to elevate MacArthur to the pinnacle of greatness, it does outline the complex story of military operations in the Southwest Pacific Area during World War II.

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What enables some militaries to perform more effectively on the battlefield than their opponents? More importantly, how and why do some military forces, even when on the verge of defeat, continue to operate efficiently and effectively? This question has vexed military historians for decades. Jasen J. Castillo, an assistant professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, addresses this question in Endurance and War: The National Source of Military Cohesion. His well-written book provides historians, as well as policy makers, military officers, and strategists at all levels, with a new and compelling template through which to examine military effectiveness.

Castillo's objective in this book is to “present a new theory to explain military cohesion while also providing an initial empirical test of the theory’s explanatory power” (p. xii). He employs four case studies designed to test the theory, which he calls “cohesion theory,” and readers should approach the book with this objective in mind. The crux of the argument is that “any large group, including a country’s armed forces, motivates members to sustain collective action by promoting and enforcing norms of unconditional loyalty among its members” (p. 3). The theory presents four types of militaries that emerge when the cohesion theory is applied to nations in wartime: messianic, authoritarian, professional, and apathetic. The author spends the first 40 or so pages outlining his theory and explaining its relevance before launching into the case studies which provide “cohesion theory” with its empirical testing.

Castillo chose to examine the German army in 1944-45, the Red Army in 1941, the French in 1940, North Vietnam between the years 1965-73, and the US army between the years 1968-72. These particular case studies are not designed to present the reader with a new interpretation of events, but rather serve to test cohesion theory's validity. In doing so, he is making a significant contribution to the field of study. While other historians such as Stephen Biddle, Robert Zierkle, and Kenneth Pollack have examined military cohesion, Castillo is the first to present cohesion theory as a tool that can lay claim to assisting strategists and planners in net assessment calculations. In preparing his case studies, Castillo relies on a number of secondary sources, but the nature of his investigation is not such that mining primary sources for previously unpublished material is required in order to demonstrate his particular thesis, or to examine cohesion theory's validity.

Castillo presents a useful and compelling theory that can be used as a template to not only predict whether or not a competitor nation might be able to sustain
military action over the course of an extended campaign, but also to evaluate other historical case studies. One might put the Peloponnesian War armies of Athens and Sparta to the test, or examine the military effectiveness of Napoleon’s army or his adversaries by employing the criteria that Castillo outlines in his book. Additionally, as the author has stated, one can evaluate irregular forces and non-state actors using cohesion theory. Castillo has provided strategists, policy makers and military officers and planners with a valuable tool for conducting in-depth analysis of adversary forces, or of one’s own military forces. His book is exceptionally readable, considering the ambitious task he has set for himself. It is highly recommended for both specialists in the field of military history as well as the general reader.

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This is one in the series of thirty-six “Historical Dictionaries of War, Revolution, and Civil Unrest” under the series editorship of Jon Woronoff, published by Rowman & Littlefield since 1997. Anne Sharp Wells should be well known to SMH members as one of the assistant editors of this journal and as an assistant editor of several volumes of *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, as well as the editor of a 1999 volume in this series *World War II: The War Against Japan*.

The dictionary entries of the volume under review are a valuable source of information about people and places (particularly countries) involved in the European war (1939-45), but including the run-up to the outbreak of hostilities. The emphasis is on politics, policy, and strategy. Particular attention in these entries is given to “fact heavy detail,”—who, what, where, when, rather than analytical analysis. The separate biographical entries tend to feature German, Russian, and British military and political leaders, while information about American commanders is often embedded in entries relating to their contribution to particular operations, such as Dwight Eisenhower and Mark Clark under “Salerno,” or George Patton and Jacob Devers under “Europe, Western: Operations (1943-45).” Regardless, the entries are a quick source of essential information. Moreover, the volume includes useful sketch maps, illustrations, an extensive list of acronyms and abbreviations, a chronology of the war in Europe, list of operational code names, selected statistics, and an extensive bibliography of relevant published sources.

Despite a somewhat hefty price tag, this is a valuable compendium for librarians, archivists, and historians of the period to have at the ready.

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MILITARY HISTORY