission.

The second advantage attained by creating US PRT leadership positions for civilians is the recruiting potential within non-DoD agencies. The possibility of a command role in teams

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\textsuperscript{135} Sedra, 10. \\
\textsuperscript{136} USAID Interagency Assessment, 10. \\
\textsuperscript{137} USIP interviews, Interview #31.
\end{flushright}
designed for SSTR operations could entice senior-level civilians, with extensive experience, to seek assignment in the US PRTs, especially if it is a way to get promoted. The context in which civilians view their assignments to PRTs is essential. If most civilians, especially senior-level officials, see deployment to PRTs as having a negative or irrelevant impact on their future career advancement they will remain unwilling to accept such hardship posts. Placing State Department or other non-military staff in charge of provincial reconstruction teams, however, could make assignment to the teams a coveted position because of the leadership experience gained while in Afghanistan. Having a greater number of qualified and experienced civilian personnel within US provincial reconstruction teams would clear a significant obstacle hindering interagency coordination. Doing so would aid in establishing a higher degree of confidence team members have in each other’s ability to fulfill their individual roles, therefore increasing their willingness to cooperate with one another.

Lessons from the German PRT model, which operated out of Konduz, provide important insight into a PRT structure under civilian leadership. The German provincial reconstruction team possessed a considerably different design from the US model. Termed as a “heavy PRT” by Colonel Gerd Brandstetter, of the US Army War College, the German team, with 400 plus personnel, consisted of more than triple the amount of staff in “light” American PRTs.\(^{138}\) Brandstetter describes the PRT at Konduz as an “inter-ministerial venture between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the Ministry of the Interior (MoI), the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (MoEC) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD).”\(^{139}\) Heavy involvement from German civilian agencies supplemented the large military task force, responsible for protecting and facilitating PRT mission goals, with a separate, “robust”

\(^{138}\) Brandstetter, 12.
\(^{139}\) Ibid, 9.
contingent of civilian representatives. In contrast to the US model, and due to a more relaxed security environment in the region, the German PRT at Konduz had a senior member from the MoFA placed in command of the team. This leadership structure made the German military commander, who took the lead on all operational facets linked to security issues, subordinate and responsible for coordination with the MoFA in all PRT related matters. Ultimately, the German PRT leadership structure, in conjunction with the support of civilian components, allowed the team in Konduz to foster strong interagency coordination among team members in spite of a strong military presence.

A second recommendation that could prove useful in establishing better interagency cooperation in US PRTs is the establishment of specific guidelines that explain the roles, missions, and authority of individual team members. A Foreign Service Officer who spent over a year deployed in Afghanistan explains:

> So, a lesson learned right up front is, if you’re going to have these types of entities like a PRT and even now people need to be fully briefed up on the interagency, the role of the PRT, what they do and don’t do, have the documentation, understand what the expectations for these bodies are, and to right up front, before either getting deployed or going out to visit, have a sense of what a PRT strategy is.

While it remains important to maintain PRTs and their methods of operation adaptable to regional demands, keeping the roles of team personnel obscure and unclearly outlined does more harm than good. The confusion and uncertainty many PRT members, especially civilian representatives, suffered from during their initial tours in Afghanistan, which wasted time, resources, and hampered interagency coordination, must be improved. Disseminating guidelines prior to deployment that delineate the duties each PRT component is expected to fulfill, and the specific areas which it has authority over, is a solution to overcome this obstacle.

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140 Perito (2005), 3.
141 Brandstetter, 9-14.
142 USAID Interagency Assessment, 13.
143 USIP Interviews, Interview # 31.
These guidelines will have two positive impacts on the interagency process of US PRTs. First, they will eliminate some of the confusion many team members experienced when first deployed to PRTs. While it is always somewhat bewildering to work within a new environment, especially one as alien and diverse as Afghanistan, having a clear notion of your mission and role provides a platform from which to operate. When PRT representatives deployed to their teams without understanding their functions, they were, in some cases, marginalized by other PRT components. If all agencies provide their representatives with a clearer understanding of their team functions, however, the different PRT components are far more likely to coordinate effectively. Even if the changing demands PRTs must meet in the various regions of Afghanistan make it necessary to evolve individual missions, it is easier to do so when team members have a fundamental understanding of their roles within the PRT.

Interagency pre-deployment guidance would also inform many of the civilian PRT representatives of the authority they possess within the team. From the initial stages of PRT development, representatives from the Department of State and USAID were expected to take the lead in all matters related to governance and reconstruction. Yet, according to a government report, “very few PRT staff, civilian or military, understood or had seen US national policy guidance on their roles within the PRT.” As a result, on several occasions, military personnel identified the civilian team components as advisors rather than decision makers. Civilians, unaware that US policy put them in charge of reconstruction and governance matters, found it difficult to impose their guidance on such issues due to the predominance of military personnel.

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144 The idea of advocating guidelines is not support for a set of rigid roles which PRT members must stick to. It is critical that when guidance is given about the duties a PRT representative is expected to fulfill that additional instruction about maintaining team flexibility be given as well. Army Colonel (retired) Joseph R. Cerami, a professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, explains that giving strict guidelines can sometimes lead to an attitude of “not my job.” This is a valid argument and must be addressed by educating future PRT representatives on the adaptive and flexible nature of PRTs and their members in addition to providing guidelines of basic team roles.

145 USAID Interagency Assessment, 13.
and resources. Disseminating clearer guidelines to all US PRT components prior to their deployment would prevent the misinterpretation of team members’ roles within the civil-military group. Civilian representatives would be able to assume responsibilities in their respective areas of expertise while working closely with the military commanders; ultimately, developing interagency cooperation as individual missions are aligned for a unified team strategy.

Significant joint pre-deployment training for US PRTs is the third recommendation intended to improve interagency coordination among team components. Michael McNerney, who worked on Provincial Reconstruction Team policy for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, states that, “Military and civilian personnel should be educated, trained, and equipped for stabilization and reconstruction missions in tandem, and not six weeks before deployment but over their entire careers.”\(^{146}\) One of the major complaints from former PRT members interviewed by USIP involved the lack of training available to them prior to their deployment. Both civilian and military personnel stressed the importance of receiving training on the cultural background of Afghanistan; instruction on languages such as Pashto, Dari or Farsi; and guidance on how to operate within an interagency environment.\(^{147}\) Requiring all members to undergo such training, especially as a team, provides significant benefits to their ability to coordinate with each other once in theater.

Training together as a team prior to deployment is essential for developing good working relationships between team members. It takes time and a concerted effort from all parties to develop trust and proper communication between individuals—factors critical to good interagency coordination. Expecting these relationships to blossom immediately when PRTs are assembled in theater is wishful thinking as well as a waste of time and resources. Requiring that

\(^{146}\) McNerney, 45.
\(^{147}\) USIP Interviews, Interview #5.
team members train and deploy together allows individuals to gain insight into the capabilities of other PRT components, so they know how best to communicate and interact with them prior to conducting operations in theater.

PRT representatives not only need to establish individual bonds with other team members, they must gain at least a rudimentary understanding of how agencies other than their own operate and are structured. By training alongside the military, civilian PRT representatives will gain a basic understanding of the military chain of command, standard operating procedures, and lexicon. Military personnel can gain valuable insight into their civilian counterparts’ operational strengths and limitations as well as important interagency work experience.

Numerous sources point out the British and some ISAF countries as an example to emulate in respect to joint pre-deployment training. Prior to the United Kingdom’s establishment of a PRT at Mazar-e-Sharif, both civilian and military members were subjected to joint training before being deployed and supported as a team.\textsuperscript{148} According to a US government report, some ISAF countries “identify PRT members as much as a year in advance and have the members undergo significant training together.”\textsuperscript{149} This critical preparation allowed British and ISAF PRT components to attain substantial understanding of the structure and abilities of the different agencies involved, resulting in high levels of interagency coordination.\textsuperscript{150}

Joint training and deployment for US PRT members also creates a partial solution to the challenges posed by poor tour synchronization. Eliminating the ad hoc manner in which PRTs were assembled by sending the team in as a group, and requiring all personnel to undergo pre-

\begin{footnote}{\textsuperscript{148} McNerney, 45 and USAID Interagency Assessment, 17.} \\
\textsuperscript{149} USAID Interagency Assessment, 17. \\
\textsuperscript{150} USIP Interviews, Interview # 16. An example of PRT pre-deployment training conducted by other nations can be seen with New Zealand PRT force. They spent five weeks in Tekapo, New Zealand, conducting advance combat training, group exercises, and taking classes de-briefing the team members on Afghan culture. James Heffield, “Pre Deployment Training in Tekapo,” New Zealand Defense Force, \url{http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/afghanistan/articles/2006/20060912-pdtt.htm} (accessed April 25, 2007).}
deployment training, reduces much of the confusion experienced by members when first arriving in theater. In order to complement PRT joint deployment, civilian and military tours need to be standardized and made uniform as a way to prevent premature rotation of personnel as well as gaps in key staffing positions.\textsuperscript{151}

Perito writes that “at a minimum, State Department and USAID representatives should receive pre-deployment introduction in Dari or Pashto, briefings on Afghan society and culture, and orientation on the unique requirements of working with the US military.”\textsuperscript{152} The availability of cultural and language training to more effectively operate in the diverse regions that compose Afghanistan will create greater trust in State Department and USAID representatives assigned to US PRTs. Making these individuals indispensable to the PRT commanders as well as the Army civil affairs component will increase their willingness to actively integrate civilian representatives into the team’s decision-making process, especially in matters related to governance and reconstruction.

Efforts were made by the US military to institute a PRT pre-deployment training regimen in late 2004. PRT commanders began receiving unit-sponsored training and the military, in collaboration with the National Defense University, initiated development of a leadership PRT instruction program. These efforts need to be emulated and supported by civilian agencies. The State Department, USAID, and USDA should strongly consider both creating their own agency-specific programs, and sending their representatives to military training programs. The Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, established

\textsuperscript{151} USAID Interagency Assessment, 15.  
\textsuperscript{152} Perito (2005), 13.
in 2004, should make an effort to become the driving force in the integration of civil-military training programs for future PRT deployments.  

The fourth and final recommendation demands an increase of civilian involvement and support for PRTs. Implementing training programs in addition to staffing and supporting PRT operations demands a significant increase of funding and personnel from civilian agencies. Undoubtedly, financial and budgetary constraints on the State Department, USAID, and USDA make this goal a difficult one, yet increased civilian participation remains essential for the continued improvement of interagency coordination within PRTs. Additionally, the costs of training are relatively inexpensive compared to the financial and political costs incurred when opportunities are lost and mistakes are made because of dysfunctional PRTs.

When civilian agencies failed to produce adequate numbers of representatives to staff PRTs in Afghanistan, other team components had to fill in the void. A representative from the Department of State assigned to the Herat PRT illustrated this problem:

> Every PRT is supposed to have one civilian each from the Department of State, USAID and the Department of Agriculture in addition to one Afghan Ministry of Interior representative. My PRT didn’t have any of those people, so USAID, in the absence of any of their employees, would delegate their duties to State, so the whole time I was there I was also wearing a USAID hat.

Relegating important duties to representatives who are not specifically trained for such work can be unproductive and cause disruptions in interagency coordination. Civilian agencies must make an effort to provide sufficient personnel to PRTs so that teams consistently have the correct staff to carry out all the roles necessary to fulfill the team’s mission.

In addition to producing enough personnel to staff PRTs, civilian agencies need to adequately supply their representatives with ample resources so they are not dependent on the

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153 McNearney, 45.
154 Perito (2005), 14.
155 USIP Interviews, Interview # 14.
team’s military component for logistical support or funding for reconstruction projects.\textsuperscript{156} Civilian PRT members often found themselves at the mercy of the military staff for transportation and other needs that should have been delivered by their respective agencies. This resulted in a disproportionate level of military influence within US PRTs. Agricultural specialists deployed to PRTs, for example, received no funding whatsoever from the USDA. They were relegated to accessing financial resources from the Commanders Emergency Response Program Fund (CERP) pending the military commander’s approval.\textsuperscript{157} Providing civilian representatives with control over the majority of resources assigned for PRT quick impact projects would improve interagency cooperation within the military dominated teams.

The British PRT model illustrates how civilian control of reconstruction funds improves team cooperation. While the UK’s PRT located at Mazar-e-Sharif was under the command of a military officer, a civilian representative was in control of the majority of funding resources. According to Michael McNerney:

\begin{quote}
The UK military relied on its government’s Department for International Development for funding assistance projects. While this limited the military’s freedom of action, it may well have been a blessing in disguise. UK military personnel coordinated closely with their civilian agency counterparts in order to access their funding.\textsuperscript{158}
\end{quote}

In the case of US PRTs, the majority of readily accessible resources dedicated for reconstruction projects should be provided or placed under the control of USAID or State Department representatives.

It is important to mention that USAID staff deployed to PRTs did have access to considerable resources from the Quick Impact Program (QIP), a funding mechanism with $137.3 million designed to support reconstruction projects in the USAID representatives’ area of

\textsuperscript{156} Perito (2005), 13.  
\textsuperscript{157} USAID Interagency Assessment, 16.  
\textsuperscript{158} McNerney, 41.
operations. In spite of QIP, projects funded with USAID money were difficult to authorize and progressed considerably slower than assistance projects financed through DoD CERP funds. One former PRT member claimed that during his deployment to Afghanistan “not one red cent” of USAID money was spent in the entire six months he was present. It does little good for civilian agencies to provide resources such as those in the QIP when their representatives cannot easily access or employ them to achieve their missions.

These recommendations by no means cover all the efforts that must be made to improve cooperation within US PRTs. They do, however, address and suggest solutions to some of the major obstacles that hampered interagency coordination within US PRTs operating in Afghanistan from 2003 until early 2006. The creation of leadership positions for civilians; establishing clear guidance on individual team member roles; requiring joint pre-deployment training; increasing civilian participation in PRTs; and assessing best practices from other nations’ PRT models are all realistic and achievable objectives that provide tangible benefits for future cooperation within US provincial reconstruction teams.

**Recent PRT Developments**

The use of PRTs to aid in SSTR operations did not diminish after the 2006 timeframe that this case study is based on. In fact, efforts have been made to expand the number of PRTs operating in Afghanistan using NATO and Coalition forces. As of 2006, all PRTs supporting Operation Enduring Freedom were placed under ISAF command and subject to management by NATO and Coalition forces. PRTs are also being deployed in support of Operation Iraqi

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160 USAID Interagency Assessment, 16.
161 USIP Interview, Interview # 16.
Freedom. As of November 2006 there were 10 operational PRTs located throughout Iraq with plans for an increase in their numbers. In January of 2007, President Bush, during his address to the nation illustrating “The New Way Forward” in Iraq, called for a doubling of PRTs deployed in Iraq. Due to the increased demand for provincial reconstruction teams in both Afghanistan and Iraq, some changes have been made to US PRT structure and deployment policy, based on lessons derived from the experience of earlier teams. Reviewing some of these key changes provides insight into the US government’s efforts to improve interagency coordination within PRTs.

One of the most notable differences between earlier US PRTs in Afghanistan and current ones operating in Iraq is the leadership and civil-military composition of the teams. As previously outlined, PRTs in Afghanistan had an Army lieutenant colonel commander and were predominantly staffed by military personnel. According to a senior program officer at USIP, PRTs in Iraq are “led by a senior State Department official and composed primarily of civilian personnel.” The ten new teams sent as part of President Bush’s expansion of the PRT program will be embedded with US Army brigade combat teams (BCT) to provide necessary force protection. The military commander of the BCT will assume charge of all matters related to security while the PRT’s civilian leader will have control on all economic and governance issues.

The restructuring of PRT command and personnel composition shows a genuine attempt to integrate civilian agencies and their representatives into the civil-military teams. Providing

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166 Ibid, 3.
larger numbers of civilian staff and placing a senior State Department official as commander of the PRTs illustrates how attempts have been made to institute a uniform level of influence among the team. Under this new structure, interagency cooperation should increase because military personnel will have little choice but to coordinate with their civilian commanders while civilian agencies must continue to rely on the military for protection.

Another major change is the creation of joint training programs for DoD staff, reservists, contractors, and other interagency personnel. New PRTs deployed to Iraq will be created in stages. Prior to sending the majority of personnel, a “joint management” team of 40 different civilian representatives will assess the different needs and environmental conditions of the PRT site so the team can be designed to meet regional demands. One author explains these “teams will undergo pre-deployment training together.”

The training is a 16-day pre-deployment training and processing program hosted at three different venues. The first five days are spent at the Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute (FIS) in Washington, D.C. training for PRT interagency coordination. This is an 18 module instructional course designed by the many US agencies with representatives present in Iraqi PRTs. During this session PRT members are exposed to lessons from past team deployments; Iraqi culture and history; PRT role, mission, and strategy; and additional instruction on interagency coordination, including simulation exercises.

Training at FIS is followed by five days at the Diplomatic Security Training Center practicing on the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Counter-Threat Course (FACT). According to the DoD pre-deployment training itinerary, “This course is expected to meet the needs of personnel traveling overseas by featuring practical, hands-on training in surveillance detection,

167 Ibid, 2.
counter-terrorism driving, explosives and weapons familiarization, and emergency medical training.”168

The final two stops for PRT personnel are the Army Continental United States (CONUS) Replacement Center at Fort Bliss, Texas, where Team members are processed, medically validated, supplied equipment and given environment and cultural awareness training. The last part of pre-deployment training and processing is spent with the National Coordination Team in Baghdad. This three to five day orientation session covers assignment responsibilities, debriefing of current conditions in the region, and a description of administrative support.169

This training regimen is a giant leap forward in comparison to what was previously available for earlier PRT personnel deployed to Afghanistan. The schedule institutes many of the previously recommended training, including instruction on interagency coordination, cultural history, and guidance of individual as well as PRT roles and missions. All these factors, if executed properly, will aid the interagency process in future US PRTs.

The true impact of these changes to PRT structure and deployment policy has not yet been felt, making an assessment of their effectiveness difficult. The PRT interagency training schedule described above, for example, just received its first candidates in March of 2007. Yet, the signs are encouraging. A combination of increased civilian participation, personnel, and resources in US PRTs; improved training; leadership positions for non-DoD staff; and more efficient deployment policies all suggest that PRT development, related to interagency coordination, is headed in the right direction. It is imperative that different agencies continue to research how these recent changes affect cooperation among current and future PRTs.

Conclusion

169 Ibid.
Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction operations will continue to play a prominent role in the future of US foreign policy. The current situations in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate a need to adapt SSTR operations so they can function in hazardous COIN environments which pose multiple threats to civilian and military personnel. Establishing seamless and effective interagency cooperation is a key, if not the most important, component to adapting SSTR functions for high-risk locations. Identifying and analyzing lessons from previous experiences, such as those of US PRTs in Afghanistan, represents a critical tool for improving future interagency teams designed to operate in COIN environments.

The US PRT experience in Afghanistan from 2003-2006 identifies some important obstacles which hampered cooperation between team members. First, the failure to provide guidance on the roles and responsibilities individual team members are expected to fulfill creates confusion, drains resources, and obstructs team member’s ability to coordinate with one another. Second, giving any one agency, in this case the military, a disproportionate amount of influence and resources can lead to a credibility gap and the marginalization of other team representatives. Third, assembling teams in theater, deploying team components at different times, and misaligning tour lengths impairs relationship-building and causes team disjointedness. Fourth, the failure to provide sufficient interagency, language, and cultural training results in some team members being unprepared to operate in a multi-agency and culturally diverse environment. Finally, poor participation and logistical support on the part of civilian agencies overburdens other team members, results in operational gaps, and causes an imbalance within the civil-military team structure. These factors all negatively impacted US PRTs ability to maximize team cooperation; however, they are not terminal and can be resolved through the implementation of the four recommendations made earlier. Solving these issues requires considerable time and
resources, yet, while it may take a Herculean effort on the part of the United States government and individual agencies involved in current and future interagency teams, the benefits will be more than worth it. Expending resources to solve the issues that hamper PRT interagency cooperation may be expensive, however, these costs are far less than those incurred when the duties PRTs are expected to meet are not done correctly and the overall mission fails to be completed.

C. An Alternative View: Sri Lanka’s Experience with an Enduring Insurgency

Patrick Baetjer

The most obvious question for policymakers is: why should the US government look to Sri Lanka for lessons in counterinsurgency warfare? This report will argue that the Sri Lankan experience holds a number of insights for the US on several levels. The Sri Lankan government has battled a pernicious separatist insurgency in the northern part of the country since the 1970s. Known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Tigers, as they are commonly known, have claimed to speak for the entire ethnic Tamil community and seek the establishment of a distinct Tamil state.

The Sri Lankan experience is not one that is widely studied by students of counterinsurgency warfare. The US campaigns in Vietnam and the Philippines are sometimes studied, but the British efforts in Malaysia and the French efforts in Algeria are considered classic examples of counterinsurgency operations.\textsuperscript{170} Indeed, the Pentagon reportedly has taken

to screening the Battle of Algiers for a number of the civilian staffers and military officers charged with addressing problems within Iraq. This focus on Algeria and Malaysia reveals two significant points. First, the US has the tendency to learn counterinsurgency lessons from other Western governments, seemingly ignoring the lessons learned by non-Western governments. Given that the US has repeatedly stated that the Iraqi insurgency will ultimately be defeated by Iraqis, it follows that the US ought to look for lessons from non-Western governments who have had to fight insurgencies within their own borders.

Secondly, the focus on past Western efforts, especially the French in Algeria, misses one key point. Rarely have Western efforts been successful over the long term. In Algeria, the French were able to dismantle much of the National Liberation Front only by turning to tactics such as torture and mass intimidation that ultimately undermined the French position and led to their withdrawal. The French learned that certain tactics that might be effective in the short term ultimately alienated the larger population, losing the larger and more significant battle, that for “hearts and minds.” Likewise, analyses of the US occupation of Iraq have suggested that certain US forces used tactics that may have alienated segments of the Iraqi population.

In part, the French government and colonial administrators fundamentally did not understand Algerian culture. The colonial French sought to turn everyone who fell beneath the Tricolor into a Frenchman in both speech and culture, with little regard for the indigenous culture. While the US has not sought to impose US culture on Iraq like the French, it has revealed itself to either have an ignorance of Iraqi and Arab culture or a shallow understanding of it. This is where looking at the Sri Lankan experience will be of value. Though the Tamils and the majority Sinhalese often claim disparate histories, they share a common history and background and this may be reflected in the various counterinsurgency campaigns.

Furthermore, Sri Lanka is extraordinarily complex, both ethnically and socially. There exist multiple ethnic groups beyond the Sinhalese and Tamils, as well as a number of religions, from Buddhism to Hinduism to Islam. Further complicating the social structure is the continued existence of the caste system, which provides a further divide beyond ethnicity and religion. The Sri Lankan experience addressing these divides within the insurgency context provides lessons for the US, which is engaged in nation-building, support and stability operations, and counterinsurgency warfare in a number of places, from Somalia to Afghanistan and Iraq, encompassing a number of bewildering social, ethnic, and religious divides. In Iraq alone, the US has encountered divides between Shi’ites and Sunnis, Arabs and Kurds, various tribes, and emerging political forces, with different identities asserting primacy at different points in time.

With regard to Iraq, there are other similarities with the Sri Lankan experience that provide the US with fresh and different insights into its counterinsurgency efforts. Like the Sunni insurgency based primarily in al Anbar Province, the Tamil Tigers are readily identifiable with a particular region of Sri Lanka, and yet both the Sunni insurgents and the Tigers have the capability to strike nationwide. Sunni insurgents have successfully attacked Baghdad while Tigers have carried out operations in the heart of Colombo.

Both the Tamil insurgency and the Sunni insurgency have an international, albeit opaque, component. There is evidence that both the Tigers and the Sunni insurgents receive funding and weapons from abroad, and that sympathetic populations in other countries contribute an unknown amount of support. There is some evidence that both the Tigers and the Sunni insurgents may receive funding from front companies or charities that ostensibly advertise themselves as relief organizations when in fact some of their funds end up with the insurgents.
Each insurgent group also has well-developed networks abroad that serve to disseminate information and may act as recruiters.

With regard to the counterinsurgency campaigns in both Iraq and Sri Lanka, each has been characterized by periods of intense crackdown followed by efforts to wean supporters away from the insurgency through various development and aid initiatives. In Sri Lanka, this was seen following the disastrous December 26, 2004 tsunami which largely devastated the Tamil regions to the north. What started off as promising cooperation between government authorities and the Tamils eventually disintegrated back into armed conflict. These efforts, given the intense focus of the US in providing aid services and development projects in Iraq and Afghanistan, hold important lessons. Before these lessons can be distilled from the Sri Lankan experience, it is necessary to understand Sri Lankan society in a historical context as well as the development of Tamil identity.

Sri Lanka: The Legacy of Colonialism

Sri Lanka, formerly known as Ceylon, first encountered Europeans in 1505 when the Portuguese arrived. The Ceylonese had a number of contacts with the Dutch and the Portuguese throughout the 1700s. Originally heavily influenced by the Portuguese traders and explorers, Ceylon was a Dutch territory before it was taken over by the British in 1796. Ceylon was made a crown colony in 1802 via the Treaty of Amiens but was not truly considered colonized until 1815 under the control of the British East India Company. The British government, however, forced a joint administration of the colony upon the company in exchange for a guaranteed monopoly of the island’s cinnamon production.\(^{172}\)

The year 1815 marked the beginning of a concerted British effort to establish unchallenged control of Ceylon. The kingdom of Kandy, simultaneously both a region and a

people within Ceylon, had been co-opted by the British to a certain degree to facilitate British commercial interests in the island. The Kandyan chiefs went before the British colonial administrators to ask to have the king, a highly unpopular figure, replaced. The British exploited this opportunity to hold the Kandyan Convention and, despite the seemingly benign title, used the opportunity to remove the monarch and assert greater direct British control. This was hardly what the Kandyan chiefs envisioned. Chaffing under the control of the British, the Disawa of Uva, a local ruler named Keppetipola, led a Kandyan rebellion in Vellassa. While colonial rebellions were hardly unique within the British Empire, the Kandyan rebellion of 1818 represented one of the few revolts that nearly succeeded in beating British forces. The British were able to recover enough to impose martial law and largely end the rebellion.\(^\text{173}\)

The British instituted the plantation system in Ceylon to exploit the island’s natural resources as efficiently as possible, much as they did in their other colonial possessions. The establishment of the plantation system, however, disrupted the traditional societal structure. The different Ceylonese ethnic groups largely stayed within their own regions, and the allocation of land for agriculture was largely informal and concluded through oral agreements. The plantation economy was extraordinarily labor intensive, forcing plantation managers to attract labor from other parts of the island. This led to a large influx of migrant Tamil workers not only from other parts of Ceylon, but from India as well.\(^\text{174}\)

The plantation economy began to break down the barriers dividing Ceylon’s ethnic groups, but these barriers were further challenged by the Royal Commission of 1833. The British, as elsewhere, had exerted control over the Ceylonese in part by playing on the ethnic and cultural divides within the island nation, including the divide between the Sinhalese and the

\(^{173}\) Ibid, 28.  
\(^{174}\) Ibid, 27.
Tamils. These divides existed prior to the arrival of the British, with a vigorous debate over which, the Sinhalese or the Tamils, are actually the indigenous people of Sri Lanka, a debate which continues to this day. The Tamils argue that the Sinhalese arrived in the 3rd century BC as Buddhism was introduced.\[175\] Sinhala history is largely based on the Pali Chronicles, the Dipavamsa and Mahavamsa, written by Buddhist monks in the 4th and 6th centuries CE. Despite the ongoing debate over the degree to which the monks intended the works as entertainment versus serious history, many Sinhalese regard the chronicles as definitive. They describe the Tamils as invaders and bandits, not indigenous people.\[176\] As early as 1799, the British recognized the truly divided nature of Ceylon. Sir Hugh Cleghorn, the 1st Colonial Secretary of Ceylon, wrote:

> Two different nations, from very ancient period, have divided between them the possession of the island: the Sinhalese inhabiting the interior in its Southern and Western parts from the river Wallouve to that of Chillow, and the Malabars [Tamils] who posses the Northern and Eastern Districts. These two nations differ entirely in their religions, language and manners.\[177\]

Though the divides existed before colonization, the British certainly played the game of ‘divide and rule’ within Ceylon. Yet in 1833, W.M.G. Colebrooke and C.H. Cameron headed up a Royal Commission that examined the British administration over the island.

In a bit of unexpected colonial progressiveness, Colebrooke and Cameron came to what were regarded as fairly radical conclusions. Instead of administering the colony along ethnic and cultural lines, they divided Ceylon into five provinces. Further, they suggested that staples of the colonial system, mercantilism, monopolistic practices, and discriminatory administrative procedures should be eliminated. According to one historian, “Many of the proposals were

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\[176\] Ibid, 15.

\[177\] Quoted in Ponnambalam, 11.
adopted and helped set a pattern of administrative, economic, judicial and educational
development into the next century.\textsuperscript{178}

Despite the adoption of a number of Colebrooke and Cameron’s recommendations, British administration of the island could hardly be considered progressive and the colonial administrators took a number of steps to further consolidate control of Ceylon. With the decline of cinnamon’s profitability, coffee became the dominant crop, with a subsequent coffee boom in Ceylon from 1839-1847. Once the British recognized the lucrative nature of coffee, they moved to bring greater tracts of land under their control.\textsuperscript{179} In 1840, colonial administrators passed the Crown Land Encroachment Ordinance No. 12 which, in effect, claimed the crown’s right to appropriate any land the authorities deemed was being ‘wasted’ or not cultivated to its full capacity. In affect, this ordinance rendered thousands of Ceylonese landless, as they had to prove in writing, English writing, that they owned the land they tended. As indicated earlier, ownership tended to be conveyed orally and certainly not in the English language. The crown thus came into possession of some additional 50,000 acres.\textsuperscript{180}

Coffee would prove to be a passing fortune. In 1869, a leaf disease struck the Ceylonese coffee industry, destroying it over a period of 15 years. British entrepreneurs countered this setback by moving to tea cultivation. Growing tea, however, requires even greater amounts of labor. As improbable as it may seem, tea cultivation led to a relative labor shortage and the British sought to solve this dilemma by encouraging the emigration of thousands of Indian Tamils. Indeed, the 1911 census found that Indian Tamils comprised some 12% of the population, or roughly 500,000 people.\textsuperscript{181} The census proved to be something of a colonial

\textsuperscript{178} Wickramasinghe, 29.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid, 34.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid, 34.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid, 36.
obsession of the British. They constructed a variety of categories to try and differentiate the various ethnicities and religions they saw throughout Ceylon. Not surprisingly, they saw the Indian Tamils as somehow different from indigenous Tamils, thus providing the detailed census numbers. Significantly, Tamils themselves, almost all Hindus, though they saw their community divided in different ways, did not make the differentiation between Indian and other Tamils like the British.\footnote{Ibid, 36.}

The plantation system had earlier created a vast influx of migrant Tamil workers. The wave of Indian Tamil immigrant workers further swelled the Tamil population, creating additional tensions between the Tamil community and the Sinhalese community, which competed for the same employment. The system was not integrated and Tamils and Sinhalese apparently grouped in ethnically homogeneous enclaves, maintaining the ethnic divides that had existed and that the British had capitalized upon during the first years of colonization.\footnote{Ibid, 37.}

Despite the influx of labor and the No. 12 Ordinance, the British sought greater amounts of land to cultivate tea. The colonial authorities focused on one of the few areas that they had unsuccessfully targeted—Ceylon peasant agriculture. While Ordinance 12 allowed for land to be seized that was either not used or in the authorities’ view was underutilized, this had little effect on the crops that the Ceylonese grew for themselves. In the midst of the decline in the profitability of coffee, the British imposed grain taxes on the Ceylonese farmers worth between $\frac{1}{14}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$ of the crop’s total worth.\footnote{Ibid, 38.} A number of the Ceylonese farmers had begun to grow coffee upon realizing its value. As the coffee industry collapsed, these farmers could no longer pay the grain tax, enabling the British to seize even more land in the 1880s. Though the Ceylon
elite effectively campaigned to have the law repealed in 1892, the British had successfully advanced their land consolidation program even further.\textsuperscript{185}

With the English hold on Ceylon increasing, the British began to mandate the institution of British laws in some aspects of Ceylon life and to establish at least the appearance of Ceylon input in the administration of the colony. In a move that would have significant repercussions later in the country’s history, the British established the Charter of Justice in 1833 that enshrined English as the colony’s language.\textsuperscript{186} In a patchwork manner, the British kept some of the Tamil laws, the Thesavalamai, but not others, such as those of the Muslim Tamils in Puttalam. In some cases, the supposedly enlightened British enforced laws that were far more retrograde than the Ceylonese laws. For instance, English law mandated women’s inferior status in marriage and property rights whereas Tamil and Sinhala law recognized women as independent and able to control their own property.\textsuperscript{187}

In an effort to give the colonial administration greater representation among the indigenous population, the colony’s ruling body, the Executive Council, appointed the Legislative Council with the idea that it would act as an advisory body. In 1833, three of the 15 council members were native Ceylonese, representing the low-country Sinhalese, the Burghers, and the Tamils. The attempt to bring more Ceylonese into the colonial administration accelerated in 1844 when the Ceylon Civil Service was opened to all Ceylonese who had acquired an English education.\textsuperscript{188} Nevertheless, higher education remained forbidden to the Ceylonese, with the notable exceptions of law and medicine, and these attempts to co-opt

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid, 38.
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid, 40.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid, 40.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid, 42.
Ceylonese elements into the colonial status quo had little effect on eliminating the continued importance of the caste system in indigenous society.\textsuperscript{189}

As the nineteenth century came to a close, the British colonial efforts had several significant effects on Ceylon society. First, the ability to speak English and the possession of an English education were keys to elite membership and to employment within the colonial administration. This emphasis on English would later play a significant role in the complaints of the Tamils. Secondly, the plantation system ossified already existing divides between ethnic groups, especially the Sinhalese and the Tamils, which had been exacerbated by earlier British divide and rule tactics. The cultivation of tea led to waves of Indian Tamil immigration that would later play a significant role in the Tamil claim that they were not being appropriately represented. As one author noted, “Rather than gelling identities, the lasting effect of colonial rule in the nineteenth century was to propagate the idea that identities were fixed and stable and that one could not jump from one to another.”\textsuperscript{190} Instead of forming a unified nation, indigenous practices coupled with British colonial machinations created a number of lasting disparate identities.

The Move Towards Independence, 1900-1948: Societal Fissures Widen

Though an overriding sense of Ceylon nationalism was noticeably absent among the populace given the number of disparate identities, the appointment of three Ceylonese members to the Legislative Council was a nod to the sentiment that the indigenous populace, at least the elite, believed that they should have some say in the colony’s affairs. In 1918, Sir William Manning was appointed the British governor of Ceylon. Manning returned to the old system of divide and rule, though this time through political manipulation. The British, and Manning in

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid, 49.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid, 50.
particular, feared that the emergence of the Ceylon National Congress political party might be
the harbinger of nationalist aspirations within the country. In order to head off this perceived
threat, Manning took steps to form minority political identities among the Kandyan Sinhalese
and the Tamils while seeking to split the Ceylon elite. The British, ironically, ended up elevating
the Kandyan Sinhalese in the colonial administration system, despite the fact that the low-
country Sinhalese were the ones who were Western educated.\textsuperscript{191}

An even greater irony is the fact that the Ceylon National Congress was hardly a major
political player and certainly not a source of national unification. The Congress largely
represented the Ceylonese elite. Manning’s efforts to establish political identities as a way for
ethnic minorities to combat the Congress was not only unnecessary, it established parties for
ethnic groups that would claim the right to influence and political power disproportionate to the
Ceylonese populations they represented.

Eventually, the British shifted their support from the Kandyan Sinhalese to the
Westernized low-country Sinhalese, but Manning’s efforts to foment political and societal
divisions by boosting ethnic minority parties bore fruit. As early as 1905, the Tamils had formed
what would likely be considered a political action committee today, the Jaffna Tamil
Association, which was open to all Tamils and pushed for greater political power for Tamils.\textsuperscript{192}
Yet Manning’s efforts contributed to the ethnic minorities’ perception that they were somehow
being left out. The Ceylon Tamils, in complete contradiction to what the British censuses
showed, claimed until the 1920s that the Tamil population was as large as that of the low-country
Sinhalese and the Kandyan Sinhalese.\textsuperscript{193}

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid, 52-53.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid, 58.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid, 58.
Manning further sought to play on this ethnic divide, overseeing a reformed Legislative Council in 1921 that increased the Sinhalese representation to 13 members while the Tamil representation remained at three seats, leading to Tamil protestations. One Tamil, Sir Ponnambalan Ramanathan, submitted a memo to the colonial administrators on April 1, 1922 requesting that minority views be heard and ethnic representation be respected. This was exactly the vehicle that Manning needed to entrench ethnic minorities within the system as a check to the Sinhalese despite the fact that the minorities represented so few people. The governor backed Ramanathan’s memo, and in 1923 the Legislative Council featured eight Tamil seats and 16 Sinhalese seats, despite the fact that the Sinhalese comprised some 67% of the population and the Tamils 11%. Manning helped foster a political culture that would endure, helping to encourage the at times unrealistic expectations and aspirations of the Tamil community. One scholar noted:

Although elites of all communities shared a common outlook, from 1931 onwards tensions arose about the safeguards and alleged discrimination in the distribution of resources and language. The quest for entitlements through representation, legislation or violence shaped the contours of identities in the years that preceded violence.

Despite Manning’s best efforts to maintain British dominance over the politics and resources of Ceylon, the damage that World War II wrought on the British Empire weakened British control. The shock of the fall of Singapore to the Japanese, as well as the anti-colony discourse that came out of the conflict, convinced the English that they would have to give Ceylon its independence. Yet Manning’s patronage of the ethnic minority parties lingered on into the political system the British left behind. The British hoped to ensure the strength of the minority parties by allotting seats through a combination of geography and splitting constituencies. Furthermore, a key provision in the constitution held that 2/3 majority of the

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194 Ibid, 59.
196 Ibid, 150.
Ceylon equivalent of the House of Representatives had to vote to amend the constitution. The British were certain that the Sinhalese could not muster that many votes given the prominence of the minority parties in the House.

In 1946, an English report concluded that English would no longer be the official language of the Ceylonese government and that instead the official languages would be the Tamil and Sinhala languages. While perhaps the British understood this as a move towards decolonization, they did not understand the significance that the English language had come to play in the nation. Understanding English was key to attaining a government post—the Ceylonese elite spoke English and viewed the attempt to discard the language as an attack on their status and privilege within society. The elite continued to use English and the importance of the language would have a significant impact on the relations between the Tamils and the Sinhala majority population down the road. It was in this context of overly influential ethnic minority political parties, a rigid and inflexible set of social identities long reinforced by the colonial experience, and a political culture that viewed politics merely as the distribution of national resources to narrow constituencies that the British granted Ceylon its freedom on February 4, 1948.

Post-Colonial Flashpoints: Disenfranchisement, Misrepresentation, and the Dominance of the Sinhalese

Though the great independence celebrations created a façade of unity among the Ceylonese, the society remained divided. Fractures existed between the Sinhalese, the Tamils, and the various other ethnic groups. As one historian argues:

The Sinhalese and Tamils are separate and distinct nations. Because of their particular historical past, and because of national-ethnic differences and the occupation of separate homelands, each

197 Ibid, 169.
198 Ibid, 148.
possesses separate and distinct national consciousness and owes its loyalty first to its own homeland, and then to Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{199}

Disagreements also arose among Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim believers, cutting across ethnic communities. Furthermore, though elites no doubt would have existed with or without the British presence, the colonial administration had created Westernized elite that favored the Sinhalese. One of the first acts of independent Ceylon would cause further ruptures within society.

In 1948, the government passed the Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18, enumerating the ways that a person in Ceylon could become a citizen with full rights. The Ceylon Citizenship Act offered two tracks to citizenship: a person either had to show proof that he or she had descended from a family who had long been established on Ceylon, or a person had to register with the authorities. The difficulty was that both tracks required documentation as well as the candidates to be literate. With one stroke, this immediately rendered thousands of Indian Tamil workers non-citizens since most were unable to read and write. Without citizenship, these workers were unable to vote.\textsuperscript{200}

Effectively, the law cemented within the rules of the political game that political parties would strive for narrow ethnic goals at the exclusion of the others. From the outset of independence, rather than refuting the ethnic politics that Governor Manning had introduced, Ceylon wholeheartedly embraced them. One historian noted, “The laws…had ruptured the possibility of stronger interethnic and class alliances by excluding the entire estate Tamil population from participating in the polity.”\textsuperscript{201} The two dominant Sinhalese parties, the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP) strove to outdo one another

\textsuperscript{199} Ponnambalam, 3.
\textsuperscript{200} Wickramasinghe, 171.
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid, 172.
through increasingly inflammatory rhetoric. Ironically, by disenfranchising so many Tamils, the Sinhalese inadvertently gave some credence to the Tamils’ exaggerated claims of discrimination and poor representation. At one point, a Sinhala spokesman announced, “The Tamil people must accept the fact that the Sinhala majority will no longer permit themselves to be cheated of their rights.”

Yet the Tamils were also let down by their own supposedly representative bodies and officials. Two trade unions, the Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC) and the Democratic Workers’ Congress (DWC), often spoke up for Tamil rights. With the establishment of the two-track system for citizenship and thus voting rights, the unions initially told the Tamil workers to boycott the registration system as a form of protest. Confusingly, however, the unions eventually backed registration applications from upper class Tamil merchants. Thus, the working Tamils, primarily those that worked on the plantations, were disenfranchised to a degree by listening to the advice of the trade unions who were supposed to be representing them.

The adoption of the national flag in 1948, seemingly minor compared to the disenfranchisement of Tamils, contributed further to their sense of alienation. Tamil kings had often used the image of a bull to represent their kingdom; Sinhalese kings utilized the visage of a lion. The flag that was adopted, which looks nearly the same as today’s flag, featured a lion placed prominently at the center of the flag with two stripes on the periphery. The two stripes represented the Muslim and Tamil communities, practically a visual confirmation of their secondary status within the dominant Sinhala society.

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202 Quoted in Wickramasinghe, 161.
203 Wickramasinghe, 173.
204 Ponnambalam, 72. The 1978 version of the Sri Lankan constitution expressly stated that the flag must have a lion prominently displayed.
Some historians assert that Sinhala colonization of traditionally Tamil homelands increased rapidly after 1948. There is some evidence to suggest that some 200,000 Sinhalese families spread out over 3,000 square miles of land in the primarily Tamil district of Batticaloa, thus affecting a land grab. These historians allege that as much as 1/3 of Batticaloa district was absorbed into the Amparai district, a largely Sinhalese area.205

The head of the Federalist Party, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, pushed for working class Tamil rights in the late 1950s. Chelvanayakam’s campaign, however, was short lived. Even within the Tamil community, there existed social and geographic cleavages. Chelvanayakam was convinced to drop his support for working class Tamil rights in 1957 when the central government agreed to several demands levied by the Jaffna Tamils. The Tamil community within Jaffna had asked that the central government recognize the Tamil language, create regional governing councils, and promise to forgo aggressive settlement of Sinhalese and other ethnicities in traditionally Tamil areas. With the recognition of these demands, Chelvanayakam agreed to drop his campaign on behalf of working Tamils.206

From the outset of independence, the Sinhalese nationalists strove to assert Sinhala dominance and to enshrine Buddhism and Sinhala authority within the constitution. The various ethnic minorities sought to block these efforts, and tension between the communities boiled over into ethnic riots in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1983, and 1987. Despite the constitutional efforts of the British to protect minorities and Manning’s legacy of elevating ethnic minorities, the Sinhala nationalists finally succeeded in achieving a number of their goals with the 1972 constitution. The document, which formally changed the nation’s name from Ceylon to Sri Lanka, gave

205 Ibid, 3.
206 Wickramasinghe, 173.
Buddhism a special place in Sri Lankan life and recognized the moral authority of the Sinhala population.\textsuperscript{207}

More importantly, the 1972 constitution established the Sinhala language as the official language of Sri Lanka. Despite the 1946 report that suggested that the official administrative language revert back to the Tamil and Sinhala languages, English had continued to be used by the elites and Sri Lankans in the civil service.\textsuperscript{208} The constitution also created the house or parliament, which the Sinhalese controlled, the supreme legislative and decision-making body in the political system.

The measures in the 1972 constitution had a dramatic effect on the Tamil population. The Tamils, despite the large numbers of illiterate Indian Tamils on the plantations, had been overrepresented within the civil service due to their intense efforts to learn the English language. No longer would knowledge of English guarantee Tamil jobs and influence within the civil service. Tamils in the civil service were given three years within which to learn Sinhala before they would face dismissal. One estimate puts the number of Tamils employed by the government at 30\% of the 82,000 government employees shortly after independence. This number had shrunk to 6\% of 225,000 state employees by 1970.\textsuperscript{209} Further, by making the parliament the supreme body, the Tamils felt marginalized within the political system. The Sinhalese finally gained control of 2/3 of the seats in Parliament, meaning that they no longer needed Tamil support to legislate.\textsuperscript{210}

The Sinhala government undertook three additional measures that exacerbated tensions with the Tamil community. Sri Lanka nationalized the numerous plantations that were a source

\textsuperscript{207} Ibid, 157.  
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid, 188.  
\textsuperscript{209} Ponnambalam, 4 and 174.  
\textsuperscript{210} Wickramasinghe, 188.
of employment for a number of Tamils. Some within the Tamil community believed that the nationalized plantations instituted discriminatory hiring practices to the detriment of the Tamils. Second, the Sri Lankan government, in an agreement with India, undertook a program between 1981-1984 to repatriate people that it did not consider Sri Lankans. In a case of “ethnic cleansing,” 445,580 people, mostly Tamils, were forcibly repatriated to the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.\textsuperscript{211} Tens of thousands of additional Tamils fled for Tamil Nadu and Western countries following the outbreak of ethnic riots in 1987. Lastly, it was alleged that in the late 1970s and 1980s, Colombo instituted a weighted system for admitting students into the universities. The Sinhalese majority, in an effort to combat the overrepresentation of Tamils within the civil service, established a system by which Tamils had to score higher, sometimes significantly higher, on university entrance exams than their Sinhalese counterparts. A number of these aggrieved students formed the early organization that became the Tamil Tigers.\textsuperscript{212}

In the wake of independence, the Sri Lankan government, especially the majority Sinhalese, had the opportunity to reach across religious and ethnic lines to strengthen national unity. Given the relatively peaceful manner in which British colonial administrators handed political control over to the Sri Lankan elite, a Sri Lankan national identity formed mostly among the elites and not among the greater populace.

Further, whether it was a combination of the historical separation of ethnic communities and the British colonial legacy, or the awakening of Sinhala nationalism, the Sri Lankan government took noticeable steps to marginalize the Tamil community. While it is undeniable that the Tamils exercised undue influence in the political system through the British constitutional checks, over-representation in the civil service, and Governor Manning’s efforts to

\textsuperscript{211} Ibid, 175.
\textsuperscript{212} Ponnambalam, 5.
split the phantom Sinhala opposition to British rule, Sinhala actions went too far. The Ceylon Citizenship Act, the 1972 constitution, the nationalization of the plantations, and the forced repatriation of thousands of Tamils alienated the Tamil community.

This sense of alienation led to violent opposition from segments of the Tamil community as early as the 1970s, particularly in the Jaffna region. The 1972 constitution and the 1977 election proved to be catalysts for the formation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam that the Sri Lankan government has fought ever since.

The Rise of the Tigers: The Growth of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

With the Tamil community extremely dissatisfied with the 1972 constitution, Tamil politicians, especially those associated with the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), began agitating for the creation of a separate Tamil state in the northern part of Sri Lanka. Significantly, the exclusion of Tamils from the education system helped to galvanize the TULF.

One Sinhalese Sri Lankan professor, C.R. de Silva, acknowledged:

> The Tamils of Sri Lanka have developed feelings of nationalism on their own and the question of educational opportunity only aggravated the conflicts that had arisen owing to questions of language and employment. Nevertheless the question of University admissions is clearly one which mobilized the youth in Jaffna and prodded the [TULF] leadership to declare in favour of a separatist state.\(^{213}\)

In the 1977 general election, the Tamil United Liberation Front issued its Vaddukoddai Resolution declaring that the Front would campaign on secession and wanted to hold a referendum on the secession question among the Tamil populace. TULF candidates won overwhelmingly in Tamil areas and proclaimed a fait accompli. Instead of pushing for some kind of referendum on the question of secession, the TULF declared that their electoral victory was in and of itself approval of their secession platform. The official website of the Tigers reads, “These elections were effectively a referendum [sic] the Tamil speaking people voted

\(^{213}\) Quoted in Ponnambalam, 177.
overwhelmingly in favour of secession.” The Sri Lankan government responded by requiring all members of parliament to swear an oath that they would not advocate secession.

The LTTE was formed on May 5, 1976 by Velupillai Prabhakaran from the nucleus of the Tamil New Tigers group he had founded in the early 1970s. The group launched its first official attack in September 1978 with the bombing of an Air Ceylon passenger jet. Prabhakaran, a reportedly charismatic figure who inspires near-worship amongst his followers, grew up in the Tamil town of Velvettiturai, long regarded as a smuggler’s haven. Prabhakaran increased his infamy by personally carrying out a number of killings and bank robberies, including the heist of 500,000 rupees and jewelry estimated at 200,000 rupees from the people’s Bank at Puttur in Jaffna in March 1979. The LTTE engaged in particularly intense periods of fighting from 1983-1989, in the mid-1990s, and from 2005 to today.

In 1980, the Tigers published a Marxist-Leninist document that sought to cast their struggle in terms of class conflict as well as national liberation. The document, “Towards a Socialist Eelam,” appears to have had significance at the time, but since the end of the Cold War, the LTTE has largely dropped all communist rhetoric or justifications for their actions in favor of self-determination arguments.

The Tigers also claim: that Tamils were discriminated against in the recruitment of the Sri Lankan security services; that the Sinhalese government has undertaken an intense and officially sponsored campaign of colonization of Tamil areas much like the conservative Israeli settlers movement in Palestinian areas; and that beginning in the late 1970s large numbers of Tamil youths were detained, not given legal representation, and tortured under the Prevention of

217 Ponnambalam, 9.
The Tigers seek to establish a separate Tamil state in the northern part of Sri Lanka and assert their right to do so under the UN Charter which guarantees the right of a people to political independence. Vital to this claim is the assertion that Tamils are a distinct people with a unique cultural heritage and history that differentiate them from the rest of Sri Lanka. The Tigers also claim the right to secede under a concept known as reversion of sovereignty in international law. They assert that the British colonial administrators acknowledged until 1833 that the Tamil people were a separate nation and that this can be seen in several British documents, including the Cleghorn Minute of 1799 and the Arrow Smith Map of 1802. The Tigers also point out that the British kept aspects of Tamil law and instituted measures to prevent discrimination of the Tamil people in the constitution in 1948. To the Tigers, the 1972 constitution claimed legitimacy over the whole of Sri Lanka, but violated all of the past precedents that acknowledged the distinctiveness of the Tamil people, their laws, and their customs. In their view, the government claim of sovereignty over all of Sri Lanka was flawed from the outset.

The Tigers seek to bolster a Tamil sense of nationalism and national pride—they can provide a source of respect for Tamils who feel alienated by the Sri Lankan government or who have experienced heavy-handed tactics by government security services. The organization seeks a Tamil eelam, or homeland, and even features a constitution and manifesto. Like most insurgents and terrorist groups, the LTTE claims that its move toward violent armed struggle was necessary because the government illegally prevented the Tigers from achieving their goals.

within the political process and because the government resorted to attacking the Tamil community.

**The Organization and Operation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)**

It is widely acknowledged that Prabhakaran rules the LTTE with an iron fist. He has violently suppressed rival violent and non-violent Tamil organizations that have sprung up since the Tigers were founded. Prabhakaran has established strict discipline among the Tiger ranks, brutally weeding out the uncommitted and preventing the Sri Lankan government from capitalizing on sustained organizational penetrations, greedy fighters, or malcontents. The LTTE has killed dissident Tamils in Canada and France and is not above intimidating a dissident’s family within Sri Lanka. The leader maintains a highly effective central intelligence organization which reports regularly on the state and affairs of the organization’s members. It is believed that there are 8-10,000 LTTE members in Sri Lanka, of which approximately 3-6,000 are trained in conventional or asymmetric tactics.  

Though the Tigers’ website cites the TULF as its ancestor, the reality is that TULF was founded as an organization for moderate Tamils in 1975 and differed greatly in its refusal to use violence. Sensing a rivalry, Prabhakaran launched several devastating attacks on TULF, largely eliminating them. Today, the remnants of the TULF are known as the Tamil National Alliance which gained 22 seats in parliament in 2006. The Tamil National Alliance has little independence from the LTTE and operates as its legislative proxy in parliament. The Tigers have repeatedly devastated rival Tamil groups, including killing most of the 300 fighters of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) and their supporters in 1986, as well as moderate Tamil groups.

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221 Van de Voorde, 185.
222 Wickramasinghe, 158.
Like most insurgent organizations, details on the recruitment, indoctrination/training, equipment, funding, public relations, and tactics of the Tigers are scarce. Regarding recruitment, it does not appear that the LTTE routinely drafts or dragoons young Tamils as is the case in some African conflicts. In May 1999, the Tigers attempted to establish a Universal People’s Militia comprised of all Tamils over the age of 15 in certain LTTE-held areas\(^\text{223}\), but the unpopularity and lack of success of the effort seems to have discouraged further attempts at drafting Tamils. The Tigers are adept at using mass gatherings or social events to portray their struggle as just, capitalizing on group dynamics to generate enthusiasm for their cause. The group will hold Pongu Thamil festivals in an effort to use the passions of frenzied crowds to recruit new members.\(^\text{224}\)

The organization attracts Tamils from all walks of life, but especially seeks to recruit young educated Tamils. Recruits with specific skill sets are put to work in areas where they fit best. For instance, one analyst states that graphic artists have been put to work making maps. University students, particularly those in engineering, have been approached to modify or improve existing devices for future attacks. Tigers not trained as fighters, however, often join the armed units in the field in order to remove the dead LTTE fighters or at least clothe them in civilian dress to further undermine the SLA’s reputation.\(^\text{225}\)

Tamils as young as 14 have been recruited, but generally those between the ages of 14-16 are believed to be kept at logistical bases and do not fight until 16-18.\(^\text{226}\) Nevertheless, a variety of human rights organizations as well as the Sri Lankan government accuses the Tigers of training a number of child soldiers. At least one expert contends that a special unit, the Leopard

\(^{223}\) Van de Voorde, 186.


\(^{225}\) C. Christine Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan (Santa Monica: RAND Arroyo Center, 2004), 11 and 30.

\(^{226}\) Mackinlay, 77.
Brigade, is comprised entirely of children and is among the more tenacious Tiger elements. Some analysts assert that between 1995-1996, ½ of the new Tamil recruits were between the ages of 12-16. According to an SLA intelligence report in 1998, 60% of Tiger recruits were younger than 18 and 60% killed since April 1995 were child soldiers. Regardless of age, new recruits sign the constitution and pledge loyalty to the LTTE above family and all others.

The LTTE appears to be extraordinarily adept at indoctrinating and training its members. It has taken on the appearance of a professional military organization, putting future fighters through a rigorous physical training regimen and instructing recruits in the use of a variety of weaponry. Tamil theorists instruct recruits in the Tiger ideology and in the abuses of the Sri Lankan government, especially the security services. These sessions are supplemented by the use of a specific genre of action movies, like the Rambo series and certain Clint Eastwood movies, as one analyst notes, in order to instill the belief that smaller forces can win against all odds.

Their training camps reportedly resemble college campuses. Male and female members typically wear cyanide capsules around their necks, not only as a way to prevent their capture, but as an outward sign of their total devotion to the cause. Curiously, female Tigers often carry two cyanide capsules.

It is significant to note that in the past, the LTTE has received training from a number of international and transnational actors. From 1976-1986, a limited number of Tigers received some training in Tyre, Lebanon from the Palestinian groups Fatah and the PFLP. India provided weapons and training to a variety of Tamil groups, including the LTTE, after the 1983 Tamil Massacre. India, in an effort to placate its own Tamil population, reacted to the anti-Tamil

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227 Van de Voorde, 186.
228 Mackinlay, 78. It is not clear why this is the case.
229 Ibid, 75.
Sinhala violence by arming the Tamils until the Indian-Sri Lankan agreement in 1987. India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) brought Tamil militants to India for training in 32 Tamil Nadu camps, with the Tigers training at Salem, Madurai, and perhaps some at the high-level facility at Dehra Dun. Indeed, by 1985 the number of Indian-trained Tamils reached parity with or exceeded the number of soldiers in the SLA. While this relationship with the Indian government has ceased, the LTTE is believed to be in contact with Sikh separatists, Kashmiri fighters, and some 20-plus separatist groups in Tamil Nadu and it is quite possible that training and weaponry is exchanged. In the 1990s, the Tigers received GPS training in Sudan as well as political training in South Africa by the African National Congress, and at least one analyst suggests that Norwegian naval personnel may have provided training in underwater sabotage techniques in Thailand. Finally, one observer alleges that the LTTE and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) have had a relationship, with the Tigers training the PKK in suicide operations and the PKK allegedly providing the LTTE with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.

In terms of equipment, analysts conclude that the LTTE has found weapons suppliers in South Africa, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Afghanistan, North Korea, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Lebanon and that the plastic explosives for its bombing and suicide bomber campaigns likely comes from the Ukraine. The Tigers have stolen weaponry on several occasions, including 60 tons of explosives destined for Bangladesh’s armed forces that were provided by Ukraine as well as some 324,000 mortars in Mozambique that were supposed to go to the SLA in 1997. Thailand assured the Sri Lankan government that it would

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231 Ibid, 111-112.
232 Fair, 36.
233 Ravinatha Aryasinha, “Terrorism, the LTTE and the Conflict in Sri Lanka,” Conflict, Security and Development 1 no. 2 (August 2001), 30. Note: This is the only author I came across who makes this claim.
234 Mackinlay, 70 and Van de Voorde, 191-192.
235 Aryasinha, 33.
crack down on LTTE activity when it discovered in May 2000 that a Thai sympathizer was in the middle of having a submarine constructed for the group at the Phuket shipyard.\textsuperscript{236} In late summer 2006, several Tamils with close ties to the LTTE were arrested in New York for not only trying to bribe US officials into removing the State Department’s terrorist designation, but also for trying to buy a variety of weapons, including missile launchers and surface-to-air armaments.\textsuperscript{237}

One expert describes Prabhakaran as a managing director of a corporate organization complete with financial offices overseen by the equivalent of a Chief Financial Officer, K.P. Kummaruppa, in Thailand. The official website of the LTTE, the Tamil Eelam homepage, lists telephone numbers and addresses in London along with a number of ways parties can contribute financially.

Sources of funding for the LTTE range from legitimate to illegal. Legitimate business enterprises include profits from farming, the cultivation of tea, the operation of bus companies, print shops, photo studios, and proceeds from factories that produce jam, soap, soft drinks, and a number of other items.\textsuperscript{238} Evidence suggests that the LTTE have invested heavily in legitimate shipping enterprises, with ships legally registered and insured. Some analysts contend that these ships, in addition to carrying legal items, act as transportation for contraband to LTTE areas, frequently making unscheduled stops en route to their destination. The Tigers receive reportedly increasing amounts of funds from overseas, especially from the Tamil diaspora.\textsuperscript{239} Large Tamil communities exist in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, the Nordic countries, and Malaysia, though some reports suggest that some Tamil communities are subjected to extortion and protection rackets from Tiger associates, and are thus unwilling contributors. A RAND

\textsuperscript{236} Ibid, 40.
\textsuperscript{238} Mackinlay, 70.
\textsuperscript{239} Ibid, 70.
report indicated that the LTTE may raise as much as $650,000 a month in Switzerland, $1 million (Canadian) a month in Canada, and $350,000 a month in the UK. Prior to the Tigers’ designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, there were several serious US-based contributors, including one California doctor who reportedly gave up to $100,000 at a time. Analysts disagree over how much of the LTTE’s funding comes from abroad, but the group has an estimated annual budget of $100 million with somewhere between 60-90% coming from overseas donors. What analysts do agree on is that in the wake of the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, countries around the globe were more willing to clamp down on LTTE fundraising activities, making it more difficult for the group to gather funds.

As far as illegal sources of funding, the Sri Lankan government claims that 75% of Tamils carrying drugs do so on behalf of the Tigers. In May 2003, the US Drug Enforcement Administration intelligence chief, Steven W. Casteel, contradicted the traditional US line that stated that Tamils were not involved in the drug trade. Citing new evidence, Casteel asserted that Tamils had been involved in narcotrafficking as early as the 1980s. Reportedly, the Tigers sponsor two Toronto-area gangs, VVT and AK Kannan, who act as narcotics distributors and local muscle. There is some evidence to suggest that the LTTE may be involved in human smuggling, which can net up to $32,000 per person—if the individuals cannot pay, they are often forced to work for the LTTE wherever they have been transported, often Europe or Canada. Within Sri Lanka, the LTTE robs banks to fund their operations and they impose ‘taxes’ on items like cigarettes imported into their areas of control.

The LTTE public relations campaign is well-honed for foreign audiences. The Tamil Eelam website intentionally utilizes language like “self-determination” and “human rights” in

240 Fair, 31-32.
241 Aryasinha, 34-35.
order to garner foreign sympathy. They have created multiple webpages, most likely in an effort to avoid being completely shut down by Sri Lankan efforts and to try and convey greater popularity than they actually have. The Tigers operate a domestic radio station, the Voice of the Tigers, as well as a satellite television station. Within Sri Lanka, the Tigers have, at times, been too dogmatic and repressive in areas that they control or have controlled. For instance, when the LTTE controlled the city of Jaffna, public outcry in the Tamil population led Prabhakaran to establish special envoys not only to propagate the LTTE’s message, but to also provide a means of redress amongst Tamils for LTTE excesses in 2000. While the Tigers have no problem with utterly ruthless tactics in Sinhala areas, in Tamil communities the LTTE visits the families of Tamils killed by security services, publishes obituaries, and provides compensation to Tamils who had property confiscated by the LTTE.\textsuperscript{242}

The Tigers have targeted the SLA, and especially the officer corps, in some of their propaganda. Occasionally the LTTE will distribute leaflets or bulletins that are directly addressed to members of the SLA. One such letter reads:

\begin{quote}
As we walk the path of national liberation, our death will acquire dignity and meaning. But yours will become insignificant….Do not die labouring for the foul campaigns of the ruling class. Do not lose your integrity and your humanity, so that those who rule us may prosper. It is only when you take up arms on the side of the oppressed Sinhala workers and peasants against the state of Sri Lanka that we could speak the language of friendship.\textsuperscript{243}
\end{quote}

RAND interviews with the US Embassy indicate that the SLA suffers from a severe officer shortage, most likely the result of a combination of LTTE propaganda campaigns and targeted assassinations of officers.

Tiger tactics are varied and complex. They will engage the Sri Lankan military conventionally, with infantry, the Air Tigers or the Sea Tigers, when they are confident of the

\textsuperscript{242} Mackinlay, 73.
\textsuperscript{243} Quoted in Ponnambalam, 221. This letter contains more of the Marxist language then some of the more recent letters as it was delivered in 1983.
outcome or are provoked. The Sea Tigers are believed to have some 3-4,000 members with six ships, primarily smaller, fast attack craft. It is believed that the Air Tigers were originally formed by a former Air Canada employee, Vythilingam Sornalingam, now deceased, with the intention of launching suicide operations against buildings with microlight aircraft packed with explosives, though they have yet to attempt such attacks. The Air Tigers have exhibited a conventional capability, raiding the Colombo airport with two aircraft believed to have taken off from airstrips built in the Mullaitivu jungle near Trincomalee.

In terms of asymmetric warfare, the LTTE engages in shootings, bombings, and suicide operations across the country, even in the capital city of Colombo. The Black Tigers are the dedicated suicide bomber contingent of the LTTE. Suicide bombings are an integral component of Tiger campaigns, and future bombers are revered among recruits and typically recruited from populations that have been physically harmed by the Sri Lankan security services. Evidence indicates that the Tigers have relied heavily on female suicide bombers who frequently face less scrutiny by security services or who may pretend to be pregnant to hide explosive devices. Members of the Black Tigers who undertake attacks are remembered annually in the Maaveerar Thinam, or Great Hero’s Day celebration. Notable assassinations by the Black Tigers include Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Sri Lankan Defense Minister Ranjan Wijeratne, Naval commander Vice Admiral W.W.E.C. Fernando, and Minister of Industries and Industrial Development C.V. Gooneratne. Since July 1987, the Black Tigers have carried out an estimated 200 suicide attacks in India and Sri Lanka, dwarfing the number of attacks carried out by better-known groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah.

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244 Fair, 29. These cadres allegedly trained in the UK, France, Switzerland and Australia.
245 Mackinlay, 75.
246 Van de Voorde, 187-188.
As one Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense Official noted, “Attacking Colombo has rich dividends. It makes leaders question the value of countering the LTTE. A single blast in Colombo has more value psychologically than full-scale conflict in the north and northeast.”

The Tigers often scout targets for weeks and have shown the capacity to mount complicated operations using communications equipment, mine fields, and indirect fire.

**Major LTTE Attacks and Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Operations**

Almost all LTTE attacks and Sri Lankan government counterinsurgency operations can be generally characterized as indiscriminate and brutal. The war has killed an estimated 70,000 people with thousands of Sri Lankans internally displaced. According to Human Rights Watch, the long-simmering conflict has forced 800,000 Tamils to flee the country, dramatically increasing the diaspora in Australia and the US, but especially in India, Canada, and the UK.

The Tigers emerged as a serious insurgent or terrorist group in 1983. In July, the LTTE killed 13 policemen in Jaffna, spawning Sinhalese riots in Colombo. The Sinhala marauders targeted Tamils, killing an estimated 1,000 people, while the government watched. Known as ‘Black July’ in the Tamil community, the riots enabled the LTTE, previously relegated to the fringes, to play a larger role and, more importantly, to attract recruits. They received additional material support from India whose population includes some 60-million Tamils, many of whom reside in the state of Tamil Nadu, the ancestral home for thousands of Sri Lanka’s Tamils.

India, however, grew alarmed as the violence intensified throughout the 1980s and reached a particularly bloody point in 1987. India sent a peace-keeping force (IPKF) to quell the violence and compel the Sri Lankan government to offer some kind of concession to the Tamils.

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247 Quoted in Fair, 47.
248 Mackinlay, 77.
249 Zissis, 3.
250 ICG Report, 3.
Patrolling in mostly Tamil areas, the Indian presence managed to wrangle constitutional amendments from Colombo that offered some Tamil autonomy. The Indian presence, however, caused a great deal of friction within Sri Lankan society, sparking an additional rebellion of Sinhalese nationalists in the south of the country. The government thus faced a Sinhala nationalist rebellion in the south and a separatist Tamil rebellion in the north and east.

The IPKF found itself fighting the LTTE, one of India’s former clients, instead of peacekeeping. While the IPKF eventually dislodged the LTTE from Jaffna, depriving the Tigers of their headquarters, training facilities, munitions factories and weapon stores, the Indians suffered considerable losses. Severely undercapitalized, Indian communication gear and guns were outclassed by the LTTE’s more modern gear and AK-47s. Further, many Indian units were undermanned by as much as 50%.251

IPKF quickly discovered why the SLA had had so many problems stamping out the Tigers. The LTTE quickly adapted its tactics following the loss of its base in Jaffna, striking the Indians whenever it proved most profitable for the Tigers. For instance, the Indians were forced to traverse the narrow Elephant Pass in order to get from the nearby port to Jaffna City, providing the LTTE with an inviting target. When the IPKF learned to identify and disable Tiger roadside or semi-concealed improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the LTTE buried high explosives beneath the blacktop, making it nearly impossible to detect the makeshift mines.252

The Sri Lankan president, Ranasinghe Premadasa, believing that the unpopular Indian intervention had inadvertently unified Tamils and Sinhalese, asked the IPKF to leave. When the

251 Fair, 21.
252 Ibid, 22.
Indians left, the LTTE filled the power vacuum in the eastern regions and was actually able to take control of some of the weaponry left by the IPKF.\textsuperscript{253}

Following the failed intervention, the Tigers were able to mount some of their most successful operations, earning their reputation as adept suicide bombers. In May 1991, an LTTE suicide bomber killed the Indian Prime Minister responsible for the intervention, Rajiv Gandhi. Two years later, another suicide bomber killed President Premadasa. His successor, Chandrika Kumaratunga first unsuccessfully sought a negotiated settlement. When the effort flagged, Kumaratunga shifted strategies, still seeking a negotiated settlement with the Tamil people while attacking the Tigers. Though the LTTE succeeded in sinking two Sri Lankan Navy vessels during the intensified fighting, the government was able to reassert its control over Jaffna.\textsuperscript{254}

Between 1996 and 1999, the Tigers launched a series of attacks, both conventional and asymmetric. In early 1996, the LTTE bombed the Central Bank in Colombo, causing hundreds of casualties. Another significant bombing took place in February 1998 when the Tigers hit the important Buddhist Temple of the Tooth in Kandy. 1999 was a pivotal year; the LTTE killed a moderate Tamil parliamentarian, tried to kill President Kumaratunga, and launched a massive conventional attack that recaptured the all-important Elephant Pass, killing an estimated 1,000 Sri Lankan soldiers. The attack on the president, however, had the unintended consequence of boosting her popularity, enabling her to win the 1999 election.\textsuperscript{255}

In 2001, the LTTE seized Sri Lanka’s international airport, a particularly galling attack in the eyes of the Sri Lankan government given its proximity to Colombo. The airport attack is regarded by some as the worst act of terrorism in aviation history. The same month, India’s External Affairs Minister Jeswant Singh pledged a $100 million loan to Sri Lanka to try and

\textsuperscript{253} ICG Report, 4.
\textsuperscript{254} Ibid, 4.
\textsuperscript{255} Ibid, 5.
offset the economic impact of the conflict.\textsuperscript{256} It is perhaps not surprising that the president’s party failed to win the December 2001 elections, with the UNP’s candidate, Ramil Wickeremesinghe, winning the post of prime minister.

The new prime minister sought a ceasefire which eventually went into effect on February 22, 2002, leaving the government in control of major towns while the LTTE controlled rural areas in the east. The agreement, however, allowed the Tigers to open political offices all around the country, a caveat they exploited to the fullest—they continued to recruit, establish protection rackets, and kill moderate Tamils. Furthermore, the agreement was heavily opposed by Sinhala nationalists who believed that it was one step on the road to granting Tamil independence—and it failed to give president Kumaratunga a role in the peace process.\textsuperscript{257}

The ceasefire, overseen by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) comprised of 60-70 representatives from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland, was able to halt major attacks until 2005. The peace talks began in Thailand in 2002, later continuing in Oslo, and consisted of six rounds of peace talks but soon highlighted the unwillingness of both sides to reach a compromise. The Tigers essentially wanted to establish their rule over the north and east before engaging in substantive talks. In addition, the LTTE demanded that the government close down its high security zones and allow free passage of Tamil ships. Sri Lanka flatly refused to budge on these two issues. The only substantive agreement reached by the two sides existed over human rights—neither wanted alleged violations on both sides investigated.

Despite the underlying unwillingness of either side to compromise, Prabhakaran indicated in late 2002 that the Tigers might be willing to give up their goal of an independent state. He stated:

\textsuperscript{256} Aryasinha, 39.
\textsuperscript{257} ICG Report, 5-6.
We are prepared to consider favourably a political framework that offers substantial regional autonomy and self-government in our homeland on the basis of our right to internal self-determination...[but if our] demand for regional self-rule is rejected we have no alternative other than to secede and form an independent state. \(^{258}\)

While the statement appears to look favorably on some form of federalism, it was never clear that what Prabhakaran envisioned would have been acceptable to the central government, much less the Sinhalese nationalists. In any case, the LTTE pulled out of the talks in 2003, demanding the establishment of an interim administration it called the Interim Self-Governing Administration (ISGA). The ISGA would have enabled the Tigers to set up a quasi-government in the north and east with negotiations to resume after five years. This proved more than the Sinhalese majority and President Kumaratunga could stomach. She accused Wickremesinghe of endangering Sri Lanka’s national security, dissolved parliament, seized control of the defense and security apparatuses, and called for new elections. \(^{259}\)

The Tigers were unable to capitalize on the disorder within the government due to their own internal problems. Long known for extreme internal discipline, rivalry between the LTTE intelligence head, Pottu Amman, and an eastern commander, Colonel Karuna, led to Karuna establishing his own Tamil group. Prabhakaran resorted once more to force to try and destroy Karuna, pushing the colonel into the arms of the Sri Lankan government in 2006. The loss proved to be a significant one—Karuna provided extremely valuable intelligence to his former enemy. Despite the turmoil in both camps, an unexpected and catastrophic event momentarily cooled hostilities.

**An Opening? The December 2004 Tsunami**

On December 26, 2004, a massive tsunami caused by the subduction of a tectonic plate under the ocean floor swept across Southeast Asia. The tsunami inundated coastal areas, killing

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\(^{259}\) ICG Report, 8.
approximately 35,000 Sri Lankans and devastating Tamil areas. For arguably the first time since independence, the government did not stand idly by while the Tamil population suffered. The Sri Lankan military played a large role in delivering relief supplies to affected Tamil areas and undertook a number of rescue missions as well.

Though the Tigers attempted to downplay the government’s efforts and sought to control the flow of all aid into their areas through the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), a cooperative body comprised of both Tamils and Sinhalese was designed to oversee and coordinate relief efforts. The Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) represented a real opportunity for the government to work collectively with the Tamil people. Joint committees comprised of government representatives, Muslims, Tamils, and the LTTE would oversee the relief efforts and provide feedback, oversight, and would recommend priority projects.\textsuperscript{260}

This promising initiative was short-lived, however, as the powerful Sinhalese nationalists once again stressed their concern that such cooperative efforts ran the risk of establishing a de facto Tamil state. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party quit the coalition government with the UNP in June 2005 because of such fears. The Sri Lankan Supreme Court sounded P-TOMS death knell by ruling that aspects of the proposed administration were inconsistent with the Sri Lankan constitution.\textsuperscript{261}

The efforts of the Sinhalese nationalists and the court ruling were poorly timed and unfortunate. Had it not been struck down, it would have forced the Tigers’ hand. They would have faced an organization with greater international legitimacy than their own TRO and would have had to decide whether to join it or possibly be marginalized. Further, the joint

\textsuperscript{260} Wickramasinghe, 159.
\textsuperscript{261} ICG Report, 9. Evidence suggests that Sinhala nationalists’ arguments resonated with the Supreme Court.
administration envisioned by P-TOMS was exactly the kind of cooperative effort that many within the Tamil community wanted out of the government. Eviscerating it before it even got off the ground likely strengthened the position of the Tigers and eliminated a cooperative effort that might have proven to be a model for further initiatives.

**Major Attacks and Counterinsurgency Operations after the Tsunami**

The election of Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse on November 25, 2005 led some to believe that a breakthrough in the peace process was possible. The president seemed committed to bringing about an end to the conflict in his campaign rhetoric. Yet Rajapakse owed his political success to Sinhala nationalists in the city of Hambantota and to an understanding with the ultranationalist JHU (Jatika Hele Urumaya) and JVP (Janata Vimukti Peramuna) parties.\(^\text{262}\) These forces would not tolerate the kind of peace process the LTTE would agree to and it is likely that the combination of the devastation wrought by the tsunami and Colonel Karuna led these nationalist forces to believe that the Tigers were vulnerable and that an intensified campaign might finally quell them. Though the two sides continued to talk throughout late 2005 and early 2006, the violence gradually escalated.

In December 2005, two LTTE activists were killed, followed by the death of 14 soldiers and 16 sailors in separate attacks. Gunmen killed a parliamentarian from the Tamil National Alliance in Batticaloa and then five Tamil students in early January 2006. In April, the LTTE bombed a market in Trincomalee and a female suicide bomber attacked the army headquarters in Colombo, nearly killing the army commander. Sinhalese riots broke out following the Trincomalee and the Sri Lankan government reverted to its past behavior of being slow to act in the face of Sinhala violence. May saw a huge conventional battle when the LTTE seized control

\(^{262}\) Teresita Schaffer and Aneesh Deshpande, “Can Sri Lanka Turn Away from War?,” *South Asia Monitor* no. 96 (July 2006).
of a water control point in the town of Mavil Aru. The government responded with massive force and the LTTE unsuccessfully counterattacked at Mutur. A massacre of all of the indigenous employees of a French aid organization took place in Mutur, with SLMM accusing the government of having perpetrated the killings.\textsuperscript{263}

The next significant conventional battle took place in August 2006, when LTTE forces were able to defeat government forces and seize Jaffna. An October counterattack on Jaffna by the government failed miserably—not only were the government forces thrown back, they suffered 133 killed and some 200 wounded. The Tigers answered both unconventionally and conventionally, with a suicide bomber hitting a bus of naval personnel and LTTE ships firing on Sri Lankan naval vessels in Galle Harbor. It is believed that since mid-2006, some 1,000 LTTE fighters were killed, with an unclear number of SLA casualties. The Sri Lankan military estimated that defense spending in 2007 would reach $1.29 billion.\textsuperscript{264}

In early 2007, hostilities continued to intensify. On March 26, the Air Tigers utilized small aircraft to bomb the Katunayake Air Force Base. The Sri Lankan Navy engaged a component of the Sea Tigers on March 29, allegedly sinking a number of their vessels. The LTTE responded a day later with a mortar and artillery attack on Batticaloa. On April 4, the Sri Lankan Air Force bombed a Sea Tiger base in Puthukkudiyiruppu.

**Problems with the Sri Lanka’s Counterinsurgency Efforts**

As the events described above make quite clear, Sri Lanka has been overly reliant on a military solution to the LTTE insurgency. In its military operations, it has often caused excessive civilian casualties, enabling the LTTE to capitalize on the deaths by utilizing its advanced and responsive public relations arm to effectively tar the central government. In one

\textsuperscript{263} ICG Report, 11.  
\textsuperscript{264} Ibid, 22.
incident in November 2006, SLA artillery batteries hit a camp for internally displaced people in the Batticaloa district, killing 47 and injuring approximately 100.\textsuperscript{265} As a result, such groups as the Asian Human Rights Commission have repeatedly criticized the Sri Lankan government for military and police operations that violate the 1994 Sri Lankan Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Acts, No. 22.\textsuperscript{266}

Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists also have criticized the Prevention of Terrorism Act for leading to the mistreatment of suspects and captured insurgents. Amnesty detailed that Sri Lankan security services have beaten suspects, suspended them upside down from the ceiling, forced pins under detainees’ fingernails, and applied ants and chilies to parts of the body.\textsuperscript{267} The International Commission of Jurists released perhaps the most strident condemnation, stating:

\begin{quote}
The provisions of the Sri Lankan Terrorism Act are not only objectionable from the human rights point of view but it is doubtful that the Act is effective in controlling terrorism…since 1979, when the Act was adopted, terrorism had not declined but rather increased in the Northern Tamil area. Increased police and army surveillance of the population have not curtailed violence but seemingly stimulated it. This experience is similar to that of some other countries which have attempted to control terrorism by armed force rather than dealing with the fundamental factors contributing to the recourse to violence.\textsuperscript{268}
\end{quote}

Interviews of former and current Tamil insurgents indicate that the indiscriminate brutality of the SLA does as much to recruit for the LTTE as anything else. In some cases, fighters from former rival Tamil organizations ended up fighting for the LTTE despite Prabhakaran’s brutal destruction of these rival groups. One fighter, only 22 years old, fought for the LTTE despite the fact that the Tigers imprisoned him and brutally eradicated TELO, the rival Tamil organization he originally belonged to. When queried about why he joined the Tigers, he responded, “The

\begin{footnotes}
\item[265] Ibid, 21.
\item[266] Van de Voorde, 190.
\item[267] Ponnambalam, 203.
\item[268] Quoted in Ponnambalam, 205.
\end{footnotes}
reason I fought for the LTTE was not because of any love for the Tigers. In fact I hate them. But we—I and my friends—did not want Tamil people to suffer at the hands of the SLA.”²⁶⁹

While large military operations and brutal interrogations have negatively impacted the civilian populace in the northern and eastern regions, the everyday actions of the SLA do much to anger the Tamil people and turn them against the central government. Daily measures such as roadblocks exacerbate tensions and contribute to the Tamil sense that the Sinhalese government is besieging their community. As C. Christine Fair, a RAND area expert argues, “These blunt instruments have proved counterproductive. They have alienated the Tamils and have provided fuel for the LTTE assertions that Colombo is anti-Tamil. Moreover, in the view of [a Ministry of Defense official] these actions have been so provocative that some Tamils may have become anti-state as a consequence.”²⁷⁰

Some scholars and analysts point to the periods of negotiation between the LTTE and the central government as positive steps toward decreasing the animosity between the Sinhala and Tamil communities. Yet even these negotiations have proved problematic. The Norwegian-led negotiations had the unintended consequence of legitimizing the Tigers as the representatives of the Tamil community at the exclusion of other Tamil groups.²⁷¹

Periods of negotiation, particularly from 1989-1990 and 1994-1995, led to a mystifying relaxation in security measures by the Sri Lankan government. While the LTTE has often argued for the removal of some measures during negotiations, the government eased security measures to such a degree so as to allow for LTTE infiltration throughout the southern portion of the country, including Colombo. Once more, whenever there is a lull in Tiger attacks, there is a tendency on the part of the government to assume that the ability of the LTTE has been degraded

²⁶⁹ Quoted in Swamy, 5.
²⁷⁰ Fair, 58.
²⁷¹ Aryasinha, 45.
and that the threat has been reduced.\textsuperscript{272} Thus, it appears that the Sri Lankan counterinsurgency campaign can swing wildly from one extreme to another, from heavy-handed indiscriminate military operations to a shockingly minimal security presence. As one analyst noted, “Sri Lanka’s maladaptive response to the LTTE’s guerilla and terrorist campaign has contributed to the strengthening of the LTTE both on the island and overseas.”\textsuperscript{273}

Even when the Sri Lankan government has offered a measured response, Sri Lanka’s understanding of security remains overly reliant on soldiers as opposed to adaptive procedures, tactics, and good intelligence. As one observer notes, “In Sri Lanka, the notion of security is highly correlated with the presence of men with guns rather than enhanced security practices and procedures.”\textsuperscript{274} More soldiers standing around a potential target is viewed as an effective response to LTTE activity, despite the fact that this does little to interdict Tiger operations and may present them with an inviting target.

Furthermore, there is little evidence that the Tamils trust the government either in the negotiations or other efforts to integrate the Tamil community. As Dr. Peter Chalk, another RAND expert on Sri Lanka, observes:

There is still a large sense of grievance amongst the Tamil community, and there’s still a perception even amongst members of the Tamil groups that have now made peace with the government, but the government’s really not sincere in what its doing and trying to address…perceptions of alienation…perceptions of discrimination.”\textsuperscript{275}

This lack of trust and perception of an anti-Tamil bias within the government, coupled with past incidents of military abuse or killing of Tamils, has created a shortfall in the number of Tamils that are recruited to the security services. The SLA has had little success in penetrating the

\textsuperscript{272} Fair, 44 and 50.
\textsuperscript{273} Van de Voorde, 192.
\textsuperscript{274} Fair, 55.
LTTE or in recruiting intelligence assets, in part due to this lack of Tamils sympathetic to the central government.\textsuperscript{276}

Much like the US efforts in support and stability operations, Sri Lanka is plagued by a lack of coordination between the military and the civilian components of the government in its fight against the LTTE. Sri Lanka’s approach has often been described as ‘ad hoc,’ with one former Deputy Inspector General of Colombo stressing the need for integrated psychological operations and civil affairs teams in order to combat the effective Tiger propaganda campaign and to provide some kind of development to the local community. Overall, “there is a need for multi-institutional cooperation and coordination.”\textsuperscript{277}

Similar to the US, Sri Lanka has had difficulties maximizing its intelligence services and in providing the appropriate intelligence consumers with what they need in a timely fashion. There is evidence that the police and the military units in LTTE areas that most require actionable intelligence often do not get what they need from the central agencies in Colombo. The agencies appear reticent or incapable of providing the field units with what they need quickly.\textsuperscript{278}

International pressure is another important component in the struggle against the LTTE. As has been documented, the Tigers acquire much of their funding and weaponry from abroad, and much of the international efforts against the LTTE have focused on cutting the inflow of both. Yet international actors have ignored the underlying ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka, failing to acknowledge that long-term peace will only be achieved if the grievances of the Tamil community are assuaged within the political system.\textsuperscript{279}

\textsuperscript{276} Fair, 12.
\textsuperscript{277} Ibid, 51-52.
\textsuperscript{278} Ibid, 12.
\textsuperscript{279} Aryasingha, 45.
Lessons for the US in Support and Stability Operations

Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency efforts since the 1970s reveal several important lessons that can be applied to US interagency efforts in support and stability operations. Three broad lessons are that: (1) understanding a nation’s history and culture; (2) implementing joint administration of relief and development efforts to build trust between a central authority and minority populations; and (3) engaging in security operations that are less kinetic and more focused on cementing personal relationships between security forces and local populations are likely to dramatically increase the effectiveness of support and stability operations.\(^{280}\)

The importance of understanding a country, a region, a people’s culture and history can do much to prevent missteps in support and stability operations. The Sri Lankan case reveals how this can occur even within a country. Despite being cohabitants on the same island since the 3\(^{rd}\) century B.C., the Sinhalese and Tamil communities subscribe to different accounts of their shared history and are often ignorant of one another’s culture. The 1972 constitution and the national flag are but two examples of measures implemented by the Sinhala majority government that inevitably led to clashes with the Tamil minority. While these policies, as well as others cited not only by the Tamils but minorities like the Muslim community, were implemented by extreme Sinhala nationalists intentionally to subvert minority identity and culture, these policies required the tacit or outright support of less extreme Sinhala parties and members of parliament. Had these Sinhala elements had a better understanding of Tamil history and culture, they may

have curbed or blunted the efforts of the extreme nationalists, minimizing or eliminating the grievances that led to a violent Tamil reaction.

The US can see the missteps that it has made in Iraq and Afghanistan due to a lack of understanding of culture and history. In Afghanistan, certain tribes have proved willing to harbor the Taliban and have frustrated US and coalition efforts to build widespread support of the Karzai government outside of Kabul. Yet Afghan history shows that the central government has usually exerted little if any control on distant provinces, where warlords and strongmen asserted their authority.

In Iraq, a number of US military and civilian missteps might have been avoided with a better understanding of Iraqi culture and history. De-Ba’athification by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) went too far and too deep, firing hundreds if not thousands of bureaucrats that could have been used to staff the retooled ministries. The policy removed many Sunnis, fueling the perception that the government was biased in favor of the Shi’ites. A proper understanding of the nation’s political history would have revealed that belonging to the Ba’ath was often a requirement for government employment and that thousands joined simply to try and survive within Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The mass-firings coupled with little hope of finding alternative employment contributed to the resentment within the Sunni community that led to the rise of the insurgency. In terms of culture, the reliance by the US military on mass detentions and nighttime raids on suspects’ homes, frequently resulting in the males in a household being flexi cuffed, searched, and questioned in front of their families, showed a lack of regard for the significance of honor within Arab culture. Such activities humiliated an untold number of Iraqi males, building resentment to the US presence and turning an unknown number to the insurgency or Shi’ite
militias. A better understanding of Arab culture likely would have led to modified tactics that would have bolstered the US mission in Iraq instead of undermining it.

This does not mean that every US military commander or agency official needs to seek a Ph.D. in Afghan or Iraqi history but at least an understanding of the major events and cultural norms that have a significant impact on the two societies. Anecdotal stories suggest that some officials within the civilian agencies and military have recommended that their subordinates read T.E. Lawrence’s *Seven Pillars of Wisdom, A Triumph* as a means to gain a better understanding of Iraqi culture. These subordinates would be better served reading the works of subject area experts and talking with Arabs and Afghans, preferably prior to deployment. Such knowledge would allow officials, soldiers, and policymakers at all levels to ensure that their day to day actions do not alienate the population and enable them to question operations or programs that might do so as well.

The second lesson for US support and stability operations is the importance of joint relief and development projects as a means to establish trust between minority populations and the central authority. In Sri Lanka, the Post-Tsunami Operational Management System, P-TOMS, fashioned a role for not only the Tamils, but the other minority communities in overseeing relief efforts in conjunction with Colombo following the December 2004 tsunami. P-TOMS promised to empower members of the Tamil community outside of the LTTE, undercut the Tigers’ own relief organization that sought to monopolize the distribution of aid in Tamil areas, and give other minorities a voice, thereby building a foundation of trust between the central government and the minority communities. Unfortunately, the short-sighted Sinhalese nationalists inadvertently torpedoed what would have been a significant challenge to the LTTE by undercutting P-TOMS. Sri Lanka’s president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, may be grasping the
importance of joint relief and development projects—in May 2007, he announced that 12,000 Sri Lankan villages would receive massive allocations of funds for development and would be overseen by Provincial Councils in coordination with the central government.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, most of the relief and development projects have been undertaken either by US military provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), commanders utilizing Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) where possible. In the short-term, this is vital for establishing credibility within the local populace for the efforts of the international community and the Iraqi and Afghan governments. In the mid to long-term, if these efforts do not gradually acquire an Iraqi or Afghan face, especially following the much-lauded elections and transfer of sovereignty, these efforts may actually undermine the credibility of the central government. Continued aid from outside sources undermines one of the central purposes of national government, thereby undermining its legitimacy and the longer-term goals of US support and stability operations.

The third lesson from the Sri Lankan experience is the impact that personal relationships have in counterinsurgency and support and stability operations. Sri Lanka’s best efforts at countering the LTTE were less kinetic, focusing instead on having the security services establish a lower profile but better relations within the local population. The former Senior Deputy Inspector General of Colombo, Merrill Gunaratne, introduced vigilance committees (VCs) during his tenure. Essentially, Gunaratne divided the city into 75-100 household units and appointed a Sri Lankan police unit as a liaison with these households. The households formed a representative body, somewhat reminiscent of a neighborhood watch, who would meet with the police on a regular basis. Two to three police units formed a subsector and reported to a
subsector chief. Several sectors made up a zone which reported to a head of a zone. These zone heads then reported directly to the Deputy Inspector.\footnote{281}{Fair, 56.}

Over time, the police units, who remained the same and were not rotated out, and VCs developed trust and the households began to provide the police with local intelligence and reported the appearance of suspicious figures. Admittedly, the VC program was plagued by problems, but these were largely the result of both police units receiving rudimentary, if any, training in such basic intelligence activities such as surveillance and the central intelligence agencies withholding intelligence from the police units. Overall, in the words of RAND analyst C. Christine Fair, “Sri Lanka’s brief experience with integrating [the central intelligence agencies] as well as with community policing (i.e. vigilance committees) appeared to enhance Colombo’s ability to interdict LTTE operations.”\footnote{282}{Ibid, 13.} Sri Lanka re-started the vigilance committees concept on January 8, 2007.

In US support and stability operations, the rotation systems in place both in the civilian agencies and the military make establishing trust within the local populations difficult. There are countless stories in Iraq and Afghanistan of military leaders who established good relations with the local loya jirga, village leaders, or community elders, working with these men and institutions who were more than willing to bring grievances forward that otherwise might fester and to report on insurgent movements. Yet when these agencies and units rotated out, in some cases while the local populace pleaded that they stay, these relationships were lost, frequently not established with the new personnel, and formerly placated areas became dangerous. These relationships take a long time to cement but are invaluable in pacifying an area and gathering intelligence. Civilians rotate out after 90 days and military personnel leave anywhere from a
couple of months to a year, breaking the bonds of trust with the local population and giving them little reason to work with their replacements. Fair, commenting on VCs, wrote, “It also requires that officers not be transferred (transferring personnel would forfeit the accumulated local intelligence and undercut the entire effort).”\textsuperscript{283} The same can be said for US support and stability operations. Longer rotations are certainly not popular, but if the US is to be successful in such operations, maintaining relationship continuity between the civilian and military components with the local population is essential.

Sri Lanka’s experience fighting the LTTE is typically studied through the lens of counterterrorism instead of counterinsurgency. Yet it is clear that there are a number of lessons that can be applied to US support and stability operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond. The US, its allies, and the local governments it attempts to rebuild, must be cognizant of the history and culture of the population, seek to establish joint relief and development projects between the central authority and minority populations to establish trust and legitimacy, and must be willing to deploy the same personnel for an extended period of time to build trust in the local community. Such efforts are difficult and cannot be completed overnight—but they hold the promise of increasing the effectiveness of interagency efforts in support and stability operations.

\section*{III. Leadership: Education, Training and Development}

\subsection*{A. Strategic Communication: Interagency Rhetoric and Consistent Interpretation}

\textit{Amanda Smith}

The importance of civil-military communication and coordination is widely acknowledged and vigorously pursued. But is it effective and functioning as intended? The new counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual, FM 3-24, states, “[T]he integration of civilian and

\textsuperscript{283} Ibid, 56.
military efforts is crucial, and calls for ‘a formal command and control system.’”\textsuperscript{284} However, is the rhetoric which outlines the systems for such integration articulated in a clear manner and implemented as intended?

In the past fifteen years the United States Government (USG) has had the opportunity to test these questions on several occasions. Conflicts of a dynamic nature such as those in Somalia and the current conflict in Iraq have demanded that prompt and adaptive strategies be communicated from the interagency to the military in an effective and consistent manner. Policy directives, such as Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56) and National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44), have attempted to outline and streamline this very issue, but have proven to be reactionary and, at times, ambiguous and contradictory. This analysis examines leadership theory and practice by assessing theories of communication and assessment, as well as the conflicts that have influenced the formation of these two key documents. The purpose of this research is to understand communications theory and practice; review relevant case studies of lessons learned; and offer recommendations for improving interagency effectiveness. As one senior US government official stated, “good interagency won’t save bad strategy.”\textsuperscript{285} This analysis suggests that no matter how good or bad the strategy, there is no hope for successful implementation if the strategy and policy are not clearly communicated. Clear policy rhetoric is essential for an effective interagency process.

Government-wide involvement in stability operations (SASO) stresses that interagency coordination and cooperation is of utmost importance. The multi-dimensional nature of support and stability operations (SASO) demonstrates what is referred to as “marble-cake governance.” According to authors Klitgaard and Treverton, the USG is experiencing a transition “from layer-


\textsuperscript{285} Senior US official, Bush School Interagency Symposium Discussion, April 5, (2007).
cake governance, where different tasks are taken on separately by different sectors (public, private, nonprofit) to marble-cake governance, with new forms of partnerships across sectors at all levels.”

This transition is not seamless; however, the challenges of this transition are manifested in the current tensions between the Departments of Defense and State. The demands of SASO require that interagency rhetoric and communication aid in clearly outlining the coordination necessary for successful interagency policymaking processes.

Theory In Action

It is not surprising that Washington policymakers often lack the time to analyze the theoretical basis for rhetoric and policy. Nevertheless, a large body of literature that addresses the theories of communication, coordination and networking is available to guide policymakers. Organizational, rhetorical and communications theory offer the opportunity to examine political communications processes at a fundamental level. Bureaucracy and interagency politics usually influence the communication and coordination processes, which are outlined in official documents. However, it is valuable to separate these influences from what the theories themselves have to offer in order to best determine how official rhetoric for communication and coordination can best be implemented to achieve effective results.

For instance, complexity theory provides a fresh way to look at how an organization conducts self-assessments. The strength of the theory, when applied to government organizations, is that it takes into account the inevitable change and adaptation which is demanded of and characterizes government organizations. According to Philip Salem, “Complexity theory describes the interactive and evolutionary processes of organizational

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While the theory addresses change within an organization, it does so without making the subjective determination of whether the change is good or bad. When applied to a dynamic interagency process, this theory allows an organization to institutionalize change rather than fear it.

While complexity theory stands apart from other theories due to its focus on change, it also builds upon other forms of assessment which may be used in an organization. Structural assessment assumes that analysis within an organization can be taken at a “point-in-time” and will produce reoccurring and repeating assessments due to the natural structure of the organization. Functional assessment ties activity to outcome in a manner which links communication with its psychological impact. Functional assessment does not take into account variables such as quality or quantity, only psychological impacts and perception. Finally, process assessment is based on information gathered over time and may include analysis of structural and functional areas, but often strongly prioritizes stability.

While these theories address key elements of assessment, Salem feels that they do not adequately account for the dynamic nature which characterizes organizations of today. The undeniable dynamic nature of SASO and complexity of the interagency process demand a theory that can be applied in times of change and adaptation. The assessment today may be dramatically different tomorrow. Therefore, Salem’s complexity model posits that change and adaptation are no longer exceptions or events which dramatically change the manner in which an organization assesses itself. Rather, change is a norm which is addressed in a cyclical fashion.

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and represents only “points in the flow.” Essentially, change becomes a repeated and anticipated byproduct of the organization’s activity.

In Salem’s complexity model, differences in perception and assessment are embraced. No two evaluations of the situation are the same. Therefore, evaluations are only used as a tool by which to further assess the point at which events occur because these points are more useful for understanding than the event itself. Noting the point in which the change occurred allows for assessment in communication from a top-down and bottom-up manner because change can occur at anytime and at any point in the hierarchy.

Salem’s theory is useful for understanding interagency communication and coordination because it addresses two key elements of governmental coordination: change and adaptation. These two elements are the norm, not the exception, and events occur at different levels of the hierarchy. The rhetoric of USG official documents needs to embody a flexibility which reflects the evolving nature of the organizations involved and addresses the fact that flexibility is demanded at all levels, not just in Washington and not just in the field. Whether or not current official documents reflect this need will be addressed later in this analysis.

While adaptive assessment is necessary to meet the needs of SASO, it is not sufficient only to tailor communications in a manner that adapts itself to change. Communication must also be used in a manner which takes into account its audience. Institutional policy and procedure often make it difficult for an organization to do so. Policies such as these are criticized by those who write that the historical manner in which rhetoric is presented is faulty and does not take into account the needs of an audience. In fact, they state, “The traditional communication texts rely on social psychology to the neglect of cognitive psychology, and they

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emphasize matters of style and format over considerations of audience, context, purpose (particularly when there are multiple or tacit objectives for a given document)” and seek to reach an audience that is “influenced, manipulated, or informed according to design.”

294 In government agencies, bureaucratic policy and procedure often dictate the form and manner in which rhetoric is presented. Style and format are, of course, useful and necessary, but should not be given priority over a presentation which takes into consideration the characteristics of the time and the audience.\textsuperscript{295} Communication should be tailored not in an effort to meet rules and guidelines, but in an attempt to be relayed effectively and accurately, as intended. These requirements necessitate a different approach to rhetoric that take into account the concept of social knowledge.

295 Social knowledge refers to a “zone of relevance” which addresses the fact that different groups will react to rhetoric in different manners based upon the experiences and knowledge of that specific group.\textsuperscript{296} This principle can be applied to the interagency process where it is important to ensure that communication and rhetoric are designed in a manner which takes into account the varying social knowledge of the agencies involved. If interpretation within an organization can vary, it most certainly can vary between agencies with different missions and social knowledge.

**Interagency Communication and Decision Processes**

Building upon communication and assessment theory are other approaches that address the intricacies of communication and coordination within the interagency itself. These views

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{295} Mary, G. LaRoche and Sheryl S. Pearson, “Rhetoric and Rational Enterprises,” *Written Communication* 2 (1985): 265.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
represent an understanding of the dynamics at work within the government and seek to address communication issues and challenges without taking a specific event or issue into consideration. No value judgment is made regarding the quality of the strategy or policy.

Although shared interpretation between agencies arguably improves over time, there are still challenges to interpreting mission and objectives given the inherently different cultures and social knowledge of the agencies. When interagency officials gather, whether it be to discuss the drafting of policy documents or strategy, gaining consensus, across the board participation, and understanding are often quite difficult. Also, each agency brings to the table different views, perceptions and understanding which create a difficult situation for the development of rhetoric that creates common interpretation.

Varying social knowledge among agencies hinders coordination efforts. Social knowledge manifests itself in preferences, interpretation differences and strategic outlook. Despite that fact that communication “patterns tend to change over the life cycle of a crisis, becoming more structured over time as formalized, issue-specific chains of command (within both [State and Defense] departments) are clarified,” the goal should be to structure command documents for the interagency team as efficiently as possible from the beginning. The first, and perhaps most important aspect, of differing social knowledge is the issue of differing vocabulary interpretation. Rhetoric varies among agencies and creates a situation in which meanings vary.

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298 Although the interagency is comprised of many different agencies and organizations, this analysis will typically use the State Department and the Department of Defense as examples which embody the key debates and differences present within the interagency. It is not the intention of this analysis to suggest that other members of the interagency do not bring their own cultures and strengths to the table. Rather, it was necessary, for the purpose of brevity, to select two or sometimes three agencies to use as examples.

due to variations in organizational culture.\textsuperscript{300} This variation can potentially create a climate in which document rhetoric is agreed upon but interpreted differently. For example, the DoD may interpret the phrase “by all means necessary” differently from the State Department.

Social knowledge is a symptom of the inherent difference in mission between agencies. “To overcome significant differences...collaborating agencies must have a clear and compelling rationale to work together.”\textsuperscript{301} Clearly the State Department and DoD have very different missions which translate into different approaches to rhetoric formation. Even if strategic goals are understood, agreement upon rhetoric which reflects that strategy may not be possible. Rask points out this disconnect when she speaks of the “State Department’s and the NSC Staff’s implicit demand for ambiguity and flexibility [which] clashes with Defense’s explicit drive for clarity and precision.”\textsuperscript{302} This organizational difference leads Defense officials to express outrage at the perceived indecisiveness of the State Department and frustration on the part of the State Department at Defense’s demand for precision and its “unyielding” attitude.\textsuperscript{303} Disagreements such as these lead to frustration and squash debate.

The struggle between the cultures of the State Department and the Defense Department do not exist only in Washington. As the President’s personal representative, the in-theatre ambassador is responsible for “exercise[ing] full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all executive branch officers in [the country], except for personnel under the

\textsuperscript{300} Major Vicki J. Rast, Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 179.
\textsuperscript{302} Major Vicki J. Rast, Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 179.
\textsuperscript{303} Major Vicki J. Rast, Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 179.
command of a U.S. area military commander……” Coordination efforts between agencies in the field requires understanding the objective and mission as well as the culture of the other organizations. Below is an adaptation of a chart presented by Gabriel Marcella in the *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy*, which highlights some of these key differences and how they affect the military and civil agencies’ perception of each other.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Military Officers</strong></th>
<th><strong>Foreign Service Officers</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical action more important than written word</td>
<td>Written word essential for diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine is important</td>
<td>Doctrine is not important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on end states, plans, and courses of action</td>
<td>Focus on the process without a specific end state expected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core functions conducted by lower level officials (i.e. enlisted personnel and NCOs)</td>
<td>Core functions conducted by officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dislike of ambiguity</td>
<td>Ambiguity is ok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership is composed of career military officials</td>
<td>Leadership is a mixture of career F.S. officers, politicians, academics, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diverse aspects of SASO are of growing importance</td>
<td>Diverse aspects of SASO are of growing importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on training</td>
<td>Training is not the focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers oversee large numbers of personnel</td>
<td>Officers oversee others in their core area (i.e. political, economic, etc.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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When agencies are wary of characteristics and views which are inherent in each other’s culture, not only will debate be minimized due to frustrations, but also unhealthy practices may be implemented which minimize the flow of information. The Iraq Study Group Report recognized the need for free flow of information and opinions and called for “an environment in

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which the senior military feel free to offer independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon but also to the President and the National Security Counsel, as envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.\textsuperscript{305} When practices such as these are not encouraged and adhered to, then this situation can lead to the hoarding of information where “expertise [and dialogue] is traded for secrecy,” and information may not be shared because other agency representatives lack the “need to know.”\textsuperscript{306} These practices can lead to disastrous and incomplete information which, in turn, causes inadequate understanding when it comes time to put strategy and rhetoric into action. A senior DoD official states, “[The] key is for all the principals to have the perspective across the board and to understand the whole issue.”\textsuperscript{307} This is easier said than done. If there is a lack of coordination at the principal level, then leaders cannot understand the whole issue and communication with lower ranks becomes impossible. And, if it is impossible for leaders to communicate clearly within their own organizations, there is certainly no hope of clear communication at the operational level among organizations. A lack of clear communication will destroy the coordination objectives and missions of SASO.

A final challenge to interagency cooperation is the memory of past action. A State Department official said, “For everyone who wishes to walk through the gates of the future, the


\textsuperscript{306} Major Vicki J. Rast, Interagency \textit{Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia} (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 180. For example, Major Rask uses an analogy of a bottle when describing how information is often shared at interagency meetings. She states that when agencies gather they often bring the debates and discussions of their respective organizations with them but leave them capped as if they were in the bottle. The representative is present and has brought the information, but it is not shared.

\textsuperscript{307} Major Vicki J. Rast, Interagency \textit{Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia} (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 185.
path is blocked by 10,000 guardians of the past.” 308 The US Government is urgently trying to adjust to the demands of SASO but finds itself struggling. Since combat operations are historically run by the military, it is easy to default to the military when combat is a possibility. The very nature of the Defense Department’s mission in counterinsurgency warfare makes the military ill-equipped to handle all of the challenges of SASO.

The interagency must constantly battle the desire to default to military plans and simply “adapt” old plans to fit new challenges. This is a classic example of a situation in which “an agency’s prior experience with a situation has prompted it to develop contingency plans to deal with future occurrences or even a ‘folk memory’ of what worked and did not work the ‘last time.’” 309 This phenomenon is destructive to the needs of SASO as there is a tendency to rely upon the military “because they’ve done this before” while at the same time acknowledging that what has been done in SASO has not always been effective.

In a results-oriented agency like the military, contingency plans abound and may often be deferred to in time of crisis simply due to their existence. This default reliance destroys any effort to develop firm coordination based upon a commonly understood strategy and to develop clear rhetoric which will allow those strategies to be implemented at the operational level.

The challenges posed by SASO are difficult enough, but interagency teams must also deal with differing social knowledge and stifled interaction. This analysis has examined the theories which apply to these situations as well as the internal challenges the interagency faces. However, before moving on to an analysis of the current official documents which represent the method by which the interagency must function and communicate in SASO, it is beneficial to

examine key historical cases of events and developments which have helped to bring the interagency process to where it is today.

**The United States in Support and Stability Operations: An Historical Perspective**

Historically, SASO is relatively new. After World War II (WWII) the US began its involvement in what is widely considered its first attempt at SASO when it occupied and rebuilt Germany and Japan. Since 1945, there have been 55 “peace operations,” 41 of which began after the end of the Cold War. These conflicts, or operations, have been called many things, to include peace operations, nation-building and support and stability operations. US participation had been a constant and will likely continue to be a factor for this nation for many years to come. In fact, according to James Dobbins, et al., “Nation-building, it appears, is the inescapable responsibility of the world’s only superpower.”

In post WWII Germany the US assumed the role of “stabilizer” and “rebuilder.” Historical documents reflect the challenges of this role from the start. The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, established on 1 April 1946, was tasked with a variety of coordination and oversight functions. Soon after, the office realized the complexity of its task. In response to shifting organizational frameworks, the G-5 sent a note on 29 August 1945 stating that the dynamics of the situation in Germany were new and challenging for a conflict-focused military. The note read, “certain matters will continue to require combined coordination by some

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other agency….Displaced Persons operations should not be considered as peculiarly Military Government function.”

In an organization which had spent the last several years focused on military victory, the new objective of stability through rebuilding, humanitarian assistance and reestablishing governments proved difficult. In fact, a working paper prepared during the Clinton administration acknowledged, “No civilian organization, however, could match the Army’s ability to organize and impose stability in an environment as desperate as that of postwar Germany.” The United States realized that it was involved in a new type of operation; one which demanded coordination and clear communication among agencies to achieve the common objective of stability in Germany. Despite great efforts over the years, the process by which the interagency coordinates is still a challenge, as evidence by the many SASO operations since World War II and the current conflict in Iraq.

Postwar Germany demonstrates the challenges of interagency coordination in its infancy. However, this model varies from many of the operations in which the US has participated, in that the US was the occupier and temporary government in Germany. Subsequently, the US has had to operate as an outside force with a more short-term mission. Somalia is evidence of such a situation, which represents a more current case for understanding the needs which SASO pose and which must be overcome to fully succeed. Likewise, Somalia is a learning experience because it occurred prior to the formation of Presidential Decision Directive 56, the document that attempted to establish the lines of communication and control to be used by the interagency in future support operations.

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Civilian/Military Communication Prior to PDD 56: Lessons from Somalia

Somalia was an eye-opening experience for the United States and the world. The United States was forced to move beyond its battle-driven strategies of the past and confront a new kind of conflict head-on. What the US learned and experienced in Somalia in those early years of the 1990s has deeply impacted the manner in which the US government looks at conflict. The various phases of the conflict demonstrated repeated attempts to “get it right” and “wrap it up” as quickly as possible. The failure of this attempt is enshrined in the minds of many Americans with the brutal images represented in the film and book Black Hawk Down. Somalia taught the US the dangers of “peacekeeping” which, in turn, has created a short fuse for tolerance from the American people for SASO. This further creates a demand that the US get in, get it done right and get out.

Brief History of the Conflict/The role of the Interagency in the Somalia Conflict

In 1991, a competition for power erupted in conflict in the African nation of Somalia. Major General Muhammad Said Barre was overthrown, which resulted in a struggle for power among clans. In the midst of the chaos and conflict, two prominent figures rose to the top and competed for power: General Mohamed Farah and Ali Mahdi Mohamed.

Food and water shortages compounded the suffering created by the conflict. Somalia typically receives less than 20 inches of rain annually. However, incredibly low levels of rainfall for many years created a drought in much of East Africa in the early 1990s. This drought plagued Somalia and left the nation with little food and water. In fact, in some areas these basic

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315 Since the focus of this monograph is the civil-military communication processes of the USG, this analysis will focus on the involvement, communication and strategy of the US and will only address the international community when necessary for clarification or explanation.

316 James Dobbins et al, America’s Role In Nation-Building: From Iraq to Germany (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 55.
necessities did not exist at all. By the early months of 1992, some 500,000 Somalis had died from starvation and hundreds of thousands more were in danger of the same.

In April of 1992, the world responded to the humanitarian crisis in East Africa. The United Nations (UN) Security Council approved Resolution 751 which established UNOSOM, the United Nations Operation in Somalia. Fifty observers and 500 light infantry soldiers were sent to Somalia, but failed to stave off famine. In response, President George H.W. Bush ordered the US military to support UNOSOM I’s mission through Operation Provide Relief which commenced on 15 August 1992. This Central Command (CENTCOM)-organized response was commanded by Brigadier General Frank Libutti, United States Marine Corps, and had the mission of “provid[ing] military assistance in support of emergency humanitarian relief to Kenya and Somalia.” Its objectives included “deploy[ing] a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) to assess relief requirements in Kenya and Somalia; activate[ing] a Joint Task Force (JTF) to conduct an emergency airlift of food and supplies into Somalia and Northern Kenya; and deploy[ing] (4) C-141 aircraft and (8) C-130 aircraft to Mombasa and Wajir, Kenya to provide daily relief sources into Somalia to locations that provided a permissive and safe environment.” It was an expansive mission from the start.

UNOSOM I and Operation Provide Relief failed and on 4 December 1992, with the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 794, President George H.W. Bush announced the beginning of Operation Restore Hope under the command of LTG Robert B. Johnston, USMC. The US’s role in the conflict expanded dramatically at this point as it would lead and provide

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military support to the multilateral United Task Force (UNITAF). While the overall strategic objectives of this new operation remained humanitarian and stabilization, the CENTCOM mission statement was revised and expanded to read:

When directed by the NCA, USCINCCENT will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organization operations, and assist UN/NGOs in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices. Upon establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations, USCINCCENT terminates and transfers relief operations to UN peacekeeping forces.

The operation proved to be relatively successful as the 38,000 troops, of which 28,000 were American forces, were able to increase stability and security and mitigate starvation in many areas. However, despite the US’s continued emphasize on the importance of fulfilling the operational mission, which included the handoff of the effort from US command to UN-led peacekeeping forces, the initiation of UNOSOM II was repeatedly postponed. Opposition from UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, who desired a complete demilitarization of the rival clans operating in the area and a “from the top down” rebuilding of the nation’s infrastructure prior to transition from a US to UN led operation, slowed the progress of the transition.

Many of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s concerns were addressed in the third phase of combat which commenced on 26 March 1993 with UN Security Council Resolution 814. UNOSOM II’s mandate expanded again to include many of the objectives which Boutros-Ghali wished for the US-led UNITAF to address. Under UNOSOM II the objectives included, “[T]he requirement for UNOMOSM II to disarm the Somali clans; … rehabilitating the political institutions and economy of a member state; and…building a secure environment throughout the

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Also, whereas UNITAF focused on the southern region of Somalia, UNOSOM II was focused on the entire country.\textsuperscript{326} Most importantly, the expanded objectives included many that the international community wanted the US to lead in the previous phase. The US, however, was not the lead nation in the third phase. A UN peacekeeping structure under US Navy Admiral Jonathan Howe, who functioned as the representative of the Secretary General, was established in Somalia and the US provided only logistical support.\textsuperscript{327} According to Yates, “Combat operations of a limited or irregular nature may be necessary at some point after stability operations are well under way.”\textsuperscript{328} This proved to be true, as threatened warlords responded to coalition efforts with attacks. The deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers on 5 June 1993 and the deaths of 18 American soldiers on 3 October 1993 weakened the resolve of the US and led to President Clinton’s decision to remove the US forces in Somalia by 31 March 1994.\textsuperscript{329}

**Communication between Civilian Agencies/Military: The Transfer of Strategic Objectives**

Communication was a severe problem in the Somalia conflict. In fact, one senior official referred to the conflict in Somalia simply as a strategic communication problem.\textsuperscript{330} The conflict was the impetus for a new transition. Jennifer Morrison Taw states, “U.S. military commanders have also attempted since Operation Restore Hope to limit the extent of their involvement in

\textsuperscript{327} James Dobbins et al, *America’s Role In Nation-Building: From Iraq to Germany* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 59.
\textsuperscript{331} Retired Senior Department of Defense Official, Bush School Interagency Symposium Discussion, April 5, (2007).
such activities [humanitarian and civic action] to the absolute minimum.” Clearly Somalia was a learning experience for the agencies involved.

The above brief summary demonstrates that Somalia was indeed a “learn as you go” situation. Toward the end of the US-led UNITAF mission, the interagency representatives had the opportunity to assess the situation and determine the way ahead. When Boutros-Ghali, pushed for the US to disarm the violent clans and begin infrastructure reconstruction, the US was wary of doing so. The US recognized the success that was occurring and the potentially volatile situation, which could ensue should unity of command be lost. Therefore, as the interagency players determined their future strategy, they needed to find a manner to inform the UN that the US was successfully meeting the mission of UNITAF and that a hasty transition was not beneficial. By allowing UNOSOM II to be enacted, the US forfeited both the progress that was being made and compounded the difficulties of the situation by allowing the mandate to be unrealistically expanded. If the situation were tenuous enough to cause the US to question the readiness of transition, it certainly was not stable enough to expand the mission.

This decision provides evidence of a common problem which Jennifer Morrison Taw highlights. She states, “[C]ivil-military and civic action operations are often considered implied tasks, required for establishing a stable and secure environment as well as valuable for force protection.” Under UNITAF/Operation Restore Hope the US military was only to provide a secure environment and assist UN/NGO’s in humanitarian efforts. The language of the mission itself was confusing, and stated that direction would come from NCA and USCINCENT but that

assistance in humanitarian efforts would be conducted “under UN auspices.” Did this language imply that the US forces were to provide security while assisting the UN/NGOs with the help of the UN? It is very unclear who was helping whom. The military naturally wants to do what it does best: combat, security, etc. In the case of Somalia, there was a very ambiguous line between where the US effort ended and the outside and UN humanitarian assistance began.

As the objectives were met, the US military undoubtedly began to feel the pressure of the UN to expand its mission to state-building and other activities outside of its mandate (“mission creep”). Without further instruction, the US Army was left with a disconnect concerning what exactly it was to provide. It appears that in the case of Operation Restore Hope, the issue was that of ambiguous language and a lack of direct instruction from the US government.

If the US military is to lead, it needs to be clearly communicated what exactly is to be led. This problem appears to be widespread. An anonymous UN Commander said, “None of the political leadership can tell me what they want me to accomplish. That fact, however, does not stop them from continually asking me when I will be done.” As Morrison Taw states, “For the Army, this tension between short-term and long-term goals is mirrored in the internal debate over how much humanitarian assistance the Army should provide.”

In situations of multilateral effort, the US government needs to clearly state what missions and tasks are expected of the US military. Civil-military communication must be at an all time high when cooperating with other nations because outside input and coordination will serve only to further cloud an unclear US strategic picture. Clear delineation of responsibility is essential and presents another challenge for the interagency process. However, even if lines of

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responsibility are drawn, ambiguous rhetoric can seriously impede clear and correct interpretation of strategy and responsibility. Just as the mission of US forces in Somalia was unclear due to cloudy instructions, US forces today face the same challenges in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.

Ambiguous and unclear rhetoric can be a challenge at all levels and in all situations. Most importantly, change and reform must start at the top. In Washington, where top-level officials are involved in interagency coordination, the effort for clear understanding must be a priority. After Somalia and subsequent conflicts of a similar nature, such as those in Haiti and Kosovo, the USG realized the need for a comprehensive document that outlined the manner in which support and stability operations would be conducted. This document, Presidential Decision Directive 56 and its successor, National Security Presidential Directive 44, provides a prime example of how rhetoric and poorly coordinated language can produce varying interpretations and subsequently varying methods by which to proceed in an operation.

The use of the written word is invaluable in large bureaucratic endeavors such as those involved in interagency coordination. Documents must be clear and easily understood to produce the intended effect: effective coordination and communication within the interagency in support and stability operations. Perhaps it was a new realization or perhaps it was merely the frustration of Somalia; nevertheless, PDD 56 attempted to meet this challenge and repair the many communication challenges which had plagued the USG up to that point.

The Drafting of PDD 56

According to the Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook, “‘Success’ in complex foreign crises requires that the interagency simultaneously address all aspects of a crisis -- diplomatic, political, military, humanitarian, and social -- in a coordinated

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Intricate coordination such as this demands that all involved agencies have an understanding of the strategic objective of the situation. Official documents for communication are perhaps the most central and tangible representation of that understanding.

In May 1997, PDD 56 attempted to establish clear lines of interagency coordination, supervision and communication for the new type of conflict in the post Cold War security environment. Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56) attempted to explain “key elements of the Clinton Administration’s policy on managing contingency operations.” It was PDD 56 that first attempted to institutionalize many of the policies and procedures and incorporate lessons learned from within Washington and from the field.

Key Assumptions and Efforts to Limit Military Involvement

Several key assumptions affect the interpretation of PDD 56. First, the document assumes that complex contingency operations will continue in the future. The document, however, was drawn up as a reaction to the experiences of recent conflicts such as Somalia. Nevertheless, the document tries to strike a balance between the past and the future with a second goal that future operations will be conducted in coalitions if at all possible. By default, this assumption requires a heightened level of diplomatic involvement.

Considering the stinging experience of Somalia, it is not surprising to see the attention that PDD 56 gives to limiting military involvement when necessary. PDD 56 presents the view

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339 For the purposes of this analysis interagency coordination will be defined as “[w]hen within the context of Department of Defense involvement, is the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense and engaged U.S. Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objecting.” Department of the Army, *FM 3-24* (2006), Section 2-10, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf.
that “In many complex emergencies the appropriate U.S. Government response will incur the involvement of only non-military assets” and “U.S. forces should not be deployed in an operation indefinitely.”343 These statements, as a whole, appeal both to the civilian and military. The first statement demonstrates a clear plan-oriented goal, which appeals to the planning needs of the military. The second statement acknowledges the process aspects which are favorable to the State Department.

While the policy may be relatively clear, the connotations of words such as “response” can be interpreted very differently and may be taken to mean operations by the military and negotiations by the State Department. This dual interpretation can lead to an unintended reliance upon the military during crisis when time is limited because the military is often more likely to have contingency plans prepared for a variety of situations. However, the document appears to acknowledge this tendency with its effort to “reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in unplanned ways.”344

**Focus on Integration and Functional Management**

The document attempts to limit military involvement in complex contingency operations whenever possible; nevertheless, it likewise acknowledges the importance of integration and coordination during the planning processes of the conflict. Integration helps “identify appropriate missions and tasks,…develop strategies for early resolution of crises,…accelerate planning and implementation of the civilian aspects of the operation, [and] integrate all components of a U.S. response (civilian, military, police, etc.) at the policy level and facilitate

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the creation of coordination mechanisms at the operational level.”345 As the document progresses, the usage of military terms such as “operations” and “mission” become more prevalent almost to the point of loosing the dual interpretation found at the beginning of the document. This creates an unclear and inconsistent interpretation.

The ambiguity of terms is once again corrected when the document addresses the role of functional management. PDD 56 establishes the role of Executive Committees (ExComms) that are formed out of the Deputies Committee but may include more organizations that are not typically included in the NSC structure. ExComm, in turn, acts as “functional managers for specific elements of the U.S. Government response (e.g., refugees, demobilization, elections, economic assistance, police reform, public information, etc.).”346 While the document calls for this concept of functional management to be used in future operations, it is difficult to discern what method will be used in the delegation process. PDD 56 requires that the Deputies Committee make these assignments, but does not discuss how these determinations are made. This adds an element of confusion to political-military (pol-mil) planning.

**Pol-Mil Implementation Plan and Rehearsal**

PDD 56 calls for a pol-mil plan to be developed through an integrated process. The goal of the plan is “to centralize planning and decentralize execution during the operation.”347 The plan is to first designate the functional roles of ExComm (through a process undefined), who will, in turn, develop their specific parts of the plan. The sections will then be analyzed and

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coordinated “among all relevant agencies” and finally developed into a final product. Although there are many requirements of the pol-mil plan, the basic concept of delegation, decentralized drafts followed by coordinated discussions, and finally decentralized execution creates a situation in which each agency can focus on its functional role.

This method has benefits and shortcomings. The greatest potential benefit is that each agency, if delegated with agency-appropriate tasks, is able to develop its section of the plan in a language that reflects the social knowledge and culture of that specific agency. However, the shortcoming is that much of the detailed understanding runs the risk of being lost in debate and later formed into unclear language. Conversely, the fruitfulness of the debate may be minimized due to a perception of “areas of specialization.” If one agency has been dedicated to forming the plan for a certain area, then the perception is that they must be the authority on that topic area.

After the plan is developed, PDD 56 calls for a period for plan rehearsal. The goal of this period is “simultaneously rehearsal/reviewing [of] all elements of the plan.” The ExComm is to present the various elements of the plan before the operation is launched or as soon as possible after its initiation, “before subsequent critical phase[s] during the operation, as major changes in the mission occur, prior to an operation’s termination” and then with an after-action review. While this incremental review process is conceptually beneficial, it becomes unrealistic during support and stability operations, which may occur with little or no prior notice.

Training

349 Rask alludes to this problem by stating, “There’s very little discussion among people-they come to the table with a set of views that are ‘deployed’ but not discussed,” and discusses the protective attitude for certain areas which can develop among agencies. Major Vicki J. Rast, Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 180-81.
Emphasis on training is a key strength of PDD 56. The document calls for yearly training (if not more frequently) of mid-level managers. During the training, the officials are given the opportunity to better understand the process of the pol-mil plan development, implementation and experiences.\(^{352}\) To be successful, training requires forums for open discussion and reflection, and clarification of the “intentions” for missions, tasks, coordination, delegation, and responsibilities and accountability. Also, there should remain some continuity and progression in training if at all possible. The goal of the training should be to continually build a foundation of managers who are well equipped and knowledgeable of the plan’s intentions. If different managers are trained each year, the project runs the risk of losing its key strengths of consistency and development. The process should ensure that trained leaders are continually “brought up to speed” and re-trained on the strategies and intentions of the ExComm, while also introducing new mid-levels leaders to the training process. This process will help to ensure consistency of understanding which is absolutely critical in SASO.

**Expected/Intended Outcomes**

As a comprehensive document, PDD 56 faced many challenges. The Clinton Administration needed to institutionalize key policies that would reflect the challenges encountered in conflicts like Somalia. As a “first shot” at developing methods for assessing and responding to conflicts, the document was quite effective. Ambiguous terms such as “response,” “mission,” and “operation” had value because they allowed the document to appeal to the different agencies by presenting phraseology which was conducive to the different social climates of the organizations; however, it also presented an ambiguous intention. Also, while the division of elements of the plan to different agencies allowed for specialization to be developed,

it can also stifle debate. Overall, the key strengths of PDD 56 were also its greatest weaknesses; diversity allows for broad appeal but diminishes consistent understanding. For some reason, PDD 56 was never really implemented as written; therefore, with a new administration came another attempt at remedying the communication challenges which still plagued the US government. The development of NSPD 44 attempted to modify the policies of PDD 56 and presented a new method by which to approach the challenges of SASO.

**NSPD 44: Transformation of Communication**

PDD 56 represents the US Government’s first attempt to manage and coordinate the efforts of various government agencies in support and stability operations through a policy directive. Admittedly the world in which NSPD 44 (2005) was drafted was far different from the pre-911 world in which PDD 56 (1997) was drafted, which perhaps highlights the key distinctions evident when comparing the two documents: NSPD 44’s focuses on security and PDD 56’s focused on managing conflict. Under NSPD 44, the US Government not only had to address the challenges of support and stability operations, but also it had to address new challenges for US security. However, the scrapping of PDD 56 in favor of a new document may exemplify common critiques that with each administration comes the attitude of “we are the first to deal with this” and “this is a new challenge.” Nevertheless, NSPD 44 was a renewed attempt to streamline strategic communication and coordination between the agencies of the government. Unfortunately, it failed to remedy many of the rhetorical ambiguities which plagued PDD 56.

**PDD 56 versus NSPD 44: A Comparison**

NSPD 44 is very different from PDD 56 on many levels. The first difference is the focus on security. The document begins, “The purpose of this Directive is to **promote the security of the United States** through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for

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reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.” While the intention of PDD 56 was likely also security, it did not expressly state so in such an overt fashion. The second key difference of the documents is NSPD 44’s focus on preemption. Whereas PDD 56 states that the document is expressly for “interagency planning of future complex contingency operations,” NSPD 44 speaks of the need “to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law.” This difference expands the policy mandate of the interagency to include potentially any type of conflict.

A final key difference between the two documents is NSPD 44’s express designation of the Secretary of State (with the option of the assistance of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization), as the “focal point” of these types of efforts. While this appears to be a clear mandate, one can see that the policy guidance of the document creates a much broader mandate for action while at the same time blurring the lines of responsibility between the State and Defense Departments.

NSPD 44 calls for the Secretary of State to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.” While this may seem clear at first, one must consider that the document addresses an extended collection of

conflicts which may or may not include a heavy military component. This inevitably carries a potentially large responsibility for the military. The authors of the document appear to recognize that fact midway through and state, “The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”

Once this statement has been made, however, any effort for centralized coordination by designating the Secretary of State as the “focal point” is lost and an ambiguous line of authority again prevails.

Unclear lines of authority and communication are mistakes which are easily repeated. As was discussed, the conflict in Somalia demonstrated these challenges. The US military’s relative success during Operation Restore Hope prompted the UN to hastily expand the mandate of the operation while also hastily transitioning the authority and centrality of the operation away from the military. As history has shown, in the Somalia case, this proved disastrous. The unclear designations of authority within NSPD 44 risk repeating this failure. While the document may rightly place authority for support and stability operations in the hands of civilians, it does so half-heartedly while simultaneously expanding the scope of operations which may fall under civilian authority. History has shown that simultaneous unclear transition of authority and expansion of operation produces ambiguity which, in turn, inhibits clear strategic communication and coordination.

**Key Language**

The language used and the policies presented within NSPD 44 are very different than those presented in PDD 56. Because PDD 56 focused on detailed process and NSPD 44 focuses on harmonization and preemptive planning, a different interpretation of the language used in

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NSPD 44 immediately arises. Despite the document calling for the Secretary of State to be the “focal point,” which has already been discussed, the document also states that the coordination between civilian and military is “to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”

Because NSPD 44 is a policy document which is meant to give direction to all members of the interagency process, one can easily assume that members of these various organizations will not be reading the document in the same room together at all times. Therefore, interpretation of the rhetoric is necessary to convey the message. For instance, if the message of the document reads that the State Department is in charge, but must harmonize its efforts with planned or ongoing Defense Department operations, it is highly likely that someone of the State Department would take away a different message than someone at the Defense Department. In this particular case the word “harmonization” is in question. What does this really mean? Essentially, it depends upon who is reading it.

The nature of bureaucracies is to demonstrate authority over whatever it is permitted within what it considers its jurisdiction, or turf, in terms of traditional agency missions, tasks, resources, culture, etc. When reading NSPD 44, it is highly likely that an official in the Department of Defense may understand its reference to “harmonization” as an indication that the State Department must harmonize its plans with what the military already has planned. In other words, while the State Department may be the “focal point” it will always be placed in a position in which it must adapt its plans in order to mirror the existing military plans, such as in the conventional phases in the War in Iraq. In a case such as this, it could be interpreted that the State Department must always default to the military because it is the military’s job to have

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operational and contingency plans in place for virtually all parts of the world and every situation. Conversely, a State Department official reading NSPD 44 may read the word “harmonize” to mean that the Defense Department must tailor its plans to coordinate with the plans put forth by the Secretary of State. One can see how a dual interpretation of a single term can produce entirely different interpretations of the same passage.

The drafters of NSPD 44 may have envisioned the problems that the language could create. Such a realization may have sparked the designation of a Policy Coordination Committee as outlined. Whereas PDD 56’s ExComm members were to be expressly tasked with individual responsibilities, NSPD 44 designates only the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization as the chair of the committee. Beyond that, no clear divisions of labor are established.

Some may argue that all it takes is a clear understanding among senior officials to remedy the problem of multiple interpretations. That may, in fact, be the intended function of the PCC. However, the document does not make that clear. It may be the point of these documents to provide a concrete written policy directive to be used throughout the interagency with a verbal understanding at the highest levels. However, in large bureaucracies such as within the US government, a senior official cannot ensure that his or her entire organization has the same understanding of a document as he or she does. Therefore, reliance upon written word is essential as an integral part of successful operations. And, as has been shown, the rhetoric of these documents is often insufficient to produce uniform interpretation among the agencies.

**Expected/Intended Outcome**

When drafting NSPD 44, the Bush Administration was already deep into the Iraq War and had an understanding of the complex nature that this “new” type of conflict presented. However, the perception that the conflict was “new” may have hindered the intended outcome of
the policy document. In an effort to acknowledge the need for civilian support of the military, because the military could not meet all of the challenges that the conflict posed, NSPD 44 attempted to provide a “bridge” for transition. It intended to place authority in the hands of the civilians to begin the process of a civilian takeover of many of the aspects of the conflict. However, the document was not able to start that process because it did not clarify how the ongoing action would be coordinated. Because NSPD 44 failed to designate a way to establish the transition of authority to the civilian agencies, it is now caught in a holding pattern in which the military must retain increased authority in SASO due to the “hot” wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Perhaps NSPD 44 will find more success in a future support and stability operations. If implemented from the beginning of the conflict with the State Department as the “focal point,” there may be a greater likelihood that the processes are interpreted in the intended manner. However, if a conflict is ongoing, the directive has little chance of success due to unclear rhetoric and perceived contradictions.

A final interpretive difference which may influence the future impact of the document is how the State Department and the Defense Department interpret language which suggests preemption. Civil contingency planning and military contingency planning are very different in nature. As has been previously discussed in Marcella’s cultural comparison, the State Department prefers flexibility and options while the Defense Department dislikes ambiguity and unclear end states. Therefore, the contingency plans that the two organizations develop are going to be very different in nature. Subsequently, if a developing conflict becomes a crisis with little time for planning and preparation, as is typically the case, it will be natural for the US Government to default to military plans due to the likelihood that they will be more concrete,
organized and planned from start to finish. No other federal agency has the military’s capacity and supporting culture for planning in terms of organization, people, resources, education, training and experience. One thing which the military and policymakers have in common is their constant search for certainty. It is reasonable to expect that for the immediate future military contingency planning is likely to offer more substantial efforts than will the Department of State.

**NSPD 44 and DODD 3000.05**

Only a few days before NSPD 44 was formalized, the Department of Defense put out Directive 3000.05. While this analysis in no way intends to posit that the document was intended to override or contradict NSPD 44, it does appear to embody the interpretive challenges that are presented by the characteristically unclear rhetoric used in interagency-wide directives. This analysis will examine the possibility that DoDD 3000.05 may have formalized its interpretation of NSPD 44 in an effort to minimize ambiguity.

DoDD 3000.05 begins by establishing some key definitions. These include the definition for stability operations, which is “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.” The definitions of “[m]ilitary support to stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR),” which are “Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.” Other key assertions made by the document include that stability operations “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities..,” and the realization that “[m]any stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military
forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”

While the majority of the document deals primarily with the responsibilities of the various DoD Under Secretaries, the document states, “Assistance and advice shall be provided to and sought from the Department of State and other U.S. Departments and Agencies, as appropriate, for developing stability operations capabilities.” Interestingly, despite the fact that DoDD 3000.05 and NSPD 44 were released so closely together, they address the same issue of coordination from seemingly contradictory standpoints. While this is clearly not an overt attempt to be contradictory, it demonstrates the unclear understanding of the policy presented in NSPD 44 and attempts to create rhetoric which matches the needs of understanding of the DoD. When interagency-wide directives fail to provide clear language to dictate the policies and communication patterns which should be institutionalized within each organization, what are the individual agencies to do?

The value of the written word is indisputable. It serves as the medium in which to ensure consistency of thought and concrete visual representation of a government’s policy decisions. However, consistency of thought does not necessarily translate into consistency of interpretation. The United States is fortunate to have many government organizations and departments which possess uniquely different missions and cultures. This fact is what makes the efforts of the interagency process comprehensive and strong while at the same time creating potential challenges which, if unacknowledged, can minimize effectiveness.

361 Department of Defense, Directive Number 3000.05 (2005), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf (accessed April 15, 2007). While the document itself is classified you can request access by contacting the Director, Executive Services and referring to document control number OSD 75774-04.

The past sixty years have demonstrated that the United States, as the world’s superpower, is in a unique position. Instability within foreign nations, weak leaders and cultural conflicts have created a new type of combat of a dynamic nature which demands the expertise of the various US agencies. The culture of the military alone or the culture of the State Department alone is not sufficient to succeed. Somalia demonstrated the delicate balance needed between military might and civil humanitarian efforts. Likewise, the failures of Somalia demonstrated the need for clear strategic communication and coordination. Without a clear understanding of who will do what and who is in charge of what operations, the agencies are left responding to dynamic crises in an ad hoc fashion. This approach has proven ineffective.

In an effort to develop a plan by which support and stability operations could be executed, the Clinton administration formed PDD 56. The detailed, comprehensive nature of the plan provided the kind of detail that the military craves. It also acknowledged the need for the civilian agencies to step up and take over in many areas that had previously been filled by the military. However, the directive also used rhetoric that proved to be ambiguous and unclear, which may have contributed to view that the plan never being fully implemented despite several SASO operations in countries such as Kosovo.

In the wake of 9/11, the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the realization that the current interagency processes were not fulfilling the USG’s strategic objectives, the Bush administration again attempted to streamline the interagency communication and coordination with NSPD 44. However, because the conflict in question was already in progress, the language of the document proved to be unclear and at times almost contradictory. Agencies were left to their own interpretation, which may indicate that DoDD 3000.05 was a partial attempt to institutionalize national policy in a coherent manner that appealed mainly to the military culture.
Clearly, insufficient rhetoric is a problem in interagency efforts. Theories of communication and of interagency dynamics indicate that the struggle to keep debate fresh and alive and the ability to clearly communicate intention is not an easy feat. However, if the USG is to be more effective in support and stability operations, it must take advantage of all of the strengths that the interagency has to offer. To do so, it must present a united front. And, in order to present a united front, it must operate from a common understanding of policy.

A Way Forward

Under the current directives, the understanding of intended coordination and communication patterns will probably not improve. Therefore, this analysis will make recommendations for the development of future directives that seek to coordinate the interagency process for support and stability operations and develop an approach in its phraseology to help assure that the rhetoric is interpreted as intended. This analysis will also offer insights as to how to understand the potentially varying interpretations and subsequent implementation of policy under current NSPD 44.

The first recommendation is for the interagency to develop an awareness of the varying organizational cultures that each agency brings to the table. These cultures affect interpretation. The term interagency in and of itself carries an implication for the necessity of understanding multiple principals and agents. Just as it is important for the US to understand the culture of another nation when communicating, it is important for the various US agencies to understand the differing cultures which each brings to the interagency process. Understanding differing communications patterns is critical to a truly comprehensive approach and should not be inadvertently devalued in the rush to put out guidance, even in crisis situations.
When agencies seek to coordinate the rhetoric of a document in a manner which is appealing to all, it is important to question how each is interpreting the rhetoric. Again, the use of the term “response” can be interpreted very differently between, for example, the State Department, USAID and Department of Defense. Therefore, merely selecting words which appeal to all is not sufficient as some phrases may confuse the situation rather than clarify.

Similar to the need for understanding agency culture and interpretation is the need to understand the implementation patterns of the various agencies. For example, should the interagency process determine that a certain strategy demands that X objective must be fulfilled, it must realize that the manner in which the various organizations will go about fulfilling that objective are very different. For example, if the objective is securing a particular village in Iraq, the agencies must realize how their approaches are inevitably going to vary given their differing cultures. While it may seem obvious to say that the objective of “security” may be achieved in a different manner by the military than by USAID or State, it is much more than that. Timelines, willingness to accept flexibility, and satisfactory end states are likely to be very different. There must be an understanding of these precepts prior to embarking on a joint effort or there will inevitably be confusion, frustration and, subsequently, less effective results.

The above two recommendations are those which must be considered in all phases of interagency coordination. However, because the current policy directives that outline the processes for strategic communication and coordination are ambiguous and unclear, it is all the more important that the officials of the various agencies take the time to establish a common understanding of strategy and objectives at the highest levels. If the officials in Washington are able to create a climate of common interpretation, then they will be more likely to disseminate
consistent interpretations to their respective organizations to create a climate of enhanced coordination both operationally and tactically.

Since it is highly likely that the US will continue to be involved in support and stability operations, the agencies must develop a policy for coordination and communication that clearly outlines a commonly interpreted process for carrying out policy and strategy. Due to the rhetorical challenges and unclear lines of responsibility that the current directive poses, this analysis recommends that the process begin for formulating a new directive that approaches support and stability operations from two perspectives: one that addresses specifically how to proceed in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and one that addresses more generally how SASO should be approached in the future.

NSPD 44 has demonstrated the challenges that arise when a directive is drafted in the middle of a conflict. It is difficult to make the transitions of authority when one organization is put in authority while another is in the midst of completing the very operations that will inevitably be affected by such transitions. It is equally important for the civilian agencies to have a role in this type of conflict. Therefore, any new directive must acknowledge these necessities and challenges and approach drafting the directive in a manner that comes closer to satisfying the needs of each agency while improving the process overall.

If a new directive that outlines the policies for coordination and communication in the interagency is drafted, it needs to address necessary rhetorical and policy-development structural changes. A new directive for interagency coordination in support and stability operations must include clearer rhetoric. By implementing the theoretical concepts of complexity theory, a new document would embrace the idea that, to a certain extent, different interpretations can be a good thing and that change is inevitable. A new policy directive must have built into it the ability for
adaptation. As complexity theory acknowledges, change is inevitable and should be included as a characteristic of the situation at hand rather than an interruption. Also, change can occur at any level, making it necessary for clear yet dynamic lines of communication to be in place for both top-down and bottom-up communication. This realization will fundamentally change the rhetoric used in a new directive.

Paradoxically, a new directive must be able to embody a line of communication that is consistent and flexible. For example, while the role of civilian agencies is critical in support and stability operations, something may change in Iraq tomorrow at the tactical level that demands that the military take temporary control over the execution of a “civilian” operation. If change is feared, the result will be chaos. However, if change is built into the directive, then it will be clearer as to when the military should be in authority and when it should relinquish its command back to the civilians. A 2005 Government Accountability Office report states, “Collaborating agencies should work together to define and agree on their respective roles and responsibilities, including how the collaborative effort will be led.”

While it may be desirable for interagency documents to be short and succinct, clarity and thoroughness must not be sacrificed in the name of brevity. More clearly established lines of authority and coordination will require that terms such as “response” and “harmonization” are more thoroughly fleshed out rather than assuming that in times of crises a common understanding will be developed.

In a perfect world, the bureaucracy of the US Government would allow for a situation in which every officer of each department would be able to meet personally with the Secretary or head official of that organization in order to discuss the goals, objectives and intent of an

operation. Of course, that is not possible. Therefore, the agencies must rely upon the written word to convey these messages. But, how are the many organizations as outlined in NSPD 1\textsuperscript{364} to develop a common rhetoric which appeals to the organizational culture of their various agencies? While it may be possible for the leaders of these organizations to come to a common understanding while meeting together face-to-face, it may very well be impossible to find language which will mean the same thing to an army general as it does to an ambassador.

The final, and perhaps most drastic recommendation, is the idea that the entire structure of policy development for SASO must change. The rhetorical purposes of documents “are shaped by contingencies specific to the organization in question”\textsuperscript{365} and that “technical writers are conscious of and accommodate the idiosyncratic constraints imposed by their organizations in the production of technical documents, as well as the expected constraints of subject matter.”\textsuperscript{366} The leaders of the interagency organizations gather together to discuss these policy issues because they each bring a different expertise to the discussion. Unfortunately, this expertise and organizational cultural understanding is often lost as the various agencies try to “harmonize” and “coordinate” the rhetoric to be used in policy.

Harmonization and coordination are indeed essential and debate should not be neglected. However, the entire of purpose of these activities in Washington is to set the stage for coordination in the field where strategy is put to work. In an effort to make coordination “seamless,” the upper levels of the interagency may have “harmonized” the language of these


policy documents to an extent in which they no longer hold interpretive value for the individual organizations.

The final recommendation of this analysis is that the USG return to a system in which the organizational climate and expertise of the various agencies are upheld and articulated. By focusing on what each organization brings to the effort at the highest levels, the agencies have a better chance of seeing true coordination in the field. Organizational climate can be enhanced and utilized to the fullest by allowing each organization to draft a version of the policy directive using language which will be commonly interpreted by the people of that organization. This does not mean that each organization drafts its own policy and operates without the knowledge and coordination of the others. Rather, it takes advantage of the expertise of the agency heads and their understanding of their organization’s culture and uses that knowledge to draft phraseology which will be understood clearly and consistently.

The agencies must take advantage of committees such as the PCC and ExComm and use them to get on the same page figuratively, not necessarily literally. For example, Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates should be able to sit in the same room, speak, debate and reach an understanding of the policy objectives for the interagency. In turn, they can then draft a specialized directive which uses language which will convey that message to their organizations without losing coordination at the highest levels. Conversely, if they come to a verbal understanding and they try to compromise on language and draft a document in the hope that it will be commonly interpreted, their chances of maintaining that high level of understanding sharply declines.

The US government should rely upon the creativity of its leaders and allow them to exercise their cultural knowledge and experience. Written instructions and policies are critical,
but must be drafted in a way that allows for proper interpretation and implementation. This may not be possible when tens of authors are present, all trying to agree upon a single word that will mean the same thing to all of their organizations. By relying upon differing organizational expertise at the highest levels in Washington, the agencies’ hopes for successful communication and coordination (from top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top) will actually increase in the field.

In a brief summary, the recommendations of this analysis are broken down into those that should be revised and implemented under NSPD 44 and those that should be considered when a new interagency coordination directive is drafted.

Under NSPD 44:

• The agencies must develop an awareness of the varying organizational cultures which each agency brings to the table and how that culture affects interpretation.

• The agencies must develop an understanding of how organizational culture affects implementation patterns by the various agencies.

Considerations for the Future:

• A new directive for interagency coordination in support and stability operations must include clearer rhetoric.

• Clear rhetoric is established by relying upon organizational expertise at the highest levels and implementing a process in which each agency develops a document, an implementing directive that contains rhetoric that will be commonly interpreted by that specific organization rather than one common document which contains vague and subsequently ambiguous language.

Conclusion
Considering the recent history of the United States, the challenges of support and stability operations appear to be a relatively new phenomenon. This type of conflict does not appear to be fleeting and will likely plague the US for many years to come. Past conflicts, such as Somalia, have demonstrated the need for interagency coordination and for US and international military and civilian agencies to be involved in the effort. Additionally, conflicts such as Somalia have also demonstrated how difficult it is to communicate clearly and coordinate effectively among high-level organizations in Washington and New York, and implementers in the field. Theories such as complexity theory by Philip Salem and the governmental interaction theories that Vicki Rast addresses, allow us to look at these types of conflicts in an objective manner by separating ourselves from the discussions of whether a certain strategy is good or bad. These theories also allow us to understand the obstacles to cooperation that are inherent in organizations, in light of the differing cultures, missions, and preferences. Conflicts are unavoidable and can actually benefit the interagency process since it is absolutely critical that the US government have a variety of diverse strengths to rely upon when meeting the demands of complex civil-military operations.

Given the challenges that Somalia and other conflicts have posed, the past two administrations have attempted to draft directives that institutionalize a process by which interagency coordination and communication are streamlined. However, the rhetoric of these documents has proven to be insufficient or contradictory. Unclear language has allowed for multiple interpretations and failed to acknowledge that the interagency is composed of very different agencies, each with its own organizational culture.

For USG policies and strategies in support and stability operations to be successful in the future, the processes that underpin the manner in which the interagency interacts must be
improved. Drawing upon the expertise of the organizations, and treating their differences as strengths rather than weaknesses, will create a climate that is more conducive to the drafting of policy that meets the immediate needs of the situation. Interpretation determines if rhetoric is clear or not. By ensuring that directives are interpreted as intended, correctly and from the beginning, the interagency has a better chance of seeing its strategy implemented successfully. Clarity must begin in Washington.

B. Counterinsurgency Doctrine FM 3-24 and Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Bottom-Up Review

Tyson Voelkel

“Do not take the first step without considering the last.”—Carl Von Clausewitz

This paper provides a bottom-up review of Operation Iraqi Freedom to compare it to current counterinsurgency doctrine FM 3-24 (COIN) from a tactical perspective. Two vignettes will compare and contrast the prescriptive solutions from COIN with actions personally experienced in Iraq from March 2003 to February 2004.

The U.S. military is the most capable force in the history of warfare, but is it flexible enough to adapt to the paradigm shift in war fighting in an asymmetric conflict? If so, what is the best method of implementing changes, and does the COIN FM 3-24 provide the guidance necessary for such a change? Does the document provide prescriptive solutions for soldiers conducting counterinsurgency in Iraq, especially when “the guerrilla wins if he does not lose?”

History is a good indicator of future performance and many strategists, politicians, and scholars believe continuation of current policies in Iraq may overstretch our military and decrease the influence America has on the stability of Iraq and the Middle East. The range of options for

367 Counterinsurgency FM 3-24 Marine Corps 3-33.5. Published in December 2006.
improving our military capabilities in support of COIN is considerable, but success hinges on the political will of American policymakers and the ability for tactical-level operational success.\textsuperscript{369}

**Overview of American Military Strategy and Counterinsurgency (COIN) Warfare**

In March 2007, America stands alone as the world’s greatest economic and military power. The values that made America great in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century are unchanged in the eyes of policymakers in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century: liberty, capitalism, and economic liberalism drove America to find innovative solutions during the 20\textsuperscript{th} century for the betterment of humankind as well as the development of the most destructive weapons in history. Nation-states were the key players in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, with most of the period dedicated to a bipolar balancing act between the United States and the Soviet Union. Strategies for success focused on robust military strength, nuclear stockpiles, and economic aid packages to countries sympathetic to democracy proved successful.

Coups organized, funded, and often led by U.S. covert operations were common and seen as necessary in the fight against the Red Army and communist ideology. The U.S. outlasted the Soviet Union and at the end of the Cold War it seemed the world would be safer with the benevolent United States as the sole superpower dominating world affairs.

Fast forward to the 1990s. Terrorism and rogue regimes replaced communism as the largest threat to the United States. Humanitarian intervention dominated public discourse as the United States committed troops to Somalia and organized a multinational force to address problems in Bosnia and Kosovo.\textsuperscript{370} In the meantime, ethnic civil wars were erupting in

\textsuperscript{369} The military currently is attempting to transform from a Cold War conventional force to one that is capable of Full Spectrum Operations ranging from conventional warfare, SASO, catastrophic recovery/relief and COIN operations. The interagency system, however, is still determining how best to focus in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century with limited resources and even more limited legislation regarding actions taken in support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). There is no strategic guidance with specific hierarchical directions for agency directors to provide long-term visions. Agencies live in a Hobbesean world where survival is based on relevance and inside the beltway, everyone is relevant.

\textsuperscript{370} Symbols played a huge role in policy in the post Somali “Black Hawk Down” era. Seeing pictures of U.S. soldiers dragged through the streets of Mogadishu led policy makers to make hasty decisions to pull out of the area.
Chechnya, Tajikistan, Myanmar, Kashmir, Sri Lanka and Croatia. The options for what U.S. policy should be toward intervention in the 1990s ranged from Chaim Kaufmann’s nuanced support of external intervention in all ethnic wars to the other side of the scale, represented by Barry Posen’s prescriptions based on internal solutions.\footnote{Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security Vol.20, No. 4 (Spring 1996): 136-75. Barry Posen, “Military Response to Refugee Disasters,” International Security Vol. 21, No.1 (Summer 1996):72-111. On page 30 Posen posits that ethnic groups should enhance communication to reconcile different views of history, and advises that external forces such as the U.S. should provide conflict resolution rather than military security forces that may end up siding with one group. Kaufmann’s entire argument is based on external forces separating the feuding groups and then siding with the underdog using Armenia and Azerbaijan as successful examples of separation.} Policymakers struggled with what role the United States would play in these conflicts and in one case stood by idly during the slaughter of 800,000 Rwandans—raising questions about American commitment and benevolence.\footnote{Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, Harper Collins: New York, NY 2002.}

In the 1990s, issues of intervention were based on American interests and defining when and where U.S. interests were in jeopardy. Genocide versus civil war became the litmus test for U.S. intervention. Why send troops to the Balkans but not to Rwanda? Various theories of ethnic war pervaded scholarly discussion—some even made it to policymakers’ desks, providing the intellectual fuel for the military’s Stability and Support Operations (SASO) doctrine of the mid-1990s.

Ironically, however, no contemporary counterinsurgency (COIN) document existed for those who would be the “boots on the ground” in these new and more prevalent irregular conflicts. Even more disturbing was the absence of any national strategy for counterinsurgency. There was a doctrinal gap in the literature and education within federal government agencies, bureaus, and leadership that spanned almost 25 years. The current COIN manual was published in December 2006, meaning the Army had no clear doctrine in the war they were fighting before that time. As a result of this educational void, very few systems were in place at the strategic, operational, or tactical level to provide leaders in the federal government with the tools to conduct complex post-combat operations. The 1990s seemed to confirm the need for a transformation in the military to a more agile and expeditionary force, yet leaders failed to appreciate the enormous change in the international order caused by the fall of the Soviet Union. U.S. forces continued to train on Soviet-style doctrine and designed weapon systems and strategy to defeat Soviet-style threats. The Stability and Support Operations conducted in Kosovo and Bosnia were viewed as outliers and not the focus for the U.S. military.

In 1999, I was a young Opposing Forces (OPFOR) platoon leader in Germany. Our mission was to replicate Soviet doctrinal maneuvering warfare against U.S. forces (BLUFORCE) training in Germany. I maneuvered 12 M-113 vehicles rigged to look like Soviet Bronevaya Maschina Piekhota (BMPs) fighting vehicles. Rotations at the Combat Maneuver Center (CMTC) focused on High Intensity Conflict (HIC) for ten days, while two days were spent on

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374 LTG David H. Petraeus and LTG James F. Amos state in the introduction that the purpose of the manual as a general approach to counterinsurgency operations is to fill in a doctrinal gap of more than 20 years within the Army and 25 years within the Marine Corps.

375 The Bronevaya Maschyna Piekhota (BMP-1) was first built in the early 1960s and seen in public in November 1967 at a Red Square parade. It was called the M-1967 and BMP by NATO before its correct designation was known. The BMP represented an important shift from the concept of an armored personnel carrier to an armored infantry combat vehicle, combining high mobility, effective anti-tank weapons, and armored protection for carrying troops. The BMP is significantly smaller than Western APCs and has considerably greater firepower.

SASO. Our Soviet-replicated opposing forces (OPFOR) vehicles and knowledge of the terrain rarely allowed the American forces to win a battle. The Danish, Germans, and even Polish military fared no better against our U.S. OPFOR. The focus for the Germans, Danes, and Polish forces were also centered on HIC. It seemed that the world’s military forces were destined to remain mired in Cold War doctrine and training techniques, while rogue regimes and terrorist organizations were increasing their capabilities and global reach.

Finally, in 2000 the U.S. military started to transition to four full days of irregular warfare at the CMTC with a focus on civilians on the battlefield (COB) and the use of media and Special Forces.376 Exercises were also developed to train and evaluate Corps, Division, and Brigade systems by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). One example was the Urgent Victory Exercise, created as part of the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). The program, headquartered at Ft. Leavenworth, is designed to train and evaluate senior leaders and staffs across the Army on key mission-essential tasks. In 2000 the V Corps conducted the largest and most ambitious training exercise of its kind. New technology, communications platforms, and command and control systems were tested. Over 10,000 soldiers, 3,000 contractors, and 25 brigade-sized headquarters were linked through simulations or brought to Germany for the exercise. The focus was primarily on command and control during conventional warfare—there was no training on insurgency or guerilla operations. The training exercise was hailed as a success, and in 2001 and 2002, the exercise continued with a focus on command and control systems—no training was conducted on establishing measures of effectiveness for fighting irregular conflicts, despite planning at the corps level in late 2002 for a possible invasion of Iraq.

Conventional operations dominated military thinking in large part because it was the core

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376 This was not an RMA period; it was simply a focus the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Shinseki, saw as a priority for the Army. He stopped the practice of REFORGER missions in Germany and increased funding for STIX lanes geared toward irregular warfare.
competency of senior leaders who experienced the euphoria of destroying the Iraqi military during the Gulf War. War was about destroying tanks and enemy command and control systems—not about insurgencies or nation building. Slowly, SASO and irregular warfare became more prevalent in discussions at senior leader education programs across the nation and at the maneuver training centers. Training Centers in California, Louisiana, and Germany increasingly placed performance measures on SASO operations. COIN development was the natural next step in the development of military capabilities, and the catalyst for that development was Operation Iraqi Freedom -- rather than strategic vision.

**COIN FM 3-24 Development**

Doctrinal literature for counterinsurgency operations is not new to the armed forces. The 1950s saw a focused effort on developing counterinsurgency doctrine for the Army. The Combat Development Group, United States Continental Army Command, the Command and General Staff College, and Combat Developments Command were all organized to develop doctrine to better prepare the armed forces for conflicts.³⁷⁷ Prior to September 11, 2001, the military focused resources primarily on improving conventional war fighting capabilities. The Cold War and Gulf War were the templates for success, while Vietnam counterinsurgency lessons learned were not maintained or institutionalized. September 11, 2001 changed the operational focus from purely force on force conventional victories to a Global War on Terror.³⁷⁸ The U.S. war against al Qaeda prompted Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. OEF focused heavily on Special Forces operations capabilities with impressive initial results. Both conflicts prompted strategists to reconsider what warfare would entail in the 21st century. Many authors and practitioners with experience in conducting operations in Iraq made the claim that insurgency

operations will be the predominant operations of the $21^{st}$ century, highlighting the need for improved interagency operations and military training.\textsuperscript{379}

In March 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) started with the stated goal of regime change. OIF, like OEF, started with impressive conventional victories and validation of the American way of war.\textsuperscript{380} Insurgency was an afterthought in the invasion planning, and at the brigade and battalion level the focus remained on destroying the Iraqi Army and militia forces. OIF was a conventional campaign with conventional goals until post-combat operations were declared. Prior to the invasion, units deploying to both combat zones began developing training plans to better prepare soldiers for expected operations.

Units, such as III Corps, developed exercises prior to deploying to Iraq, spurring After Action Reviews (AARs) for improving U.S. Army capabilities in Iraq. In January 2004, the counterinsurgency shortcomings identified in the III Corps exercise were consolidated and compiled for analysis. The next step in the development in FM 3-34 came as a directive from the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center, at Ft. Leavenworth Kansas: an order for a new counterinsurgency field manual. In October 2004 the interim field manual was published for use in training and leader development courses.\textsuperscript{381} For one year (November 2004-November 2005), extensive interviews and research were conducted on OEF/OIF in an attempt to gather the most relevant information to include in the doctrine for publication.

Simultaneously, key authors were selected under the direction of Dr. Conrad Crane. In February 2006, a counterinsurgency conference served as the final vetting venue prior to

\textsuperscript{380} The American way of war, as described by Colin S. Gray in \textit{Parameters} Vol. XXXVI, No.2 Summer 2006.
\textsuperscript{381} Interview at Ft. Benning Infantry Center with Major Daniel Hart, and Mr. Arthur Durant, Infantry Doctrine Center, April 2007.
The document underwent revisions and analysis from February 2006 until June 2006, when the first draft was distributed to the force, and in December 2006 COIN FM 3-24 was published—three years after the invasion of Iraq.

COIN FM 3-24 was developed in less than two years, yet it contains salient prescriptions for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Taken as a whole, the manual boils the complexity of counterinsurgency into five imperatives, eight principles, and nine paradoxes for successful execution of COIN.\(^{383}\)

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<th>Imperatives</th>
<th>COIN Paradoxes</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Manage information and expectations</td>
<td>- The more you protect your force, the less secure units may be</td>
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<td>- Use measured force and discriminate actions</td>
<td>- Doing nothing in some cases may be the best response to insurgent actions</td>
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<td>- Learn and adapt</td>
<td>- The best COIN weapons are ones that don’t shoot</td>
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<td>- Empower the lowest levels</td>
<td>- Tactical success guarantees nothing</td>
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<td>- Support the host nation</td>
<td>- A tactic may work in one province but not the next</td>
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<th>Principles</th>
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<td>- Legitimacy as the main objective</td>
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<td>- Unity of effort</td>
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<td>- Political primacy</td>
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<td>- Understanding the environment</td>
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<td>- Intelligence as the driver for operations</td>
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<td>- Isolation of insurgents from their cause and support</td>
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<td>- Security under the rule of law</td>
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\(^{382}\) Dr. Conrad Crane is currently the Director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA. \(^{383}\) Combined Arms Center--An Engine of Change. Presentation by Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus. October 2006, Ft. Leavenworth Kansas.
Understanding the imperatives, principles, and paradoxes offered in FM 3-24 ensures military planners have the requisite framework to view the problems encountered in irregular warfare. Executing operations based on this framework has proved to be a difficult task in Iraq, and it continues to influence domestic political debates and fuel discussions within the Department of Defense (DOD) regarding what course of action will lead to strategic victory in the prosecution of OIF.

Combat operations in Iraq began on March 19, 2003, and FM 3-24 was published in December of 2006. It is difficult not to assume that some of the current difficulties in Iraq can be attributed to the lack of a focused COIN doctrine for planners at the strategic and operational levels. It is also reasonable to assume that there was not a national strategy for combating insurgency at the outset of OIF. Would FM 3-24 have provided the military with the proper framework to prevent the seemingly intractable situation facing the U.S. in Iraq in March 2007? The following firsthand account of operations in Iraq from March 2003-February 2004 may provide insights into the usefulness of the doctrine and its proper implementation in DOD training and learning centers.

**Operation Clean Sweep: 82nd Airborne Division: Best Intentions Gone Bad**

*Task Force Falcon's First Major Civil-Military Project with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)*

The 82nd Airborne Division is renowned for its ability to rapidly deploy worldwide within 18 hours of notification to neutralize any threat. Our brigade combat team (BCT) of 3,430 paratroopers conducted a ground assault, convoy and simultaneous tactical air insertion into Iraq on March 23, 2003. From that date until May 1, 2003, the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division conducted combat operations from Samawa to Falluja. During fierce combat operations, the brigade neutralized at least 700 fedayeen, Royal Republican Guard, and militia in
the battle for Samawa alone. Conventional joint operations as well as combined arms operations were second nature to the paratroopers of the 2/82nd. Losing a battle was not an option, and every minute of training and discipline were required to survive the extreme temperatures and battles with the fedayeen. Conventionally, the 2/82nd was well-trained, equipped, and utilized. Leaders in the brigade were conducting joint operations with the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Special Forces, and the Central Intelligence Agency to neutralize the enemy threats and facilitate the regime change mission of the invasion. Every mission was conducted within the five phase framework of the strategic Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1003V.\textsuperscript{384} From February 3, 2003 to May 4, 2003, the 2/82nd conducted combat operations over 600 miles through nine Iraqi cities before reaching Baghdad.\textsuperscript{385}

Morale was high. Mission success was paramount and brigade leadership made every effort to recognize the efforts of the unit’s brave paratroopers. They were trained for direct-action conventional combat operations and they were professionals. Every paratrooper had completed rigorous training and certifications on critical war-fighting tasks at Ft. Bragg and the National Training Center (NTC) prior to the deployment—there was no certification on fighting guerilla operations.\textsuperscript{386}

On the first of May, President George W. Bush declared an end to major combat operations in Iraq, signaling the move to Phase IV of OPLAN 1003V. The brigade moved to Southern Baghdad for stability and support operations (SASO). Our ability to adapt from high-intensity combat (HIC) to low-intensity combat (LIC) operations within hours was critical to our

\textsuperscript{385} See Appendix A for detailed information about attack route and operation.
\textsuperscript{386} 2/82 served as the division-ready brigade for over six months prior to the deployment with equipment readiness and paratrooper development and training as top priorities. Initially, the 2/82 was preparing to conduct operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The 2/82 completed live fire exercises, and a deployment and parachute assault to NTC in support of the Millennium Challenge Exercise in 2002.
success. None of the paratroopers in our brigade envisioned conducting SASO/LIC operations prior to deployment. The focus at Ft. Bragg had been on conventional skill sets and conducting a parachute assault into enemy territory and neutralizing the enemy. Counterinsurgency operations were not even mentioned during the development of OPLAN 1003V or introduced into our brigade lexicon during our first three months in Iraq. To complicate matters, civilian leadership in Iraq was transferred from retired LTG Jay Garner, then deputy at CENTCOM for reconstruction in Iraq, to Ambassador Paul Bremer. Authority shifted from CENTCOM to Ambassador Bremer for reconstruction in Iraq—to include security forces. The Iraqi Army was disbanded and Iraqi police force stripped of all high-ranking, experienced officers for fear of Ba’ath Party resurgence. This single action changed our role of liberation force to one of occupation—an occupation that immediately took on the responsibility of policing Iraqi streets.

My role as a brigade staff officer during this period was simple: assist in the planning of tactical operations in Southern Baghdad to ensure the Ba’ath Party leaders and Saddam loyalists were captured or killed. This was a typical task for an infantry captain on brigade staff, especially since I had been in the job for over 13 months and had the experience of two short-notice brigade deployments. The focus of my job changed drastically when a Civil-Military Operations Cell (CMOC) was created by the artillery battalion commander (Lieutenant Colonel Smith). The CMOC consisted of volunteers from each of the primary organizations in the brigade combat team: artillery, air defense, intelligence, medical, legal, logistical personnel, and civil affairs representatives were all part of the new group. The group met daily to develop methods to spur economic growth, rebuilding, and infrastructure repair/creation—tasks no one in our unit was trained in and, frankly, not ones we thought we were responsible for. A common theme during this period was expressed by paratroopers: “Sir, we did our job…we killed the
enemy and Saddam is not in power, now let’s go home. I didn’t join the 82nd to build sewage lines or get shot at while I help build a school.“387

The CMOC group was ad hoc, and few had prior SASO training other than LTC Smith. I was responsible for coordinating all of the CMOC operations, as well as the unit’s tactical operations. Twenty-hour days were the norm and showers were optional during the initial days as we drove ourselves into the ground trying to understand our new purpose.

The first CMOC meeting lasted five hours in a cinder block room in 115 degree heat. Each of the members walked away from the event stupefied at the Herculean task ahead. LTC Smith expected us to catalog every sewage pumping station, electric power station, school, mosque, church, and gas station by the end of the week. Despite our misgivings, we saluted with our brigade motto -- "All the way—let’s go!" -- and accomplished the tasks over the next week. During the week, the CMOC group spent countless hours driving the streets and alleyways of Southern Baghdad. Most times we were greeted by smiling Iraqis, proud of their new freedom and excited at what lay ahead for their families. Children swarmed our Hummers trying to get a glimpse of our faces and especially our eyes. Elderly Iraqis often cried with gratitude. In all cases, the Iraqis I encountered wanted to be proud of their country and its enormous potential. It occurred to me that these men, women, and children were very similar to those in my hometown—people who wanted to work for a living and care for their families. They wanted to be proud of where and how they lived.

The problems the newly liberated Iraqis faced were immense. Unlike my hometown, there was no government system in place to provide basic necessities for the citizens. No sewage plan, no garbage collection plan, no electricity plan, limited job opportunities, and—worst of all—no police to enforce law and order. Corruption was rampant and looting government

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buildings was viewed as a right for the poorest Iraqis. The lack of systems and motivation was a problem that would not be corrected quickly and would require more than just money or U.S. security. The Iraqis needed a paradigm shift in how to live and govern their lives. Sanctions against Iraq following the Gulf War left the country firmly at the mercy of Saddam and his regime. Most Iraqis I spoke to had no memory of initiative or self-reliance because of Saddam’s rule. Over the past thirty years, they had no hope unless they pledged their unyielding support to Saddam and his regime; now, they could break free from these chains and live freely—but it would not be simple. Problems were around every corner and it seemed no actions the coalition took were fast enough or understood. The coalition wanted to fix everything right away—as did the Iraqis—however, the reality of the situation precluded anything from happening quickly. The disparity between the State Department and the military seemed wide, but not nearly as wide as the perception the Iraqis had of what America could do versus what America was actually capable of doing.

One problem seemed to stand out in my mind as a symbol of change in the city—the huge amount of space piled full of garbage from years of no sanitation cleanup. Saddam’s garbage trucks were paid poorly by the government, and drivers earned more from tips from wealthy Iraqis than the government salary of one dollar a day. Naturally, the poor sectors of Baghdad had no means of tipping, so the garbage trucks never made stops there. This filth left no room for children to play sports, but plenty of room for disease, crime, and poverty—perfect recruiting grounds for insurgents.

A sight I will never forget is seeing children wading through sewage to pick up remnants of plastic bottles so they could use them to collect water. Looting was also rampant in the wealthier areas of our sector. The Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
(ORHA) gave strict orders for U.S. personnel to remain neutral when facing looters. This mandate left many of our paratroopers astounded as Iraqis ripped the very cables out of government buildings to sell on the markets. Everything that could be ripped from walls and windows was stripped during the looting, and coalition forces were told to stand by and “let the Iraqis police themselves”—a policy we would all come to regret adopting in the coming months. Witnessing these activities and the plight of many Iraqis gave our CMOC the courage to continue working tirelessly toward some solution in our sector. I knew we could make an impact if we could find a way to clean up the major trash areas adjacent to living quarters. The more pride they had in their home, the less chance for the enemy to seek refuge or foment hatred. The main problem our units and Iraqi allies faced was scarce resources. Our brigade did not have a direct link to the other agencies operating in our sector other than ad hoc relationships created by motivated civil affairs personnel and paratroopers. Our brigade was equipped with the requisite equipment to kill insurgents, but not to educate, train, and rebuild. The only tool we had at our disposal was our unyielding desire to accomplish the mission we were assigned. We attempted to teach democracy, train security forces, and rebuild by scrounging and improvising. We certainly were not equipped to establish a large trash cleanup project in sector.  

To make our vision a reality, I needed money and expertise. I received the go-ahead on the project from our brigade commander with permission to use his military police detachment and Hummers. The brigade commander fully understood what operations his paratroopers should engage in during the day—rebuilding and legitimacy operations. He constantly told commanders, “Without legitimacy our mission will fail, go out there and shake hands, don’t break promises, and work 24/7 to figure out who the bad guys are…if you don’t know who the

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388 The 2/82nd was under the operational control of the 3rd Infantry Division until the First Armored Division arrived in country.
key players are in your sector, you aren’t doing your damn job.” As the operations officer for the CMOC, I had the freedom to stay in the relative safety of the compound or travel the streets of Baghdad. I chose to travel the streets and seek out the interagency personnel who could help our brigade with the mission of trash cleanup in the al Risala and al Shurta sectors. Within two days, I located the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) office in the Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) headquarters in the Green Zone. There was no directory of office locations or even a list of who was working in the Green Zone at this time, so finding key personnel to solve problems was a matter of chance and determination. I met with the USAID Chief of Station, and he agreed to send a team into our sector to see what could be done.

Within one week, USAID had established a Direct Assistance Reconstruction Team (DART) to assist in the project. DART teams from USAID consisted of a small handful of experts in waste management, water, logistics, medical services, and contract vetting. The first project we collaborated on included the delivery of thousands of medical aid kits to clinics in the 2/82nd sector. The DART team members were professionals and understood the importance of building credibility with the locals, and they wasted little time in the delivery of medical and dental supplies. For our next project, we envisioned 5,000 Iraqis working to clean up trash in their local areas. USAID insisted that the idea for a cleanup come from Iraqi city council members in the sector rather than a dictate from coalition troops. The 2/82nd preference was to take control of the entire operation from start to finish. We decided to try the USAID method.

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390 The first successful project for our brigade was the delivery of medical supplies to our sector. The following link has a picture and description of the event. http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/photogallery/gallery_13/he03.html.
The following week we held numerous meetings as the Iraqi city council members mulled over the ideas USAID presented. Eventually the Iraqi city council members decided they needed a project to keep the young men off the streets. This project had the potential to provide jobs and a purpose for thousands of the citizens in our sector. Providing jobs would increase legitimacy of the council and coalition as well as deter potential insurgent recruits.

After a five-hour session with one of the USAID representatives, the council determined that it could hire 12,000 young men for the job. The estimate was far more ambitious than the USAID DART leader or I had envisioned, and we were ecstatic. The council members would take care of advertising, hiring, documentation, and pay distribution to each of the 12,000.\(^{391}\) The only requirement for U.S. forces was security at various checkpoints and along the perimeter of the trash cleanup area to protect the workers. USAID agreed to pay the 12,000 workers. I left the meeting with a feeling of pride and accomplishment. This was democracy at work—a free-thinking group of Iraqis had solved a problem for themselves and all they needed was a bit of prodding and hope. The council members held a press conference immediately following the meeting for a gathering group of Iraqis. Reporters took notes on ragged tablets with stubs of pencils while the council announced the project. Singing and chanting could be heard for blocks. It was a good day for the coalition and the Iraqi leaders.

It was during this meeting that I learned that the most powerful weapon in SASO was offering hope and legitimacy to the Iraqis. Hope was the most powerful thing these people had: a hope for their families and for the future of their country. I was humbled by the effort the USAID representatives put into coaching the fledgling city council. Our paratroopers saw the Iraqis in a different light and also learned about the importance of liberty and freedom. It was a great day—

\(^{391}\) After the first week of the project we learned that one of the council members was receiving kickbacks from a few hundred of the people he helped hire. It was customary that 10% of the salary would be paid to the person who got the job for them. We put a stop to this practice and privately reprimanded the council member.
everyone walked away from the meeting feeling as though we accomplished something extraordinary.

One week later, we began Operation Clean Sweep. 9,780 workers showed up and were paid that afternoon. The next day we had close to 11,000 workers. The men came by foot, by car and by donkey; some carried brooms, some carried handmade shovels, and some could work only with bare hands and feet. They were paid two dollars a day. They sang and danced as they cleaned one neighborhood after another. Various media outlets covered the success story and word spread throughout other Baghdad neighborhoods of the project. USAID was pleased and decided to replicate it on a larger scale in Sadr City in Northeast Baghdad. I made a trip to the sector to meet with coalition members, describe the success we had in Southern Baghdad, and pass on my lessons learned. USAID then replicated the project in Sadr City with tens of thousands of workers.

In the meantime, B-Company of the 3d Battalion of the 325th Parachute Infantry Regiment (3-325) took the lead on Operation Clean Sweep in Southern Baghdad. The commander saw the positive aspects of the project. Attacks decreased in his sector and his city council was pleased with the number of jobs they were able to create, giving them more credibility with their constituents. For many Iraqis, it was the first time they had clean fields for soccer games and other sports. Hope was increasing in direct correlation to our legitimacy and the credibility of the city council members. It seemed as though we found a solution to SASO in Iraq.

Our unit was still conducting tactical operations at night while working on civil-military operations during the day. The tempo was fast, and it was rare for our paratroopers to sleep more than four hours a in a 24 hour period. At this point we still had no air conditioner units, ice, or
consolidated forward operating bases. Infantry companies were operating out of their own forward operating bases in our sector. We were looking forward to redeploying on the 4th of July. As the date for our redeployment drew near, we realized that we would be asked to stay for a longer tour. The Third Infantry Division (3ID) had been extended and we knew that it was going to be a long, miserable summer—but none of us knew how miserable.

In mid-July at the brigade headquarters, we had just eaten lunch and were working on operational orders for future missions. The temperature inside the building was well over 100 degrees, and the temperature outside in the sun felt like an open flame. No one was working directly in the sun and the Iraqis stayed indoors during the hottest parts of the day.

Our soldiers at the Operation Clean Sweep site were taking breaks in an air-conditioned bus as they guarded the borders of the clean up operation. Two soldiers, SPC Gibbs and PFC Burns, were taking their turn on the bus when two rocket propelled grenades (RPG) ripped through the bus, killing Gibbs instantly and severing Burns’ legs and a portion of his right arm.

The report of the attack crackled across the radio as I listened intently. My heart sank and my lunch began to work its way back up. My first thought was one of guilt for establishing the trash project, since the soldiers would not have been there if I had not set it up. I was sick to my stomach and outraged at the Iraqis for what they had done. Our unit reaction followed standard operating procedure: we established a cordon around the immediate neighborhood, searched every home in the vicinity, placed the area under strict curfew, established checkpoints, and conducted field interrogations of questionable individuals. Morale of the unit was low and emotions ran high. Iraqi council members shared our disgust and did their best to calm the company commanders in the sector. USAID and other agencies stopped daily visits and only came to drop off large duffle bags of money to pay the Iraqi workers. Our paratroopers’
puzzlement at the complex environment developing before their eyes grew with each passing sunrise.

Our two-month deployment had turned into a six-month one as our focus had turned to civil-military operations rather than combat operations, and our minds and bodies were exhausted. The attack at the trash site affected everyone.

Paratroopers felt disgust; State Department, USAID, NGOs, and other agencies no longer wanted to drive into our sector unless they had armed escorts. My trips into the Green Zone were increasingly viewed as jumping the chain of command in order to get work done. Agencies felt concern over safety, and they had the ability to remain in the protected hallways of the palace while my men and I suffered the wrath of disgruntled Iraqis and uncompromising work schedules. To further complicate matters, many of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Department of State officials refused to meet one-on-one with Iraqis unless our soldiers searched the buildings and vetted the individuals prior to meetings. The solution was to bring the Iraqis to the Green Zone for meetings. Insurgents only needed to document people who entered and left the Green Zone in order to target them later. Interpreters started to receive death threats, as did members of the city councils. The common assumption made at the embassy and military intelligence units was that Ba’ath Party members had gone underground to cause the increase in violence. A new term was coined: Saddam loyalists.

With a new term came new missions to locate and destroy or capture the Saddam loyalists in sector. A new purge of Ba’ath Party members began. Under ORHA and later the CPA, Ba’athists were automatically considered untrustworthy and were removed from any meaningful decision-making roles. Coordination became more difficult, operations became more complex and reconstruction slowed to a snail’s pace in the sector. The first improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) were being used in Baghdad and our brigade only had four armored Hummers. I would spend hours on the highway daily in a Hummer with no doors, traversing roadblocks, checkpoints, and IEDs to obtain funding and encourage ORHA to honor our requests for reconstruction. The answer, more often than not, was, “ORHA has the mandate for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, but not the resources.”

To complicate matters for the trash project, many of the Iraqi workers left. Some left because of threats of further violence if they helped the coalition, others for fear of their lives, and some because they lost faith in the project and their countrymen. Ironically, thirty hours after the attack the two gunmen were traced to a sector outside of Baghdad. They had been hired to come into the sector and disrupt civil-military cooperation.

After we learned of the plot, our forces immediately put the word out to the Iraqi leadership and newspapers that the men who killed the U.S. soldier were not from al Risala or al Shurta. They were Iraqis who wanted Iraqis to fail. Within two days of the attack, we were back in operation with over 12,000 Iraqi workers. But there was an important difference this time: our soldiers were very aggressive toward the Iraqis and suspicious of every vehicle that came within 500 yards of the work site. The environment had changed, and it signaled a different type of warfare than we had been trained to fight.

We had officially entered the irregular warfare phase of OIF I. Two months passed before I was called back to the United States on emergency leave to care for my mother after a risky heart surgery, and I was in the United States for almost 20 days. My mother survived and was in good spirits. I could have stayed longer but my place was with my men in Iraq. I made a trip to Walter Reed Hospital to see the wounded soldiers from the 82nd and saw PFC Burns, a triple amputee at age 19. He would receive his Purple Heart and U.S. citizenship from President Bush.

392 Discussion with ORHA Assistant Director for Governance, July 2003, Baghdad, Iraq.
later in the week. His spirits were good, but what struck me the most was the pride and admiration his father held for America, my soldiers, and our mission. He believed with all his heart that his son was wounded in the pursuit of justice and hope for a democratic peace in the Middle East. We had a wonderful talk, and as I left he told me, “Good luck, sir. Take care of the boys.” I choked back tears as I walked past the rooms of wounded soldiers and family members. Some were not American citizens yet—but they sacrificed for America. I walked away thinking of how I could help prevent more of these young people from being injured or killed.

What was the best way to take care of my troops in this irregular war? I made a pledge to myself as I left. These men, their wounds, and their idealistic visions of American democracy would not be wasted. We had to succeed in Iraq to justify the pain and sacrifice these young people experienced. At this point, I was convinced that the solution lay in the hands of the Iraqis and not my soldiers. I returned to Iraq with a renewed sense of purpose and vigor. Our unit would rid the streets of insurgents, rebuild my sector, and provide hope for the children of al Risala and al Shurta.

My experience changed the methods I used in the Risala and Shurta sectors as a company commander. The difficult part was convincing my paratroopers that brute force, large scale operations, top-down intelligence, and technology were not the solutions for fighting the insurgency—they were simply tools that could be used as appropriate.

I returned to Iraq to find the attitude of the soldiers and Iraqis in a terrible state. “Thank you for removing the tyrant, now go home” became the dominant attitude of many Iraqis.393 Anger, frustration, and distrust were building toward the coalition and the Iraqi population we

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393 Steven Metz Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2007. In his article Steven Metz describes the insurgency as a deadly bloom that policymakers and military leaders did not expect to become involved in, and he makes the claim that the only way for the United States to have success is to learn faster than the insurgents and focus on intelligence-centric, fully integrated interagency that is culturally adept and capable of organizational adjustments based on the actions of the insurgents.
were sworn to protect. Civil reconstruction projects had dried up, raids were turning up more dry holes than enemy combatants, and the news most of the Iraqis were getting was dominated by Al Jazeera. ORHA was failing in its information operations and the military seemed to be blind to its importance. The seeds of civil war were being sowed and we were facilitating the destruction of the sector by not understanding the root of the problems. U.S. legitimacy was lost and the credibility of coalition forces in Baghdad had begun to erode. Coalition forces were continuing with a focus on raids and detaining enemy personnel. Measurement of success continued to be based on conventional standards. Numbers of enemy killed, raids, and offensive operations seemed to dominate senior leaders’ rhetoric and evaluation of subordinates.

What caused the erosion of legitimacy? Who was best suited to solve the problems the Iraqis faced? Our unit had labeled all Iraqis as part of the same insurgent category and alienated many of our Iraqi allies by failing to ask these fundamental questions. How do we best protect our soldiers in irregular warfare while increasing the legitimacy of the fledgling Iraqi government and our coalition forces? The answer was not more large-scale operations, increased kinetic attacks, or decreased interaction with the local populace.

Cultural understanding within our unit was low. As a new commander in the sector, I came with a bird’s eye perspective on the fundamental problems facing our unit. Cultural awareness was nonexistent, kinetic solutions were preferred to using “soft power,” and the majority of paratroopers viewed their role in the country as ending as soon as the war was “won” in May 2003. My first sergeant and I immediately instituted a cultural awareness class for every paratrooper under my command. Interpreters taught the classes. I focused my energy during the day on political solutions to the insurgency by meeting with business leaders, council members, and religious leaders. I rewarded soldiers and platoon leaders who focused on reconstruction
projects and interaction with school headmasters and the underrepresented areas of my mixed sector. The sector was made up of 250,000 Iraqis, 80% of whom were unemployed. 60% were Shia, 40% Sunni. There were 32 schools, 23 Mosques, one Christian church, two clinics, two markets, two gas stations, and a community of 400 amputees from the Iran-Iraq War.\textsuperscript{394} The sector was large and diverse, providing ample opportunities for insurgent recruitment and attacks against our forward operating base (FOB). Actionable intelligence was the only method of ensuring our unit’s success and up to this point in the conflict intelligence was fed from higher headquarters to ground units to take action. This commonly ended in raiding the wrong homes, detaining innocent Iraqis, or getting involved in longstanding tribal disputes between families.

After taking command, I decided to change our modus operandi for gathering intelligence. We turned our intelligence operations into a focused effort of every paratrooper and established systems for the collection and dissemination of information within our company. We focused less on firepower during raids and even fielded non-lethal weapons on many operations. Tazers, rubber bullets, and foam grenades were favorites of my paratroopers—when we had them. No longer was it standard operating procedure to blow up the doors of suspects with C-4 or other explosives. Instead, we began knocking unless the threat was high enough to justify the use of explosive forced entry. Intelligence was no longer going to be spoon fed to my unit from higher headquarters: we would develop our own targets and feed intelligence to the battalion and division.

The paradigm shift took time, but within a month we reduced attacks against our compound and soldiers. We increased spending on reconstruction by two million dollars and regained the trust of the local council and many of the business leaders.\textsuperscript{395} Intelligence

\textsuperscript{394} See Appendix B for map of sector.
\textsuperscript{395} See Appendix C on civil-military operations in sector.
operations were so successful that the senior commander in Iraq (LTG Ricardo Sanchez) told his staff in a Battle Update Brief in late September that A-Company 3-325 Airborne was setting the standard for operations in Iraq. The unit cohesion was higher than ever before and our vision for our purpose in Iraq changed. My men and I realized that the men and women of Iraq were not the future—the children were. If we could show them that we were there to help rather than hurt them, our unit would all return to Ft. Bragg—alive and better prepared for the next deployment.

Two areas were critical to success in al Risala and al Shurta: first was the establishment of credible city councils, and second was reliance on the development of actionable intelligence.

2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade Combat Team, 82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne Division: Operation Build Democracy: City Councils of al Shurta and al Risala, Baghdad

\textit{Establishing Democratic City Councils within al Risala and al Shurta, Baghdad}

On May 1, 2003 President Bush declared an end to hostilities in Operation Iraqi Freedom, signaling the beginning of Stability and Support Operations. Phase IV of the operation had begun, and the paratroopers were ready for the challenge. Priorities shifted from killing enemy combatants to protecting the local populace, rebuilding, and establishing city councils at the local level.

Each company sector contained at least one city council selected from residents who met specific criteria.

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\textbf{2/82\textsuperscript{nd} City Council Criteria} (as of June 2003) \\
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- Could not be Ba’athists \\
- Could not be former military commanders \\
- Must be high school graduates \\
- Must be a resident of the neighborhood they represented \\
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\end{tabular}
In my sector of 250,000 Iraqis, we built two city councils comprised of 23 total members from Sunni, Shi’a, and Christian backgrounds. The brigade commander insisted that women serve on the councils, so each council initially had at least one female member. After four months, there were four women on the councils. The female members of my councils were bold, educated, and willing to sacrifice for the sake of their neighborhoods. I came away from interactions with them with a sense of hope for the women of Iraq and with a profound sense that in rebuilding Iraq women would play crucial roles. Each council also had diverse career backgrounds, ranging from businessmen to Imams.\(^{396}\) The common denominator for all members was their eagerness to help rebuild their neighborhoods and provide jobs for constituents. Security, sewage, and electricity were the top priorities of most citizens.

Meetings were initially conducted for 5-8 hours in the blistering summer heat. At this time military units were starting to receive air conditioner units, but there was no money in the budget for such luxuries for the city councils. In typical Army fashion, we initially tried to teach democracy through the use of PowerPoint slides and visual aids. After burning up a number of projectors, we realized that the only way to make progress was through drinking plenty of chai tea and having long discussions.

Unit commanders made requests through USAID and ORHA for basic supplies and equipment for the councils to function. After many trips to the Green Zone, we were able to secure funding through USAID for building renovations, supplies, and salaries for the council members. Eventually we were also issued cell phones from ORHA to give to council members for communications. Progress was slow (but noticeable) during August 2003, and meetings were the weapon of choice in problem solving.

\(^{396}\) See Appendix D for council member details.
Initially, many meetings were canceled due to security conditions, other missions, and because meeting locations were simply too hot. In time, the meetings became part of our lives and part of our intelligence and psychological operations. Members of these rudimentary councils spent countless hours debating the best methods of moving forward, and it took a considerable amount of energy for commanders to convince the council members to make decisions. Some unit commanders grew frustrated and delegated the task of attending and running council meetings to subordinates. Others took on the role of “mayor” in their sectors, providing guidance, directing reconstruction, and detaining suspected insurgent supporters at night. Fundamental to the establishment of the councils was education. Soldiers had no documents teaching them about democracy, and no representatives from ORHA to assist in the selection, training, and administration of the city councils. It was not until September 2003 that I learned of an office in the palace (the embassy) designated with the responsibility to assist military units in the establishment of local governance. Once I contacted the office, it was willing to assist in my city councils. I started to receive funding and support for a district city council headquarters. We still faced a perception problem with the Iraqis, and an even more difficult problem to solve was with the reluctance of many Iraqi men to take any initiative. The society under Saddam was not accustomed to making decisions or taking responsibility for their problems. This attitude was very difficult to overcome, and only time and relationships could change it.

In late September 2003, the councils in my sector were functioning with great success. They conducted town hall meetings in which I was often the guest speaker and the person they could point fingers at and blame for problems within the sector. I was often on the receiving end of bitter language and insults, but I was never intentionally disrespected. When I spoke, the room
got quiet and the city council almost always agreed with my assessments. My unit’s credibility
was high and the local newspaper recognized our efforts. Electricity, sewage, and security were
the top three concerns of the citizens of al Shurta and al Risala, and therefore these were top
priorities for my unit.

Improving security required increasing our success with locating and capturing weapons
caches and those responsible for funding the insurgency. Bottom-up intelligence operations
enabled my company to capture many weapons caches while building credibility with informants
in the area. My compound became a haven for disgruntled Iraqis who had information to sell.
The information came in as a trickle at first, but I was able to establish myself as the point of
contact for Iraqis with information to sell. This action established relationships based on trust
with my informants and ensured their safety would not be compromised. Over time, my
company developed a number of sources, informants, and a network of businesses and
individuals who were dedicated to seeing the coalition succeed. With early successes came more
information, caches, and insurgents.

The biggest problem I faced was from other intelligence organizations and turf wars over
informant ownership. I was fortunate enough to have a battalion commander who appreciated the
art of gathering intelligence from the ground up. He gave me the freedom to coordinate with
special operations units in my sector and other agencies whose primary roles were gathering
information and managing agents and sources. My company unit was not resourced or mandated
to manage informants, but I had to in order to prevent attacks and protect my sector.
Furthermore, in order to pay informants under the Army system, I would have to wait weeks to
receive funds. Other agencies had cash on hand and could pay informants on the spot for good
intelligence. Special operations forces carried huge amounts of cash and would pay informants
immediately. My word had to suffice for many of the informants who came to my forward operating base. This often forced me to spend my own money to keep from losing valuable information. Over time, my unit developed relationships with the other intelligence operators in sector and conducted weekly meetings to unofficially share information. Although I did not always have cash to pay informants as other agencies did, I had paratroopers to take action on the information provided. In October 2003, the system was working very well. The second and third order effects of this success were paramount to the legitimacy of my unit, and by extension the city councils in our sector. The council members also became intelligence gatherers for me, and at city council meetings I would meet privately with certain members to obtain information. They trusted me completely, and as a result they were willing to accept the risk of conducting democratic elections for their jobs.

We were the first sector in Baghdad to ask for the CPA’s permission to conduct elections. We were given verbal permission to go ahead with our plan because the CPA governance representative did not think we would be ready by the new year (January 2004). Our city council members spent money on flyers, debated each other in the local council center, and developed action plans for the department of public works and local schools. In the meantime, attacks continued to wane and support for our company increased in sector. However, there were also sometimes periods of unrest and protest.

There were often protests against me and my unit because of broken promises. For example, an NGO once promised my city council it would provide new books and supplies to all children in elementary school. Unfortunately, the NGO ran out of money before it could deliver a single book, leaving my unit to answer to the city council. Protests outside my compound started out small, but they grew larger over time. Rather than stop the protests with force, I
simply put on my gear and walked outside the gate of my compound and spoke to the mob through my interpreter. Many in the group were afraid that I would retaliate against them for the protest, and none looked me in the eye as I addressed them. I simply told them that I was proud of them for protesting and that they now enjoyed the right to do so because they were forming a democracy. I explained the situation about the NGO’s failure, and I told them I was willing to listen to them if they could provide me information on a recent rash of rocket propelled grenade attacks. I left to applause and laughter. The protest lasted 15 more minutes and dissipated.

Two days later, I had the information I needed to conduct a raid on the RPG attackers. Word of our successful capture of the RPG attackers spread quickly through the mosques and schools. We took the opportunity to conduct a psychological campaign to deter further attacks by spreading a rumor of a new weapon system that could detect and destroy anyone launching mortars or RPGs within our sector. To further spread the rumor we told our city council and police chief that the weapon was top secret. That night we fired mortar illumination rounds and artillery rounds into an empty field and told our council the next day that the new weapon system destroyed the vehicle and men setting up a mortar outside the sector. Upon making the announcement, my interpreter and I received a standing ovation from the group. They then told me that they were ready for elections, and they wanted to know when they could conduct them.

The city council was prepared to have an election and had spent time and money campaigning. All that was left was for me to receive written permission from the Baghdad District Council (BDC) to conduct the election and recognize the winners at its conclusion. I was denied permission by the CPA and the BDC—despite their previous encouragement—and I had to return to the council with another broken promise. The trust I had built was beginning to erode

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397 Deception operations are key to COIN. Getting inside the decision cycle of the enemy is critical to success. Brigade commander used AH-64s and other weapons as part of our deception plans in Baghdad. Attacks always decreased after we concluded deception operations in conjunction with psychological and information operations.
with these broken promises and growing sectarian violence in other parts of Baghdad. Less than a week later our unit had orders to return to the United States no later than February 2004. We had less than forty-five days left in country, and things were beginning to change across Iraq.

Small FOBs were being consolidated into larger FOBs across the country. The goal seemed logical: move U.S. forces out of the sectors and allow Iraqi forces to pick up more of the security operations and governance. Our company forward operating base was closed and my 136 paratroopers and I moved into Forward Operating Base FALCON. We now had a Post Exchange, hot showers, basketball/volleyball courts, full gym, and air-conditioned private barracks rooms and offices. We were ecstatic, but our council was not. They knew that the effect of moving out of sector would be negative for them.

The council was right. Most units decreased the number of patrols, raids, and reconstruction dramatically once they moved into FALCON. The top priority for many units shifted from the Iraqis to taking care of themselves. The entitlement attitude was contagious, and it was difficult for even the most motivated paratroopers to leave the comfort and security of FALCON to brave the streets of Baghdad. It was as much a psychological victory for the insurgents as a defeat for my company, and there was little I could do about it. The Relief in Place operation was approaching, and my last three weeks were spent creating a continuity file for the unit replacing mine in sector. I met with my councils, business leaders, and informants for the last time and wished them well. Many tears and heartfelt hugs were exchanged during those final days, but the sense of hope was high. The 2/82nd left Baghdad in February 2004 after

398 Visits from Senator Clinton and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld praised the advances in FOB security, comfort, and predictability. Movie theaters, PXs, private sleeping quarters, four hot meals per day, huge gym facilities, and phone centers were all designed to make soldiers comfortable. FOBs had no problems with sewage, electricity, or hot water for showers. The Iraqis we were protecting were not so lucky, and hatred toward the coalition began to foment. Furthermore, soldiers were less willing to patrol and conduct operations in sector when life was so good on the FOBs. A new term for this type of soldier was created: fobbits. The FOBs briefed well to Congress and the American public, but from a tactical perspective they were a huge mistake.
a year-long deployment. Our mission was complete and our success far outweighed our failures, yet we all seemed to know that Iraq would take many years to recover from the reign of Saddam Hussein and the sanctions of the 1990s. We had no idea that soon sectarian violence and insurgency would engulf every aspect of Iraqi life. Eight months after returning home, we were called back to Iraq on 96-hour notice to assist in the Iraqi elections of 2005.

**Comparing COIN to 2nd Brigade 82nd Airborne Division Tactical Actions in OIF I**

Hindsight allows me to compare the actions taken on the ground in Iraq during OIF I to the prescriptive solutions found in FM 3-24. The vignettes used in the comparison were not written to highlight the special ability of the 2/82nd or brag about the success of any unit. Rather, the descriptions are meant to highlight the fact that soldiers in many units were doing the same things my unit was doing. Units across Iraq were learning and adapting to the environment they faced. Many had great success, while others experienced tragic failure. The main point of this reflection stems from the initial question of my research: would better COIN doctrine have caused a different outcome than the one the U.S. is experiencing in Iraq in 2007? In order to answer the question two areas are addressed. First, were any actions taken during OIF I **counter** to what is prescribed in COIN FM 3-24? Second, were any actions taken during OIF I **similar** to what is prescribed in COIN FM 3-24? After reviewing this data, I will suggest answers to these two questions to assess FM 3-24’s doctrinal prescriptions.

The initial conventional operations conducted by 2/82 are not a point of deliberation. Leaders conducted conventional operations within the parameters of the Geneva Convention and the rules of engagement (ROE), winning every engagement with the enemy decisively. At the conclusion of operations in OIF I, the 2/82nd had lost 24 soldiers killed in action and had 240 wounded. The majority of these occurred after the President declared an end to combat
operations. The fundamental difference was in the type of war we were waging, and it had very little to do with the type of soldier we were waging it with.

Disciplined, motivated, and well-trained soldiers can accomplish any mission assigned; however, none of the 2/82nd soldiers was trained for (or even aware of) the rising insurgency. Decisions were being made by ORHA and then by the CPA, as well as decision makers at CENTCOM, that inhibited the ability of soldiers to take action on the ground to prevent the insurgency from growing. Six critical areas are fundamental to understanding why the insurgency in Iraq gained strength despite coalition efforts:

1. The disbandment of the Iraqi Army in May 2003
2. The order from CPA not to take action against looters in May 2003
3. Slow and negligent information operations across the spectrum of the interagency during post-combat operations within DOD and across the interagency spectrum
4. Decentralized U.S. Army command structure—each division conducted operations in its area of operations focused on unilateral offensive operations
5. No national strategy for conducting counterinsurgency operations
6. No counterinsurgency focus at training centers or education centers across the federal government prior to OIF—mission success depends on individual personality, ad hoc organizations, and willpower of individuals operating without a system to provide synergy and leverage for all resources towards victory

Each of these issues is also covered in FM 3-24 as being the worst possible actions an occupying force can take when fighting an insurgency. The list of best and worst COIN practices that the 2/82nd unknowingly committed follow.
Worst Practices by 2/82nd OIF 1

- Conducted too many large-unit operations
  - 2/82nd reaction to insurgent action was always large-scale cordon and searches resulting in damage to innocent Iraqi homes, business, and morale
  - Operations at the battalion level almost always resulted in fewer weapons caches and less information than those conducted at the platoon or company level, yet the preference was for large-scale operations
  - Intelligence was usually driven from the top down rather than the bottom up, leaving much room for error. COIN intelligence operations are fundamentally driven by actionable intelligence gathered at the tactical level and fed up to the battalion for analysis rather than the conventional top-down approach
  - No system for quick payments to informants

- Consolidated all company-level forward operating bases into one large forward operating base
  - FOB mindset is hard to reverse
  - Decreased the number of mounted and dismounted patrols in sector
  - Decreased the amount of contact with potential informants
  - Decreased the amount of information operations in sector
  - Decreased the rapid response time to emergency situations such as police station attacks or riots in sector

- Placed priorities on killing insurgents rather than engaging and protecting the population
  - Promotion and awards were given primarily to those who had more offensive action and detainees than those with the largest reconstruction and civil military projects
  - Focus on killing led to increased collateral damage to include accidental killing of innocent civilians

- Focus special forces on raids rather than training and advising host nation police and military
  - Direct action teams in sector were focused primarily on killing and detaining insurgents rather than advising and gathering intelligence

- Built and trained the host nation police and military to look just like 2/82nd
  - The Iraqi Civil Defense Force and police were equipped and trained to look more like coalition forces than their own culturally accepted forces. This gave the impression that these Iraqi forces were just puppets of the coalition and therefore illegitimate

- No interagency coordination cell until days before redeployment
  - Without a system for commanders to interact with USAID, DOS, and other agencies, the amount of progress made in sector was hindered
  - All relationships with other agencies were ad hoc
Best COIN practices of 2/82 during OIF I

- Disciplined soldiers with a desire to positively impact their area of operations.
- No Rules of Engagement violations or criminal activity.
- Appoint a single authority—usually a dynamic, charismatic leader to interact with local Iraqi leaders.
- Brigade Commander took the lead on relationships with local Iraqi leadership.
- 2/82\textsuperscript{nd} was the first unit to receive funding for a consolidated district council headquarters for Iraqi citizens to voice concerns, find jobs, and report questionable activities in sector.
- 2/82\textsuperscript{nd} was first unit in Baghdad to establish a weekly training session for city council members on democracy.
- Brigade Commander empowered company commanders with resources, time, and support on all civil-military operations.
- Focus on the population’s needs and security.
- 2/82\textsuperscript{nd} had the largest amount of reconstruction money per capita in Baghdad due to the efforts of the CMOC.
- Commanders were empowered to spend CERP funds on projects in sector ($10,000 per week), soccer fields, job creation, and short time span high-impact projects.
- Train Iraqi military forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations.
- Established first ICDC training compound in Baghdad.
- Established police liaisons with Iraqi police.
COIN as a Panacea for Irregular War?

Is the American way of war doomed to fail against an insurgent movement? I do not think so. The American way of war can adapt to the new challenges posed by insurgent strategy and terrorist tactics. The most obvious fact supporting this adaptability is the new counterinsurgency manual. The manual is well-received among combat veterans of all ranks and those about to enter the Iraqi theater of operations. Better late than never—FM 3-24 is replete with practical methods for the soldiers and marines at the tip of the spear in COIN operations. Had our unit trained on these tactics, techniques, and procedures prior to the invasion in March 2003, the original transition from combat operations to COIN operations may have gone more smoothly. FM 3-24 may not be a panacea for counterinsurgency operations, but it does provide leaders at the operational and strategic level with a framework for understanding the problem and paradoxes of irregular warfare.

So, is the solution simply COIN training for military forces? Hardly. The point of my vignettes was not simply to display that military forces can adapt and succeed in irregular warfare. History shows the U.S. military is capable of achieving great feats with the requisite support. The implications suggested by Andrew Mack, “It necessarily follows that insurgents can only achieve their ends if their opponents’ political capability to wage war is destroyed,” are more salient than ever.

The interagency is an area where more focus is needed. Resourcing, training, mandates, and ideologies of the myriad agencies in the federal government must adapt to irregular warfare and post-combat operation reconstruction. The “alphabet soup” of agencies operating in irregular conflicts must be better coordinated and resourced in order to provide targeted effects synchronized with military operations. Mobilization is more a function of political will than the
ability to produce the bodies and materials needed to rebuild a country. Deterrence against terrorists can be effective if used in conjunction with other tools of diplomacy and statecraft. Determining the exact methods for deterring terrorist tactics and insurgent strategies hinges on targeting. Targeting in insurgencies is a matter of determining the right question and then developing the right solution from a menu of options. The only menu the military has is force versus the lack of force. The National Security Strategy 2005 (NSS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and Presidential Policy Directive 56 set an optimistic tone for maintaining American security at home and abroad. Two themes pervade all strategic literature since September 11, 2001. Specifically, the two pillars of President Bush’s introductory letter in the NSS highlight the optimistic tone of strategic-level decision makers with regard to the Global War On Terror:

Promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity—working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies. Free governments are accountable to their people, govern their territory effectively, and pursue economic and political policies that benefit their citizens. Free governments do not oppress their people or attack other free nations. Peace and international stability are most reliably built on a foundation of freedom.

The second pillar of our strategy is confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies. Many of the problems we face—from the threat of pandemic disease, to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to terrorism, to human trafficking, to natural disasters—reach across borders. Effective multinational efforts are essential to solve these problems. Yet history has shown that only when we do our part will others do theirs. America must continue to lead.

Conclusion

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FM 3-34 provides useful guidance for military planners at all levels. Of course, there is no easy solution in the Global War On Terror or the war in Iraq. Even now, soldiers, airmen, and Marines are engaged in the most complex environment imaginable in the GWOT. Actions taken by these soldiers with the best intentions can backfire in an instant. FM 3-34 is a “best intentions” version of what the military is capable of accomplishing if the mission and vision of the campaign are aligned with the training and capabilities of the force. The key to success in counterinsurgency is the ability for our military and interagency to adapt and change faster than the enemy.

COIN operations can be successful with the proper support of the interagency. Irregular warfare is not simply a military problem with military solutions. Interagency roles are critical to the success of COIN. If my experience in Iraq is any indicator of the operational capability of the rest of the agencies in Iraq, then there is great hope as well as cause for concern. Key areas of disparity between interagency operations and those of the military include:

1. Length of deployment across DOD should be standard. Current disparities allow for seams in the transition of key areas of Iraq and inter agency rivalries. Length of deployments for civilians should be similar to those of their military counterparts. The 90-day average deployment is too short to make an impact.
2. Civilian agencies must find a way to arrive in theater better prepared for the culture, tempo, and risks associated with reconstruction of Iraq.
3. Interagency working groups should be established prior to deployment and continue during deployment, utilizing technology to share information and streamline approval processes for projects, intelligence, and strategic planning.
4. Key agencies involved in the rebuilding of Iraq should train with military counterparts at the maneuver training centers prior to deployments in order to educate the military and civilians on each federal organization’s unique capabilities.
5. Turf wars should end upon entrance to the Iraqi theater of operations and Congress should mandate that agencies share resources, information, and expertise. A Goldwater-Nichols reform of the interagency would not solve current problems in Iraq, but it would lay the foundations for successful future operations.

6. The National Security Council’s role in OIF and OEF should be evaluated for best and worst practices.

7. Information operations in the United States and abroad are more important during COIN than conventional operations. A complete review of standard operating procedures should be conducted to determine possible areas for improvements. 401

8. The military must adapt to the insurgency and fight COIN rather than attempt to force COIN into a conventional construct. 402

The political will of American democracy must match the determination of those executing the missions in support of the Global War On Terror. All resources must come to bear on the problem facing the future stability of American security. The proper questions must be asked in order to solve the most important problems. Just as the problem my unit faced in Southern Baghdad was exacerbated by our initial response to the enemy, U.S. policy should be implemented to avoid making similar mistakes. My unit adapted to COIN by understanding the fundamental questions facing our security. We adapted to succeed. Adaptability is the key to winning the irregular warfare of the 21st century, and FM 3-24 does an exceptional job of offering a framework for planners to utilize in the conduct of counterinsurgency.

402 This is the same argument made by Andrew Krepinevich in his book The Army and Vietnam. His theory asserts that the military in Vietnam never adapted to the insurgency, trying to fight the war as a conventional operation. Andrew Krepinevich, Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
Appendix B: Demographics al Shurta and al Risala, Baghdad, Iraq, May 2003
C. Leadership Education and Training for the Interagency

Brian Polley

The nature of the international security environment has radically changed over the past fifteen years. No longer is the United States threatened directly by a large traditional military armed with strategic missiles, and no longer is the primary danger posed by nation-states and their leaders. Instead, we currently face enemies that have no home country, respect no international borders, and disregard traditional rules of warfare. Because the threats to national security have changed, so must our strategies and preparations for dealing with them.

The need for change is reflected clearly in military doctrine and official government policy, from Army field manuals all the way to the President’s National Security Strategy. These documents and others recognize that today’s conflicts call for a renewed focus on non-traditional operations, especially support and stability operations. Because of the nature of the enemy and the asymmetric warfare tactics they use, the type of conflicts the United States is now engaged in require a different government structure, a different military strategy, and a different type of leadership.

One of the most important goals laid out in the National Security Strategy, and one that is necessary if Americans are to live in a secure international environment, is promoting democracy in countries where authoritarian governments persecute their own peoples. Democracy promotion, and building state institutional capacity so democracy can be sustained, requires a stable environment relatively free of internal violence and foreign conflict. Support and stability operations are those which the United States and its allies engage in to provide that stable environment and allow citizens to build democratic institutions and establish the rule of law.

403 “Support and stability operations” is the term most often used in today’s conflicts. A number of other terms have similar meanings, including “low-intensity conflict,” and “counterinsurgency warfare.” Subtle differences in terminology can have meaningful consequences, a point I will return to later, but for now I will use these terms synonymously.
The boundaries between the role of the military and the role of civil society have become blurred in support and stability operations. Success in the conflict and post-conflict environments the US is in today and those of the future require close cooperation between military and civilian agencies. Support and stability operations are necessarily interagency in nature—they cannot be successful using military means alone. One of the most challenging aspects of coordinating interagency efforts in these operations is the function of leadership, or how men and women can lead effectively in post-conflict environments. A number of important questions relate specifically to leadership issues:

- How is leadership defined in military and civilian contexts?
- How should various agencies communicate with each other in conflict and post-conflict environments?
- How should the agencies and stakeholders involved decide who is in charge of a task or operation?
- How can we prepare men and women to fill leadership roles and solve difficult problems in dangerous environments?
- How can various agencies improve the way they educate and train leaders to align goals and work together?

In order to successfully create a stable and lasting peace in support and stability operations, it is imperative that the US do several things better. Most importantly, the United States needs a set of standard, coherent leadership training programs to equip interagency officials with the tools necessary to function in complex, dangerous environments in which a number of different organizations are represented and have a stake in the outcome. Coordination and teamwork in these kinds of operations are too often ad hoc and reactive; the United States government should make interagency teamwork part of its preparation for post-conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping.

To understand the functions and responsibilities of leaders in interagency support and stability operations, I will first discuss relevant interpretations of leadership, and in particular
how it is generally defined by the US government in military and civilian contexts. Second, I will summarize various programs and practices currently used by US government agencies to develop leaders and prepare them to work on interagency teams. Next, I will critique these programs and describe what tends to make some of them more successful than others, and what aspects of them are worthwhile. Finally, I will discuss my overall findings and outline several recommendations for implementing successful practices in leadership development. By following this progression we can better understand the roles and responsibilities of leadership in coordinating interagency teams in conflict and post-conflict environments.

**Defining Leadership**

An analysis of roles and functions of leadership in interagency cooperation in counterinsurgency warfare must begin with a discussion of the various definitions of leadership in military and civilian contexts, and a brief history of leadership theory’s development. Human beings have always been interested in understanding leaders and the qualities that enable effective leadership—according to theorist James MacGregor Burns, leadership is “one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth.” Thousands of years ago, Confucius sought to define the nature of the relationship between leader and follower. Plato considered leadership at the highest levels, idealizing the “philosopher-king” as the model for a perfect republican system of government. Later, Plato and his followers established the Paidea in early Greece, a school and forum for discussing leadership and how best to develop it. In the 16th century, the Italian Niccolo Machiavelli wrote his famous discourse on the more practical aspects of leading kingdoms and principalities. These are only a few of the hundreds of influential thinkers across human history that have considered leadership an important concept and have contributed to the intellectual discourse on the topic.

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For many of these influential thinkers, leaders are understood to be a select few exceptional individuals who have the good fortune to be born with characteristics required to inspire and motivate. According to this “great man” theory of leadership popularized in the 19th century and still somewhat prevalent today, “there are only a few, very rare, individuals in any society at any time with the unique characteristics to shape or express history.” The great man theory, while worthy of consideration, cannot be used to instruct leaders and therefore has little use as a scientific theory.

The modern, scientific study of leadership can trace it’s lineage to German and French psychologists and sociologists in the latter half of the 19th century. Psychology and sociology have been leading fields in the development of leadership theory, but disciplines as varied as political science, history, military sciences, education, philosophy, management, public administration, anthropology, and biology have made significant contributions as well. Over the past century, the study of leadership has become increasingly scientific and quantitative, especially beginning with the emergence of Frederick Taylor’s “management science” concept around the turn of the 20th century. Taylor disputed the commonly held assumption that fundamental interests of employers and employees are necessarily at odds with one another, and instead argued that the interests of the two groups are actually one and the same—that prosperity cannot exist for the employer unless it is accompanied by prosperity for the employee, and vice versa. Often applying his analysis to sports as well as “soldiering,” Taylor believed that his reasoning led to the conclusion that the principal aim of both workers and management should be

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406 Fitton, 4.
408 Fitton, 5.

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training and developing each individual in the organization in order to reach full potential. His scientific framework directly challenged the great man theory, since he advocated a system in which leaders are developed by organizing workers for efficient production, rather than reducing inefficiency by searching for exceptional leaders someone else has trained.\(^{410}\) Furthermore, he applied scientific management principles to all different kinds of human activities, from the simplest tasks to complex endeavors in large organizations. Military scientists have been influenced by Taylor’s scientific management for decades, and his framework has much to offer in preparing leaders to cooperate in support and stability operations.

The mid- to late-20\(^{th}\) century saw a proliferation of leadership theories, when many distinct interpretations arose to complement or compete with great man and scientific management theories. For example, Philip Selznick and others taking a sociological approach to leadership define it as a specific type of work or function within an organization, not as something special or glorified. Leadership is defined by the demands of a social situation, and who emerges as a leader depends on the requirements of an organizational task; leadership is a relation that exists between people in social situations, and, therefore, we can expect to see different leaders emerge in different situations.\(^{411}\) The sociological approach also holds that leadership is not necessarily performed by those in high places or positions of authority, and that leadership is dispensable and not necessary in all situations.

The “business approach” to leadership, exemplified by John Kotter, echoes the sociological approach’s tenet that leadership is nothing mystical or mysterious, but rather is a system of action that is largely about coping with change, as opposed to management’s function

\(^{410}\) Taylor, 1.
of coping with complexity.\textsuperscript{412} Since today’s business environment is more dynamic and more volatile than ever before, the quickened pace of change has demanded a corresponding increase in leadership. While Kotter argues that leadership and management are distinct concepts, he points out that they are complementary systems of action and are both required in a successful business.\textsuperscript{413} The business approach to leadership, while not \textit{obviously} applicable to interagency cooperation in counterinsurgency warfare, provides a useful addition to other frameworks of analysis we will consider.

Perhaps the most relevant for our purposes is the political science approach and its most prominent theorist, James MacGregor Burns. According to the political science approach, leadership is best understood as a relationship between leaders and followers; it is exercised when someone uses “institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers.”\textsuperscript{414} An important distinction exists, to proponents of this approach, between true leaders and mere power wielders: power wielders exercise their authority and demand obedience, disregarding any desires or goals of their respondents. Leaders, on the other hand, work to motivate others to realize goals mutually held by \textit{both} leaders and followers. Like power, leadership is relational and purposeful, but a leader is a particular kind of power holder—the kind that induces followers to act for certain goals, needs, and aspirations shared among themselves and their leader. It is this approach to understanding leadership that adds the most value to an examination of how to prepare men and women to

\textsuperscript{413} Not all theorists in the business camp agree with Kotter that distinguishing between leadership and management is useful; some fall more in line with my position, which is that leadership and management are so closely related that distinctions are practically meaningless. Management theorists David Whetten and Kim Cameron (2005), for example, argue that differences in management and leadership today are so small that they are negligible.
\textsuperscript{414} Burns, 18.
cooperate effectively in dangerous conflict and post-conflict environments, especially on interagency teams where different values and goals may be represented.

These theoretical approaches vary in how much emphasis they place on personal attributes of individuals versus situational factors in determining the quality of leadership. They also vary in the degree to which they consider ethical decision making to be a defining feature of good leadership, a distinction important to an analysis of leadership in support and stability operations. This distinction enters most prominently in the debate over the relative merits of transactional versus transformational leadership, the two categories many theorists agree are the fundamental leadership styles all leaders display to some degree, but tend to use more of one or the other in their “defining moments.”

Transactional leadership generally involves contingent reinforcement, or followers are usually motivated by leaders’ promises, praise, and rewards, and they are corrected by negative feedback, threats, or disciplinary action. Essentially, leaders react to whether or not their followers carry out what leaders and followers have “transacted” to do. Thus, transactional leadership can be understood as a sort of contract between leaders and followers; it is somewhat impersonal and formal relation grounded in a worldview of self-interest. Telling the truth, keeping promises, distributing what is due to others, and using valid incentives and sanctions are all important aspects of transactional leadership.

Transformational leadership, on the other hand, is based on more than self-interest. It tends to inspire a more realistic concept of the self—one that is connected to others whose welfare may be more important than one’s own. This concern for other’s welfare is a key component of government service. In transformational leadership, moral obligations are

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416 Bass and Steidlmeier, 184.
grounded in a broader understanding of cultural and social norms and beliefs.\textsuperscript{417} According to the most prominent transformational leadership theorist, James MacGregor Burns, leadership is best when it is both transactional and transformational—it is based on a set of agreements or bargains, but both leaders and followers are transformed it its course. To be transformational, a leader must be morally uplifting; he raises himself and his followers to higher levels of morality through leadership.

Transformational leadership contains four main components, and each is important for leaders who wish to raise themselves and their followers to higher standards.\textsuperscript{418}

1. Charisma, or idealized influence—transformational leadership is envisioning, confident, and sets high standards for emulation.
2. Inspirational motivation—transformational leaders provide followers with meaning and challenges for sharing commitments to goals.
3. Intellectual stimulation—transformational leaders encourage followers to think critically, and allow them to question assumptions and generate new and creative solutions to problems.
4. Individualized consideration—transformational leaders treat each follower as an individual and as an end in him/herself, never as a means to an end. The leader provides coaching, mentoring, and growth opportunities, always working to develop followers into leaders. Transactional leaders tend to worry only about their followers’ dependence.

A defining characteristic of transformational leadership is that followers identify with their leaders and their leaders’ goals. Rather than simply obeying orders, followers want to emulate their leaders and grow into leaders themselves.

A final distinction bears mentioning—that between \textit{authentic} transformational leadership and \textit{inauthentic} or “pseudo-transformational” leadership. All aspects of leadership (both transactional and transformational) have ethical dimensions, and it is the behavior of leaders that is authentic or inauthentic. Organizations need authentic transformational leaders in order to raise the organization’s ethical standards; these leaders are persuasive, but not manipulative, and

\textsuperscript{417} Bass and Steidlmeier, 186.  
\textsuperscript{418} Bass and Steidlmeier, 187.
use elements of both transactional and transformational leadership to increase the effectiveness of both.\footnote{Bass and Steidlmeier, 186.}

All of these theoretical frameworks have played a role in shaping the literature on leadership in military and civilian government organizations. Since our focus is on interagency cooperation in support and stability operations, our analysis must consider the history and development of military doctrine on leadership and where these frameworks fit.

The United States Army first became acutely aware of leadership as it worked to shift from the small, professional army of the interwar era to the expanded structure required in World War II.\footnote{I primarily focus on the Army here because it is the most useful case study in leadership development programming. Other branches of the military have experienced similar transitions.} There have certainly been leadership training and instruction programs in the US military throughout its history, but they were greatly expanded during this time.\footnote{John W. Brinsfield, “Army Values and Ethics: A Search for Consistency and Relevance,” Parameters Autumn (1998): 70.} The Army and other branches began enlisting help from the civilian academic community, especially psychologists, to identify and develop junior leaders. The 1940s saw a shift from management science to human relations in the academic community, and therefore a corresponding shift in the military community.\footnote{Robert A. Fitton, “Development of Strategic Level Leaders,” The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University (1993).} For the Army, leadership and ethics are historically topics that go hand-in-hand, and the years during and after World War II saw an enormous proliferation of books, journal articles, and classroom instruction on these topics. The rapid increase in literature and instruction on ethics and leadership continued in the thirty years between the late 1960s and 1990s: by 1998, the Army War College listed 1,670 titles in these two fields.\footnote{Fitton, 5.}

The perceived crisis in leadership of the Vietnam War led to a resurgence of emphasis placed on developing ethical leaders. Of the three presidents most closely associated with the
war, one commander-in-chief was assassinated, another chose not to run for re-election, and another was forced to resign. This, coupled with shocking incidents like the 1968 My Lai massacre, encouraged a wholesale reevaluation of military leaders and leadership development techniques, and specifically the Professionalism Study commissioned by General Westmoreland in 1970 and others like it.\footnote{Brinsfield, 71.} The efforts had some success, as this same time period witnessed a dramatic rise in military professionalism and the amount of trust placed in the US Army as an organization—probably more than any other army in the world in the time between the end of the Vietnam War and the end of the Cold War.\footnote{Brinsfield, 69.} The most obvious evidence of the rise of military professionalism and the corresponding rise in public opinion of the military is in the tremendous respect and trust the American people (as well as other peoples) placed in the US military during and after Operation Desert Storm in 1990-1991. Confidence of high ethical standards and effective leadership in the military may have been at an all-time high after the conflict in the Persian Gulf.\footnote{Brinsfield, 74.}

Several crises in the 1990s struck a blow to this restored confidence in ethical military leadership, including sexual misconduct in the Navy, violence at Fort Bragg, and numerous charges of racism, sexism, and homophobia.\footnote{Brinsfield, 76.} The response to these incidents, led by then-Army Chief of Staff Gordon England, eventually became known as “Character Development XXI” and sought to reexamine military leadership training policies and eliminate some of the biggest weaknesses. At the same time, an effort was underway at Fort Leavenworth to revise Field Manual 6-22, the Army’s main leadership manual. The primary goal was to have a set of

\footnote{Brinsfield, 71.} \footnote{Brinsfield, 69.} \footnote{Brinsfield, 74.} \footnote{Brinsfield, 76.}
leadership ideals that also included an iteration of core values for the military.\footnote{Brinsfield, 77.} FM 6-22 is a model for similar documents in other branches of the armed service, and it is important to consider in its own right.

FM 6-22 is the primary document in military leadership doctrine. The most recent revision was published in October 2006 and was written under the direction of then-Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker. The document applies to Army personnel at all levels, and its main functions are threefold:

1. It defines what leadership means in the Army.
2. It outlines leadership roles and requirements.
3. It provides a general description of how to develop leadership within the Army.

According to FM 6-22, there are three levels of leadership, each with its own set of challenges and competencies: direct leadership, organizational leadership, and strategic leadership. Common to all three levels, though, is the Army’s “warrior ethos,” an attitude integral to the life of a soldier. An ideal Army leader at any level has a strong intellect, a commanding physical presence, professional competence, high moral character, and serves as a role model to others.\footnote{Department of the Army, “Field Manual 6-22: Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile,” 12 October (2006).}

Finally, part of being a good leader in the Army is to also be a good follower.

Field Manual 6-22 describes Army leaders in a three part framework, based on what leaders should BE, what they should KNOW, and what they should DO. In other words, leaders’ behavior (what they do) emerges from who they are (be) and what they have learned (know).\footnote{Framework developed by retired Brigadier General, Dr. Howard Prince and others at the West Point Behavioral Science and Leadership Department. It is adapted from university and leadership research based on the original words “cognitive, behavioral, and ethical,” but was simplified in order to be used at all ranks in the Army.} The BE aspect of leadership is comprised of the values and attributes that shape one’s character,
or internal and defining qualities that are possessed at all times. Defined by FM 6-22, an Army leader is:

Anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking, and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization. 431

The KNOW aspect of leadership refers to the knowledge that leaders should use based on personal experience and formal instruction. Army leaders should have a general knowledge of military tactics, technical systems, organizations, management of resources, and the tendencies and needs of people.

Character and knowledge are not enough for effective Army leadership. The DO aspect of leadership refers to leader actions, and it is directly related to the influence a leader has. The act of leadership, according to FM 6-22, is “the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.” This definition mirrors the political science approach and transformational leadership, since leadership is seen as a relationship between people that improves both leaders and followers as well as the organization as a whole. What leaders should do can be broken down into three constituent parts: 432

1. Influencing—getting people, including Army soldiers, civilians, and multinational partners, to do what is necessary. Influencing is about providing purpose, vision, direction, and motivation.
2. Operating—actions taken to influence others to accomplish missions and to set the stage for future operations.
3. Improving—capturing and acting on important lessons of ongoing and completed projects and missions. Improving includes developmental counseling, stressing team effort and focused learning.

432 FM 6-22 2006, 1-2 and 1-3.
It is important to note that FM 6-22 and similar documents on military leadership doctrine divide leadership into three functional levels: direct, operational, and strategic. Strategic-level leadership, in particular, conceptually parallels some of the theoretical frameworks mentioned earlier and should be addressed separately. Strategic leadership essentially means leadership “at the highest echelons of organizations;”\textsuperscript{433} it is concerned with big picture considerations and overall organizational goals. Examples of strategic leaders are easy to find in both military and civilian organizations: General George Marshall, Henry Ford, and Lee Iacocca are a few of the better-known strategic leaders.\textsuperscript{434} Case studies of these men and other people like them raise the question of whether strategic leaders are born or made; to join their ranks, must one be born with exceptional leadership potential, or is leadership something that can be taught and learned? This is an old debate that juxtaposes the “great man” theory of leadership, which holds that leaders are exceptional people by birth, with the sociological and political science approaches, which hold that leadership is contextual and learnable. Most leadership experts and psychologists agree that there is a dynamic interplay between innate ability and external factors across every person’s life, and that leadership, like most other human traits, can be learned and developed. A fundamental assumption of FM 6-22 and military leadership theorists rests on this claim that there are learnable competencies essential for being an effective strategic-level leader.\textsuperscript{435} Civilian government agencies generally share this assumption, and it is to their leadership development programs that I now turn.

Just as military organizations have programs for identifying and developing potential leaders, so do civilian government agencies. Government organizations including the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, the Office of Personnel

\textsuperscript{433}Fitton, 4.
\textsuperscript{434}Fitton, 4.
\textsuperscript{435}Fitton, 5.
Management, and the Central Intelligence Agency all have their own literature and programming for finding and training those men and women within their ranks who have the most leadership potential. The Office of Personnel Management is historically something of a lead agency in defining leadership in US government, thus it will be my primary focus.

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) sees itself as the government leader in designing and delivering educational and leadership development courses and programs.\(^{436}\) It has three locations across the country that offer in-residence formal leadership education, and it also custom designs leadership training programs based on the needs of particular client organizations. Aside from formal leadership education, OPM also has a program called the Presidential Management Fellows designed to identify and recruit talented individuals with Master’s degrees and doctorates. Also created by the OPM is the “Leadership and Knowledge Management System,” which focuses on identifying and addressing agency leadership competencies so that continuity of leadership is ensured, the organization shares knowledge throughout, and it creates an environment of continuous learning. The custom designed training and consulting services OPM offers, tailored to individual needs of client organizations, include:

- Succession planning and development
- Management development and certification programs
- Developing strategic collaborative partnerships
- Consulting services that fit other agencies’ needs.

In assessing potential leaders and identifying those who might meet government agencies’ requirements for advancement, OPM’s main document and assessment tool is called the Office of Personnel Management Leadership 360.\(^{437}\) The Leadership 360 focuses on six Executive Core Qualifications:

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1. Fundamental Competencies—interpersonal skills, written and oral communication, integrity/honesty, continual learning, and public service motivation.
2. Leading Change—creativity and innovation, external awareness, flexibility, resilience, strategic thinking, and vision.
3. Leading People—conflict management, leveraging diversity, developing others, and team building.
4. Results Driven—accountability, customer service, decisiveness, entrepreneurship, and technical credibility.
5. Business Acumen—financial management, human capital management, and technology management.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also has some literature on effective leadership and development programs, particularly in the context of coordinating interagency efforts abroad. USAID has created formal instruction and other programs to help train men and women to be effective community leaders in poverty-stricken and post-conflict areas all over the world. For example, USAID representatives provided nation-building training for town council members in Sierra Leone, building knowledge about leadership, public service, accountability, acceptance, and teamwork. Similar leadership training programs USAID has coordinated in Guatemala, Vietnam, and other countries have involved Americans as well as foreign nationals. Programs like the ones USAID and OPM have offer valuable lessons to all organizations involved in interagency efforts, particularly those in dangerous environments and support and stability operations. Civilian agencies are often successful in identifying and selecting those men and women who have the potential to lead others in novel, challenging situations.

Although many parallels exist between civilian and military leadership needs, there are a few important differences that bear mentioning. These differences suggest caution is necessary

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before making too close a comparison between military and civilian leaders. First, civilian leaders, in most cases, do not have the “unlimited liability contract”\(^440\) that military officers have; while civilian jobs in post-conflict environments and support and stability operations are certainly dangerous, military leaders are the ones most often targeted by enemies and are therefore in near constant mortal danger. A second difference to consider is an effect of the general officer personality factor, meaning significant personality discrepancies between the typical military leader and the typical civilian leader. For example, military officers are often described as the “aggressive adventurer” type. They also tend to have a high need for control, higher dominance than the typical civilian manager, greater comfort with data than with intuition, and also score high on an “achievement through conformity” scale.\(^441\) All of these characteristics can be very positive in certain contexts, but some evidence suggests that they can all have drawbacks as a leader moves from the tactical to the strategic level.

A final important difference between military and civilian leadership demands is the necessary but sometimes troublesome “warrior ethos,” mentioned earlier. This warrior ethic of authoritarian rule and unquestioning loyalty can serve to “rationalize leader behaviors that are situationally inappropriate,”\(^442\) for example when a leader’s style and preference for centralized control results in poor decision-making because he or she cannot gain access to all relevant information. The issue military leaders face is maintaining the warrior spirit while simultaneously allowing for change, agility, creativity, and self-awareness—the very

\(^{441}\) Ulmer, 12.
\(^{442}\) Ulmer, 14.
characteristics required of an army engaged in counterinsurgency warfare and support and
stability operations.\textsuperscript{443}

Armed with all this knowledge, both theoretical and practical, the various agencies in US
government that are involved in support and stability operations face the challenge of designing a
practical and efficient system to identify potential leaders, place them in positions to gain
experience, formally train them to lead others, and work closely with leaders from other agencies
who often do not share all the same goals, values, or competencies. This is a difficult task, and
one various agencies have struggled with for years.

\textbf{Training Leaders for Interagency Cooperation}

In support and stability operations, there is traditionally a common tendency to place too
much emphasis on the military aspects of securing victory. The US Army, in particular, often
shoulders the lion’s share of the burden for maintaining a secure environment and allowing
reconstruction and capacity building after a major conflict. The problem, though, is that the
Army is only one aspect of American power that should \emph{complement} and \emph{support} other elements
of national power in order to achieve desired objectives.\textsuperscript{444} In other words, the military effort is
only one side of the equation, and support and stability operations are necessarily interagency in
nature; the military must be able to work with civilian agencies to achieve a broad spectrum of
goals. Working with civilian agencies in these kinds of conflicts is about more than just
coordinated action—it is about \emph{synchronization} and a pervasive unity of effort across the
political, military, economic, and psychological spectrum.\textsuperscript{445} In low-intensity conflicts and

\textsuperscript{443} These characteristics have proven important time and time again: for the British during the Arab Revolt and
World War I in the Middle East, for the French in Algeria, and for the United States in Vietnam and Iraq, to name a
few examples.
\textsuperscript{444} Donald R. Morelli and Michael M. Ferguson, “Low-Intensity Conflict: An Operational Perspective,” \textit{Military
Review} November (1984). This sentiment has been echoed more recently by military veterans with interagency
experiences, including John Nagl and David Petraeus.
\textsuperscript{445} Morelli, 8.
counterinsurgency operations, nonmilitary resources often play a far greater role in achieving
victory than do military resources. This is true at all levels, from overall strategy down to
ground-level tactical decisions. This poses challenges to even the best military leaders since it
requires an understanding and appreciation for the elements of national power other than
military, which are generally not their main areas of expertise. The bottom line is that the
military aspects of low-intensity conflict cannot be separated from the political, social, and
psychological dimensions.  

Of all the challenges leaders face when training to work on interagency teams, several are
particularly noteworthy because they are especially difficult to overcome. First, the lack of a
common lexicon hampers communication in theater and coordination of training efforts. The
tact fact is that representatives of different government agencies do not always mean the same thing
when using the same terminology. For example, the word “counterinsurgency” does not
necessarily mean the same thing to a Foreign Service Officer as it does to an Army officer. The
same applies for commonly used terms like “nation-building,” “security,” “policing,”
“democracy promotion,” and “regime change.” Even the word “terrorism,” used frequently in
the media as well as in support and stability operations and leadership training, is defined
differently by different agencies of the United States government.

A second important problem in training leaders for interagency cooperation is even more
obvious: the lack of a common vision and shared strategic goals. Agencies often train leaders
differently because they seek different ends once in theater in post-conflict environments. All

446 Morelli, 9.
447 Brigadier General Daniel Bolger, interview with author, February 26 (2007). General Bolger has extensive
experience leading interagency teams, including close cooperation and training with Iraqi soldiers during Operation
Iraqi Freedom and in his current post at the Joint Readiness Training Center.
448 Linda Jamison, interview with author, March 22 (2007). Linda Jamison also has a great deal of experience
operating in interagency environments, most notably in her service during peacekeeping operations in the Clinton
agencies have their own interests (especially political interests), and these interests are not always shared by all members of an interagency team. The result is too often a kind of turf battle, or a struggle to carve out which piece of the operation is for which agency, who answers to whom, and who has ultimate authority to make final decisions. While this kind of struggle can involve representatives of many government agencies, it tends to happen the most often between the Department of State and the Department of Defense.\textsuperscript{449} Personalities can end up playing a large role in determining who takes responsibility for various operational aspects, and this is not necessarily the most efficient way of deciding on the best interests of the United States and its allies. Besides pure personality factors, other considerations, such as which agency has the highest-ranking member participating on an interagency team, can determine leadership roles. Whichever agency’s representative is closest to the president may take charge; one’s clout on an interagency team tends to diminish with increasing relative distance from the president.

Though this is how leadership positions are usually determined on interagency teams in post-conflict environments, strong evidence suggests that the process does not have to work this way. During the many interagency efforts in the Clinton years, these kinds of teams often showed deference to field experience rather than proximity to the president in a number of cases.\textsuperscript{450} In Bosnia, for example, US Army and other military personnel often followed the advice or delegated responsibility for important decisions to American civilians or UN officials. This experience holds lessons for present-day US government interagency teams and leadership selection/development.

\textsuperscript{449} Jamison, 2007.
\textsuperscript{450} Jamison, 2007. The best examples of this are in Bosnia and Haiti, when US Army personnel even at the highest levels sometimes deferred to the more experienced Foreign Service Officers or UN peacekeepers in tactical decision making.
A final important problem interagency teams face when delegating tasks and setting priorities is the lack of shared training or educational experience of many team members.\textsuperscript{451} Interagency teams are often created ad hoc, and agency representatives might share little or no common training or related experience. Contrast this with the general practice of the military services, where the preference is to form teams and coordinate the mission \textit{before} deployment. Throughout the interagency process, things are far more individual—Foreign Service Officers, USAID personnel, and others may have shorter individual postings or rotate assignments more frequently. In the State Department, for example, personnel posted to difficult locations (especially those in post-conflict or reconstruction environments) rotate in and out in short periods of time—sometimes as short as three to six months. When one Foreign Service Officer really begins to understand a team’s dynamics and mission goals, he or she might be replaced with someone new as he or she leaves for another post. Leadership is especially challenging when the team is constantly changing and incorporating new faces is part of the routine. A different model would have interagency teams assembled and trained together before deployment.

In today’s efforts at interagency cooperation in support and stability operations, there are two main types of training and education programs: institutional or formal education, and interagency participation in military training programs. The institutional education comes in curricula at the military academies, in ROTC programs in colleges and universities around the country, and in classroom instruction at places like the Federal Executive Institute and the Management Development Centers run by the Office of Personnel Management. Curricula at the military academies and ROTC programs are often designed with the interagency process in mind, and the men and women in them are trained from the beginning to sometimes work on

\textsuperscript{451} Bolger, 2007.
interagency teams. Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) receive similar training for interagency work, but usually only at a higher level (platoon sergeants or higher). OPM’s Management Development Centers offer a broad range of formal instruction and coursework for civilian government leaders, including topics such as Bridging Organizational Cultures, Collaborating Across Organizational Boundaries, Developing High-Performing Teams, and a number of specially-tailored leadership seminars.

Interagency participation in military training programs is another way government organizations prepare leaders for the unique interagency challenges of support and stability operations. This kind of less formal educational instruction happens at a number of military training centers and reserve bases, for example, at the Joint Readiness Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. These programs actually partner military units with other government agencies to train them together, and they exist here in the United States as well as in theater. An example of this kind of program might be an FBI forensics expert visiting a combat training center to help train troops in forensic science before deployment. These interagency training programs are almost exclusively governed and coordinated by the Department of Defense—other agencies rarely do anything similar on a comparable scale. A partial explanation for the Defense Department’s near monopoly on informal interagency leadership training lies in the fact that it simply has the resources and funding to make the programs possible—other agencies often just cannot afford them.

Model Practices in Leadership Development

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Decades of research and theory have created a large body of literature on the topic of leadership development and education. This literature comes from a variety of philosophical backgrounds and academic disciplines, but a large portion of it applies directly to development programs for civilian and military government organizations involved in interagency operations. Army regulations and military doctrine, for example, have proven very useful in providing lessons of how to lead teams and how to develop capable leaders, and these lessons apply to non-military organizations as well. In general, military leadership development is considered a career-long process that involves “professional experience, formal professional training and education, and self-study, assessment, and reflection.” The military generally operates from the assumptions that effective leaders are made, not born, that leadership is a skill set that can be developed over time, and that specific competencies exist essential for effective strategic leadership. Based on these assumptions, the US Army and other military branches have created and revised doctrine that outlines a number of specific institutional requirements for maximizing leadership potential of officers and NCOs.

*Give aspiring leaders early opportunities for varied responsibilities.* Specialization is important, but the best leaders will be trained and feel comfortable leading in a number of different situations and roles. The US Army does this as well or better than most large organizations.

*Have clearly communicated standards for what it means to be a good leader.* This is about having practical guidelines and a well-developed and advertised system of monitoring. The US military tends to do this well, but not in all cases. The corporate world seems to

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455 Fitton, 2.
456 Ulmer.
understand this principle better, in terms of being serious about setting management standards and establishing appropriate style, mentoring, and measuring leadership results.  

Provide feedback often and create a formal mentoring system. The corporate world tends to do this better than the military, by formally pairing junior and senior leaders in mentor-mentee relationships. Also, it takes a great effort to reduce institutional discomfort with providing and accepting feedback. It might be worthwhile for military organizations to create a formal mentoring system—mentoring and coaching have been part of the Army’s strategy for some time, but their use tends to be uneven and localized.

Have a system in place that measures organizational attitudes and climate. This means having a formal system for recording morale, mission focus, clarity of procedures and expectations, effectiveness of communication, trust in leaders, perceived level of discipline, support for initiative and innovation, and fair treatment of all personnel. This is essentially an easy and inexpensive way to monitor employee feelings and attitudes and alert leaders to issues before they become problems. According to many retired and active military officers, the military falls short on this principle compared to the business world.

Train leaders in assessment methods, or in how to judge the effectiveness of other individuals and groups. Neither the army nor large corporations seem to do this very well. Too often, top management assumes that leaders know how to evaluate performance of others when this is not actually the case. This is a more difficult principle to implement, but it is not impossible: the Office of Strategic Services made extensive use of assessment methodology.

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457 Ulmer, 9.
458 Ulmer, 11.
459 Ulmer.
during and after World War II, and today there is an extensive literature on assessing leadership capabilities in personality psychology and related academic disciplines.\textsuperscript{460}

\textit{Use many sources of input for promotion decisions.} The corporate world is far ahead of the US military on implementing this principle. Essentially, this means that the decision for promoting or passing on an officer should not be based exclusively on his supervisor’s assessment—colleagues and subordinates at all levels should have a measure of input as well. In other words, use bottom-up input as well as the standard top-down assessment for promotion decisions. Personality and leadership assessments agree that some leadership traits or characteristics cannot be reliably observed from above; specifically, many aspects of transformational leadership, discussed earlier, are difficult to assess from higher in the organizational hierarchy. Examples include articulating a motivational vision, inspiring teamwork, providing intellectual challenge, treating subordinates as individuals, being open to new ideas, modeling moral behavior, and demonstrating a willingness to subordinate oneself to the mission.\textsuperscript{461}

\textit{Formalize a system that promotes continuous learning.} This principle is one of the most important: too many organizations and government agencies provide initial training and then leave personnel to suffer the consequences of time and memory loss on the important educational aspects of that training. The military—and the US Army in particular—tends to be better about this principle than most large organizations, including those in the corporate world. The Army expresses and then demonstrates a commitment to encouraging education throughout an officer’s military career. Understanding this principle of continuous learning allows an organization to

\textsuperscript{460} See, for example, the work of Gordon Allport, Raymond Cattell, Sam Gosling, and William Ickes, to name a few. These theorists come from a variety of backgrounds, but generally agree that personality and leadership potential can be assessed reasonably accurately, and furthermore that individuals can learn to be more accurate in their assessments.

\textsuperscript{461} Ulmer, 13.
“marshal [its] intellectual and operational resources to facilitate learning from [its] individual and collective experience.”

In many ways, the US military is actually ahead of other public agencies and private sector corporations in terms of developing human resource potential, which is partially explained by the fact that the military has at its disposal larger access to the full range of behavioral, cognitive, and social sciences. Knowledge of these disciplines in the military is somewhat scattered, but vast. To build on these already existing competencies, US military organizations should bear in mind institutional commitments to growing individuals in concern for compassion as well as in operational competence.

Support and stability operations, and any operations in post-conflict environments, necessarily involve the various civilian agencies and not just the military. Developing leaders is a task not limited to the Army, but instead is a goal that must be shared across the spectrum of US government agencies. To be sure, the Army must be involved in the process of defining the nature of the peace, and therefore diplomats, aid workers, and other government civilians must have an awareness and understanding of the military capabilities in any post-conflict situation. This is extremely important, but not always adhered to; soon after the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) took over in post-major conflict Iraq, for example, one senior CPA official observed that:

The civilians in the Coalition generally had no knowledge of military organization, and thus no idea of which parts of the military might either assist them or need to know what they were planning. The civilians didn’t know whom to call.

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462 Ulmer, 16.
463 Ulmer, 16.
464 Morelli, 9.
In order for all to be effective together, civilian government workers must have an understanding of military capabilities beyond the pure application of force. Leadership development programs in civilian agencies should consider how best to integrate political and economic goals with those goals the military works toward, so all aspects of national power are aligned and moving in the same direction. Legislation like that proposed in March 2007 by Senator Daniel Akaka is an excellent example of a step toward coordinating interagency training and efforts in theater. If it becomes law, Senator Akaka’s bill would encourage management and supervisory training for all government agencies—training which today varies across organizations and is inconsistently implemented. The bill would require agencies to provide training during a manager’s initial year on the job and mandatory follow-up training every three years after that.\textsuperscript{466} It would give public sector managers a clearer understanding of leadership roles and responsibilities and re-focus leaders on institutional goals shared across the US government. Furthermore, coordinating leadership training across civilian government agencies would provide excellent opportunities to integrate leaders into joint training programs with military units and other interagency teams. Lawmakers proposed similar legislation in the past, but it foundered in committee—passing the current bill would be a step in the right direction and provide an impetus for integrating goals in Washington and in post-conflict environments abroad.

While the military is ahead of other large organizations in implementing some important principles of leadership development, certain non-military government agencies have their own well-developed competencies that offer lessons to their counterparts in other areas of government. For example, the intelligence community generally communicates best from Washington to the field, and also seems to be most prepared to work closely with interagency

teams. This strength of intelligence agencies is telling, since gathering good intelligence is one of the single most important (and most difficult) aspects of fighting counterinsurgencies or low-intensity conflicts. With the challenges they face, intelligence services’ success could provide important lessons for other government agencies that are less effective in sharing information. The Department of State has developed its own set of core competencies that might be useful for other organizations to learn from. While Foreign Service Officers from the State Department are often stretched thin and lack sufficient numbers in theater, they frequently have regional or functional expertise in particular areas. Other government agency personnel, both military and non-military, could improve performance by recognizing the expertise of their State Department counterparts and trying to combine knowledge to further overall operational goals, both in training programs and in the active operational environment.

Given these model practices in leadership development, all US government organizations participating on interagency teams have opportunities to improve on core competencies and have a more positive impact in support and stability operations environments. Considering the knowledge accumulated in the body of literature on leadership theory, the experiential knowledge of various government agencies, and the problems that the interagency process has experienced in recent years, a number of important steps are possible that could streamline it and improve the overall functioning of the US government in Washington and abroad.

**Applying Leadership Knowledge to the Interagency Process**

First, the interagency process would be significantly strengthened if the US government sought to *develop a common lexicon or vocabulary* on the topic of support and stability operations. Government agencies should collectively decide on some formal definitions for key terms, including:

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To the extent possible, this common lexicon should be developed with participation from the whole spectrum of government agencies involved in overseas operations, it should be formalized, and it should be published and made available to everyone. There are a number of viable alternatives for the problem of who should take responsibility for creating such a formalized shared vocabulary. One possibility is a stronger National Security Council with a new mandate to coordinate this project. This does not mean the NSC would become operational, only that it would have a new and slightly broadened mandate. Another possibility is giving responsibility to a new interagency task force or policy team, created in Washington, given the authority to develop a formalized “dictionary” or list of terminology that would ultimately be used by all agencies participating in support and stability operations, however defined. Either of these options falls short of creating something entirely new or hiring a set of new people—they simply shift resources slightly to reflect changing priorities. Either would be more effective with vocal support from the president.

A second change the US government should make to improve the interagency is to increase the frequency and number of joint training exercises with both military and civilian participants present. There are far too many people in government today who have never heard anything about training people for work on interagency teams; the dearth of interagency training opportunities results in a fundamental lack of knowledge of how one can traverse a professional atmosphere in which he must represent the interests of his agency as well as the mission and the
US government writ large. There are certain programs that exist today that utilize interagency simulations, but they are almost entirely created ad hoc—after problems arise and quick action is necessary—and in theater instead of in the United States. “Institutionalized ad hockery” will not meet today’s security challenges; we need interagency teams that are assembled, trained, and experienced together before deploying overseas. These teams should include representatives from the whole spectrum of government agencies—not just Defense Department, State Department, and USAID, but also the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Commerce, Department of Agriculture, and the US Information Service. All of these agencies have different areas of expertise that can strengthen interagency teams when they face challenging situations. Other agencies should be represented on the teams as necessary.

The training programs that assembled interagency teams experience together must simulate as closely as possible the actual environment that may be encountered in the field, especially when they will be sent to a country with an ongoing counterinsurgency campaign. Simulations are necessary in order for team members to experience what the military calls “reinforcement of competence,” or the learning process that takes place in an officer’s mind during his peacetime training followed by the period of active service. Realistic simulations make the transition to actual dangerous scenarios easier, and once in theater men and women take the step from being a leader in peacetime to a leader in war, what one historian calls a “renewal of competence.” Military and civilian training that simulates the actual predicted reality in theater makes the step from the training situation to the combat (or post-combat)

470 Klaus-Richard Bohme, “The Only War They Had: A Study of Low Level Tactics in the Vietnam War,” The University of Stockholm History Faculty (undated).
environment as small as possible. It is important to offer good training opportunities to all men and women who serve abroad, but it is especially important for those that will serve as leaders and commanders because not only do they have to know and understand their own tasks, but they also must safely command and control the actions of subordinates. These training simulations are also opportunities for the best leaders to practice some of the leadership competencies discussed earlier, for example, the transformational leadership style and the Army’s “Be-Do-Know” framework.

A recent example of when interagency training opportunities were insufficient is in the US experience using Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, especially from 2003 to 2005.471 There was usually no team building for groups except in theater, and there was no standard implemented training regimen for operating in the interagency environment. PRT staffing was sometimes haphazard and did not necessarily match the needs of individual teams, and team members often shared no common understanding of the main goals and challenges of their missions. Some other countries have used a similar model in Afghanistan, with more success. Specifically, German and British PRTs were usually assembled and trained before being deployed to Afghanistan—sometimes as much as six months in advance. Once in theater, these interagency teams were able to draw on common training experience to coordinate tasking and work cooperatively to accomplish their missions.472

It should be noted that while more joint training is very important, it is also usually desirable to have one agency (or even one person) with ultimate authority to make the final call

on tough decisions; joint training for interagency teams does not necessarily suggest that all agencies have an equal amount of decision-making power. To illustrate, one of the main problems with peacekeeping operations (which, like support and stability operations, necessarily involve the interagency) is that more people show up than can contribute to the effort efficiently. In Bosnia in the mid-1990s, for example, UN peacekeepers were joined by a group of American civilians who wanted to teach the Bosnians Spanish as part of the peacekeeping effort.\textsuperscript{473}

Initially, the UN soldiers allowed them to stay and help even though there is simply no reason for Bosnians—whether Muslim, Serb, or Croat—to learn Spanish. This was basically a failure of leadership: some person or group should have used its authority to say no to this group in order to keep the mission focused.

In some ways, the recommendation for increased joint military-civilian training implies “militarizing the interagency,” an idea first suggested by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 in 1997.\textsuperscript{474} However, it does not imply that the military should become completely in charge of interagency operations; rather, it means that the structures and functions of interagency teams should operate more like the military, with a clear chain of command and someone in ultimate command who delineates which agency is responsible for each task in accomplishing the broader mission. It also means creating clearer lines of communication and eliminating structural obstacles to information sharing.

A third recommendation for improving leadership in the interagency is that the US government create a formal, centralized knowledge management system. The problem that this recommendation addresses is the fact that every new presidential administration—at least every

\textsuperscript{473} Jamison, 2007. Jamison was actually present in Bosnia when this group arrived.
eight years in other words—appears to come into office thinking that it faces totally unique challenges and this it is somehow the first administration to ever deal with many of the problems that require interagency cooperation. There is almost never any sense of bringing lessons learned from the past, or looking to previously documented knowledge and literature; each administration tries to “carve its own trail” in counterinsurgency and other interagency challenges.\textsuperscript{475} This adversely affects US support and stability operations as well as peacekeeping operations that the United States participates in. Ironically, there is a body of knowledge out there on things the United States tends to do well, for example recruiting international police as it did in Bosnia and Haiti, versus what other countries that we could partner with do well.\textsuperscript{476} There is also information available that outlines strengths of particular agencies and how their personnel might be used most effectively in particular operations. The problem is that this information is never consolidated or organized in any coherent and meaningful way, so government officials involved in the operations may never know it exists or how to access it, and therefore they cannot use it to train leaders. This is a problem some have labeled “institutional memory loss,” meaning the US government collectively forgets that it has engaged in similar operations in the past and has sometimes been successful. Even if the American government has not been successful, oftentimes some other government (or other agency, or other army) has been successful in the past. The challenge is to organize and institutionalize this knowledge base and experience so that it can be tapped in future operations and used in future leadership education programs.

**Conclusion**

\textsuperscript{475} Linda Jamison, Interview with author, March 22 (2007).
\textsuperscript{476} Jamison, (2007).
In current and future low-intensity conflicts, or counterinsurgency warfare, the United States will only be successful if it is able to utilize all political, economic, and psychological options at its disposal. The challenges of these operations are unique, and require interagency cooperation from the level of small teams in theater all the way up to the highest levels in Washington. The role of the military must be defined based on how the United States can best apply its military capability in synchronization with other elements of national power—we need to build capacity in the military as well as civilian agencies.\textsuperscript{477} So far, we seem to have been most successful at increasing the capabilities of only the military; early after the invasion of Afghanistan, “99.9% of the resources in country were controlled by the Department of Defense.”\textsuperscript{478} Adequately funding the military is essential, but since “the humanitarian space and the battle space overlap,”\textsuperscript{479} overall mission goals are best served by funding civilian agencies as well. Military leaders must coordinate with the country team in order to achieve synchronization of military and political will, especially when it comes to planning and resourcing. Faulty planning in support and stability operations are a national problem, and civilian agencies including State Department and USAID need to be better funded in order to meet challenges they face.

To implement these changes successfully, the United States needs bright, thoughtful, well-trained leaders who understand leadership theory and are motivated to cooperate with representatives of other government agencies in order to bring the full hard and soft power of the

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\item \textsuperscript{477} Senior Official, US Army War College, “The Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations: The Integration and Alignment of Military and Civilian Roles and Missions,” Research Symposium, Texas A&M University, April 5-6 (2007).
\item \textsuperscript{478} Senior Official, Office of the Secretary of Defense, “The Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations: The Integration and Alignment of Military and Civilian Roles and Missions,” Research Symposium, Texas A&M University, April 5-6 (2007). This is an exaggeration used to produce a desired effect on the audience he was speaking to.
\item Robin Dorff, “The Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations: The Integration and Alignment of Military and Civilian Roles and Missions,” Research Symposium, Texas A&M University, April 5-6 (2007).
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United States to bear. In today’s counterinsurgency operations, there is something lacking in the interagency process—perhaps that thing is effective *leadership*. To better prepare leaders of interagency teams, the United States needs a set of standard, coherent leadership training programs and evaluation methods that address three main problems: the lack of a common lexicon across the spectrum of government agencies; insufficient joint training with both military and civilian agencies present; and the lack of a formal knowledge management and knowledge sharing system.

By implementing these changes and coordinating planning and resource allocation, the United States can enjoy greater success in future counterinsurgency and support and stability operations. Some of the most important reforms we need have to do with leadership—how we train and educate people and how we equip them to align civilian and military goals determines how far we are able to further US interests in strategically important areas of the world.

**D. The Influence of Stability Operations on the Army Profession and Public Management**

*Chris Cline*

It can be argued that the Army bares the brunt of stability operations on the ground. This is despite the fact that there exists a deeply rooted cultural bias within the Army profession, embodied by the Army’s officer corps, that traditional combat operations are the Army’s premier mission while stability operations are the responsibility of civilian agencies or specialized units such as civil affairs and military police. The publication of National Security Presidential Directive– 44 (NSPD-44) and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 challenge this traditional mindset and forces the Army profession to confront how it will accept stability operations as a core mission with importance parallels to traditional combat operations and adapt its culture to this new operational dimension. Stability operations are complex and have a large
interagency aspect to them. While the Army plays a vital role, many aspects of stability operations cannot occur without the integration of civilian government leaders. It is the responsibility of civilian leaders, or more specifically public managers in government, to develop and carry out a multitude of programs within stability operations. Recent events in Iraq have demonstrated that U.S. government officials, as public managers, need to reevaluate their methods and practices in light of resource and capability challenges. Achieving success in stability operations may require both the Army officer and public manager to examine what knowledge and skills are necessary along with examining what changes, if any, both groups must make to cultural attitudes, beliefs, or practices.

Understanding what knowledge and skills are essential to operational success requires an examination of the elements comprising the Army profession and public management as well as possible challenges both cultures face. This paper attempts examine these aspects in five sections:

- **Section One** – Examines the practices linking the Army profession and public management in counterinsurgency and nation-building. Their respective cultures are also examined.
- **Section Two** - Looks at the importance of National Security Presidential Directive -44 and Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 as benchmarks for establishing stability operations as a U.S. national security concern and for creating knowledge and skill requirements for the Army profession and public managers.
- **Section Three** - Focuses on the manner in which the Army profession and public management have approached, or should approach, stability operations, including
necessary knowledge and skill sets. This section also contains insights from highly respected leaders in the studies of the Army profession and public management.

- Section Four - Highlights areas of concern and interest for both the Army profession and public management regarding approaches to stability operations, and knowledge and skill development.
- Section Five – Presents findings, recommendations and conclusions.

The Army Profession

The Army’s officer corps embodies what is known as the Army profession. Unfortunately for many officers and those outside the Army, the notion of the Army profession is often misunderstood. What makes the officer corps a profession and what impact does this have on the role and expertise of the Army officer? To develop proficiency in the necessary skill sets required for stability operations, the Army’s officer corps must first understand what it means to be a professional.

Dr. Don Snider, a retired Army colonel and civilian professor at the United States Military Academy, has spearheaded many of the latest studies on the Army profession. According to Snider, the Army can be viewed as a large bureaucratic organization and a profession. He notes that at times the Army’s bureaucratic nature overshadows its commitment to military professionalism. What has led to this overshadowing of professionalism is decades of organizational and bureaucratic concepts gaining prevalence and priority over more professional concepts. This phenomenon has produced an organization focused on efficiency rather than effectiveness, he argues. He advocates a return to an Army where professionalism dominates elements of bureaucracy. To achieve that goal the officer corps must first understand what makes them part of a profession.
In *The System of Professions* (1988), Andrew Abbot outlines four characteristics inherent to a profession: knowledge, tasks, control, and jurisdiction. Knowledge, or more specifically the academic knowledge system of a profession, provides for legitimation, research, and instruction while also providing new treatments, diagnoses, and inferences for the professional.\(^{480}\) Tasks are any problems that are open to expert service and are defined in the profession’s cultural work. Professional controls include schools to train professionals, examinations to test them, licenses that identify them, and a code of ethics that guide how professionals practice their craft as well as informal controls pertaining to the worksite.\(^{481}\) A profession must also claim or assert its dominance over a jurisdiction, the boundaries of knowledge and expertise of the profession. This claim requires professions to ask society to recognize its cognitive structure through exclusive rights with social acceptance and forms of legitimating responses from society.\(^{482}\) Abbott refers to jurisdiction as the link between a profession and its work, and as something which has culture and social structure.\(^{483}\)

**Army Professionalism Defined**

A set of established tasks is essential in considering the Army as a profession. Those tasks can be seen in the components of the Army’s operational concept, full spectrum operations: offense, defense, stability, and civil support.\(^{484}\) This operational concept provides the foundation for all Army doctrine. Based on Abbott’s theory, Snider and his research team drafted what they

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\(^{481}\) Abbott, 79-81.

\(^{482}\) Ibid, 58-61.

\(^{483}\) Ibid, 59.

\(^{484}\) The components of full spectrum operations comes from a document entitled “Doctrine Review” (February 24, 2007) written by the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center At Fort Leavenworth, Kansas which summarizes some of the doctrinal changes reflected in the soon to be published FM 3-0, *Operations: Full Spectrum Operations*. The tasks within each component are listed as: Offense: movement to contact, attack, exploitation, pursuit; Defense: area defense, mobile defense, retrograde; Stability: civil security, civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, support to economic and infrastructure development; Civil support: provide support in response to disaster, support civil law enforcement, provide other support as required.
considered the negotiated jurisdictions of the U.S. military professional (Figure 1). External and internal jurisdictions exist with external jurisdictions primarily serving the Army’s client, American society, and internal jurisdictions serving the profession itself. The four external jurisdictions consist of major combat operations, stability operations, strategic deterrence, and homeland security. The Army sees competition within these jurisdictions from such outside professions as the other military services, other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private contractors.\(^485\)

Developing Army professionals with expert knowledge and expertise comprise the two internal jurisdictions. Four subsets or clusters exist within developing expert knowledge: military-technical, moral-ethical, political-cultural, and human development.\(^486\) Figure 1 shows how these clusters of expert knowledge correspond to the four identities of the Army officer: warrior, leader of character, member of profession, and servant of country. Expert knowledge and expertise are also traits which outside sources try to develop as well. As a result, the Army sees competition within the internal jurisdictions from such sources as Army retirees and private corporations hired for contracting work.\(^487\)


\(^{487}\) Snider, 10-20.
Figure 1 – Negotiated Jurisdictions of American Military Professions

2003 Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study Report

Adapted from Snider, 10-20.
In 2003, the Army released the findings of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study Report. The original mission of the ATLDP was to focus on contributing to the Army’s Transformation Campaign. However, as over 13,500 officers began to provide their input, it became evident that focus was needed on Army leaders themselves. The findings demonstrated that officers failed to fully understand the Army Service Ethic and concepts of officership and professionalism. These findings echoed Snider’s findings. While officers demonstrated strong support for the foundations of Army Service Ethic -- pride in their profession, commitment to the Army and its values, belief in the essential purposes of the military -- these concepts, along with the concepts of officership, proved esoteric to officers since they were neither clearly defined nor reinforced throughout an officer’s career.489

Perhaps an even more important finding was that Army leaders needed the requisite leader competencies to thrive “in a complex environment marked by the challenge of high-intensity combat and the ambiguities inherent in stability operations and support operations.”490 Backed by officer comments, the study found that the Army’s educational experience failed to provide officers with the knowledge and skill sets needed for proficiency in today’s operating environment. The changing operational environment, with the increased requirement for proficiency in full spectrum operations (offense, defense, stability and civil support) showed a number of inadequacies in the officer education system (OES). Officers perceived OES was failing them. The study found that OES did a good job teaching branch technical and tactical skills, but did not sufficiently teach combat support and combat service support officers the basic combat skills necessary for leading and protecting units in full spectrum operations. The study

489 Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army, The (2003); hereafter ATLDP
490 ATLDP.
concluded that while there was increased emphasis on battle command at war within the education system, the Army needed to add stability and support operations to OES. 491

The Role of the Public Manager

Just as many officers are unaware of their responsibilities as members of the Army profession, public managers and interagency officials involved in stability operations also need to understand their roles and responsibilities. The redefining and clarification of Army missions and the requirement for interagency involvement calls not only for the Army profession to understand what knowledge and skills are expected from them, but also for public managers to understand as well. Public managers play an important role in the military bureaucracy, the function of the Army, and the interagency process as a whole. Unfortunately, many in society look upon the bureaucracy as too burdensome and obtuse. Examining the traits of an effective manager will shed light on the professionalism needed within the bureaucracy to improve individual and organizational performance in stability operations as a whole.

An effective public manager, regardless of his or her particular position or responsibility, must possess the temperament and skills to organize, motivate, and direct the actions of others in and out of government towards accomplishing public purposes. Additionally, like managers in the private sector, public managers direct the allocation of scarce resources for achieving specific goals. Being a successful public manager involves comprehending exactly what public management is just as the Army’s officer corps involves understanding what makes the military profession a profession. Public management has three dimensions. Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., a public management professor at Texas A&M University with extensive experience in

491 A summary of findings and conclusions on the officer education system from the ATLDP.
government and academia, outlines these three dimensions as structure, craft, and institution, which translate to “management,” “manager,” and “responsible practice.”

Public management was originally conceived as a structure of governance to provide a means for limiting and overseeing the exercise of state authority by public managers. In terms of structure, public management exhibits the elements of lawful delegation of authority and external control over the exercise of delegated authority. It is the means of striking a balance between capacity and control, which is a controversial aspect of public management. Failing to create this balance often results in failing to achieve public management reform. Tensions often arise when speaking about “making managers manage” through the requirement of formal controls over managerial discretion and “letting managers manage” through holding public managers accountable for their performance instead of adherence to formal rules and procedures.

In recent decades the focus on public management as a craft involving behavioral skills and intellectual ability has increased. Some managers are simply better than others, and performance and effectiveness often reflect whether or not a specific manager possesses the skills appropriate for success in a specific position. Public management literature often characterizes successful public managers as understanding and mastering problems; having imagination; working effectively with interest groups, legislators, and members of the agency; possessing the ability to make effective arguments; and being inclined to act. The idea of craft postulates that public management will be only as effective as public managers are able to master their craft.

The concept of responsibility is significant when identifying public management as a self-regulated institution. As an institution, public management provides a means to achieve a

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494 Ibid, 7.
balance between capacity and control. An institution provides guidance to public managers and allows them to understand the need to practice their craft under a precept of values and ideals. In essence, public institutions establish standards of professionalism.
Managerial Responsibility

Aside from being well-versed in the established directives and governing documents of the current administration, public managers should be students of the U.S. Constitution as well. Unfortunately, many within government do not know some of the basics outlined in the Constitution. Understanding the Constitution and the role that public management plays in government helps the public manager understand their responsibility to government.

What constitutes responsibility in the sphere of public management? In Madison’s Managers, Anthony M. Bertelli and Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. put forth what they consider as four axioms of responsibility, derived from constitutional values and seen in the classical literature of public administration: judgment, balance, rationality, and accountability. These axioms help the
public manager operate within the contexts of the separation of powers, allowing the legislative, executive, and judicial to share powers. According to Bertelli and Lynn, these axioms are not a classification of managerial functions like POSDCORB (planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, budgeting), principles, or qualities of action such as efficiency, effectiveness, professionalism, responsiveness, flexibility, consistency, stability, leadership, probity, candor, competence, efficacy, prudence, and due process. The difference is that judgment, balance, rationality, and accountability are fundamental to constitutional governance through adhering to Madison’s ideal of administrative discretion.

Judgment, synonymous with autonomy and discretion, is considered fundamental to a constitutional scheme in which legislative powers delegate authority to the executive. Public managers must exercise their discretion wisely since it often determines the level of action taken on a matter of public concern. Public managers must also exhibit balance in their decisions to avoid corrupting the constitutional process through acting on behalf of their own self interests or the interests of particular bodies or ideologies. Instead, their goal is to identify and resolve inevitable conflicts among interests. In terms of rationality, Bertelli and Lynn contend that the default position for public managers motivated to fulfill the constitutional scheme should be reasonableness in their actions and decisions. Finally, balanced and rational judgment leads to accountability or responsibility, the “entire purpose of public management as an institution among the separate powers.”

Implications of DoD Directive 3000 and NSPD-44

In December 2005, the White House released a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-44) to address the management of interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and

496 Bertelli and Lynn, 146.
stabilization. In NSPD-44, the President sanctioned the Department of State, specifically the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction, to act as overall coordinator of stability operations and to establish workable relations with all relevant U.S. agencies to “prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.” The Secretary of State is also required to coordinate stabilization efforts with the Secretary of Defense “to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.” Perhaps the most significant element of NSPD-44 is that it acknowledges the importance of stabilization and reconstruction efforts to US national security.

The release of DoD Directive 3000.05 in November 2005 is also significant in that, along with NSPD-44, it affirms stability operations as an element of U.S. national security. Dr. Douglas V. Johnson, II believes this directive could “be one of the most important documents of this decade.” Stability operations, defined by DoD as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States,” is now considered a core U.S. military mission that requires the same priority as combat operations.

Given these policy directives, Army professionals and public managers must understand the importance of stability operations and their roles in establishing the peace that ultimately wins the war. Part of this understanding includes new expectations and outlined tasks. DoD Directive 3000.05 states that stability operations “are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values.” Establishing this order entails providing the local populace

498 NSPD-44.
with security, restoring essential services, and meeting the necessary humanitarian needs as part of the immediate goal. The long-term goal of stability operations is helping the indigenous population develop the capacity for securing essential services, “a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.”

To further develop the immediate and long-term goals, the directive outlines three major tasks:

- Rebuilding “indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment”;
- Reviving or building the private sector, “including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure”; and
- Developing governmental institutions representative of the people.

While DoD Directive 3000.05 acknowledges that many tasks which fall under stability operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals, it makes clear that the U.S. military must be prepared to perform all necessary tasks in the event that civilians are unable to do so. The question then becomes: What skill sets do Army professionals and public managers need to develop to become proficient in stability operations, particularly if the military has to perform them alone?

The Army Profession and Stability Operations

Traditionally, the U.S. military has regarded conventional warfighting as its premier mission. However, the Army’s most recent experiences have demonstrated the need for the profession to embrace stability operations as a core mission. DoD Directive 3000.05 is a landmark document in that it firmly establishes stability operations within the military’s core missions. No longer are the tasks associated with “Phase IV” (post-conflict stability operations)

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501 This paragraph summarizes DoD Directive 3000.05, paragraph 4.2.
502 DoD Directive 3000.05, paragraph 4.3.1.
503 Ibid, paragraph 4.3.2.
504 Ibid, paragraph 4.3.3.
the responsibility of other government agencies and NGOs. The military must no longer be concerned with solely winning the war, but with winning the peace as well. As important as stability missions are, the concept may be a difficult task for many in the Army profession to accept and internalize.

Dr. Lawrence A. Yates, a former specialist in stability operations at the Combat Studies Institute, notes that despite the fact that the Army has participated in more stability operations-type activities than conventional wars since 1789, the institutional Army maintains an emphasis on warfighting.\(^{505}\) As an example, Yates refers to the opening paragraph of FM 3-0, *Operations* (2001), in which it declares, “Fighting and winning the nation’s wars is the foundation of Army service – the Army’s nonnegotiable contract with the American people and its enduring obligation to the nation.”\(^{506}\) He also notes a prevailing attitude that follow-on stability operations are “someone else’s job,” either that of civilian agencies, specialized personnel or units such as civil affairs (CA), military police (MP), engineers, medics, lawyers, and special operations forces (SOF).\(^{507}\)

While maintaining the ability to effectively destroy the enemy’s military capabilities remains crucial and should not be questioned, many officers debate what exactly falls within the boundaries of warfighting and ultimately war-winning. Army participation in post-combat stability operations is common when instability prevents the immediate withdraw of military forces; however, many Army professionals are reluctant to accept and fully embrace stability operations as a core mission. Some of these traditionalists argue that combat troops would lose

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\(^{507}\) Yates, 21-22.
warfighting skills and their warrior ethos if stability operations became a core mission. Any general officer or political leader who seeks to make stability operations a core mission of the military will have to overcome and transform a deep-seated, traditional mindset as to the Army’s proper role, according to Yates.

Yates and Snider agree that the Army’s officer corps should accept stability operations as a core mission and not question whether or not it has a place in the Army’s jurisdiction. That sentiment is now shared by the institutional Army as displayed in the developing doctrine and publications. Post-conflict stability operations are and always have been in the field of the profession’s expert knowledge. As Snider chides, “Shame on us (the Army’s officer corps) for not knowing it.” History has several examples of the Army conducting stability operations: building and securing the frontier’s infrastructure and establishing stability after the Mexican and Civil Wars and post-conflict Germany, Japan and South Korea. Snider believes it is the cultural bias Yates describes which has allowed updated and current doctrine to be ignored and the past lack of emphasis on civil affairs specialists to occur.

Even if the officer corps in its entirety accepts stability operations as a core mission, there is the concern of the Army’s role. Should the Army be completely responsible for operations or subordinate to another agency or interagency task force? More than likely the military will indeed stay and bear the brunt of stability operations because there is a tendency for other agencies not to get involved. Michele Flournoy, former senior advisor in the CSIS International Security Program, explains that when the military is asked “to undertake these kinds of missions

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508 Ibid, 22.
509 Ibid.
510 This paragraph contains the views of Don Snider as he answered why the Army professional should embrace stability operations as a core mission; Answers were given during an interview between Snider and the author (2 March 2007).
511 Yates, 3-14.
without adequate civilian partners, they get stuck with mission creep and no exit strategy….So in the short-term, they have to step into the breech.”⁵¹² According to Snider, if the Army considers itself a profession, then it should be willing to step into the breech and take the lead. Snider believes that the Department of Defense is the only agency funded well enough to carry out operational missions abroad.

Despite the view of Snider and others that the Army profession should be responsible overall, there exists a competing view that perhaps the State Department should take responsibility for a significant part of stability operations. NSPD-44 supports this view and grants the State Department oversight of stability operations. Snider contends, however, that the State Department is responsible for manning embassies and, like other government agencies, is not funded for or capable of leading or taking part in SASO. While the State Department may supply knowledgeable experts on the ground to assist with operations, they should not be expected to carry out the operational aspects of such missions or bear the overall responsibility. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), however, will always be involved since they have the ability to work operationally.⁵¹³

The Public Manager and Stability Operations

Stability operations affect the missions and tasks public managers are going to have to face. As the lessons learned from Iraq indicate, public managers play a significant role in the planning and implementation of personnel management, overall operations, contracting, auditing, and various reconstruction programs to include institution building. Unfortunately,

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⁵¹³ This paragraph is from a phone interview with Don M. Snider conducted on 2 March, 2007. His answer was in response to a question about whether or not an Army profession’s expert knowledge of stability operations would reduce the likelihood of involvement and cooperation from outside organizations such as the State Department, the NGO community, and other government agencies.
many public management mistakes have been receiving most of the attention. Examples include staffing issues such as reported in the *Washington Post* on February 24, 2007. The U.S. government contracted the job of promoting democracy in Diyala, a province northeast of Baghdad, to a Pakistani citizen completely unfamiliar with democracy. Further, the U.S. put Diyala’s Border Patrol commander in charge of the management of reconstruction projects despite his having no reconstruction experience.\(^{514}\)

Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. states, “The best thing to do for stability operations is to believe in stability.”\(^{515}\) This quotation reinforces the need for public managers not only to do their job as it pertains to stability operations, but also to believe in the necessity of post-conflict stability itself. This belief in the mission and its importance is the first step to ensuring successful operations. An administration, agency, or organization which does not take seriously the role of post-conflict stability faces the risk of creating an environment which slides into instability from a lack of resources, sufficient planning, and organization. Once government officials, as public managers, believe in their mission and tasks, they can begin approaching operations with the appropriate management skills.

**Required Knowledge and Skills**

Conducting stability operations is not an easy task and is mired in complexity, involving issues ranging from politics, to extensive networking and effective communications. The Army professional has to consider all the elements involved in stability operations which are not normally considered part of traditional military operations -- political, financial, social, economic, and humanitarian challenges. Professionals have to educate themselves on what is required to effectively carry out the roles and responsibilities expected in such a complex core


\(^{515}\) Lawrence E Lynn, Jr., interview with author, March 7 2007.
mission. No longer can military professionals concern themselves with only combat effectiveness; they must be concerned with the means of delivering stability to a region. In short, the professional needs to learn to think and act in ways that increases the profession’s expertise in stability operations.

**Thinking Like a Strategic Leader**

The path to increasing the required expert knowledge for the Army professional is to begin thinking like a strategic leader. Professionals need to begin by asking themselves, “What knowledge and skills do I not have?” They need to understand the map of expert knowledge and its jurisdictions as it pertains to the profession. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the profession to develop this required knowledge. Also, the Army’s mission and requirements necessitate strategic leaders that can work across boundaries. Fortunately, one can learn how to work across boundaries through self development and institutional development.

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517 For more on expert knowledge refer to Chapter 1 of *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2d Edition.


519 This paragraph is from the Snider interview conducted on 2 March 2007 in reference to a question about how an Army professional should approach stability operations. Snider believes that while the Army War College is making some steps forward regarding training senior officers to work across boundaries, much work is still needed in this area.
## Stability Operations Considerations

### Doctrine
How should doctrine address the distinctions between stability operations conducted during war as opposed to similar operations conducted during peacetime? What principles should apply? How and when should interagency participation be integrated? How should planners integrate available allied forces, peacekeepers, or international police units? What is the best way to incorporate lessons learned from emerging experience and expertise?

### Organization
How should the Army organize itself to best fulfill the tasks associated with stability operations? Is there a possibility for the creation of specialized units? Would multi-tasking existing organizations to perform stability operations in conjunction with combat operations and other tasks prove too much to handle? Should the same command carrying out combat operations be responsible for stability operations? At what organizational level should planning for stability and combat operations take place and should the same or different organizations be responsible? Are soldiers who have just completed combat operations best suited for initial stability operations and providing for public security until the creation of a local police force can take over responsibility? How should other government agencies and service providers such as NGOs, allied forces, and international organizations be factored into planning and execution?

### Training, Leadership, and Education
What additions or modifications must be made to training and leader development systems to produce Army professionals adept at stability operations? Is the training provided at the pre-commissioning and basic training levels adequate for subjecting new soldiers to the realities of both stability operations and warfighting? Are the tasks required for proficiency in stability operations addressed throughout a leader’s career? Are realistic stability operations scenarios played out in the Army’s combat training centers?

### Material
What are the material demands for stability operations? Within the zone of conflict, what are the sources for supplying the basic needs of the population? Which materials provided for unit sustainment can be used to aid stability operations? What local assets will most likely be available to assist? Given the requirement for Army units to exercise restraint and discrimination in potentially hostile environments, are there any material or technological solutions which could provide assistance in such conditions? Can the Army preposition material required for stability operations in theaters of operations? Is there a need for deploying additional support units such as transportation and medical to handle civilian requirements post-conflict?

### Personnel
Do Army personnel systems meet the flexibility and fidelity requirements for identification and assignment of personnel and units needed for stability operations? Is the right mix of individual specialties available to the Army? Do the active forces possess enough personnel ready for immediate deployment? Are specialists in the Reserves such as civil affairs and military police readily available in sufficient numbers for deployment and sustainability over multiple deployments? Does the personnel system track stability operations skills among reserve members along with relevant civilian specialties such as an infantryman with police, local government experience, and construction?

### Table 1 – Five Considerations for Stability Operations by Schadlow, Barry, and Lacquement

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520 Questions developed by Schadlow, Barry, and Lacquement: 258-265.
What should Army professionals consider when thinking about stability operations? DoD Directive 3000.05 states that stability operations “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.”

Nadia Schadlow, Charles Barry, and Richard Lacquement narrow this down to five considerations (See Table 1, previous page) which they believe the Army professional needs to be aware of when incorporating stability operations within the core expert knowledge and practicing professional expertise – doctrine; organization; training, leadership, and education; material, personnel. According to them, stability operations need to be as much a part of the Army professional expertise as warfighting since it is equally essential to winning the war strategically.

Public managers play a crucial role in planning phases and must demonstrate creativity and the ability to think in abstract terms. Public managers need to think of every possible scenario and contingency in an attempt to control events after things have been set in motion. Although Lynn refers to this as “common sense public management,” it is an act that is sometimes overlooked. Lynn cites a time when he was a member of the National Security Council (NSC) Staff during the Vietnam War. Henry Kissinger handed Lynn the war plan for the invasion of Cambodia and told him, “I want to know everything that can go wrong; I want to know everything that has not been thought about or is not being thought about in that plan; I

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521 DoD Directive 3000.05, paragraph 4.1.
want to know everything you can think of that I (Kissinger) should be able to possibly anticipate and help the President anticipate.‖

While he considers that situation a “pretty small scale effort,” Lynn and his staff spent several days going over the plan to think of every possible scenario, such as, refugees, unexpected forces from the North Vietnamese side, reactions from the Cambodians, and reactions from Cambodian allies. Questioning all assumptions in this manner is essential. Any public manager taking part in or contemplating anything remotely similar needs to prepare for eventualities and unintended consequences. The public manager also needs to take action and prepare for these potential worst case scenarios and risks, and to consider and acknowledge scenarios that seem highly likely from outside agencies or sources. This preparedness becomes even more crucial in a dangerous and uncertain world.524

Building a Toolkit

One useful public management tool that is needed in stability operations is the ability to identify the personnel that possess the requisite skills and expertise for success in a particular operation. While the Army has such experts at its disposal, such as civil affairs, most other government agencies such as the State Department do not. For example, while overall responsible for stability operations and for reconstruction teams such as those in Diyala, the State Department has no agronomists, engineers, police officers or technicians at its disposal.525 As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has remarked, “No foreign service in the world has those people.”526

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523 This paragraph contains excerpts from an interview conducted between Dr. Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. and the author on 7 March 2007 at College Station, Texas.
524 Contains excerpts and ideas presented in the Lynn (7 March 2007) interview.
525 Chandrasekaran.
526 Ibid.
The lack of qualified personnel and experts within civilian government agencies opens up the possibility of establishing a new public management strategy of reserve capabilities like the one the Bush administration has proposed and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has recommended.\textsuperscript{527} The question then becomes, “Where does this capability come from and how do we identify such personnel?” Are they part of a permanent establishment dedicated to stability operation missions or are they on a call-up status?\textsuperscript{528} These are not unlike the questions regarding personnel which Schadlow, Barry, and Lacquement address concerning the Army profession. The answer, according to Lynn, is through professional public management.\textsuperscript{529}

The ability to identify and manage personnel is important because personnel management can have a major impact on how operations are carried out. Staffing and manning requirements must place qualified applicants as the highest priority. For stability operations, applicants must have appropriate language skills, experience in post-conflict operations, or expertise in stability-related fields. In addition, there must be a sufficient number of personnel available to carry out the duties and tasks associated with ongoing operations. Such staffing problems are evident in the rebuilding of Iraq where there is a dearth of qualified personnel to carry out the reconstruction efforts.\textsuperscript{530}

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\textsuperscript{528} Several aspects of the reserve force concept are outlined in an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization at the U.S. Department of State presentation entitled, “Building a USG Civilian Reserve for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations” (2006). According to the presentation prepared by Gary Russell, rationale for a civilian reserve include complementing USG civilian agency capacity; cost effectiveness of “just in time” surge capability versus adding permanent USG staff; leveraging U.S. capacity with parallel international and multilateral capacity; reliability and command/control issues associated with contracting networks; the military’s need for a civilian counterpart in order to phase down. Civilian reservists would be specialists in all aspects of governance and recruited from state, local, federal governments as well as the private sector, and able to be deployed within 30 days of call-up and remain in country for up to one year.
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\textsuperscript{529} Lynn interview (7 March 2007).
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\textsuperscript{530} Chandrasekaran.
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In *Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Human Capital Management* (2006), the Special Inspector General declares that personnel management and planning must “clearly identify current and future human capital needs, the number of personnel required to accomplish a specific mission, the specific competencies necessary, and the sources from which skilled personnel can be drawn.”

Public managers must ensure such actions take place. A flipside to such management planning exists which parallels the need for public managers to believe in the mission of stability. Should public managers also be willing to execute their tasks and missions in the environment for which they are planning? For example, part of the lack of qualified personnel in Iraq is attributable to a lack of desire for agency workers to work in a combat zone.

Another important element of stability operations is the need to establish human service programs for the local populace. While primarily a public management task, the Army profession and all interagency officials would benefit from understanding the considerations involved in human service programs. Gordon Chase provides what he considers a framework for thinking about implementation difficulties in establishing these programs. Though this framework was intended mostly for programs in the United States, all interagency officials involved in stability operations should be aware of its elements, especially since they can be transferred to other aspects of stability programs.

According to Chase, the three general sources of implementation difficulties include the operational demands implied by a particular program concept, the nature and availability of the resources required to run the program, and the program manager’s need to share his authority with or retain the support of other bureaucratic and political actors while assembling the...
necessary resources and managing the program. Careful and thorough examination of these three sources of difficulties may help the public manager identify all or most of the problems related to various program implementation. The added dimensions of interagency involvement and potentially hostile operational environments demonstrate why public managers must carefully plan, coordinate, and implement their management programs.

**The Importance of Language and Cross-cultural Savvy**

Some Army professionals argue that the Army “has not been able to provide post-conflict stability sufficient for strategic success in the type of wars it seems destined to face in the coming decades.” If one could narrow success in stability operations along with its interagency implications to two essential skills, what would they be? There should be a set of essential skill sets which one can develop as early as the pre-commissioning phase to aid the junior officer on the ground and help provide the backbone for a successful transition to strategic leader. For instance, Don Snider adamantly recommends all officers possess language proficiency and cross-cultural savvy. These two skills, he believes, will help the Army profession achieve success in the world of stability operations and interagency involvement. Lawrence Lynn believes these two skills are vital to public managers as well.

Cross-cultural savvy is the ability to work across boundaries and understand other cultures. It includes not only the ability to work with non-U.S. militaries, but also the ability to

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533 Gordon Chase. “Implementing a Human Service Program: How Hard Will It Be?” *Public Policy*, 27 (1979): 391. Chase further breaks down the considerations of each program difficulty. The manager should focus on the following dimensions of the program: the people to be served; the nature of the services to be delivered, the likelihood and costliness of distortions and irregularities that may be implicit in the program concept, and the program’s controllability. As for the various resources required, the manager should examine money, personnel, space, and supplies and technical equipment. Bureaucratic and political actors requiring consideration include: the overhead agencies, other line agencies, elected officials in the same government, higher levels of government, private-sector providers, special interest and community groups, and the media.


535 Lynn interview (7 March 2007).
understand cultures beyond one’s organizational, economic, religious, societal, geographical, and political boundaries. Cross-cultural savvy enables members of the Army profession to interact with a variety of actors such as Congress, the media, tribal warlords, members of the diplomatic corps, and NGOs. It allows the officer to work outside of their traditional comfort zone and to do so effectively while being grounded in the values of his or her organization. Cross-cultural savvy is an essential skill for an officer to possess as interagency involvement increases along with foreign interaction from globalization.

Most importantly, cross-cultural savvy can be developed as early as the pre-commissioning phase. Courses in international relations, foreign language, and regional studies, coupled with internships with other agencies and study abroad, help expand one’s worldview and cultural awareness. Institutional schools can provide instruction in interagency issues along with education on specific geographical regions. During the early mid-point of one’s career, a general understanding and awareness of other cultures can be further enhanced with experience on joint or multi-national staffs. Additionally, Congressional internships, graduate school education, overseas tours, training with industry assignments, and fellowships can help educate culturally savvy officers.

Going hand-in-hand with possessing cross-cultural savvy, an officer needs to be able to speak with the local populace in a trustworthy manner. Achieving success in stability operations means the Army professional must have the local populace trust what they are being told. It is simply not enough to have the ability to say a few key words and phrases in the local’s native language. It is not a matter of the local populace understanding what officers are trying to tell

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537 Wong and Snider, 615.
them. It is about speaking and listening in a language with enough proficiency to establish an element of trust between the Army on the ground and the local populace. It is about understanding local concerns. Therefore, foreign language skills are essential to the Army professional.  

Perhaps the best way to establish an officer corps that is proficient in the necessary language skills is to require them for commissioning. Snider believes that language is such an important skill that he recommends that an officer candidate not receive his commission unless he demonstrates at least Level 3 proficiency in a language. The language the officer is proficient in may not be the right language for particular operations; however, that first language provides the foundation for the study of a second, more applicable language. Snider admits that a language requirement for commissioning would produce fewer officers, but in his view it is far more important to produce officers with the ability to communicate in a trustworthy manner than to produce a greater amount with the inability to effectively communicate.

Possessing language proficiency and cross-cultural savvy as the foundation of expert knowledge for stability operations proves highly beneficial to the junior officer. Speaking at a conference on the impact of stability operations upon the armed forces, rear Admiral Richard Cobbold of the Royal United Services Institute remarked that the demands for comprehensive training are higher for stability operations than for warfighting. Unfortunately, training doctrine manuals are unable to address every eventuality because of the diversity of tasks and unexpected nature of the operations. Cobbold adds that this lack of spelled-out instruction for every situation

\[538\] Snider interview (2 March 2007). The importance of language was given as a response to a question regarding whether or not junior officers have the necessary skills sets and expertise to effectively carry out our stability operations.  

\[539\] Snider interview (2 March 2007). Level 3 proficiency corresponds to a rating of Superior by the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL). “Speakers at the Superior level are able to communicate in the language with accuracy and fluency in order to participate fully and effectively in conversations on a variety of topics in formal and informal settings from both concrete and abstract perspectives” (American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages, 1999).
may cause junior officers and non-commissioned officers to draw upon inculcated values gained through education rather than procedures and tactics learned in training. This is where a solid foundation of cultural awareness and communication becomes indispensable.\textsuperscript{540}

Additionally, public managers need to develop a sense of cross-cultural savvy and language proficiency parallel to that of the Army profession. One of the SIGIR recommendations regarding program management in Iraqi reconstruction efforts includes having program managers integrate local populations and practices at all levels of planning and execution.\textsuperscript{541} The SIGIR found that the most successful reconstruction managers in Iraq took the time to understand the local customs and practices. The ability to cross cultural boundaries in the affected country can have a significant impact on project and program success. Of course, obtaining cultural knowledge of an affected country prior to involvement is optimal.

Cross-cultural savvy is beneficial in interagency environments as well. As public managers work with other agencies to accomplish mission tasks, they increasingly need to work outside the boundaries and cultural settings of their resident agencies. Feeling comfortable in and operating within unfamiliar environments enables the manager to be more effective and establish a better communications base with other agencies. There is perhaps a greater need for public managers to possess cross-cultural savvy in the interagency sense than Army officers because of the nature of the public manager’s tasks in general, particularly at the higher levels of government policy making and operations.

**Implications of Stability Operations and Considerations**

**Education and Officer Commissioning Sources**

Snider and Lynn both agree that two crucial skills for operating in a foreign environment are language proficiency and a high level of cultural awareness or cross-cultural savvy. While proposed ways of developing these skills in officers include increased language study at the pre-commissioning level as well as instruction in the social sciences, this development ultimately requires the need to examine the commissioning sources themselves. Looking at the capabilities and nature of the commissioning sources is recommended for further study and will help with the question of developing leaders capable of operating in the post-conflict environment.

One aspect of the commissioning sources requiring assessment includes curriculum. Any curriculum reforms, however, must consider several questions. Do the three commissioning sources (Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), United States Military Academy (USMA), and Officer Candidate School (OCS)) have the ability to establish a curriculum sufficient to meet any proposed language and cultural awareness requirements within the timelines of their programs? Should there be an established academic program of study for the Army profession similar to other professions such as doctors and lawyers? Would an established academic program hinder diversity of backgrounds and knowledge among the officer corps? Should only select academic majors be considered for commission? Would additional requirements be needed for commissioning through OCS? Could future cadets and officer candidates entering a commissioning program be pre-selected for a particular track specialty or branch with applicable curriculum based on a set of pre-existing academic knowledge and skills (based on previous high school curriculum or work experience for example)? Would an increase in commissioning requirements have the effect of additional barriers to entry into the profession and thus create opportunities for new competition?
The location and character of ROTC programs and schools need to be examined as well. Following the Vietnam era, several ROTC programs at elite colleges and universities in the Northeast were discontinued. However, many new programs were established at schools in the South where 49 percent of Army, 41 percent of Air Force, and 41 percent of Navy ROTC programs are located. Many of the new programs in the South were established at state schools where it is more likely that participants come from that particular state or region. The result, as Michael C. Desch contends, is a cadet pool that was predominantly Southern. How does an officer candidate pool composed of a significant number of cadets with a particular regional background affect the cultural awareness of those future officers? Does limited interaction with students from other regions and backgrounds at schools have a significant impact on the cultivation of cross-cultural savvy? Would internships or study abroad experiences be sufficient outside exposure for students at such schools?

There are also civil-military implications that result from the creation of an officer corps which possesses enhanced expertise in stability operations and the requisite skill sets. If the officer corps does not adequately represent the civilian population or reflect the beliefs and values of the American populace, then an officer corps which possesses roughly the same skills and educational background could further broaden the civil-military gap. Such a difference in skills and education may not ultimately matter, but it is an issue which the Army profession should address. It is difficult to say at this point how such changes within the officer corps would affect the values and beliefs of the military; however, such studies will be needed in the future.

Redefining a Culture?

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543 Desch, 295.
Is there a need for public managers to adopt something akin to a “warrior ethos” or redefine the notion of “selfless service” regarding operations in hazardous war-torn regions? Is this too much to ask of civilians? The inability of some agencies to require its managers and experts to take part in overseas operations has created situations that lack insufficient personnel to provide crucial stability related services. Simply put, not many civilian agency officials are quick to volunteer for lengthy tours in the areas where stability operations take place. However, their knowledge and expertise are critical to success and a greater willingness to make personal sacrifices may be helpful to operations.

Also, do public managers need greater operational experience? Should public managers be expected not only to develop cross-cultural savvy and language proficiency, but also spend their early years in operational jobs? Greater operational experience early in a manager’s career may provide a greater appreciation for the managerial planning involved in operations. Should there be a separate class of public managers who possess these skills and operational experience who specialize in stability operations and interagency involvement, an interagency professional? Public management should consider all these questions.

**Contractor Involvement**

One threat to both the Army profession and public management which may arise from stability operations is dependence on contractors and outside government agencies. The skills and resources that contractors and outside agencies bring to stability operations are skills and resources which the Army profession and public managers must control. There will be a need for contactors to provide expertise in specific areas, but a heavy reliance on knowledge that the Army profession and public managers can and should learn needs to be reduced. The Army profession and public managers must ask themselves, “If contractor involvement ceases

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544 Chandrasekaran, AO1.
altogether, would we still have the knowledge and expertise to complete the mission?” If the answer is no, then a problem may exist. However, if contractors must be used, it is best to try and establish contracts and relations among the local populace as the SIGIR recommends.

A factor which impacts on the use of contractors in stability operations and presents a serious challenge to public managers is the deployability of civilian agencies. The SIGIR report on human capital management cites the conclusions of a U.S. Institute of Peace report which made the following statement on the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) experience in Iraq: “Even if planners had correctly anticipated the difficulty of establishing stability and governance in post-war Iraq, there is simply no capacity in U.S. civilian government agencies to mobilize large numbers of the right people quickly.”

Public managers need to find a method for overcoming the manning challenge or the use of contractors will likely increase. Again, a reserve capacity may be the answer, but only if deployability concerns are resolved. The Army’s taking the lead in all aspects of operations may be a possible alternative as well.

**Length of Tours and Continuity**

Length of tours and the desire to maintain continuity is another issue which the Army profession and public managers need to examine. As stability operations progress into timeframes of several years, inappropriate or incongruous tour lengths, particularly among key players, can have a significant impact on establishing proper continuity and making the mission seamless. The recurrent turnover of key personnel proved to be a debilitating factor in the Iraq reconstruction program, according to the SIGIR. This problem is perhaps mostly centered on civilian agencies which do not have standard practices for deployments and lacked established deployment cycles.

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545 SIGIR (February 2006), 30.
546 SIGIR (February 2006), 27.
Active-duty Army units in Afghanistan and Iraq now serve 15 month tours while key Army personnel can serve even longer. However, tour lengths of other military services vary with typically six months for the Navy, four months for the Air Force, and seven months for the Marines. The inconsistent military and civilian tour lengths present coordination problems along with establishing lasting and trustworthy working relationships. An across-the-board minimum tour length could be a consideration. Both groups need to consider this factor in their planning and develop a method and means to overcome it.

NSPD-44 and Army Expertise

The President authorized the Department of State via a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-44) to coordinate all stabilization and reconstruction efforts overseas. How will an Army profession which strives to be the expert in stability operations coexist with the new DoS Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)? If the Army profession establishes itself as the outright expert in operations, then a risk of the military’s undermining NSPD-44 or the State Department’s authority could result. At the very least, significant tension could exist between the Department of State and Department of Defense, particularly during planning and execution phases. How should S/CRS personnel be integrated into military plans and organization? Does the inability of the State Department to provide an adequate number of qualified personnel to regions, such as Iraq, bolster an Army profession’s argument for primacy in stability operations? How would the situation change if S/CRS was adequately funded to carry out its missions? In the end, the agency with the greatest resources available and ability to provide trained experts will likely become the recognized leader.

The Army Taking the Lead?
If government agencies lack the ability to adequately conduct stability operations because of personnel, logistical, or budgetary constraints, then what is the best method to ensure unity of command and overall effectiveness? Would the Army’s taking the lead in stability operations provide a better alternative to the State Department? This would certainly be a practical alternative because it provides an organization, the Army, which has made cultivating expert knowledge in stability operations a priority. Also, the Army is arguably better equipped and organized to handle such operations than other government agencies in terms of personnel, deployability, funding, and overall operational experience. Not only would Army responsibility help with a smoother transition from combat to stability operations, but also it could aid in basic coordination, continuity, and management given the Army’s longer length of tours and ability to assign Army professionals to a particular region based on skills and experience.

Of course, the entire Army profession lacks the necessary expert knowledge of stability operations to make such an alternative possible at this time. Expert knowledge and capabilities from outside agencies are essential and should be promoted. This is where true interagency involvement is required with subject matter experts and teams from agencies and organizations to work with the Army and to integrate all aspects of training, planning, and execution. The Army alone is incapable of handling the multitude of managerial tasks as well. The knowledge and skills of public managers are required and always will be required. Public managers must ensure that they are prepared for stability operations and interagency involvement as well.

Unless other agencies have the ability to restructure their organizational culture towards embracing stability operations and the sacrifices participation in such operations entails such as working in hazardous environments, lengthy tours, and frequent deployments then perhaps the Army should provide overall coordination. DoD Directive 3000.05 already establishes that the
military will be prepared to handle such operations whether or not support from other agencies is available or not. However, there is still the matter of NSPD-44 which grants the Department of State authority to coordinate all matters of stability.

Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion

Stability operations have always been and continue to be part of America’s wartime and peacetime responsibilities. The delicate and complex nature of stability operations requires personnel with the skills and expertise to be successful. Army officers and public managers must realize this fact and develop the knowledge and skills necessary to conduct successful operations. Stability operations are going to be a part of military and government operations whether or not military and government actors prepare for them. Together, Army officers and public managers are going to play vital roles in planning, executing, and learning from stability operations.

In terms of the knowledge and skills most applicable to both the Army profession and public managers, three areas should be examined. Although two different cultures, both the Army profession and public management can benefit greatly from:

1) Thinking like a strategic leader (asking what knowledge and skills do you not have and considering all possible outcomes during planning);
2) Cross-cultural savvy (not just a sense of cultural awareness but the ability to work across boundaries and understand other cultures); and
3) Language proficiency (not simply speaking and having others understand what you are saying, but having the ability to communicate in a trustworthy manner with the local populace).

The need for these three skills comes up several times in various literatures on the Army profession as well as in lessons learned from bad management practices in Iraq. Snider and Lynn mention these three areas in some form or another as essential to Army officers and public managers, respectively.
These skills, at least the foundations of these skills, would best be developed early in careers, during the pre-commissioning phase of Army officers and during the first few years of a public manager’s career. In terms of developing cross-cultural savvy, the most feasible means of accomplishing this within the officer corps is to provide exposure to other cultures through cultural emersion programs, internships, and instruction in history and the social sciences. A set curriculum is probably not the best approach, but a choice of electives in addition to pre-commissioning military science courses may suffice. This approach may help address issues because some colleges and universities which host ROTC programs simply do not have a robust selection of courses to choose from. Cross-cultural savvy within public management may best be achieved through selective assignments for public managers where they are exposed to operational environments and working with other agencies through internships or various interagency missions with incentives for overseas assignments. Self development and self study should be encouraged as well as a means for broadening one’s boundaries and understanding of various cultures.

For Army officers and public managers to better internalize the importance of language, language ability should be tied to career progression and advancement. Higher levels of language proficiency should increase the potential for advancement and promotion. This would be similar to joint experience as a requirement for advancement among senior officers. Higher level public management positions, particularly those with substantial interagency involvement, should also have language proficiency as a prerequisite. This requirement would provide the incentive necessary for Army officers and public managers not only to learn a language but also take the necessary steps to develop and maintain their language speaking and reading ability.
Army officers and public managers must not simply work on developing their ability to think like a strategic leader, their cross-culturalsavvy, or their language proficiency. These individuals need to first realize the importance of and their role in stability operations. The best thing for stability operations is to believe in stability. For Army officers this is most important since it means overcoming a deep-rooted cultural bias in the Army which regards stability operations as “someone else’s job.”

Many in the Army continue to believe that conventional warfighting is the Army’s premier mission. However, the Army’s most recent experiences have demonstrated the need for the profession to embrace stability operations as a core mission, particularly with the publications of DoD Directive 3000.05 and NSPD-44. If the Army’s officer corps considers itself a profession then stability operations becomes part of the Army profession’s expert knowledge and within its professional jurisdiction.

The officer corps must be mindful, however, not to become so overwhelmingly focused on stability operations and miss the mark of winning wars. Warfighting is the Army’s responsibility and it must never forget this fact. While stability operations needs to be accepted as equally important in terms of winning the war, the ability to defeat the nation’s enemies militarily should never be questioned. Maintaining the warrior ethos is a vital part of this responsibility.

Unlike with the Army profession, stability operations are unlikely to produce profound changes within public management in terms of developing knowledge and changing a deep-rooted mindset. Interagency public managers need the ability to adapt to changing environments and instability, but the fundamental aspects of public management do not change. Public managers will need to properly and effectively manage the systems which are in place, ensuring
that they prepare for and address every possible outcome and contingency. As in the case with the development of an effective personnel management tool for identifying personnel with desired skills and placing them where they will be most effective, public managers will need to be creative and forward-thinking. In addition, the nature of stability operations and the possible involvement of other agencies will require public managers to develop their own sense of cross-cultural savvy and be comfortable with not only their own environment, but outside and international environments as well.

For public management officials, other questions require further study. For example, there have been several cases, particularly in Iraq, in which public managers simply did not want to take part in operations within a dangerous environment. This opens up several staffing and manning concerns as outlined in the SIGIR reports. In addition, civilian agencies have difficulty forcing employees to work in such environments and in most cases there are no incentives for a worker to do so. This is where a cultural change may be necessary. Perhaps public managers need to examine the possibility of adopting something akin to a warrior ethos or reexamine their notion of selfless service. Another possibility may be for agencies to place a greater emphasis on having public managers work at the operational level early in their careers, making it a requirement for advancement.

An important factor to success in stability operations is unity of command.\textsuperscript{547} Having the Army take the lead in stability operations with the integration of expertise available from outside services and agencies may be the best means of establishing that unity of command. If the Army profession manages to establish itself as the premier expert in stability operations (which some argue it should if it considers itself as a profession) while other agencies continue to lack the

\textsuperscript{547} James Dobbins, et. al. \textit{America’s Role In Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq}. (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003): xxv.
requisite skills, experience, and operational ability, then the Army profession has no choice but to affirm its statue as the leader in such operations. With the Army, you have an organization already taking steps to become proficient in stability operations. This type of impetus is lacking in several civilian agencies such as the State Department.

Stability operations require an Army profession and public managers who not only understand the importance of stability operations but also their roles and responsibilities within those operations. Education and training programs will require adjustments. Cultural attitudes and beliefs will require examination. In the end, the Army profession and public managers will need to establish long-term development programs tailored to new definitions of warfare and security missions where multiple, diverse players exist. Together, officers and public managers can make a significant impact on America’s success in winning the complete war.
## IV. Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATA</td>
<td>Afghan Transitional Authority</td>
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<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
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<td>CAT</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Team</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>US Central Command</td>
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<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commanders Emergency Response Program</td>
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<td>CFC-A</td>
<td>Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>CHLC</td>
<td>Coalition Humanitarian Cells</td>
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<td>CJCMOTF</td>
<td>Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordinance Disposal</td>
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<td>FIS</td>
<td>Foreign Service Institute</td>
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<td>FSO</td>
<td>Foreign Service Officer</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>JRT</td>
<td>Joint Regional Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoEC</td>
<td>Ministry for Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupational Specialty</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHDACA</td>
<td>Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOP</td>
<td>Psychological Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QIP</td>
<td>Quick Impact Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
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V. Bibliography
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VI. Author Biographies

Katherine Rogers graduated cum laude from Texas A&M University with a B.S. in Mathematics in May 2005. She also earned both University and Foundation Honors distinctions. During her time at Texas A&M, Katherine co-founded the Texas A&M University Orchestra. At the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Katherine studied national security and interned at 21st Century Technologies, a small government contractor with the mission of inserting emerging mathematical technologies into complex problems in the intelligence and military communities. Katherine graduated from the Bush School Masters Program in International Affairs in 2007 and hopes to work in the intelligence community.

Carlos Hernandorena is a 2007 graduate of the Masters Program in International Affairs at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service. He received his B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia in 2002. His work experience includes more than a year working for a large international law firm as a project finance paralegal and office assistant. He has also worked for a summer as a research assistant at GlobalSecurity.org, a web-based think tank that specializes on defense and security issues.

Patrick B. Baetjer is originally from Unionville, Pennsylvania. He worked in the United States Senate before moving to the Center for Strategic and International Studies as a Research Assistant to the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy. Mr. Baetjer’s work focused on the Middle East, especially Iran and Iraq, terrorism, and military force transformation. He assisted in the research and writing of *Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success* by Dr. Anthony Cordesman. Mr. Baetjer is a student in the George Bush School of Government and Public Service received a Master’s Degree in International Affairs in 2007. He received a B.A. in History from Davidson College.

Amanda Smith is a 2007 graduate of the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M with a Master’s Degree in International Affairs. In 2005, she graduated *summa cum laude* from Dickinson State University in Dickinson, North Dakota with a B.A. in Political Science and a B.S. in Psychology. While completing her undergraduate studies she worked as a Bankruptcy and Foreclosure Specialist for Mackoff, Kellogg, Kirby and Kloster, the largest and oldest law firm in western North Dakota and eastern Montana. Amanda is a certified Cecchetti Council of America ballet teacher and hopes to pursue a career in defense policy and national security issues.

Tyson Voelkel is a graduate of the George Bush School of Government and Public Service Master’s Program in International Affairs. Captain Voelkel will serve as an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He served as a company commander in the 82nd Airborne Division on two separate tours to Iraq. Captain Tyson graduated from Texas A&M University with a degree in engineering.

Brian Polley graduated in May 2007 with a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from the George Bush School of Government and Public Service. His area of concentration is national security, with a particular focus on defense policy and military affairs and intelligence as an instrument of statecraft. He worked as an intern at The Scowcroft Group international business
advisory firm in 2006 and currently works as an intern at UBS Financial Services doing capital investment and portfolio management. A 2004 graduate of the University of Texas, Brian hopes to pursue a career in public service as a counterterrorism analyst.

**Chris Cline** is an Army captain who completed a Master’s Degree in International Affairs with a concentration in National Security from the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University in 2007. He received a B.S. degree in 1999 from the United States Military Academy where he majored in American politics. His previous assignments include platoon leader, company executive officer, and battalion S1 in the 51st Signal Battalion (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, NC; team leader in the 22d Mobile Public Affairs Detachment at Fort Bragg; and most recently commander in the 22d Personnel Services Battalion at Fort Lewis, WA where he deployed to Kuwait in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II. Following completion of his M.A., Captain Cline will serve as the Southwest regional commander in the Directorate of Admissions at West Point.
VII. About the Bush School

The Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University educates principled leaders in public and international affairs, conducts research, and performs service. Both the Master of Public Service and Administration (MPSA) and Master’s Program in International Affairs (MPIA) are full-time graduate degree programs that provide a professional education for individuals seeking careers in the public or nonprofit sectors, or for activities in the private sector that have a governmental focus.

The MPSA, a 21-month, 48-credit-hour program, combines 11 courses in public management, policy analysis, economics, and research methods with 5 electives. Students select an elective concentration in one of the following areas: nonprofit organizations; state and local policy and management; natural resources, environment, and technology policy and administration; security, energy, and technology policy; and health policy and management. A professional internship is completed in the first summer session.

The MPIA, a 21-month, 48-credit-hour program, offers tracks in National Security Affairs and International Economics and Development. Students construct a program of study based on two or more concentrations or clusters of related courses such as economic development, diplomacy in world affairs, intelligence in statecraft, national security, or regional studies. Satisfactory completion of a foreign language exam is required to graduate. At the end of their first year of study, students will participate in either an internationally oriented internship or a foreign language immersion course.

The Certificate in Advanced International Affairs (CAIA) program is a focused curriculum offered via distance education or through in-residence study. The program consists of 12-15 credit hours of graduate courses designed for those with limited time but a strong desire to upgrade specific dimensions of international relations. The Certificate in Homeland Security (CHS) program is offered only via distance education and intended for people who need to understand the new security environment as part of their management and supervisory duties. This program requires students to take 15 credit hours of graduate course work centered upon homeland security issues and strategies at all levels of the government and private industry.

For more information on the Bush School please visit: http://bush.tamu.edu/.